State of Indiana v. Ernesto Ruiz , 123 N.E.3d 675 ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                 FILED
    Jun 03 2019, 2:16 pm
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    IN THE
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-336
    State of Indiana,
    Appellant (Plaintiff)
    –v–
    Ernesto Ruiz,
    Appellee (Defendant)
    Argued: February 21, 2019 | Decided: June 3, 2019
    Appeal from the Jackson Circuit Court, No. 36C01-1510-F4-25
    The Honorable Richard W. Poynter, Judge
    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,
    No. 36A01-1712-CR-2999
    Opinion by Chief Justice Rush
    Justices David and Goff concur.
    Justice Massa concurs in result.
    Justice Slaughter dissents, believing transfer should be denied.
    Rush, Chief Justice.
    If police interrogate someone in custody without providing Miranda
    warnings, the person’s interrogated statements are generally inadmissible
    as evidence against that individual in a criminal trial.
    Here, two police officers interrogated Ernesto Ruiz in a secured area at
    a police station, without providing him Miranda warnings. When the State
    tried to use statements Ruiz made during the interrogation as evidence
    against him in a criminal trial, he moved to suppress them as
    inadmissible. The trial court granted the motion.
    The State appealed, arguing suppression was contrary to law because
    Ruiz—although interrogated—was not in custody. Finding substantial,
    probative evidence that he was in custody, we affirm the trial court’s
    decision.
    Facts and Procedural History
    In a small, windowless room in a secured area of the Seymour Police
    Department, two police officers tag-teamed an interrogation of Ernesto
    Ruiz, who had been accused of a crime. Neither officer gave him Miranda
    warnings, and multiple times the officers told Ruiz that he was to “sit
    tight” in the interrogation room.
    Later, the State sought to use a video of the interrogation as evidence
    against Ruiz in a criminal trial. Ruiz moved to suppress it, arguing his
    statements in the video were inadmissible because they were made during
    custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings.
    The trial court heard evidence on the matter: testimony from the two
    officers who interrogated Ruiz, and the audio–video recording of the
    interrogation. The court also heard arguments, which the court considered
    overnight along with relevant caselaw. The next day, the court heard more
    testimony and argument, and then granted Ruiz’s motion to suppress.
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019        Page 2 of 12
    In granting the motion, the court recognized—rightly—that whether
    Ruiz was in custody turns on objective circumstances. 1 It then determined
    that the environment was “a police setting” in which multiple officers
    questioned Ruiz in an accusatory and focused way in a room behind
    several closed doors. The court observed that although Ruiz went to the
    police station on his own, he “had to be buzzed into the area or taken into
    the area of a secure room.” And although the first officer told Ruiz he
    could walk out of the interrogation-room door, the court found that
    statement, in this specific context, would not make a reasonable person
    feel free to leave. The court emphasized that after the second officer later
    entered the room, shut the door, and took on the role of interrogator, Ruiz
    was not told that he could leave or that the first officer’s initial statement
    remained valid.
    The State claimed that it could not proceed without the evidence that
    had been suppressed. For this reason, and since a jury had already been
    empaneled, the court declared a mistrial.
    The State appealed the suppression decision, see Ind. Code § 35-38-4-
    2(5) (2018), and a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the
    interrogation was not custodial, State v. Ruiz, No. 36A01-1712-CR-2999,
    
    2018 WL 3543561
    , at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. July 24, 2018).
    Ruiz petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the Court of
    Appeals decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
    1The trial court also rightly recognized that statements made in coercive settings implicate
    Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution. Ruiz made a similar acknowledgment in his motion to
    suppress, alleging that his rights under the Indiana Constitution were violated alongside his
    federal constitutional rights. But Ruiz did not advance any state constitutional arguments
    separate from those based on the Federal Constitution. While the rights protections of the
    state and federal constitutions often run parallel, they do not always mirror one another
    exactly, and they derive from independent sources of authority. For these reasons, claims
    brought under each charter warrant separate arguments. See, e.g., Litchfield v. State, 
    824 N.E.2d 356
    , 359–64 (Ind. 2005). See generally Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the
    Making of American Constitutional Law (2018). Since Ruiz did not develop any arguments
    separate from those resting on the Federal Constitution, he waived any right to suppression
    on independent state-law grounds. Cf. State v. Timbs, 
    84 N.E.3d 1179
    , 1184 (Ind. 2017), vacated
    & remanded by 
    139 S. Ct. 682
    (2019).
