Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Sega of America, Inc. , 711 F. App'x 986 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    UNILOC USA, INC., UNILOC LUXEMBOURG S.A.,
    Appellants
    v.
    SEGA OF AMERICA, INC., UBISOFT, INC., KOFAX,
    INC., CAMBIUM LEARNING GROUP, INC.,
    Appellees
    ______________________
    2016-2000
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2014-
    01453, IPR2015-01026.
    ______________________
    Decided: October 23, 2017
    ______________________
    DANIEL LUKE GEYSER, Stris & Maher LLP, Los Ange-
    les, CA, argued for appellants. Also represented by
    DOUGLAS D. GEYSER, Dallas, TX.
    ERIC ALLAN BURESH, Erise IP, P.A., Overland Park,
    KS, argued for appellees. Also represented by MICHELLE
    LYONS MARRIOTT.
    ______________________
    2                   UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA and HUGHES,
    Circuit Judges.
    PROST, Chief Judge.
    Appellants Uniloc USA, Inc., and Uniloc Luxembourg
    S.A. (collectively, “Uniloc”) appeal from a final written
    decision from two consolidated inter partes reviews
    (“IPR”) holding that claims 1–20 of 
    U.S. Patent No. 5,490,216
     are unpatentable for being anticipated and
    obvious. In particular, Uniloc argues that the Patent
    Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) erred in its priority
    analysis and that the submitted reference does not dis-
    close certain claim elements. Because we conclude that
    the Board did not commit any legal or factual errors in its
    analysis, we affirm.
    I
    A
    The ’216 patent, entitled “System for Software Regis-
    tration,” is directed to “[a] registration system [that]
    allows digital data or software to run” without restriction,
    “only if an appropriate licensing procedure has been
    followed.” ’216 patent Abstract. An algorithm on the
    user’s computer combines certain user information to
    generate a “local” ID that is unique to the user. 
    Id.
     at col.
    5 ll. 61–67. The same process is duplicated at a registra-
    tion server for the program’s licensor using the same user
    information and algorithm to create a “remote” 
    ID.
     Id. at
    col. 6 ll. 1–8. These two IDs are compared and if they
    match, the program enters a “use mode” where that
    program can be accessed without restrictions. 
    Id.
     at figs.
    2a–2c. If they do not match, the program enters into a
    “demo mode,” in which certain features are disabled. 
    Id.
    at col. 6 ll. 42–52.
    Claim 1 is illustrative:
    UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.               3
    1. A registration system for licensing execution of
    digital data in a use mode, said digital data exe-
    cutable on a platform, said system including
    [a] local licensee unique ID generating means and
    remote licensee unique ID generating means,
    [b] said system further including mode switching
    means operable on said platform which permits
    use of said digital data in said use mode on said
    platform only if a licensee unique ID first gener-
    ated by said local licensee unique ID generating
    means has matched a licensee unique ID subse-
    quently generated by said remote licensee unique
    ID generating means; and
    [c] wherein said remote licensee unique ID gener-
    ating means comprises software executed on a
    platform which includes the [sic] algorithm uti-
    lized by said local licensee unique ID generating
    means to produce said licensee unique 
    ID.
    Id. at col. 13 l. 54–col. 14 l. 1 (emphases added).
    The ’216 patent was filed on September 21, 1993, and
    claims priority to two separate Australian provisional
    patent applications: PL4842 filed September 21, 1992,
    and PL5524 filed October 26, 1992. The ’216 patent
    added certain new matter that was not included in the
    Australian provisionals. It issued on February 6, 1996.
    B
    In a separate case, Uniloc sued Microsoft Corporation
    in 2003 for allegedly infringing the ’216 patent. Uniloc
    USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
    447 F. Supp. 2d 177
    , 180
    (D.R.I. 2006) (“Uniloc I”), vacated in part, 290 F. App’x
    337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Uniloc II”). During that litigation,
    the district court construed the “generating means” term
    pursuant to 
    35 U.S.C. § 112
    , ¶ 6. 
    Id.
     at 190–91. The
    district court found that the term’s function was “to
    4                   UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.
    generate a local or remote licensee unique ID/registration
    key,” and that its structure was “a summation algorithm
    or a summer and equivalents thereof.” 
    Id. at 190
    . In
    deriving the structure, the district court concluded that
    the “only algorithm” in the ’216 patent for generating a
    licensee unique ID is found in the sixth embodiment,
    which states:
    The algorithm, in this embodiment, combines by
    addition the serial number 50 with the software
    product name 64 and customer information 65
    and previous user identification 22 to provide reg-
    istration number 66.
