Staley v. DVA ( 2021 )

Case: 20-2127 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 07/15/2021
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SHASTA DOMONI STALEY,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent
______________________
2020-2127
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-1221-19-0639-W-1.
______________________
Decided: July 15, 2021
______________________
SHASTA DOMONI STALEY, Whitsett, NC, pro se.
MARIANA TERESA ACEVEDO, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, ROBERT
EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.
______________________
Before CHEN, CLEVENGER, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
Case: 20-2127 Document: 33 Page: 2 Filed: 07/15/2021
2 STALEY v. DVA
PER CURIAM.
Shasta D. Staley appeals from a final decision of the
Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) denying her re-
quest for corrective action by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) for a personnel action prohibited under the
Whistleblower Protection Act, as amended by the Whistle-
blower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-199, 126 Stat. 1465. Staley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
No. DC-1221-19-0639-W-1, 2020 WL 1983454 (Apr. 20,
2020) (Board Decision). For the reasons discussed, we af-
firm.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Staley worked at the VA as a rating veterans ser-
vice representative. On October 18, 2018, the agency initi-
ated a proposed removal and, on October 30, 2018, decided
to remove her. The removal action was not under review
in the Board proceeding below nor is at issue in this appeal.
Before the VA effectuated her removal, Ms. Staley notified
the agency that she had recently filed a complaint with the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC). She requested the agency
to stay the removal action pending guidance from the OSC.
The VA agreed.
The nature of the OSC complaint is unclear from the
parties’ briefing and the Board Decision, but it appears to
qualify as protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). 1 In response to this activity, alleges
1 Respondent’s brief discusses only protected disclo-
sure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), Resp’t’s Br. 15–16, but the
record shows the Board viewed the filing of the OSC com-
plaint as a protected activity under § 2302(b)(9), J.A. 537–
38 (discussing the basis for the Board’s jurisdiction). See
Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 626 F. App’x 261, 267 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (explaining § 2302(b)(8) protects whistle-
blowing and § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) protects exercising a
Case: 20-2127 Document: 33 Page: 3 Filed: 07/15/2021
STALEY v. DVA 3
Ms. Staley, the VA engaged in retaliatory personnel action
against her—specifically, the revocation of previously ap-
proved leave without pay (LWOP) under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and its conversion into absence
without leave (AWOL). That action followed a decision by
the VA to re-review Ms. Staley’s already approved FMLA
application and occurred while the review of her OSC com-
plaint was pending.
According to the agency, the re-review was prompted
by Ms. Staley’s occasional appearances at the office while
she was supposed to be out on FMLA leave. Ms. Staley’s
position is that the re-review was initiated to assist the VA
in receiving a favorable outcome in the OSC investigation.
After the review, the agency concluded that Ms. Staley’s
FMLA application lacked sufficient supporting medical in-
formation and had been improperly granted. Specifically,
the application did not identify a serious health condition.
The FMLA application had included information from
Ms. Staley’s doctor, Dr. Diana Lizardo. In response to a
question of whether Ms. Staley’s medical condition made
her unable to perform any of her job functions, Dr. Lizardo
had checked “no.” J.A. 1773. In response to a question re-
garding the nature of Ms. Staley’s treatment, she wrote:
“Physical therapy & Psychiatry & Neurology.” Id. In simi-
larly general terms, in response to another question asking
for a description of relevant medical facts related to the
condition for which leave was being sought, Dr. Lizardo
wrote:
Patient will need time to rest to reduce fatigue.
Physical therapy requires multiple visits in a short
grievance right related to whistleblowing). Regardless, alt-
hough the specifics of the OSC complaint are not discussed,
the Board appears to have had jurisdiction, which is not
presently disputed. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a).
Case: 20-2127 Document: 33 Page: 4 Filed: 07/15/2021
4 STALEY v. DVA
period of time. Some medications can make her
sleepy, she should not drive, but she can work from
home.
Id.Although the agency found the FMLA application to be
deficient, it offered Ms. Staley the opportunity to submit
updated medical documentation, within fourteen days, to
preserve her FMLA leave. Otherwise, she could have her
past FMLA leave converted to another type of leave of her
choosing. If Ms. Staley took neither of these actions, the
FMLA leave she had taken would be converted automati-
cally to AWOL. However, the agency informed Ms. Staley
it would not take any disciplinary action based on that ret-
roactively applied AWOL, which it acknowledged would be
the result of the agency’s own error in granting FMLA
leave in the first place. VA employees offered to meet with
Ms. Staley to discuss the deficiencies in her documenta-
tion. Ms. Staley ultimately did not take up these offers to
meet—she contends that there were justified reasons for
why she did not, specifically that the agency was trying to
hide information by meeting rather than communicating
through emails—nor did she provide additional documen-
tation. Accordingly, her FMLA leave was converted to
AWOL.