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019                           Page 3 of 12
    Standard of Review
    The State brings this appeal under Indiana Code 35-38-4-2(5), which
    authorizes the State to appeal an order granting a motion to suppress if
    the order ultimately prevents further prosecution of at least one charged
    count. This kind of appeal, we have recognized, is one from a negative
    judgment. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 
    70 N.E.3d 331
    , 334–35 (Ind. 2017); State
    v. Keck, 
    4 N.E.3d 1180
    , 1183 (Ind. 2014); State v. Washington, 
    898 N.E.2d 1200
    , 1202–03 (Ind. 2008); see also State v. Estep, 
    753 N.E.2d 22
    , 24–25, 24 n.5
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Ashley, 
    661 N.E.2d 1208
    , 1211 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1995). A negative judgment is the denial of relief to a party on a claim for
    which that party had the burden of proof. See Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 
    738 N.E.2d 253
    , 258 (Ind. 2000).
    It is true that Ruiz filed the motion to suppress his statements. But no
    matter Ruiz’s burden to support his challenge to the statements’
    admission, 2 the trial court, in granting his motion, necessarily determined
    that the State failed to carry its countervailing burden to prove that the
    statements were admissible. See Colorado v. Connelly, 
    479 U.S. 157
    , 167–69
    (1986); Lego v. Twomey, 
    404 U.S. 477
    , 488–89 (1972). Specifically, since Ruiz
    brings his challenge under the Federal Constitution, the State had to show
    2 See United States v. Artis, No. 5:10-cr-15-01, 
    2010 WL 3767723
    , at *4 & n.2 (D. Vt. Sept. 16,
    2010) (unreported table decision) (observing lack of clarity in and disagreement over the
    burden to establish whether the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation). Compare
    United States v. Jorgensen, 
    871 F.2d 725
    , 729 (8th Cir. 1989) (requiring defendant to show
    custodial interrogation), United States v. Lawrence, Nos. 88-2056, -2086, -2087, -2109, -2135, 
    1989 WL 153161
    , at *5–6 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1989) (unpublished table decision) (requiring defendant
    to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to custodial interrogation),
    United States v. Davis, 
    792 F.2d 1299
    , 1309 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring defendant to prove “that
    he was under arrest or in custody”), and United States v. Peck, 
    17 F. Supp. 3d 1345
    , 1354 (N.D.
    Ga. 2014) (collecting cases), with United States v. Dudley, No. 18-cr-286-WJM, 
    2019 WL 1403115
    ,
    at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2019) (requiring defendant to present “evidence or allegations
    sufficient to support a motion to suppress”), United States v. Miller, 
    382 F. Supp. 2d 350
    , 361–62
    (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (requiring defendant to allege custodial interrogation in the absence of
    Miranda warnings), and United States v. Gilmer, 
    793 F. Supp. 1545
    , 1555 (D. Colo. 1992)
    (requiring defendant to point to some evidence that his statements were made in violation of
    his constitutional rights). See generally United States v. Charles, 
    738 F.2d 686
    , 692 (5th Cir. 1984),
    abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Bengivenga, 
    845 F.2d 593
    , 596–97 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
    banc); United States v. Crocker, 
    510 F.2d 1129
    , 1135 (10th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds by
    United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 
    235 F.3d 505
    , 516 (10th Cir. 2000).
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019                               Page 4 of 12
    by a preponderance of the evidence that Ruiz voluntarily waived his
    Miranda-protected rights before he made the statements. See United States
    v. Charles, 
    738 F.2d 686
    , 696 (5th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by
    United States v. Bengivenga, 
    845 F.2d 593
    , 596–97 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
    United States v. Miller, 
    382 F. Supp. 2d 350
    , 362 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Smith v.
    State, 
    689 N.E.2d 1238
    , 1246 & n.11 (Ind. 1997). The State also bore the
    ultimate burden at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    Taylor v. State, 
    587 N.E.2d 1293
    , 1301 (Ind. 1992).
    So, since the suppression order rested on the State’s failure to carry its
    burden to prove the statements’ admissibility, and that decision precludes
    the State from further prosecuting a criminal charge, which the State had
    the burden to prove, the State appeals from a negative judgment.
