Gadsden Industrial Park, LLC v. United States ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 18-2132   Document: 69    Page: 1     Filed: 04/22/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Cross-Appellant
    ______________________
    2018-2132, 2018-2147
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:10-cv-00757-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G.
    Bruggink.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 22, 2020
    ______________________
    EDWARD LEVICOFF, The Levicoff Law Firm, PC,
    Pittsburgh, PA,   argued  for    plaintiff-appellant.
    KENNETH DINTZER, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC, argued for defendant-cross-appellant.
    Also represented by ERIC JOHN SINGLEY, JOSEPH H. HUNT,
    ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.
    ______________________
    Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 18-2132      Document: 69     Page: 2     Filed: 04/22/2020
    2              GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    This appeal and cross-appeal concern an alleged taking
    by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from
    Gadsden Industrial Park (GIP) of certain steelmaking
    material located on a parcel of real property in Gadsden,
    Alabama. GIP appeals the trial court’s just compensation
    awards, arguing that they should be increased. The
    Government appeals the trial court’s conclusion that GIP
    had a cognizable property interest in certain material the
    EPA recovered from the parcel. For the reasons set forth
    below, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, and vacate-in-
    part.
    BACKGROUND
    This case involves GIP’s takings claim for “slag,”
    “kish,” and “scrap.” The parties do not dispute the trial
    court’s definitions of these terms. Slag, a byproduct of steel
    manufacturing, is “a non-ferrous material that separates
    during smelting.” Gadsden Indus. Park, LLC v. United
    States, 
    138 Fed. Cl. 79
    , 92 (2018) (Decision). Kish is “a
    ferrous byproduct of a blast furnace operation in various
    sizes that has economic value.”
    Id. at 94.
    Scrap refers to
    “metal of various sizes that may or may not be ferrous, but
    that can be either recycled into steel manufacturing or sold
    for other purposes. It is typically finished steel product . . .
    and is thus not a byproduct.”
    Id. at 92.
                                    I
    In 2002, GIP purchased certain real and personal
    property at an auction of a steel mill’s bankruptcy estate,
    as reflected in the bankruptcy trustee’s Bill of Sale. GIP
    specifically omitted some real property from the purchase,
    including a parcel known as the “Eastern Excluded
    Property.” GIP did, however, purchase certain personal
    property located on the Eastern Excluded Property.
    Alabama law governs the contract covering GIP’s asset
    purchase.
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    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES             3
    Relevant to this appeal, the Eastern Excluded Property
    contains two large piles of material, comprising, among
    other things, large quantities of slag, kish, and scrap. At
    the time of GIP’s purchase, each pile occupied more than
    ten acres of land, contained an estimated three to four
    million cubic yards of material, and was more than eighty
    feet high. J.A. 3091 ¶ 4. Each pile was a state-licensed
    industrial landfill. Transcript of Proceedings at 209:10–
    210:13, Gadsden Indus. Park, LLC v. United States,
    No. 10-757 (Fed. Cl. June 26, 2017), ECF No. 169; 1
    J.A. 3091 ¶¶ 2–4, 3106.
    The bankruptcy trustee identified the assets for sale in
    the auction as “[a]ll materials, whether raw materials or
    by-products, situated within the boundaries of the real
    property being sold, including kish and scrap.” 2 J.A. 2586.
    The identified assets included “inventory,” which itself
    included “by[-]products of manufacturing including but not
    limited to kish and miscellaneous other materials and
    assorted scrap.” J.A. 2612. Prior to making its purchase,
    GIP drafted a “Purchaser’s Itemization of Excluded Items
    1   The Court of Federal Claims held a seven-day trial
    in two waves, first from June 26–29, 2017 and then from
    July 26–28, 2017. The transcript of the trial proceedings is
    consecutively paginated across seven volumes, with each
    day corresponding to a separate volume. Transcript of
    Proceedings, Gadsden Indus. Park, LLC v. United States,
    No. 10-757 (Fed. Cl. June 26–29, 2017 & July 26–28, 2017),
    ECF Nos. 169, 171, 173, 175, 178, 180, 182. We hereinafter
    refer to trial testimony by citing the transcript page or
    pages where it appears using “Trial Tr.”
    2 “[T]he real property being sold” refers to all of the
    real property of the steel mill’s bankruptcy estate offered
    for sale to the highest bidder in the bankruptcy auction.