    Uniloc I, 
    447 F. Supp. 2d at 192
     (quoting ’216 patent, col.
    11 ll. 53–56). We remanded that case on other grounds.
    Uniloc II, 290 F. App’x at 344. On appeal from that
    remand, we endorsed the district court’s construction and
    noted that “the summation structure was derived” from
    the sixth embodiment. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
    Corp., 
    632 F.3d 1292
    , 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Uniloc III”).
    It is undisputed that this portion of the specification was
    new matter added in the ’216 patent and was not con-
    tained in either of the Australian provisionals.
    C
    In this case, Appellees Sega of America, Inc., Ubisoft,
    Inc., Kofax, Inc., and Cambium Learning Group, Inc.,
    (collectively, “Appellees”) filed an IPR with the Board
    challenging all claims of the ’216 patent. The Board
    instituted IPR proceedings on all claims and found them
    unpatentable.
    In its final written decision, the Board adopted the
    district court’s construction of the “generating means”
    term from Uniloc I and found that the term encompassed
    the structure of “a summation algorithm or a summer and
    equivalents thereof.” J.A. 8, 10. The Board then analyzed
    whether the Australian provisionals provide written
    UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.                 5
    description support for the “generating means” term by
    reviewing if they “necessarily disclose” or “reasonably
    convey” a “summation algorithm or a summer and equiva-
    lents thereof.” J.A. 13. The Board concluded that the
    provisionals do not disclose this structure and that the
    asserted claims were not entitled to claim priority to those
    provisionals. J.A. 20. The Board then performed a novel-
    ty analysis and determined that claims 1–11 and 17–20
    were anticipated by 
    U.S. Patent No. 5,509,070
     (“Schull”)
    entitled “Method for encouraging purchase of executable
    and non-executable software” and filed on December 15,
    1992. 1
    On appeal, Uniloc challenges the Board’s priority and
    anticipation determinations. In particular, Uniloc argues
    that the Board erred by applying the wrong legal stand-
    ard in its priority analysis. According to Uniloc, the
    provisionals only need to satisfy 
    35 U.S.C. § 112
    , ¶ 1 to
    meet the written description requirement, but the Board
    improperly required that the provisionals satisfy § 112,
    ¶ 6 as well. Uniloc also argues that Schull does not teach
    “generating means” because it fails to disclose a summa-
    tion algorithm. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(4)(A).
    II
    A
    Under pre-AIA 
    35 U.S.C. § 120
    , a patent may claim
    priority to a provisional application so long as the provi-
    sional application satisfies “the first paragraph of section
    112 of this title.” The first paragraph of § 112 requires, in
    relevant part, that “[t]he specification . . . contain a writ-
    ten description of the invention.” A disclosure satisfies
    the written description requirement if it “reasonably
    1  The Board invalidated claims 12–16 on other
    grounds, none of which are challenged here.
    6                   UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.
    conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
    possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing
    date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
    598 F.3d 1336
    , 1351 (2010) (en banc). And “[o]ne shows that one is
    ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention,
    with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it
    obvious.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
    107 F.3d 1565
    ,
    1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
    The claims here are drafted in means-plus-function
    format and their scope is governed by § 112, ¶ 6. Under
    ¶ 6, claimed subject matter may be “expressed as a means
    or step for performing a specified function without the
    recital of structure” but “such claim shall be construed to
    cover the corresponding structure . . . described in the
    specification.” We have previously explained that such
    means-plus-function claim limitations “comprise not only
    the language of the claims, but also the structure corre-
    sponding to that means that is disclosed in the written
    description portion of the specification (and equivalents
    thereof).” Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 
    198 F.3d 1374
    , 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
    Whether a priority document contains sufficient dis-
    closure under § 112, ¶ 1 is a question of law that we
    review de novo. Utter v. Hiraga, 
    845 F.2d 993
    , 998 (Fed.
    Cir. 1988). However, “compliance with the written de-
    scription aspect of that requirement is a question of fact”
    that we review for substantial evidence. 
    Id.
     In conduct-
    ing this inquiry, “[t]he fact finder must determine if one
    skilled in the art, reading the original specification, would
    immediately discern the limitation at issue in the parent.”
    Waldemar Link v. Osteonics Corp., 
    32 F.3d 556
    , 558 (Fed.
    Cir. 1994).
