In Re Morgan Stanley v. United States , 417 F. App'x 947 ( 2011 )


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  •           NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    Wnttdr ~tate~ 626 F.3d 1252
     (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re
    Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 
    609 F.3d 1378
     (Fed. Cir. 2010); In
    re Nintendo Co., Ltd., 
    589 F.3d 1194
     (Fed. Cir. 2009); In
    re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 
    587 F.3d 1333
     (Fed. Cir.
    2009); In re Genentech, Inc., 
    566 F.3d 1338
     (Fed. Cir.
    2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 
    551 F.3d 1315
     (Fed. Cir.
    2008).
    This court dealt with similar circumstances in Acer.
    There, the plaintiff and five defendants were headquar-
    tered in the transferee venue and the plaintiff filed suit in
    a venue that had no apparent connection to the cause of
    action. 
    626 F.3d at 1254
    . Under those circumstances,
    this court granted mandamus holding that the large
    number of parties with presence in the transferee forum
    was "an important consideration" and that a denial of
    transfer would require almost every witness to expend
    significant time and cost in order to attend trial. 
    Id. at 1255-56
    .
    Given that the plaintiff and 27 defendants are head-
    quartered in or close by the transferee venue here, these
    cases make an even more compelling showing for transfer.
    Notably, the inventors, patent prosecution attorneys, and
    the defendants' employees with unique knowledge regard-
    ing the accused products reside in or near the transferee
    venue. Meanwhile, no party is headquartered within a
    5                                     IN RE MORGAN STANLEY
    hundred miles of the Eastern District of Texas. In addi-
    tion, Realtime has only vaguely referenced two individu-
    als in that venue having some relevant information to the
    case. Thus, transfer would significantly minimize the
    cost, time, and expense of travel to attend trial, which is
    the very purpose of § 1404(a). See Cont'l Grain Co. v.
    Barge FBL-585, 
    364 U.S. 19
    , 26 (1960).
    B.
    Realtime nevertheless contends that a writ should not
    issue to compel the district court to comply with Acer and
    our prior precedent. In this regard, Realtime asserts that
    the judiciary has an interest in maintaining these cases in
    the Eastern District of Texas because it would eliminate
    the need for a different judge to become educated on the
    patents and technology.
    The interest of justice as a component of a § 1404(a)
    analysis takes into consideration how administration of
    the court system would best be served in deciding a
    transfer motion. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 
    376 U.S. 612
    ,
    625 (1964). Factors considered under an interest of
    justice analysis have traditionally included where the
    litigant is more likely to receive a speedy trial, consolida-
    tion of related litigation, and the ability to have a federal
    judge try a case who is more familiar with the applicable
    state law at issue in diversity actions. See In re Volks-
    wagen of America, Inc., 
    545 F.3d 304
    , 315 (5th Cir. 2008)
    (en banc); see also Coffey V. Van Darn Iron Works, 
    796 F.2d 217
    , 221 (7th Cir. 1986).
    This court twice recently considered and rejected ar-
    guments that the preservation of judicial economy should
    preclude transfer to a far more convenient venue. In
    Zimmer Holdings, the district court denied transfer to a
    more convenient venue because the patentee had a pend-
    IN RE MORGAN STANLEY                                      6
    ing suit in that venue involving one of sixteen patents
    asserted in the two cases. 
    609 F.3d at 1382
    . We held that
    the district court had erroneously prevented transfer
    based solely on that ground because the cases would
    result in significantly different discovery, evidence, pro-
    ceedings, and trial. 
    Id.
    In re Verizon, _ F.3d _, 201O-M956 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
    23, 2011) also involved denial of transfer to a far more
    convenient venue based solely on the district court's prior
    familiarity with the patent. Similar to this case, the
    district court in Verizon denied transfer because it had
    previously issued a claim construction order in a case
    involving the same patent. In granting mandamus to
    direct transfer, we explained that "[t]o interpret § 1404(a)
    to hold that any prior suit involving the same patent can
    override a compelling showing of transfer would be incon-
    sistent with the policies underlying § 1404(a)." Verizon,
    2010-M956 slip op. at 5.
    As the opinions in Zimmer and Verizon indicate, the
    proper administration of justice may be to transfer to the
    far more convenient venue even when the trial court has
    some familiarity with a matter from prior litigation. That
    is the only conclusion that we can draw from the facts
    here. As noted above, 28 parties are located either in or
    close to the transferee venue and no party is located in
    the Eastern District of Texas. Moreover, despite the
    district court's prior familiarity with some of Realtime's
    patents, half of the patents asserted here were not as-
    serted in the prior litigation. Furthermore, there is no
    relation between the prior suit and the financial products
    or services involved in these cases except for data com-
    pression generally. Thus, no matter where the case is
    tried, a court will have to familiarize itself with new
    patents, new subject matter, and new technology. In
    addition, all three related cases will be decided by the
    7                                    IN RE MORGAN STANLEY
    same court upon transfer. Thus, granting transfer will
    not require multiple courts to simultaneously decide the
    same or similar issues.
    Finally, Realtime argues that the court congestion
    factor weighs against transfer. However, we do not
    regard the prospective speed with which this case might
    be brought to trial to be of particular significance in this
    case. Realtime acknowledges that it does not make or sell
    any product that practices the claimed invention. It
    therefore is not in need of a quick resolution of this case
    because its position in the market is threatened. Nor has
    Realtime pointed to any other reason that a more rapid
    disposition of the case would be important enough to be
    assigned significant weight in the transfer analysis.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    The petitions are granted.
    FOR THE COURT
    APR 062011                     /s/ Jan Horbaly
    Date                        Jan Horbaly
    Clerk
    cc: Daniel A. DeVito, Esq.
    Robert A. Cote, Jr., Esq.
    Keith J. Grady, Esq.                             FILED
    I.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    Scott F. Partridge, Esq.                  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
    Rick L. Rambo, Esq.
    David R. Francescani, Esq.                   APR 06 lOll
    Michael M. Murray, Esq.
    Lynn E. Rzonca, Esq.
    James H. Shalek, Esq.
    Benjamin W. Hattenbach, Esq.
    IN RE MORGAN STANLEY                                      8
    Constance S. Huttner, Esq.
    John M. DiMatteo, Esq.
    Brian E. Moran, Esq.
    Clerk, United States District Court For The Eastern
    District Of Texas
    s19