    See J.A. 2581, 2586, 3092 ¶¶ 5–9, 3173 ¶¶ 5–6, 3180–89
    ¶¶ 1,10, 13, 20, 26, 31, 32A.
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    4              GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    from Sale.” J.A. 2639. Relevant here, GIP excluded certain
    items from “inventory”:
    1. With reference to the property identified in
    “ATTACHMENT 5 – INVENTORY,” Purchaser
    excludes:
    A. All miscellaneous other materials.
    B. All by-products of production other than kish
    and 420,000 cubic yards of slag which are located
    on the Excluded Real Property as is described on
    Exhibit B to the deed from Seller to Purchaser of
    even date herewith, together with a reasonable
    period of time to remove such items.
    Id. (emphasis added)
    .
    
         In 2003, the EPA began investigating claims of
    contaminants leaching from the piles on the Eastern
    Excluded Property. Over the course of several years, the
    EPA determined that contaminants from the piles were
    migrating from the Eastern Excluded Property and began
    communicating with GIP regarding ownership and
    environmental remediation issues. At the same time, GIP
    began discussing with Watkins Metal Co. the separation of
    recoverable metals from the Eastern Excluded Property.
    GIP and Watkins drafted, but did not consummate, an
    “Agreement to Process Kish,” which provided that for $70
    per ton of output, Watkins would “separate and screen the
    Kish in order for [GIP] to reclaim and sell the metals in the
    Kish.” J.A. 2861 ¶¶ 3, 5. Under the non-finalized
    agreement, Watkins would have had an exclusive right to
    separate recoverable metals from the piles so long as
    Watkins reclaimed 500 tons of metal per month, in addition
    to the right to withdraw from the agreement should
    recovery become unprofitable. J.A. 2862 ¶ 12.
    In October 2008, the EPA decided to remediate the
    environmental problems on the Eastern Excluded Property
    by having contractors reduce the size of the piles through
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    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES               5
    recovery and sale of saleable material from the piles. Once
    the contractors had extracted saleable material, the EPA
    planned to cap what was left of the piles. 3 From
    October 2009 to February 2013, contractors recovered
    material from the piles, selling 245,890 tons of material for
    about $13.5 million. J.A. 3093–94 ¶¶ 15–16. The EPA and
    its contractors also recovered and used 92,500 cubic yards
    of slag onsite for environmental remediation.          Trial
    Tr. 1367:5–8.
    Mr. Casey, the owner of GIP, testified at trial that prior
    to the start of the EPA’s recovery operation, GIP had
    removed about 15,000 cubic yards of its allotment of slag,
    using some, selling some, and giving some away. Trial
    Tr. 206:17–207:9. As of March 2008, GIP had not removed
    any kish from the Eastern Excluded Property.
    In 2013, the project became unprofitable, and the EPA
    shut it down. At that point, the EPA contractors had
    processed approximately 50% of the material in the piles.
    Ultimately, the EPA contractors spent $14.5 million on the
    recovery operation, about a million more than income from
    sales. Trial Tr. 1242:18–1243:6. The EPA never capped
    the piles. Instead, the EPA “compacted the materials to
    minimize leachate,” leaving further remediation to state
    environmental authorities. J.A. 3086. GIP did not attempt
    its own recovery operation during the EPA’s remediation
    project.
    II
    GIP sued the Government in the United States Court
    of Federal Claims, alleging a Fifth Amendment takings
    3 Capping each pile would involve regrading it to
    allow placement of a clay cap over the entire pile to stop
    hazardous leachate from seeping from the pile. See Trial
    Tr. 640:25–642:25.
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    6              GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    claim for the slag, kish, and scrap 4 recovered from the
    Eastern Excluded Property by the EPA. At trial, GIP
    sought damages of $755,494 for 92,500 cubic yards of slag.
    Applying a fair market value theory, Mr. Gleason, GIP’s
    damages expert, calculated just compensation for the kish
    and scrap taken by the EPA at around either $9.8 million
    or $10.4 million, depending on the geographic market used
    in the calculation. 5 Trial Tr. 1277:10–18.
