Taylor v. United States ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-1216   Document: 21     Page: 1   Filed: 04/13/2021
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    BYRON L. TAYLOR,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2020-1216
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:19-cv-00765-PEC, Judge Patricia E.
    Campbell-Smith.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 13, 2021
    ______________________
    BYRON L. TAYLOR, West Yellowstone, MT, pro se.
    JANET A. BRADLEY, Tax Division, United States De-
    partment of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-
    appellee. Also represented by THOMAS J. CLARK, RICHARD
    E. ZUCKERMAN.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 20-1216    Document: 21      Page: 2    Filed: 04/13/2021
    2                                               TAYLOR   v. US
    PER CURIAM.
    Byron L. Taylor appeals a final decision of the United
    States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) dismiss-
    ing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Taylor filed timely income tax returns and fully
    paid his tax liability for the 2010, 2011, and 2012 tax
    years. Mr. Taylor later filed amended returns for the
    2010–2012 tax years. The Internal Revenue Service
    (“IRS”) determined that all of the amended returns were
    frivolous and assessed penalties against Mr. Taylor. The
    IRS transferred Mr. Taylor’s overpayments from tax years
    2014–2017 as partial payment for the penalties and has
    unsuccessfully attempted to use liens and levies to collect
    the outstanding balance.
    After unsuccessfully seeking relief in the Tax Court,
    on May 21, 2019, Mr. Taylor filed a complaint in the
    Claims Court seeking damages allegedly stemming from
    the IRS’s assessment of penalties and its collection efforts.
    On September 10, 2019, the Claims Court dismissed the
    complaint, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction
    over Mr. Taylor’s challenges to IRS assessments of tax
    liability and collection practices. Mr. Taylor then filed a
    motion for reconsideration, apparently predicated on the
    Fourth Amendment, which the Claims Court denied on
    October 7, 2019. Mr. Taylor appeals. We have jurisdic-
    tion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(3).
    DISCUSSION
    The only issue here is whether the Claims Court
    properly dismissed Mr. Taylor’s complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction.
    We review de novo a dismissal by the Claims Court
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C.
    Case: 20-1216     Document: 21    Page: 3    Filed: 04/13/2021
    TAYLOR   v. US                                             3
    v. United States, 
    862 F.3d 1370
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
    (citing Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    805 F.3d 1082
    , 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). A plaintiff
    must show by a preponderance of the evidence that juris-
    diction obtains. Taylor v. United States, 
    303 F.3d 1357
    ,
    1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Thomson v. Gaskill, 
    315 U.S. 442
    , 446 (1942)).
    The Tucker Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    , is the principal
    statute governing the Claims Court’s jurisdiction. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    ; Taylor, 
    303 F.3d at 1359
    . Under the
    Tucker Act, the Claims Court has jurisdiction
    to render judgment upon any claim against the
    United States founded either upon the Constitu-
    tion, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
    an executive department, or upon any express or
    implied contract with the United States, or for
    liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
    sounding in tort.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1).
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    , sometimes known as the
    “Little Tucker Act,” the Claims Court also has jurisdiction
    over
    civil action[s] against the United States for the re-
    covery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have
    been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,
    or any penalty claimed to have been collected
    without authority or any sum alleged to have been
    excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected
    under the internal-revenue laws.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (a)(1).
    Under the “full payment rule,” to maintain a tax re-
    fund action under § 1346, a taxpayer must have fully paid
    the assessed tax. Shore v. United States, 
    9 F.3d 1524
    ,
    1526 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Flora v. United States, 362
    Case: 20-1216    Document: 21     Page: 4    Filed: 04/13/2021
    4                                              TAYLOR   v. US
    U.S. 145, 150, 177 (1960)). We have further held that for
    the Claims Court to have jurisdiction over “a claim over
    assessed interest or penalties,” the taxpayer must “prepay
    such interest and penalties” before filing suit. 
    Id.
     at
    1527–28. Here, Mr. Taylor sought a refund for the frivo-
    lous return penalties assessed against him without hav-
    ing paid said penalties in full. Therefore, under the full
    payment rule, the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction
    to hear his claim for a refund.
    As to Mr. Taylor’s Fourth Amendment claim, the ju-
    risdiction of the Claims Court “is limited to cases in which
    the Constitution or a federal statute requires the payment
    of money damages as compensation for their violation.”
    Brown v. United States, 
    105 F.3d 621
    , 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
    (emphasis added). Because “the Fourth Amendment does
    not mandate the payment of money for its violation,” the
    Claims Court does not have jurisdiction over Fourth
    Amendment claims. 
    Id.
    Mr. Taylor also argues that the Claims Court did not
    take account of the exhibits he submitted in support of his
    claim, but having reviewed the record, we find no reason
    to doubt the Claims Court’s representation that it “thor-
    oughly examined” Mr. Taylor’s complaint and response
    brief in deciding the government’s motion to dismiss. See
    S. App’x at 3.
    Finally, we note that contrary to Mr. Taylor’s asser-
    tion, the government’s motion to dismiss before the Tax
    Court in no way constitutes a concession that the IRS
    lacked jurisdiction to assess taxes or penalties against Mr.
    Taylor.
    We hold that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction
    over Mr. Taylor’s complaint and properly dismissed.
    AFFIRMED