    Accordingly, the State must show that the trial court’s decision was
    contrary to law—meaning that the evidence was without conflict and all
    reasonable inferences led to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court.
    See 
    Brown, 70 N.E.3d at 335
    ; State v. McCaa, 
    963 N.E.2d 24
    , 29 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2012), trans. denied. The State cannot make this showing if there is
    substantial, probative evidence supporting the suppression ruling. See
    
    Brown, 70 N.E.3d at 335
    .
    Here, the trial court’s suppression decision was proper if Ruiz was
    under custodial interrogation, which triggers Miranda. Because the State
    admits that Ruiz was under interrogation, we focus our review on the trial
    court’s determination that Ruiz was in custody.
    The custody inquiry is a mixed question of fact and law: the
    circumstances surrounding Ruiz’s interrogation are matters of fact, and
    whether those facts add up to Miranda custody is a question of law. See
    Thompson v. Keohane, 
    516 U.S. 99
    , 112–13 (1995). We defer to the trial
    court’s factual findings, without reweighing the evidence; and we
    consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the suppression ruling.
    State v. Quirk, 
    842 N.E.2d 334
    , 340 (Ind. 2006). But we review de novo the
    legal question of whether the facts amounted to custody. 
    Brown, 70 N.E.3d at 335
    .
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019          Page 5 of 12
    Discussion and Decision
    Under Miranda v. Arizona, if Ruiz was under “custodial interrogation,”
    the police were required to give him certain warnings about his rights,
    and the absence of those warnings precludes the use of his statements to
    prove guilt. 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 444 (1966).
    The State acknowledges that Ruiz was under police interrogation but
    contends that he was not in custody. Custody under Miranda occurs when
    two criteria are met. First, the person’s freedom of movement is curtailed
    to “the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 
    559 U.S. 98
    , 112 (2010) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U.S. 649
    , 655 (1984)).
    And second, the person undergoes “the same inherently coercive
    pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.”
    Howes v. Fields, 
    565 U.S. 499
    , 509 (2012).
    We hold that the State did not carry its burden here to show that the
    trial court’s ruling was contrary to law. The record includes substantial,
    probative evidence of circumstances that, taken altogether, met both
    criteria of Miranda custody. We’ll address each in turn.
    I. The totality of objective circumstances
    surrounding the interrogation would make a
    reasonable person feel not free to end the
    questioning and leave.
    Under Miranda, freedom of movement is curtailed when a reasonable
    person would feel not free to terminate the interrogation and leave. 
    Howes, 565 U.S. at 509
    . This freedom-of-movement inquiry requires a court to
    examine the totality of objective circumstances surrounding the
    interrogation—such as the location, duration, and character of the
    questioning; statements made during the questioning; the number of law-
    enforcement officers present; the extent of police control over the
    environment; the degree of physical restraint; and how the interview
    begins and ends. See id.; Oregon v. Mathiason, 
    429 U.S. 492
    , 493 (1977) (per
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019         Page 6 of 12
    curiam); United States v. Infante, 
    701 F.3d 386
    , 396 (1st Cir. 2012); Sprosty v.
    Buchler, 
    79 F.3d 635
    , 641 (7th Cir. 1996).
    Here, the State argues that Ruiz’s freedom of movement was not
    curtailed and thus he was not in custody. The State points to certain
    evidence in support: Ruiz provided his own transportation to the police
    station; the first interrogating officer told him, “you don’t have to talk to
    me” and “you can get up and walk out that door at any time”; Ruiz sat
    near the unlocked interview-room door and had not been arrested; the
    interrogation lasted less than an hour; and Ruiz left unhindered after it
    was over.
    This evidence does indeed point toward no custody. But substantial,
    probative evidence in the record points in the opposite direction and
    supports the trial court’s suppression ruling.
    To start, the time and place of the interrogation were directed by
    Detective Greg O’Brien, who showed up at Ruiz’s home, informed Ruiz of
    the allegations against him, explained that he “needed to interview” Ruiz,
    and “asked him to come up to the police station.” Importantly, Detective
    O’Brien did not inform Ruiz that any other time or place would suffice for
    the interview. Cf. 
    Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493
    (defendant returned officer’s
    phone calls to set up a meeting, and officer asked defendant where it
    would be convenient to meet).