On July 1, 2019, Ms. Staley filed an individual right of
action (IRA) with the Board, claiming that the VA retroac-
tively revoked her FMLA leave in retaliation for the pro-
tected activity of filing her OSC complaint. She requested
corrective action. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
Board determined that Ms. Staley had proven, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, her prima facie case of retaliation.
But the Board denied her request for corrective action be-
cause it found that the agency had proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence it would have taken the same action
absent Ms. Staley’s protected activity.
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STALEY v. DVA 5
Ms. Staley timely appealed the Board’s final decision.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(9). Ms. Staley argues that the Board’s conclusion
that the VA had rebutted her prima facie case by clear and
convincing evidence is unsupported by substantial evi-
dence. Ms. Staley also raises a due process violation by the
agency and errors in the Board’s discovery and evidentiary
rulings.
DISCUSSION
We must affirm a decision of the Board unless it is ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; obtained without procedures by
law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsup-
ported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Sub-
stantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Berlin v. Dep’t of Labor, 772 F.3d 890, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We do not disturb the
Board’s credibility determinations unless they are “inher-
ently improbable or discredited by undisputed fact.” Pope
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 114 F.3d 1144, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
We review “the Board’s determinations of law for correct-
ness, without deference to the Board’s decision.” King v.
Dep’t of Navy, 130 F.3d 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Once a petitioner has established a prima facie case
that she engaged in protected activity which was a contrib-
uting factor in a personnel action taken against her, the
burden of persuasion is on the agency to show by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same per-
sonnel action in the absence of such activity. 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e); Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2012). To determine if the agency has carried its
burden, the Board considers the three Carr factors: (1) “the
strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its personnel
action,” (2) “the existence and strength of any motive to re-
taliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved
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6 STALEY v. DVA
in the decision,” and (3) “any evidence that the agency
takes similar actions against employees who are not whis-
tleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr
v. Social Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
An agency is not required to produce evidence with respect
to each and every one of these factors. Rather, the factors
are “merely appropriate and pertinent considerations” for
determining whether the agency carried its burden.
Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374. Analyzing these factors, the
Board found the VA had shown by clear and convincing ev-
idence that it would have revoked Ms. Staley’s FMLA leave
even if Ms. Staley had not filed her OSC complaint. The
Board’s determination is supported by substantial evi-
dence.
With respect to the first Carr factor, the Board made
several fact findings. As an initial matter, the agency’s de-
cision to re-review Ms. Staley’s FMLA application was
based on seeing Ms. Staley come into the office on a day she
was on leave and supposedly incapacitated from working.
The Board found Ms. Staley’s appearance to be a reasona-
ble basis for reopening the review. 2 The change from
2 Ms. Staley points out that the definition of incapac-
ity concerns the ability to work and not whether an em-
ployee is physically present at the workplace. Therefore,
she argues, the Board should have disregarded her mere
presence at work for having no probative value as to
whether Ms. Staley had a serious health condition and was
eligible for FMLA leave. However, the proper inquiry be-
fore the Board and in this appeal “is not whether the
agency action is justified; it is whether the agency would
have acted in the same way absent the whistleblowing.”
Smith v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 930 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2019). Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for her
appearance, on a day she wasn’t expected, to have raised a
question about her FMLA status and prompted another
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STALEY v. DVA 7
finding Ms. Staley’s FMLA application grantable when
first reviewed to improperly granted when re-reviewed was
reasonably explained by human resources specialist Ariel
Handsome’s testimony. Ms. Handsome was the one who
had previously reviewed and recommended Ms. Staley’s
application. Ms. Handsome testified that only later, after
receiving additional training, did she recognize that
Ms. Staley’s documentation was insufficient to support an
FMLA request and her initial assessment had been in er-
ror, which the Board found credible. Typically, Ms. Hand-
some’s evaluation would have been reviewed by a
supervisor, Sabrina Smith, before being sent for approval.
