Case: 21-1596 Document: 21 Page: 1 Filed: 07/14/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ANDREW U.D. STRAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2021-1596
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:20-cv-01132-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
______________________
Decided: July 14, 2021
______________________
ANDREW U.D. STRAW, Washington, DC, pro se.
ANDREW JAMES HUNTER, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT
EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.
______________________
Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Case: 21-1596 Document: 21 Page: 2 Filed: 07/14/2021
2 STRAW v. US
Andrew U.D. Straw appeals from a judgment of the
United States Court of Federal Claims (“the Claims Court”)
dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We af-
firm.
I
Mr. Straw has filed several actions focused on his claim
that he was injured as an infant by contaminated water at
Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, and that his injury re-
sulted in a mental disability. In this case, he seeks
$6,000,000 in compensatory damages for what he regards
as a taking of property without just compensation, in vio-
lation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Straw’s Takings Clause theory stems from an ac-
tion he brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”) seeking recovery for the alleged injury he and his
family members suffered because of the contaminated wa-
ter. That action was combined with other similar cases in
a Multidistrict Litigation proceeding in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The
district court in the Multidistrict Litigation proceeding
ruled that Mr. Straw’s claims under the FTCA were barred
by North Carolina’s ten-year statute of repose. In re Camp
Lejeune N.C. Water Contamination Litig.,
263 F. Supp. 3d
1318, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2016). The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of Mr. Straw’s action, 774 F. App’x 564
(11th Cir. 2019), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
140 S. Ct. 2825 (2020).
Mr. Straw then brought this action in the Claims
Court, arguing that the rulings of the Georgia district court
dismissing his FTCA claims effected a judicial taking of his
tort claims and the damages he sought in that action.
Straw v. United States, No. 20-1132, at 1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 12,
2021). The Claims Court rejected his takings claim and
dismissed his complaint for want of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
Id. at 1–3. The court explained that by claiming that
the Georgia district court and the Eleventh Circuit had
Case: 21-1596 Document: 21 Page: 3 Filed: 07/14/2021
STRAW v. US 3
caused a taking of his personal-injury cause of action, Mr.
Straw was in effect asking for the Claims Court to overturn
the decisions of those courts that his FTCA claim was time-
barred.
Id. The Claims Court refused to do so, holding that
it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of a United
States district court.
Id.
Relatedly, the court held that Mr. Straw’s claim
sounded in tort. Id. at 2. That was because his takings
claim depends on a theory that he is entitled to compensa-
tion for personal bodily harm, a paradigmatic tort claim.
Id. And tort claims, the court noted, are expressly excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Claims Court under the Tucker
Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1491.
Mr. Straw appeals to this court.
II
This appeal is frivolous. The Claims Court correctly
explained that Mr. Straw’s Takings Clause theory is mer-
itless because it constitutes a collateral attack on the final
judgment of a federal district court in a tort case, which the
Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain. Nonetheless,
Mr. Straw has raised the same issues before us, while add-
ing unwarranted personal attacks on the trial judge. 1
1 In addition to the case before the district court in
the Northern District of Georgia, Mr. Straw in 2017 filed
an action in the Claims Court almost identical to this one.
That action resulted in a dismissal by the Claims Court
and an affirmance by this court. See Straw v. United
States, No. 17-560C,
2017 WL 6492003 (Fed. Cl. May 24,
2017), aff’d, 710 F. App’x 881 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Mr. Straw
then asserted a claim for compensation from the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, which the Department denied,
followed by a denial of relief by the United States Court of
Veterans Claims,
32 Vet. App. 374 (2020), whose judgment
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4 STRAW v. US
As the trial court noted, the Claims Court does not have
jurisdiction to review the decisions of federal district
courts. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States,
862 F.3d 1370,
1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Shinnecock Indian Nation v.