    Ruiz came to the police station shortly after getting dressed. Detective
    O’Brien then led Ruiz through various sections of the station house: from
    the lobby through a door that required a key fob to enter; into a secured
    area containing the police squad room; “up the elevator and the stairs”;
    through a second keyed door that was propped open; and into a small
    interview room with no windows and a single door, which the officers
    closed for the interrogation. Although he was not handcuffed or locked
    inside the interrogation room, Ruiz was physically and visually cabined to
    the small compartment with officers positioned near the single, shut door.
    Inside the interrogation room, Ruiz was at first alone with Detective
    O’Brien, who began the questioning. But after about thirteen minutes,
    Detective Troy Munson entered, closed the door, and became the primary
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019             Page 7 of 12
    interrogator. At this time, and through the end of the interrogation, the
    police outnumbered Ruiz in the room two-to-one.
    When Detective O’Brien started to question Ruiz, he told Ruiz—a
    single time—that he could walk out “that door.” But the trial court did not
    err in concluding that this statement was not enough to make a reasonable
    person feel free to leave, for three reasons.
    First, the officers told Ruiz to “sit tight” multiple times, belying any
    prior indication that Ruiz was free to go.
    Second, the circuitous path by which Detective O’Brien took Ruiz into
    the interrogation room drew a labyrinthine exit route with many
    obstructions to egress. One of the doors Detective O’Brien led Ruiz
    through required a key fob when heading toward the interrogation room.
    And nobody told Ruiz that it was unlocked going the opposite direction.
    Finally, and most importantly, the police significantly undercut any
    initial message of freedom when they dramatically changed the
    interrogation atmosphere. Shortly after Detective O’Brien began the
    interview, a second officer—whom Ruiz had not yet met—entered the
    interview room; shut the door; and took over as the main, and more
    aggressive, interrogator. In this way, the police completely recast the
    interrogation, subverting the force and applicability of Detective O’Brien’s
    earlier walk-out-that-door statement. And at no point did either officer
    say anything to preserve that statement’s validity.
    Other statements the officers said or omitted, along with the character
    of their questioning, point toward curtailed freedom of movement.
    Detective O’Brien did not tell Ruiz that he didn’t have to respond to other
    detectives who may question him. Nor did the detectives tell Ruiz that he
    wasn’t under arrest; that he could end the interrogation at any time; or
    that he was free to leave once Detective Munson suddenly injected himself
    into the interrogation and began aggressive questioning. Cf. Luna v. State,
    
    788 N.E.2d 832
    , 833 (Ind. 2003) (affirming suppression decision where
    defendant was told multiple times that he did not have to talk to the
    police, that he was not under arrest, and that he was free to leave at any
    time).
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019            Page 8 of 12
    The officers did, however, repeatedly tell Ruiz to explain to them what
    happened, coaxing him to “[t]ell us now so that we know that you’re
    being honest with us and . . . not lying.” The officers were explicit that
    they believed Ruiz had engaged in the accused conduct. And their
    questions were accusatory—not exploratory, like ones to identify suspects
    in the early stages of an investigation. Detective Munson emphasized this
    with deception—saying that the person who made the accusations had
    passed a lie-detector test.
    The questioning was also prolonged, lasting almost an hour. Although
    the length of an interview, alone, does not determine whether a person is
    in custody, the questioning here was sustained and relatively drawn out,
    especially compared to roadside traffic-stop questioning. See Berkemer v.
    McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 437–38 (1984). And the officers continued the
    interrogation past the time they knew Ruiz was supposed to pick up his
    daughter, telling him to “sit tight” until they were satisfied. Indeed, the
    interrogation did not end until after the officers had extracted
    incriminating remarks.
    Altogether, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation add up to
    a situation in which a reasonable person would not feel free to end the
    interrogation and leave. So, the record supports the conclusion that the
    curtailment-of-movement criterion was met.
    As custody turns on the totality of the circumstances, the conditions
    bearing on the curtailment-of-movement inquiry also factor into the
    second custody inquiry: whether the person was subjected to coercive
    pressures that necessitate Miranda safeguards.
    II. The station-house interrogation included the
    coercive pressures that drove Miranda.
    The second custody criterion asks whether the circumstances exert the
    coercive pressures that drove Miranda. 
    Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112
    . When the
    case involves “the paradigm example of interrogating a suspect at a police
    station,” the answer to this question is generally “obvious, in the absence
    of unusual facts.” United States v. Ellison, 
    632 F.3d 727
    , 729 (1st Cir. 2010);
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019           Page 9 of 12
    see 
    Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439
    –40. The answer is less obvious for situations
    outside the classic Miranda station-house paradigm—such as a traffic or
    Terry stop; or questioning individuals in their usual environment, such as
    inmates in prison. 
    Ellison, 632 F.3d at 729
    ; see 
    Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112
    ;
    
    Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439
    –40.
    The State devotes little attention to this specific custody inquiry. But it
    does argue that Ruiz “was never coerced to cooperate in exchange for
    freedom.” We disagree, as the record includes substantial, probative
    evidence to the contrary. And overall, the station-house questioning here
    both resembles the Miranda paradigm and exhibits the coercive pressures
    that Miranda targeted.
    The interrogation here was not brief roadside questioning, see 
    Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439
    , or interrogation in the “low atmospheric pressure” of a
    suspect’s typical surroundings, 
    Ellison, 632 F.3d at 730
    . Rather, it took
    place at the station house in an isolated room—removed from Ruiz’s
    friends, family, and familiar environment, and with multiple officers
    employing various interrogation tactics for almost an hour, trying to
    convince their suspect to incriminate himself.
    The officers also applied multiple layers of subtly coercive forces that,
    together and in the absence of Miranda’s safeguards, would impair their
    suspect’s free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.
    First, after the interrogation began, the officers kept Ruiz “off balance”
    in the already unfamiliar environment. See 
    Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455
    .
    Detective Munson (whom Ruiz had not yet met) entered the room and
    assumed the role of main interrogator, with a more aggressive style than
    that of Detective O’Brien.
    Detective Munson then used subterfuge, lying to Ruiz about the
    accuser having taken a lie-detector test. See 
    id. at 448–57
    (describing
    pressures that create coercion, including use of deceptive stratagems). He
    also counseled Ruiz that the alleged conduct was “not a big deal” but that
    Ruiz would “look bad” if he wasn’t forthcoming about it.
    And the officers intimated that Ruiz’s fate was in their hands. They
    suggested that if Ruiz didn’t talk right then about what he had done, they
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019           Page 10 of 12
    would make things worse for him in the future—because they would
    worry that he wasn’t honest and that he had done “something more” than
    the alleged wrongdoing. See Illinois v. Perkins, 
    496 U.S. 292
    , 297 (1990)
    (“Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may
    create mutually reinforcing pressures that . . . will weaken the suspect’s
    will . . . .”).
    Other pressures piled on. The officers said that they “knew” the
    allegations were true; they engaged in prolonged, persistent, and
    accusatory questioning that focused on encouraging Ruiz to admit to the
    officer’s description of the wrongdoing; and they instructed Ruiz to stay
    put in the interrogation room while the time to pick up his daughter
    passed.
    These types of coercive pressures, applied in a station-house
    interrogation, are precisely what induced Miranda’s warning
    requirements. So, the second custody criterion, like the first, was met.
    It is true that a person is not in custody simply because he is questioned
    at a police station, or because he is an identified suspect, or because he is
    in a coercive environment. See 
    Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495
    . And here, certain
    elements, taken in isolation, may suggest an inference of no custody. But
    custody depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
    interrogation. In this case, the totality of the circumstances, supported by
    substantial, probative evidence in the record, amount to Miranda custody.
    So, the State failed to show that the trial court’s suppression ruling was
    contrary to law.
    Conclusion
    The Fifth Amendment secures a suspect’s right against self-
    incrimination. And to protect this right from the inherently compelling
    pressures of custodial interrogation, Miranda requires police to provide
    certain safeguards. Here, the police did not provide those safeguards to
    Ruiz before interrogating him at the station house.
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019         Page 11 of 12
    Because the totality of objective circumstances evidenced on this record
    supports the trial court’s conclusion that the interrogation was custodial,
    we affirm the suppression of Ruiz’s statements.
    David and Goff, JJ., concur.
    Massa, J., concurs in result.
    Slaughter, J., dissents, believing transfer should be denied.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Attorney General of Indiana
    Henry A. Flores, Jr.
    Laura R. Anderson
    Tyler G. Banks
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Andrew J. Baldwin
    Mark E. Kamish
    Baldwin Kyle & Kamish, P.C.
    Franklin, Indiana
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-336 | June 3, 2019       Page 12 of 12