But Ms. Staley herself had requested that Smith not be al-
lowed to see her information and so, because of that, Smith
did not conduct a secondary review. Therefore, the final
approval relied on Ms. Handsome’s erroneous recommen-
dation. The Board also found that, based on the infor-
mation provided by Dr. Lizardo, there was “no way for the
agency to have determined whether the appellant indeed
suffered from a serious health condition, and further
whether her condition whatever it might have been, made
her unable to perform any of her essential job duties.” J.A.
20. Thus, the Board reasonably found the VA presented
strong evidence for its decision to request additional docu-
mentation and then revoke FMLA leave when it did not re-
ceive the documentation.
Ms. Staley contends that her FMLA application con-
tained sufficient, general information because there is no
look at her application. In other words, Ms. Staley’s ap-
pearance was a reasonable reason to trigger the re-review
which led to the revocation of her leave, even if it, without
more, could not have been a proper basis for the revocation
itself. That would require something else, which in this
case turned out to be the lack of documentation showing a
serious health condition.
Case: 20-2127 Document: 33 Page: 8 Filed: 07/15/2021
8 STALEY v. DVA
requirement that the agency be allowed or required to de-
termine the nature and seriousness of an employee’s con-
dition from an FMLA application. She argues that, in fact,
the agency’s request for additional medical information
was an improper invasion of her privacy. Ms. Staley’s ar-
gument lacks merit. An employee must have a “serious
health condition” that “makes the employee unable to per-
form any one or more of the essential functions of his or her
position” to be entitled to FMLA leave. 5 C.F.R.
§ 630.1203(a)(4). The agency must be given sufficient in-
formation to determine whether an employee’s situation
satisfies those requirements to grant FMLA leave.
As to the second Carr factor, the Board reasonably
found a lack of retaliatory motive in view of the manner in
which the agency handled the situation after it discovered
the deficiencies in Ms. Staley’s FMLA application. The
agency could have immediately revoked the grant of FMLA
or immediately converted Ms. Staley’s leave to AWOL and
then taken disciplinary action based on the AWOL. In-
stead, Ms. Staley was given time to provide new documen-
tation to support her FMLA status or to request another
type of leave. Conversely, based on the email evidence in
the record before it, the Board was not persuaded by
Ms. Staley’s arguments for why she did not meet with
agency officers to discuss those options nor ultimately pro-
vide the additional information. The Board also found
credible the testimony of agency employees regarding ei-
ther not knowing the existence or content of the OSC com-
plaint or not being affected by the OSC complaint while
handling the FMLA review. The Board reasonably con-
cluded that the OSC complaint was not a motive for the
revocation of Ms. Staley’s FMLA leave.
On the third Carr factor, the Board rejected
Ms. Staley’s comparator evidence for showing a disparity
in treatment. Like Ms. Staley, the comparator had been
requested to provide additional medical documentation.
But unlike Ms. Staley, the comparator provided the
Case: 20-2127 Document: 33 Page: 9 Filed: 07/15/2021
STALEY v. DVA 9
additional documentation. Substantial evidence therefore
supports the Board’s conclusion that the comparator evi-
dence supported the agency’s claim of not treating
Ms. Staley differently from other employees.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the Board’s de-
termination that the VA demonstrated by clear and con-
vincing evidence that it would have reviewed and revoked
Ms. Staley’s FMLA leave even if Ms. Staley had not filed
her OSC complaint.
We reject the remaining arguments raised by
Ms. Staley in this appeal. There was no due process viola-
tion. As discussed above, Ms. Staley was provided a fair
opportunity to justify her FMLA status. 3 The discovery and
evidentiary issues raised by Ms. Staley are likewise merit-
less. We do not agree with Ms. Staley that the Board
abused its discretion in denying her motion to compel dis-
covery responses based on relevancy and privilege grounds.
Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368 (“[P]rocedural matters relative
to discovery and evidentiary issues fall within the sound
discretion of the board and its officials.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Board also did not abuse its discre-
tion when it declined to disqualify Monique Smart, the
agency’s counsel, based on finding there was no conflict of
interest and Ms. Smart was not a fact witness. Id. Accord-
ingly, none of these grounds is a basis to find the Board
committed reversible error.
3 Ms. Staley’s due process violation arguments in-
clude an allegation that the agency improperly withheld
discovery until after the issuance of the Board Decision. We
already found this argument meritless in denying Ms.
Staley’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Appendix.
Order Denying Mot., ECF No. 31.
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10 STALEY v. DVA
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.