    Uniloc here argues that the Board erred in its priority
    analysis because it did not look for a disclosure that would
    “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the
    inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as
    UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.              7
    of the filing date” in the Australian provisionals. Ariad,
    
    598 F.3d at 1351
    . Instead, Uniloc contends that the
    Board “looked myopically at whether specific structure
    was disclosed in the provisionals,” which “may answer the
    question posed by paragraph six of Section 112, but not
    paragraph one.” Appellants’ Br. 12. We disagree.
    The Board proceeded through the proper analysis for
    determining priority. When determining priority, the
    Board must first construe the relevant claim terms. X2Y
    Attenuators, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
    757 F.3d 1358
    ,
    1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Where the claims have not been
    properly construed, the full scope of the claim is unknown,
    thereby rendering baseless any determination of written
    support in an earlier patent.”). After construing the
    claims, the Board determines if the original disclosure
    “describ[ed] the invention, with all its claimed limita-
    tions,” Lockwood, 
    107 F.3d at 1572
    , to show “possession of
    the claimed subject matter as of the filing date,” Ariad,
    
    598 F.3d at 1351
    .
    Here, the Board first construed the “generating
    means” term as encompassing the function “to generate a
    local or remote licensee unique ID” and the structure “a
    summation algorithm or a summer and equivalents
    thereof.” J.A. 10. As noted earlier, the Board adopted
    this construction from Uniloc I and neither party chal-
    lenges this construction. In construing the “generating
    means” term, the Board also determined that the sixth
    embodiment of the ’216 patent discloses the structure for
    this term. And it is undisputed that this embodiment was
    new matter added to the ’216 patent and was not included
    in the Australian provisionals.
    Even though the Australian provisionals do not in-
    clude the sixth embodiment, the Board reviewed the
    provisionals to determine if they describe the structure in
    a different part of the disclosure. J.A. 13–20. Appellants
    argued, both to the Board and on appeal here, that the
    8                   UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.
    provisionals disclose a summation algorithm by teaching
    that the “registration number algorithm combines infor-
    mation entered by a prospective registered user unique to
    that user with a serial number generated from infor-
    mation provided by the environment in which the soft-
    ware to be protected is to run.” J.A. 199 (emphasis
    added). Uniloc also argues that figure 2B in the provi-
    sionals, shown below, discloses a summation algorithm by
    stating that the “[r]egistration number” is “generated
    from user details added to Serial number.” J.A. 208.
    The Board reviewed these arguments and was unper-
    suaded. We too are not convinced.
    In its final written decision, the Board determined
    that the provisionals’ disclosure of an algorithm that
    “combines information” and of a registration number that
    is “generated from user details added to” the serial num-
    ber is insufficient for one skilled in the art to “immediate-
    ly discern,” Waldemar Link, 
    32 F.3d at 558
    , a summation
    algorithm. J.A. 16–17. This finding is supported by
    substantial evidence. As the Board explained, the Appel-
    lees’ expert testified “that there are a number of different
    ways to combine letters and numbers without mathemati-
    cal addition.” J.A. 18–19. The expert further testified
    that to non-mathematically combine or add information,
    “you could put a code for the different digits and scramble
    them up. You could take portions of each and try to
    create another registration number. You could use differ-
    ent operations in different ways.” J.A. 19. The Board also
    relied on the expert’s testimony that the word “add” does
    UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.              9
    not necessarily mean “sum” because it can also describe
    “adding a redundancy” or “add[ing] a header.” 
    Id.
    Further, figure 2B and the text that Uniloc points to
    in the provisionals is also present in the ’216 patent.
    Specifically, the ’216 patent recites that:
    Preferably, the registration number algorithm
    combines information entered by a prospective
    registered user unique to that user with a serial
    number generated from information provided by
    the environment in which the software to be pro-
    tected is to run (e.g., system clock, last modify
    date, user name).
    ’216 patent col. 4 ll. 6–11 (emphasis added). And, figure
    2b, copied below, states that the “registration no. [is]
    generated from user details added to serial no.”
    Despite these disclosures, the district court found, and we
    confirmed, that only the sixth embodiment of the ’216
    patent provides the structural support for the “generating
    means” term. See Uniloc I, 
    447 F. Supp. 2d at 192
     (noting
    that the “only algorithm specified in the ’216 Patent for
    generating a licensee unique ID is found in the sixth
    embodiment”); Uniloc III, 
    632 F.3d at 1304
     (confirming
    that “the summation structure was derived” from the
    sixth embodiment).