    Mr. Gleason valued the kish and scrap taken by
    estimating their net present value as of June 4, 2008, the
    date GIP alleges the takings occurred. 6        See Trial
    Tr. 1225:19–1226:7, 1260:24–1261:20. Two elements of
    Mr. Gleason’s damages calculation are relevant here:
    4   The Government contends that GIP “did not allege a
    taking of ‘scrap’—as distinct from the alleged takings of
    ‘kish’ and slag’—until it filed its post-trial brief.” Appellee’s
    Br. 61–62. The Court of Federal Claims considered the
    Government’s position and concluded that GIP’s takings
    claim for scrap was tried by consent. While we see no error
    in the trial court’s conclusion, we need not reach this issue
    because we affirm the trial court’s award of no damages as
    discussed below.
    5 Mr. Gleason also offered a lost profits damages
    theory, which the trial court rejected as “not the
    appropriate measure of just compensation.” 
    Decision, 138 Fed. Cl. at 97
    (citing United States v. Gen. Motors
    Corp., 
    323 U.S. 373
    , 379 (1945)). Addressing the merits,
    the trial court found that “Mr. Gleason’s lost profit
    calculation suffers from many of the same defects
    discussed” with respect to his fair market value calculation
    “due to the unreliable calculation of avoided costs.”
    Id. at 97
    n.5. Our discussion of avoided costs applies equally
    to both of Mr. Gleason’s damages theories.
    6 The Government did not offer a competing date of
    taking at trial.
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    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES             7
    revenue and costs. To calculate revenue, Mr. Gleason
    approximated a June 2008 price for the kish and scrap and
    applied that price to the actual volume of material
    recovered by the EPA contractors. Trial Tr. 1262:7–
    1263:10. Mr. Gleason also estimated GIP’s avoided costs—
    the costs GIP hypothetically would have incurred by
    partnering with Watkins to conduct its own recovery
    operation. See Trial Tr. 1230:4–14, 1242:12–17, 1330:7–
    1331:17. To get a net present value of the kish and scrap
    as of June 4, 2008, Mr. Gleason subtracted avoided costs
    from revenue and applied a discount rate to that number.
    See Trial Tr. 1259:18–1262:15, 1276:4–1277:14.
    To approximate the June 2008 price, Mr. Gleason used
    an industry publication to relate the contractors’ sales
    price to the market price of a comparison metal over the
    course of the EPA’s remediation project.         See Trial
    Tr. 1267:3–1268:11, 1270:11–1271:15. Mr. Gleason then
    applied that relationship to the average market price of the
    comparison metal from April 2008 to June 2008, which
    yielded a price of $483 per ton. Id.; Trial Tr. 1262:20–
    1263:12.     At trial, Mr. Gleason conceded that his
    approximated June 2008 price was “historically . . . a very
    high price” that lasted only “[f]ive or six months” before
    taking a dive. Trial Tr. 1262:20–1264:6, 1265:19–1266:3.
    Overall, Mr. Gleason projected the revenue from a
    June 2008 sale of kish and scrap to be $19,873,418,
    significantly more than the EPA contractors’ $13.5 million
    in revenue. Trial Tr. 1273:17–21; J.A. 3094 ¶ 16.
    To determine GIP’s avoided costs, Mr. Gleason
    assumed that GIP would have consummated its agreement
    with Watkins to process kish for $70 per ton. Trial
    Tr. 1239:24–1240:23. He further relied on a purported oral
    modification to the agreement under which GIP would not
    pay Watkins anything for recovered material that GIP sold
    for less than $70 per ton. Trial Tr. 1247:14–1248:18.
    Because GIP already employed sales and administrative
    personnel, Mr. Gleason assumed that GIP would incur no
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    8              GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    additional administrative, sales, or overhead costs as a
    result of partnering with Watkins. Trial Tr. 1257:12–
    1258:3. He also assumed that the sales price of the
    recovered materials would include freight.            Trial
    Tr. 1256:22–1257:3. Mr. Gleason concluded that GIP’s
    avoided costs were about $4.9 million. Trial Tr. 1258:4–6.
    The Government argued that Mr. Gleason’s fair
    market valuation suffered from at least two flaws. First,
    the Government asserted that Mr. Gleason’s use of the
    historically high June 2008 sales price for all material was
    improper because the material was sold over a longer
    period of time, during which a purchaser would have
    expected the price to fall. Second, the Government
    maintained that Mr. Gleason’s reliance on the Watkins
    agreement to calculate avoided costs was unfounded due to
    critical distinctions between Watkins and the EPA
    contractors. For example, the evidence did not suggest that
    Watkins had a similar processing capacity as the EPA
    contractors, and Watkins had the right to walk away from
    the project if it became unprofitable.
    Following a seven-day trial, the Court of Federal
    Claims concluded that “GIP purchased kish, assorted
    scrap, and 420,000 cubic yards of slag at the bankruptcy
    auction,” that “each material was present on the Eastern
    Excluded Property[,] and that it was used or sold by EPA.”
    
    Decision, 138 Fed. Cl. at 90
    . Additionally, the trial court
    held that the EPA’s remediation project effected a
    compensable taking of GIP’s slag, scrap, and kish.
    Id. Accordingly, the
    trial court awarded GIP $755,494 for the
    EPA’s taking of 92,500 cubic yards of slag.
    Id. at 100.
         Regarding the scrap and kish, however, the Court of
    Federal Claims found that GIP had failed to provide
    “sufficient reliable proof of what a willing buyer would have
    paid for the scrap and kish.”
    Id. First, the
    trial court
    agreed with the Government that Mr. Gleason’s
    “construction of an artificial sales price as of June 2008 for
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    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES            9
    materials sold later was inappropriate,” because a buyer
    would know that it would not instantly recover the value of
    the materials sold and “would be presumed to know that
    the price in June 2008 was abnormally high.”
    Id. at 99.
     Second, the trial court deemed Mr. Gleason’s avoided costs
    calculations flawed at least because they assumed that all
    of the risk in GIP’s hypothetical recovery project “would
    have been borne by Watkins, which, in actuality,
    maintained the right to walk away from the recovery
    operation by the terms of the draft agreement.”
    Id. The trial
    court further criticized GIP’s avoided costs
    calculation, characterizing assumptions drawn from the
    EPA contractors’ records as “highly questionable,” due to
    differences in the EPA contractors’ processing capacity and
    the capacity required of Watkins to maintain exclusivity.
    Id. at 99–100.
    The trial court also concluded that GIP
    would have experienced other costs unaccounted for by
    Mr. Gleason.
    Id. Unable to
    calculate just compensation
    with reasonable certainty, the trial court awarded GIP zero
    damages for the EPA’s taking of GIP’s kish and scrap. See
    id. at 100.
        The Government and GIP appeal. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
    DISCUSSION
    The Government asserts that the Court of Federal
    Claims erred in concluding that the EPA took GIP’s slag.
    For its part, GIP contends that the trial court should have
    awarded just compensation for 405,000 cubic yards of slag
    rather than only 92,500 cubic yards of slag. GIP further
    argues that the trial court erred by awarding GIP no just
    compensation for its kish and scrap after concluding that
    the kish and scrap had value and that the EPA had taken
    them.     We address these arguments in turn, first
    considering the parties’ arguments with respect to slag,
    and then turning to their arguments regarding kish and
    scrap.
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    10             GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    We review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal
    conclusions de novo and its fact findings for clear error.
    Holland v. United States, 
    621 F.3d 1366
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir.
    2010) (citing Cal. Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States,
    
    245 F.3d 1342
    , 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). A fact finding is
    “clearly erroneous” when “the reviewing court on the entire
    evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been committed.” Am. Pelagic Fishing
    Co. v. United States, 
    379 F.3d 1363
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
    (quoting Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States,
    
    239 F.3d 1374
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
    I
    The Government asserts that the trial court erred in
    holding that GIP had proven the requisite property
    interest to establish a takings claim for slag. “Whether a
    taking under the Fifth Amendment has occurred is a
    question     of   law    with     factual   underpinnings.”
    Cary v. United States, 
    552 F.3d 1373
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
    (citing Alves v. United States, 
    133 F.3d 1454
    , 1456
    (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The plaintiff in a takings case bears the
    burden to demonstrate a protectable property interest. See
    Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States, 
    561 F.3d 1361
    , 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    According to the Government, the Court of Federal
    Claims erred when it concluded “that the Government took
    [GIP’s] slag—as differentiated from the tons of slag that
    remain on th[e] property.” Cross-Appellant’s Br. 32. GIP
    does not dispute that following completion of the EPA’s
    remediation project, slag remains on the Eastern Excluded
    Property. Instead, GIP responds that the presence of slag
    is “irrelevant to whether a taking occurred,” because the
    EPA “embalm[ed] permanently” all remaining materials at
    the conclusion of its remediation project, thereby
    preventing GIP from recovering its full allotment of slag.
    Appellant’s Resp. Br. 32, 35 (quoting 
    Decision, 138 Fed. Cl. at 96
    ).      Accordingly, GIP seeks increased just
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    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES             11
    compensation to account for 405,000 cubic yards of slag—
    the amount remaining in GIP’s allotment when the EPA’s
    remediation project began.       We agree with the
    Government.
    GIP has not demonstrated that the EPA’s presence and
    operations on the Eastern Excluded Property intruded on
    any of GIP’s property rights to slag. GIP specifically
    excluded from its purchase “[a]ll by-products of production
    other than kish and 420,000 cubic yards of slag.” J.A. 2639.
    As a matter of law, the Exclusion List that GIP itself
    drafted conveyed title to GIP in 420,000 undifferentiated
    cubic yards of slag on the Eastern Excluded Property. See
    Wheeler v. First Ala. Bank of Birmingham, 
    364 So. 2d 1190
    , 1194 (Ala. 1978) (“The construction of a written
    document is a function of the court. If the document is
    unambiguous, its construction and legal effect is a question
    of law.” (citations omitted)). As GIP concedes, slag is
    fungible, and the Bill of Sale included no limitations that
    would restrict GIP’s 420,000 cubic yards of slag to any
    particular subset of the whole of the slag on the Eastern
    Excluded Property. Appellant’s Resp. Br. 24. Nothing in
    the Bill of Sale granted GIP first rights to mine slag from
    the piles, the right to exclude others from the Eastern
    Excluded Property, or any other property right that the
    EPA could take by merely temporarily excluding GIP from
    the Eastern Excluded Property. Indeed, GIP repudiates
    any notion that the Bill of Sale granted it the right to mine
    the piles,
    id. at 1–3,
    and GIP specifically excluded the
    Eastern Excluded Property parcel from its purchase of real
    property, J.A. 3092 ¶ 8. GIP was entitled to no more than
    420,000 cubic yards of slag, and the evidence
    overwhelmingly indicates that even after the EPA’s
    remediation project, sufficient slag remained on the
    Eastern Excluded Property for GIP to recover its full
    allotment.     See Trial Tr. 545:3–24, 1365:12–1366:1;
    J.A. 3091 ¶ 4.
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    12             GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    GIP argues that the EPA prevented it from recovering
    its full allotment of slag because, as the trial court found,
    the EPA “embalm[ed] permanently” all material remaining
    in the Eastern Excluded Property piles after concluding its
    recovery operation. Appellant’s Resp. Br. 35 (quoting
    
    Decision, 138 Fed. Cl. at 96
    ). On this record, however, the
    trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous.
    The Court of Federal Claims did not cite any evidence
    to support its finding that the remaining material was
    “embalm[ed] permanently.”
    Id. Indeed, the
    trial court
    elsewhere noted that the EPA had not capped 7 the piles
    after concluding its recovery operation.
    Id. at 90.
    Nor did
    GIP cite any evidence to support the trial court’s finding
    that materials were “embalm[ed] permanently.” During
    oral argument, counsel for GIP pointed to Mr. Casey’s
    testimony that when the EPA contractors left the site, the
    slag on the Eastern Excluded Property was “mixed with
    trash and therefore is unusable.” Oral Arg. at 5:03–37,
    30:44–31:01 (citing J.A. 265–66). In the same discussion,
    however, Mr. Casey admitted that at the time of purchase,
    the piles were “industrial landfills” into which the
    bankrupt steel mill had deposited “about ten different
    types of trash.” Trial Tr. 209:20–210:13. He further
    testified that during the EPA’s recovery operation, the EPA
    “took the slag and put it over with the trash that they
    weren’t using from the north and south pile.”
    Id. Therefore, the
    trial court’s finding that the slag was
    unusable after the EPA’s remediation project is belied by
    the record.
    7 During oral        argument,   counsel   for  GIP
    acknowledged that the EPA never capped the piles. Oral
    Arg. at 6:50–7:18, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov
    /default.aspx?fl=2018-2132.mp3. Counsel interpreted the
    trial court’s use of the phrase “embalm[ed]” to mean that
    the material was “unusable.”
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    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES               13
    GIP’s argument that the finding was supported by the
    trial judge’s firsthand observations during a site visit is
    easily disposed of. Appellant’s Resp. Br. 7, 35. The trial
    court’s opinion does not mention any site visit, let alone
    rely on a site visit to support its finding that materials were
    “embalm[ed] permanently.” The only discussions of a site
    visit during trial do not mention “embalmed” material and
    instead support the notion that recoverable material
    remains on the Eastern Excluded Property. See, e.g., Trial
    Tr. 1092:24–1093:4 (trial judge noting “[t]he piles have
    been gone through since [the EPA contractors] left, and yet
    what’s left seems to be a lot of ferrous kind of material
    that’s magnetic”); Trial Tr. 1170:24–1173:15 (noting site
    visit observation of leachate on the south Eastern Excluded
    Property pile, and trial judge’s observation that the EPA’s
    leftover material on a third pile was still adhering to a
    magnet).
    Additional witness testimony further supports the
    notion that after the conclusion of the EPA’s remediation
    project, the Eastern Excluded Property piles contained
    recoverable material.     For example, Mr. Brady, who
    worked on the Eastern Excluded Property piles as a site
    manager for an EPA contractor, testified that he was sure
    that metal and a significant amount of slag remain in the
    piles following the conclusion of the EPA’s remediation
    project, and that he did not know of anything that would
    prevent a party “willing to make the investment” from
    “mining the rest of the material” in the piles. Trial
    Tr. 1008:9–22.    And a project manager for an EPA
    contractor who worked on the Eastern Excluded Property
    when the EPA began winding down its recovery operation
    testified that at the end of the project, the EPA “just
    ensur[ed] that the piles were rounded and that runoff
    would go into the ditch.” Trial Tr. 894:1–12. We find no
    record support for the trial court’s finding that material
    was “embalm[ed] permanently” at the conclusion of the
    EPA’s project.
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    14             GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    Because GIP has no claim to any particular subset of
    slag on the Eastern Excluded Property and the trial court
    erred in finding that the EPA somehow prevented GIP
    from recovering its full allotment of slag, GIP cannot
    establish a cognizable property interest in the slag that the
    EPA recovered. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s
    award of damages for 92,500 cubic yards of slag.
    II
    Regarding kish and scrap, GIP argues that the trial
    court “was duty-bound to fashion an appropriate damage
    award,” and “had no discretion to award zero damages as
    just compensation” after it found that the kish and scrap
    the EPA recovered had value. 8 Appellant’s Br. 38–40. But
    “[o]nce a taking has been established, it is the
    [property ]owner who bears the burden of proving an actual
    loss has occurred.” Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States,
    
    779 F.3d 1315
    , 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Bd. of Cnty.
    Supervisors of Prince William Cnty. v. United States,
    
    276 F.3d 1359
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “To carry its burden,
    the [property ]owner must show actual damages ‘with
    reasonable certain[t]y,’ which ‘requires more than a guess,
    but less than absolute exactness.’”
    Id. (quoting Precision
     Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 
    596 F.3d 817
    , 833
    (Fed. Cir. 2010)). We hold that the trial court in a takings
    case is not obligated to fashion its own award when a
    plaintiff has not provided evidence sufficient to determine
    just compensation with reasonable certainty.
    We find no takings cases—nor does GIP cite any—
    supporting the notion that the trial court must fashion its
    8 We agree with the trial court that GIP had a
    cognizable property interest in all of the kish and scrap on
    the Eastern Excluded Property. The Bill of Sale did not
    limit the amounts of kish and scrap that GIP purchased.
    J.A. 2586, 2612, 2639.
    Case: 18-2132    Document: 69     Page: 15    Filed: 04/22/2020
    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES             15
    own award in the absence of evidence sufficient to
    determine an appropriate measure of just compensation
    with reasonable certainty. The cases identified by GIP
    merely stand for the proposition that the trial court has the
    discretion to make its own findings on damages rather than
    adopting in full either party’s damages theory.
    GIP relies on Whitney Benefits, which cites Almota
    Farmers for the proposition that “[w]hen private property
    is taken for a public purpose, the Constitution requires the
    taker to pay the owner ‘just compensation’ and imposes on
    the court the duty of determining what compensation is
    just.” Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 
    18 Cl. Ct. 394
    , 407 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing Almota Farmers
    Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 
    409 U.S. 470
     (1973)); see also Appellant’s Br. 25. As an initial matter,
    we note that as a decision from the Claims Court, Whitney
    Benefits is not binding authority on this court. See K-Con,
    Inc. v. Sec’y of Army, 
    908 F.3d 719
    , 726 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
    Additionally, Whitney Benefits did not address a situation
    where the plaintiff had failed to prove just compensation
    with reasonable certainty. Rather, the trial court in
    Whitney Benefits largely adopted the plaintiffs’ just
    compensation calculation, making modifications as it
    deemed appropriate based on extensive evidence from both
    parties regarding valuation of the subject property. 18 Cl.
    Ct. at 407–16. Similarly, Almota Farmers does not obligate
    a trial court to calculate just compensation. Rather,
    Almota Farmers merely holds that, for just compensation
    purposes, improvements to leasehold property should be
    assessed at their fair market value in place on the
    leasehold property over their useful life, without regard to
    the remaining term of the 
    lease. 409 U.S. at 473
    . Nothing
    in Almota Farmers suggests that the plaintiff did not
    present sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to
    determine just compensation with reasonable certainty.
    GIP’s reliance on Otay Mesa for the same proposition is
    similarly unavailing. In Otay Mesa, we affirmed the Court
    Case: 18-2132     Document: 69     Page: 16     Filed: 04/22/2020
    16             GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    of Federal Claims’ independent formulation of a just
    compensation award when it “was confronted with
    conflicting evidence and relatively extreme valuations”
    from the plaintiff and the 
    Government. 779 F.3d at 1326
    .
    “We detect[ed] nothing inappropriate with the Court of
    Federal Claims looking at the evidence as a whole and
    using its own methodology to calculate a damages award.”
    Id. We further
    noted “that it is both correct and important
    for a trial court to use its flexibility to tailor a fair and
    reasonable result based on the evidence it credits or rejects.”
    Id. (emphasis added)
    (citing Precision 
    Pine, 596 F.3d at 832
    –33). GIP correctly notes that, in endorsing the trial
    court’s use of its own methodology to determine just
    compensation, we stated: “the [trial] court had few options
    in determining a just compensation award other than
    creating its own valuation.”
    Id. But we
    did not hold that
    the trial court must fashion its own award; rather, we held
    that it may do so. Moreover, the Otay Mesa trial court had
    sufficient record evidence to fashion an award that was
    “within the range of credible testimony” and “reasonable on
    the evidence.”
    Id. at 1327.
    Contrary to GIP’s suggestion,
    Otay Mesa did not hold that a trial court must fashion its
    own just compensation award when not presented with
    sufficient evidence to do so with reasonable certainty.
    Consistent with these principles, the Court of Federal
    Claims in this case acknowledged that it “may award
    damages, even if [it] does not fully credit [a] party’s
    methodology.” 
    Decision, 138 Fed. Cl. at 100
    (quoting
    Precision 
    Pine, 596 F.3d at 833
    ). It found, however, that it
    was “not given sufficient reliable proof of what a willing
    buyer would have paid for the scrap and kish” to
    independently determine a damages award.
    Id. On this
     record, the trial court did not err.
    The trial court found Mr. Gleason’s calculations
    unreliable due to his reliance on what it deemed ill-founded
    assumptions to calculate avoided costs and his use of an
    inflated June 2008 sales price to calculate revenues for
    Case: 18-2132    Document: 69     Page: 17    Filed: 04/22/2020
    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES            17
    material sold later. We cannot say that the Court of
    Federal Claims erred in these findings. On this record, a
    reasonable fact finder may well have been able to
    approximate the revenues from sales of kish and scrap
    using a more accurate methodology not presented by
    Mr. Gleason. But there is little in the record to allow any
    calculation with reasonable certainty of GIP’s avoided
    costs, a critical component of the just compensation
    calculation under both a fair market value theory and a lost
    profits theory.
    The only evidence GIP offered to prove just
    compensation was Mr. Gleason’s testimony regarding his
    calculations based on the non-finalized Watkins
    agreement. The record also contained evidence of the EPA
    contractors’ recovery costs. It was not unreasonable for the
    trial court to conclude that neither provided sufficient
    evidence to calculate just compensation with reasonable
    certainty.
    The trial court reasonably found that certain
    assumptions underlying Mr. Gleason’s avoided costs
    calculations rendered them unreliable. By crediting the
    oral addendum to the Watkins agreement, Mr. Gleason
    assumed Watkins would willingly provide GIP with free
    labor to recover any material from the piles which GIP
    could not sell for a profit. The trial court did not err in
    finding this assumption unreasonable. Mr. Gleason also
    assumed that Watkins would process the same amount of
    material at the same capacity as the EPA contractors
    regardless of market prices. Mr. Gleason thus essentially
    discarded the provision allowing Watkins to walk away if
    the agreement became unprofitable, thereby shifting all
    the risk of a drop in prices to Watkins while assuming
    Watkins would complete the contract. Trial Tr. 1247:14–
    1248:18, 1330:7–18. The trial court did not err in finding
    this second assumption unreasonable.
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    18             GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES
    Further undermining Mr. Gleason’s avoided costs
    calculations, the evidence does not support the notion that
    Watkins had the same capacity to process material as the
    EPA contractors. Watkins thought it would take at least
    ten years to process the piles, while the EPA contractors
    processed half the piles in approximately four years. Trial
    Tr. 384:8–13, 545:3–18; J.A. 3094 ¶ 16. And if Watkins
    processed the minimum tonnage required under the
    Watkins agreement, it would take Watkins around forty
    years to process the same amount of material that the EPA
    contractors processed in approximately four years. Trial
    Tr. 1312:1–14. Mr. Gleason acknowledged that if it took
    Watkins longer to process the piles, there would be a longer
    period of discounting for his fair market valuation,
    resulting in reduced value for the same volume of material.
    See Trial Tr. 1353:8–1354:17. Nonetheless, Mr. Gleason
    assumed that Watkins would follow the same material
    processing schedule as the EPA contractors, at around a
    third of their costs. Trial Tr. 1247:14–1248:18, 1258:4–6,
    1330:7–18. The trial court did not err in finding this
    assumption unreasonable.
    Mr. Gleason also did not account for additional costs
    GIP would have incurred had it run its own recovery
    project, such as those associated with supervising the
    Watkins operation and loading, marketing, and selling
    recovered material. Trial Tr. 1257:12–1258:3, 1349:19–
    1350:16. The trial court did not err in noting this
    deficiency.
    With respect to evidence of the EPA contractors’ costs,
    even GIP concedes that they are not an appropriate proxy
    to assess GIP’s avoided costs. Mr. Gleason testified that
    the EPA and GIP ran “two totally different operations” on
    the Eastern Excluded Property with “different activities,
    different goals, [and] objectives,” and “that account for
    different costs.” Trial Tr. 1299:20–1300:9. It was therefore
    reasonable for the trial court to conclude that neither the
    Case: 18-2132    Document: 69     Page: 19    Filed: 04/22/2020
    GADSDEN INDUSTRIAL PARK, LLC v. UNITED STATES            19
    Watkins agreement nor the EPA contractors’ costs
    provided competent evidence of GIP’s avoided costs.
    As the Court of Federal Claims recognized,
    Mr. Gleason’s calculations arbitrarily lowered GIP’s
    avoided costs at every turn. At a minimum, Mr. Gleason’s
    unreliable calculations left open too many variables for the
    trial court to resolve on its own with reasonable certainty
    based on the evidence available. Left without competent
    evidence relating to a critical component of the damages
    calculation, the trial court did not err in determining that
    that it could not independently fashion a just compensation
    award. We therefore affirm the trial court’s award of zero
    damages for the Government’s taking of kish and scrap.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
    and do not find them persuasive. For the foregoing
    reasons, we reverse the Court of Federal Claims’ decision
    that GIP had a cognizable property interest in the slag
    recovered by the EPA, vacate the trial court’s award of just
    compensation for 92,500 cubic yards of slag, and affirm the
    trial court’s award of zero just compensation for kish and
    scrap.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND
    VACATED-IN-PART
    COSTS
    No costs.