United States,
782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Joshua
v. United States,
17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 2 Be-
cause Mr. Straw’s takings claim depends on him challeng-
ing the Georgia district court’s decision—which is final and
preclusive—the Claims Court correctly held that it cannot
grant the relief he seeks.
was affirmed by this court, Straw v. Wilkie, 843 F. App’x
263 (Fed. Cir. 2021). In addition, Mr. Straw filed five other
actions in the Claims Court between 2017 and early 2021:
Straw v. United States, No. 17-1082; Straw v. United
States, No. 20-1145; Straw v. United States, No. 20-1154;
Straw v. United States, No. 20-1157; and Straw v. United
States, No. 21-745. Besides the appeal in this case, he cur-
rently has four other appeals pending before this court:
Straw v. United States, No. 21-1597; Straw v. United
States, No. 21-1598; Straw v. United States, No. 21-1600;
and Straw v. United States, No. 21-1602. As of 2017, the
Claims Court noted that since 2014 Mr. Straw had filed at
least 21 complaints and 12 appeals on his own behalf in
various federal courts. See Straw v. United States, No. 17-
1082C,
2017 WL 6045984, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 6, 2017).
Since then, Mr. Straw has filed a number of additional ac-
tions and appeals in various courts with himself as plaintiff
or appellant.
2 Mr. Straw objects to the Claims Court’s reliance on
Joshua on the ground that the plaintiff in that case was
incarcerated and was seeking an unrealistic amount of
monetary damages. Those facts have no effect on our hold-
ing in Joshua, which was that the Claims Court does not
have jurisdiction to review the decisions of United States
district courts.
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STRAW v. US 5
The Claims Court was also correct in holding that Mr.
Straw’s claim is in essence a tort claim, which is outside
the jurisdiction of the Claims Court under the Tucker Act,
Hercules Inc. v. United States,
516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996).
See Straw, No. 20-1132, at 2 (citing and relying on Straw
Estate of Stevens v. United States, 710 F. App’x 881, 883
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Mr. Straw complains that the Georgia district court ef-
fectively deprived him of “the law of the place where the
damage happened.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 2. That is not
true. The Georgia district court applied the North Carolina
statute of repose, and Mr. Straw does not contend that any
other law was applicable in that case. His actual complaint
is that the case was improperly transferred to the Northern
District of Georgia as part of the Multidistrict Litigation
proceeding and that the Georgia district court construed
the North Carolina limitations statute in a manner con-
trary to the way it has been construed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit. But those were issues for the Georgia district court
and the Eleventh Circuit to resolve. They are not issues
that either the Claims Court or this court has jurisdiction
to address, particularly now that the decisions of the Geor-
gia district court and the Eleventh Circuit have become fi-
nal.
Mr. Straw contends that a claim of a taking of property
without just compensation is cognizable even if the alleged
taking is effected by judicial branch officers. The extent to
which the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies
to the actions of courts has been the subject of debate.
Compare Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Env’t Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 713–15 (opinion of Scalia, J.),
with
id. at 733–42 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). But even ac-
cepting that the prohibition against taking property with-
out just compensation applies to courts in the same manner
that it does to other governmental entities, there is no force
to Mr. Straw’s argument that a party can characterize an
adverse judicial decision in a tort case as a taking of a
Case: 21-1596 Document: 21 Page: 6 Filed: 07/14/2021
6 STRAW v. US
“chose in action” and seek “compensation” for that taking
through an action in the Court of Federal Claims. 3
At bottom, Mr. Straw’s takings theory is based on the
assertion that when a court errs in denying a plaintiff relief
in a tort case, it effectively “takes” his cause of action and
his entitlement to relief. Under that logic, all cases sound-
ing in tort in which a plaintiff is denied relief could be re-
cast as Takings Clause claims and re-presented to the
Claims Court, notwithstanding the prohibition in the
Tucker Act against the Claims Court exercising jurisdic-
tion over tort claims. Not surprisingly, Mr. Straw cites no
authority in support of that theory of recovery.
Neither Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City
of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897), nor Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982), cited by Mr. Straw, provide
support for his claim. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
case established that a state’s taking of property without
just compensation constitutes a denial of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
166 U.S. at 233–39. The
Court went on to hold that the prohibition against uncom-
pensated takings applies to a state’s courts as well as its
legislative and executive branches, but that case concerned
a traditional eminent domain proceeding.
Id. at 233–41.
3 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stop the Beach
does not support Mr. Straw’s theory. That opinion con-
cluded that “the Takings Clause bars the State from taking
private property without paying for it, no matter which
branch is the instrument of the taking.”
560 U.S. at 715.
But nothing in Justice Scalia’s opinion supports the propo-
sition that a court “takes” a party’s cause of action for per-
sonal injury when it denies the claim on the merits. See In
re Lazy Days’ RV Ctr. Inc.,
724 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013)
(The court “adjudicated the parties’ bona fide dispute re-
garding their rights . . . . This sort of adjudication of dis-
puted and competing claims cannot be a taking.”).
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STRAW v. US 7
The Logan case held that a procedural error by a state
agency that extinguished a claimant’s cause of action con-
stituted a violation of due process.
455 U.S. at 433–37.
Neither of those cases nor Smith v. United States,
709 F.3d
1114 (Fed. Cir. 2013), also cited by Mr. Straw, support his
contention that an erroneous decision by a federal district
court in a tort case constitutes a taking of property without
just compensation for which a remedy lies in the Court of
Federal Claims.
Contrary to Mr. Straw’s contention, a court does not
“take” a party’s chose in action by ruling against that party
on the merits. Takings claims based on that theory have
been repeatedly rejected by this court. See Campbell v.
United States,
932 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“It is
well established that the Claims Court ‘cannot entertain a
taking[s] claim that requires the court to scrutinize the ac-
tions of another tribunal.’” (citation omitted)); Petro-Hunt,
862 F.3d at 1385 (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims correctly
dismissed Petro-Hunt’s judicial takings claim because it
could not determine if Petro-Hunt’s mineral servitudes
were ‘previously imprescriptible’ or ‘transformed’ from pri-
vate to public property without determining whether the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of precedent was correct.”);
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 782 F.3d at 1352 (“Adjudication
of the Nation’s proposed judicial takings claim would re-
quire the Court of Federal Claims to scrutinize the merits
of the district court’s judgment, a task it is without author-
ity to undertake.”); Vereda, Ltda. v. United States,
271 F.3d
1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims
cannot entertain a taking claim that requires the court to
‘scrutinize the actions of’ another tribunal.” (citation omit-
ted)); Allustiarte v. United States,
256 F.3d 1349, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To permit collateral attacks on bank-
ruptcy court judgments would ‘seriously undercut[] the or-
derly process of the law. . . . The proper forum for
appellants’ challenges to the bankruptcy trustees’ actions
Case: 21-1596 Document: 21 Page: 8 Filed: 07/14/2021
8 STRAW v. US
therefore lies in the Ninth Circuit, not the Court of Federal
Claims.” (citation omitted)).
In addition to his legal claims, Mr. Straw asserts that
the trial judge was biased against him based on the iden-
tity of the President who appointed the judge and on a
statement in the judge’s opinion referring to Mr. Straw’s
effort to recast his tort claim as “sly.” Appellant’s Opening
Br. 2–3. Neither of those complaints has any merit. There
is no support whatsoever for the contention that a judge
can be disqualified based simply on the identity of the Pres-
ident who appointed him. See MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp.
Equip. Fin., Inc.,
138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998) (appoint-
ment by a particular administration is not a ground for
questioning a judge’s impartiality); McKee v. U.S. Dep’t of
Just.,
253 F. Supp. 3d 78, 81 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[T]he identity
of the President who appointed the judge assigned to a case
has no bearing on recusal.”); Armenian Assembly of Am.,
Inc. v. Cafesjian,
783 F. Supp. 2d 78, 93 (D.D.C. 2011) (“The
case law is clear that recusal is not warranted where a
judge is alleged to be biased based solely on political con-
nections to the President who appointed her.”). And the
use of the term “sly” is not “insulting,” contrary to Mr.
Straw’s suggestion; it merely calls attention to the fact that
Mr. Straw has sought to recast a tort claim as something
that it manifestly is not—a case arising under the Takings
Clause. The term “sly” strikes us as a rather mild way to
characterize that effort at legal legerdemain.
Mr. Straw also alludes to the “Anti-Filing” order en-
tered against him by the Claims Court. Appellant’s Open-
ing Br. 3. He appears to invoke that order in support of his
claim that the trial judge was biased against him. Because
Mr. Straw was permitted to file the present action, the
anti-filing order had no effect on him with regard to this
case, and we therefore will not address the merits of that
order in this appeal. To the extent Mr. Straw points to the
order as evidence of bias on the part of the trial judge, we
do not regard the order as indicating any such bias,
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STRAW v. US 9
particularly in light of the large number of meritless filings
by Mr. Straw in the Claims Court and other courts during
the past several years.
AFFIRMED