    Accordingly, the Board here proceeded through the
    proper analysis for determining priority by first constru-
    ing the means-plus-functions claims under § 112, ¶ 6, and
    10                   UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.
    then determining if the original disclosure “describ[ed] the
    invention, with all its claimed limitations,” Lockwood, 
    107 F.3d at 1572
    , under § 112, ¶ 1. Because substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s finding that the provision-
    als do not disclose a summation algorithm, we agree with
    the Board that the ’216 patent may not claim priority to
    the Australian provisionals. 2
    B
    Uniloc next argues that even if Schull does predate
    the ’216 patent, Schull does not anticipate the ’216 patent
    because it fails to disclose a “generating means.” As noted
    above, claim 1 of the ’216 patent recites a “local licensee
    unique ID generating means and remote licensee unique
    ID generating means.” The Board construed “generating
    means” as encompassing the function “to generate a local
    or remote licensee unique ID” and the structure “a sum-
    mation algorithm or a summer and equivalents thereof.”
    J.A. 10. Uniloc argues that Schull fails to disclose this
    structure. We disagree.
    Schull discloses a system that allows a user to access
    advanced features of software only with a valid password.
    Schull at Abstract. It describes a password-generating
    algorithm that locally generates a “Passwordable ID” by
    concatenating a Program ID, Feature ID, and Target ID.
    Id. at col. 5 ll. 20–33, col. 7 ll. 10–27, col. 9 ll. 5–9. Schull
    also discloses that the “Passwordable ID” can include two
    digits that constitute a “checksum for the preceding
    digits.” Id. at col. 7 ll. 28–36.
    2  The parties also dispute whether the Australian
    provisionals provide written description support for the
    “mode switching means” term. Because we conclude that
    the provisionals do not provide written description sup-
    port for the “generating means” term, we need not ad-
    dress this alternate argument.
    UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.               11
    The same password-generating algorithm is per-
    formed at a Licensing Processor, and is transmitted to the
    user’s processor and stored. Id. at col. 11 ll. 8–13, 35–40,
    51–54; col. 6 ll. 6–11. A password validation check com-
    pares the generated “Passwordable ID” to the stored
    password and if there is a match, the advanced features of
    the software are unlocked. Id. at col. 5 ll. 40–47.
    In its final written decision, the Board found that
    Schull’s disclosure of concatenating the three IDs as well
    as its disclosure of the two-digit checksum each inde-
    pendently discloses a summation algorithm. J.A. 26–31.
    Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that at
    least the checksum discloses a summation algorithm. We
    accordingly do not reach whether the concatenation also
    discloses a summation algorithm.
    In relevant part, Schull teaches that:
    In addition, to ensure error-checking when the
    Passwordable ID is transmitted to the central
    computer (80), it is desirable that a Passwordable
    ID satisfy some kind of coherence constraint such
    that the misreport of a single digit can be detect-
    ed. One coherence constraint would be to append
    two more digits to the ID which would constitute a
    checksum for the preceding digits. Thus an error
    would be detected when the checksum and the
    preceding digits were inconsistent.
    Id. at col. 7 ll. 28–36. The Board credited Appellees’
    expert’s testimony that “[a]s of 1992, using a checksum to
    detect an error in a number, as described by Schull, was
    done using what is known as a ‘check digit,’ and all of the
    methods for calculating check digits utilize some form of
    addition.” J.A. 30 (internal alterations omitted). The
    Board also relied on Uniloc’s expert’s testimony that most
    checksums use addition and that he had never created a
    checksum that did not use summation. Id.
    12                  UNILOC USA, INC.   v. SEGA OF AMERICA, INC.
    Uniloc argues that the disclosed checksum does not
    perform the function of “generat[ing] a local or remote
    licensee unique ID” because the checksum is appended to
    the ID and therefore is not a part of the ID. Uniloc does
    not cite any expert testimony or other basis for this ar-
    gument. See Appellant’s Br. 46. Because Uniloc’s argu-
    ment was not supported by any evidence, the Board
    properly relied on Appellees’ expert’s testimony and its
    reading of Schull to find that the checksum appended to
    the Passwordable ID became a part of that ID. Uniloc
    also argues that the Board did not give enough weight to
    its expert’s testimony that it is possible to perform a
    checksum using tables instead of addition. Uniloc is
    essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we
    cannot do. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean
    Motor Co., 
    868 F.3d 1013
    , 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
    III
    In sum, we conclude that the Board applied the prop-
    er legal standard in determining the priority date of the
    ’216 patent. We further conclude that the Board’s finding
    that the ’216 patent is not entitled to claim priority to the
    Australian provisionals is supported by substantial evi-
    dence. Finally, we conclude that Schull discloses the
    “generating means” term and therefore anticipates the
    ’216 patent.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the Board is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED