Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland Gmbh v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 21-1981   Document: 36    Page: 1   Filed: 05/09/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH,
    Appellant
    v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
    Appellee
    ______________________
    2021-1981
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2019-
    01657.
    ______________________
    Decided: May 9, 2023
    ______________________
    KENNETH WAYNE DARBY, Fish & Richardson PC, Aus-
    tin, TX, argued for appellant. Also represented by MATT
    COLVIN, Dallas, TX; LAUREN ANN DEGNAN, WALTER KARL
    RENNER, Washington, DC; JOHN STEPHEN GOETZ, New
    York, NY.
    DOUGLAS H. CARSTEN, McDermott Will & Emery, Ir-
    vine, CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by WENDY
    L. DEVINE, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, PC, San
    Francisco, CA; ELHAM FIROUZI STEINER, San Diego, CA;
    TASHA THOMAS, RICHARD TORCZON, Washington, DC.
    ______________________
    Case: 21-1981    Document: 36      Page: 2    Filed: 05/09/2023
    2                     SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    Before REYNA, MAYER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
    CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
    Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH owns U.S. Patent
    No. RE47,614 (“the ’614 patent”). Mylan Pharmaceuticals
    Inc. petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
    (“Board”) for inter partes review of claims 1–18 of the ’614
    patent. In its final written decision, the Board found all
    challenged claims unpatentable as obvious over prior art.
    Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH,
    IPR2019-01657, Paper 39, 
    2021 WL 1158193
     (P.T.A.B.
    Mar. 26, 2021) (“Decision”). Sanofi argues on appeal that
    Mylan failed to argue that 
    U.S. Patent No. 4,144,957
     (“de
    Gennes”) constitutes analogous art to the ’614 patent and
    instead compared de Gennes to another prior art reference.
    We agree with Sanofi. Because Mylan argued that de
    Gennes is analogous to another prior art reference and not
    the challenged patent, Mylan did not meet its burden to
    establish obviousness premised on de Gennes and the
    Board’s factual findings regarding analogousness are not
    supported by substantial evidence. We reverse.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. The Challenged Patents
    The ’614 patent is entitled “Drug Delivery Device and
    Method of Manufacturing a Drug Delivery Device.” The
    ’614 patent’s stated invention relates to a “drug delivery
    device” that can be “configured to allow setting of different
    dose sizes.” ’614 patent col. 1 ll. 26–32.
    The ’614 patent seeks to provide a drug delivery device
    to improve “operability with respect to dosage control
    and/or improved reproducibility of the dosage in connection
    with different cartridges.” 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 51–55. It purport-
    edly achieves this objective using a “spring washer” that
    can “exert a force on the cartridge and secure the cartridge
    against movement” and is “secured to the housing so as to
    prevent relative axial movement between [the] spring
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    SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH        v.                      3
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    washer and housing.” 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 59–67, col. 2 ll. 31–35.
    The ’614 patent explains that spring washers are advanta-
    geous because spring washers can secure the cartridge
    “without requiring much space,” allowing for “a very com-
    pact drug delivery device.” 
    Id.
     col. 2 ll. 15–17.
    The ’614 patent has 18 claims, all of which require a
    “spring washer” secured by “at least two fixing elements.”
    
    Id.
     col. 8 l. 1 to col. 10 l. 18. As an example, claim 1 recites:
    1. A drug delivery device comprising:
    a housing with a proximal end and a distal end,
    a cartridge adapted to accommodate a drug,
    a cartridge retaining member adapted to retain
    the cartridge, the cartridge retaining member
    releasably secured to the housing, and
    a spring washer arranged within the housing so
    as to exert a force on the cartridge and to se-
    cure the cartridge against movement with re-
    spect to the cartridge retaining member,
    wherein the spring washer has at least two fixing
    elements configured to axially and rotation-
    ally fix the spring washer relative to the hous-
    ing.
    
    Id.
     col. 8 ll. 2–14 (emphases added).
    B. IPR Proceedings
    Mylan petitioned the Board to institute IPR proceed-
    ings on the ground that all claims of the ’614 patent are
    obvious based on a combination of three prior art refer-
    ences: (1) U.S. Patent Application No. 2007/0021718 (“Bur-
    ren”); (2) 
    U.S. Patent No. 2,882,901
     (“Venezia”); and (3) de
    Gennes. J.A. 92. Mylan relied on Burren—cited as prior
    art within the ’614 patent—to teach the use of springs
    within a drug-delivery device. J.A. 107–09. Mylan sought
    to combine Burren with Venezia to teach the use of spring
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    4                     SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    washers within drug-delivery devices and de Gennes to add
    “snap-fit engagement grips” to secure the spring washer.
    J.A. 109–11. In its petition, Mylan argued that “De
    Gennes, while concerned with a clutch bearing [in automo-
    biles], addresses a problem analogous to that addressed in
    Burren (axially [sic] fixation and support of two compo-
    nents relative to one another).” J.A. 111 (emphasis added).
    Mylan’s expert reiterated the same point, stating that “alt-
    hough De Gennes is concerned with a clutch bearing, it ad-
    dresses a problem analogous to that addressed in Burren.”
    J.A. 1507 (emphasis added).
    In its patent owner response, Sanofi argued that de
    Gennes is not analogous art to the ’614 patent. J.A. 2309.
    Sanofi argued that de Gennes relates to cars and not drug
    delivery devices or medical devices, such that a person of
    ordinary skill in the art “would not have considered a
    clutch bearing to be within the same field of endeavor.”
    J.A. 2310. Sanofi further argued that de Gennes is not
    “reasonably pertinent” to the ’614 patent’s problem, J.A.
    2312, which it asserted is “secur[ing] a cartridge against
    movement within a housing.” J.A. 2313; accord J.A. 2415
    (Sanofi’s expert).
    Mylan responded by repeating its Burren-centric argu-
    ments. J.A. 3153–55; accord J.A. 3372–78 (Mylan’s ex-
    pert). In its petitioner reply, Mylan argued that Sanofi’s
    analogousness arguments relied on a “faulty understand-
    ing of controlling law.” J.A. 3136. Mylan criticized Sanofi
    as “tr[ying] to change the pertinent problem by importing
    extraneous goals from” the ’614 patent, asserting that
    “Burren’s suggestion . . . provides the pertinent problem in
    this case,” and that a skilled artisan “reading Burren (ra-
    ther than reading the goals of [the ’614 patent] with hind-
    sight) would have considered” de Gennes highly relevant.
    J.A. 3154–55. When asked during oral argument before
    the Board as to which “problem” should be examined for
    the analogous art test, Mylan’s counsel stated “[i]t doesn’t
    really matter” and that “the problem to be solved . . . is
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    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    really identical[ly] presented between Burren and [the ’614
    patent]. They’re both interested in solving the same issue
    and that is on the Burren side accommodating various car-
    tridge lengths and on the [the ’614 patent] side identifying
    the cartridges.” J.A. 3705.
    In its final written decision, the Board determined that
    Burren in combination with Venezia does not render the
    challenged claims of the ’614 patent unpatentable. Deci-
    sion at *15. However, the Board found that Burren in com-
    bination with Venezia and de Gennes does render the
    challenged claims unpatentable because, among other
    things, the “snap-fit connection” of de Gennes taught the
    “fixing elements” of the ’614 patent. 
    Id.
     at *15–18, *25.
    In reaching its conclusion, the Board found de Gennes
    constituted analogous art to the ’614 patent. 
    Id.
     at *7–9.
    Because all parties agreed the ’614 patent and de Gennes
    belong to distinct fields of endeavor, the Board focused on
    whether de Gennes was “reasonably pertinent” to a prob-
    lem faced by the inventor of the ’614 patent. 
    Id.
     at *7–8.
    The Board rejected Sanofi’s definition of the “problem” as
    too narrow and adopted Mylan’s definition: “axially fixing
    two components relative towards each other.” 
    Id.
     at *8–9.
    In a footnote, the Board agreed Mylan “refer[red] to Burren
    when identifying a problem,” stating that Burren’s “defined
    problem is also relevant to the ’614 patent, especially given
    that the ’614 patent acknowledges that Burren’s spring
    performs the same function (that is, solves a same problem)
    as the ’614 patent.” 
    Id.
     at *8 n.4. The Board found de
    Gennes “analogous to the ’614 patent” because it “is rea-
    sonably pertinent to axially fixing two components relative
    towards each other, a problem addressed by the inventors
    of the ’614 patent.” Id. at *9.
    Sanofi timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(4)(A).
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    6                     SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    “We review the [Board’s] factual findings for substan-
    tial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo.” Donner
    Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 
    979 F.3d 1353
    , 1358
    (Fed. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Redline
    Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 
    811 F.3d 435
    , 449
    (Fed. Cir. 2015)). “Obviousness is a question of law based
    on underlying facts.” 
    Id.
     at 1359 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v.
    Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 
    845 F.3d 1357
    , 1372 (Fed. Cir.
    2017)). “Whether a reference is analogous art is an issue
    of fact.” 
    Id.
     (citing In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
    496 F.3d 1374
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
    B. Analogous Art Arguments
    Sanofi argues that the Board “altered and extended
    Mylan’s deficient showing” by analyzing whether de
    Gennes constitutes analogous art to the ’614 patent when
    Mylan, the petitioner, only presented its arguments with
    respect to Burren. Appellant’s Br. 25–26. Sanofi cites our
    decision in In re Magnum Oil Tools International, Ltd. to
    argue that the Board cannot “raise, address, and decide un-
    patentability theories never presented by the petitioner
    and not supported by record evidence.” Id. at 28 (quoting
    
    829 F.3d 1364
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Sanofi argues the
    Board improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from
    Mylan—to prove the claims of the ’614 patent are un-
    patentable—to Sanofi—to defend the claims of the ’614 pa-
    tent as patentable. 
    Id.
     at 26–27. Sanofi argues the Board
    “adopted Mylan’s problem statement derived from Burren
    and then worked backward to relate that problem to the
    ’614 patent,” which led the Board to a “legally erroneous
    conclusion that lacks substantial evidence.” Id. at 26.
    Mylan argues its petition permitted the Board to eval-
    uate de Gennes as analogous art because there is no func-
    tional difference between the problem of Burren and the
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    SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH     v.                    7
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    problem of the ’614 patent. Appellee’s Br. 25. Mylan also
    argues Sanofi raises a distinction without a difference be-
    cause “[t]he evidence and arguments underlying the
    Board’s findings—whether linked to Burren or [the ’614 pa-
    tent]—remained the same.” Id. at 27. Mylan argues the
    Board “relied on substantial evidence to find Mylan’s defi-
    nition of the ‘problem’ more appropriately defined the scope
    of analogous art.” Id. at 28.
    We agree with Sanofi that Mylan did not carry its bur-
    den to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the ’614 patent.
    Moreover, the Board’s factual findings regarding analo-
    gousness are not supported by substantial evidence. See
    Magnum Oil, 
    829 F.3d at 1381
    . Because the Board found
    that Burren and Venezia alone do not render all the chal-
    lenged claims unpatentable without the benefit of de
    Gennes, the Board’s finding that de Gennes constitutes
    analogous art is dispositive to its conclusion. Decision at
    *15–21. Accordingly, we reverse.
    We first examine the framework a fact finder must use
    to evaluate whether a reference constitutes analogous art.
    Next, we examine whether Mylan supported its arguments
    properly under this framework.
    1. Analogous Art Test
    “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior
    art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor,
    regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the refer-
    ence is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor,
    whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the
    particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In
    re Bigio, 
    381 F.3d 1320
    , 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations
    omitted); see also In re Clay, 
    966 F.2d 656
    , 658–59 (Fed.
    Cir. 1992); In re Wood, 
    599 F.2d 1032
    , 1036 (CCPA 1979).
    The “problem” being examined must not be defined so nar-
    rowly as to collapse these inquiries and only consider art
    within the inventor’s field of endeavor. Donner Tech., 979
    F.3d at 1360 (“Such a PHOSITA—resigned to considering
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    8                     SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    art outside her field of endeavor—would thus not identify
    the problems so narrowly so as to rule out all such art.”);
    ICON Health, 
    496 F.3d at 1380
     (refusing to limit problem
    to treadmills and instead focusing on problems of “support-
    ing the weight” of folding mechanism and “providing a sta-
    ble resting position”).
    Mylan argues we should reject Sanofi’s “rigid and le-
    gally improper analogous-art test” that would set aside the
    Board’s findings “simply because the petition allegedly an-
    alyzed the ‘problem’ to be solved in terms of the prior art
    instead of [the ’614 patent].” Appellee’s Br. 34. We disa-
    gree.
    In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we
    have consistently held that a patent challenger must com-
    pare the reference to the challenged patent. Donner Tech.,
    979 F.3d at 1359 (examining whether reference is “reason-
    ably pertinent to one or more of the particular problems to
    which the [challenged] patent relates” (emphasis added));
    Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 
    841 F.3d 995
    , 1001
    (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“If a reference disclosure and the claimed
    invention have a same purpose, the reference relates to the
    same problem.” (emphasis added)); Bigio, 
    381 F.3d at 1325
    (examining whether prior art is “reasonably pertinent to
    the particular problem with which the inventor is involved”
    (emphasis added)). This conclusion is reinforced by the
    purpose of the analogous art test, which is to examine
    whether a reference can be considered as prior art to the
    challenged patent in the first place. Chemours Co. FC, LLC
    v. Daikin Indus., Ltd., 
    4 F.4th 1370
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
    (analogous art test defines “scope of the relevant prior
    art”); Donner Tech., 979 F.3d at 1359 (“The scope of the
    prior art includes all analogous art.”); Cir. Check Inc. v.
    QXQ Inc., 
    795 F.3d 1331
    , 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“To be con-
    sidered within the prior art for purposes of the obviousness
    analysis, a reference must be analogous.”).
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    SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH        v.                      9
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    At most, the cases cited by Mylan confirm that an ad-
    judicator must consider the “purposes of both the invention
    and the prior art”—Clay, 
    966 F.2d at
    659—but the purpose
    of the “prior art” must be evaluated with reference to the
    inventor’s purported invention disclosed within the chal-
    lenged patent. 
    Id.
     (“If a reference disclosure has the same
    purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to
    the same problem, and that fact supports use of that refer-
    ence in an obviousness rejection.” (emphasis added)).
    Mylan cites Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 
    335 U.S. 291
    ,
    295–96 (1948), and In re Mariani, 
    177 F.2d 293
    , 294–96
    (CCPA 1949), to argue it is proper to compare a reference
    to other references for analogous art purposes. Appellee’s
    Br. 35–36. We disagree with Mylan’s interpretation of
    those cases. In Mandel Bros., the Court held that prior art
    in the field of chemistry could be considered in examining
    the patentee’s use of urea in the field of cosmetics. 
    335 U.S. at 296
    ; 
    id. at 292
     (“The claimed discovery of the patent is
    in adding to the old acid-salts cosmetics certain types of the
    reactive amino chemical group, particularly urea.”). Thus,
    the Court’s analysis undeniably focused on the problem in
    the challenged patent. 
    Id.
     As to Mariani, that decision
    declined to “express[] any view upon the question of non-
    analogous art.” 
    177 F.2d at 296
    . Even so, Mylan appears
    to acknowledge that the patentee in Mariani sought to
    challenge that the prior art was “analogous to the claimed
    invention.” Appellee’s Br. 36 (emphasis added); see Mari-
    ani, 
    177 F.2d at 295
     (“[T]he gravamen of the allegations of
    error . . . is that both [prior art] patents are in fields of art
    not analogous to the field of appellant’s application.” (em-
    phasis added)).
    Mylan’s arguments would allow a challenger to focus
    on the problems of alleged prior art references while ignor-
    ing the problems of the challenged patent. Even if a refer-
    ence is analogous to one problem considered in another
    reference, it does not necessarily follow that the reference
    would be analogous to the problems of the challenged
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    10                    SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    patent. Mylan argues that a fact finder must construe the
    scope of analogous art broadly because “familiar items may
    have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.” Appel-
    lee’s Br. 35 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wyers v. Master
    Lock Co., 
    616 F.3d 1231
    , 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see also
    KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
    550 U.S. 398
    , 420 (2007). We
    agree. But that conclusion does not allow a fact finder to
    focus on the problems contained in other prior art refer-
    ences to the exclusion of the problem of the challenged pa-
    tent.
    2. Mylan’s Analogous Art Arguments
    Next, we turn to whether Mylan properly supported its
    argument that de Gennes is analogous art to the ’614 pa-
    tent. Because it did not, the Board’s conclusion that de
    Gennes is analogous to the ’614 patent is not supported by
    substantial evidence.
    We have routinely held that the petitioner has the bur-
    den of proving unpatentability. Magnum Oil, 
    829 F.3d at 1375
    ; see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cam-
    bridge Ltd., 
    821 F.3d 1359
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of
    the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceed-
    ings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition
    identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the
    grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 
    35 U.S.C. § 312
    (a)(3))). A petitioner has the ultimate burden
    “to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evi-
    dence.’” Magnum Oil, 
    829 F.3d at 1375
     (quoting 
    35 U.S.C. § 316
    (e)).
    We have reversed the Board’s patentability determina-
    tion where a petitioner did not adequately present a moti-
    vation to combine. In Magnum Oil, the Petitioner analyzed
    and asserted a first combination of prior art references and
    argued that the “same analysis applies” to a second combi-
    nation of prior art references based on a different primary
    reference. Id. at 1372. The Board instituted the IPR and
    issued a final written decision in view of the second
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    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    combination. Id. at 1373. We held that the Board erred
    because “[n]either the Board nor the petitioner explained
    why borrowing the rationale for combining the first set of
    references equally applies to the second set of references.”
    Id. at 1378. We reversed because, among other things, the
    petitioner’s conclusory statements could not satisfy the pe-
    titioner’s burden of demonstrating a motivation to combine
    and “the Board’s factual findings regarding the alleged mo-
    tivation to combine lacked substantial evidence.” Id. at
    1380–81. Similarly, in In re IPR Licensing, Inc., we re-
    versed a Board decision finding claims unpatentable that
    relied on draft Universal Mobile Telecommunications Sys-
    tem (“UMTS”) standards because the petitioner had “not
    relied on the UMTS standards in its petition” and “pointed
    to nothing” to support its motivation to combine argu-
    ments. 
    942 F.3d 1363
    , 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
    Here, Mylan did not make the analogous art argument
    on which the Board’s obviousness finding relied—that de
    Gennes is analogous to the ’614 patent. E.g., J.A. 111 (IPR
    Petition) (“Professor Erdman explains how De Gennes,
    while concerned with a clutch bearing, addresses a problem
    analogous to that addressed in Burren . . . .”); J.A. 1507
    (Expert Declaration) (“[A]lthough De Gennes is concerned
    with a clutch bearing, it addresses a problem analogous to
    that addressed in Burren.”). As we explain, Mylan’s argu-
    ments as to Burren are insufficient to carry its burden be-
    cause they do not address the ’614 patent.
    Mylan cites several statements in its petition that dis-
    cuss the purported problem of the ’614 patent and the prior
    art generally to argue that it properly addressed the anal-
    ogous art issue. See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. 23–25. Mylan
    identified the alleged invention of the ’614 patent as “se-
    curely holding a cartridge within a drug-delivery device” by
    incorporating “a spring element—a spring washer—to ap-
    ply an axially-directed biasing force.” J.A. 89. In discuss-
    ing the level of ordinary skill in the art, Mylan explained
    that a person of skill in the art “would have been familiar
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    12                    SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH v.
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    with elements commonly used to bias and secure compo-
    nents within mechanical devices (e.g., spring elements, fas-
    tening structures) and the mechanical principles involved,”
    as “confirmed by [the ’614 patent’s] specification.” J.A. 99.
    Mylan argued that Burren teaches “injection pens” with
    “components that perform the same function as those
    claimed by [the ’614 patent].” J.A. 112. Mylan also com-
    pared de Gennes to elements of the challenged claims
    within the ’614 patent. J.A. 114–48. None of these pas-
    sages, however, explain how de Gennes is analogous to the
    ’614 patent.
    A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise
    analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a peti-
    tioner can use its reply to “respond to arguments raised in
    the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary re-
    sponse, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”
    See 
    37 C.F.R. § 42.23
    . However, Mylan did not use its reply
    to explain how de Gennes is analogous to the ’614 patent.
    See J.A. 3153–56 (Mylan Reply Brief); J.A. 3372–78, 3382
    (Mylan’s Second Expert Declaration). Instead, Mylan dis-
    puted that it needed to frame its arguments as to the ’614
    patent and accused Sanofi of misunderstanding the law.
    J.A. 3136 (“Sanofi’s analysis of de Gennes’ analogousness
    relies on a faulty understanding of controlling law . . . .”);
    J.A. 3154 (“Sanofi tries to change the pertinent problem by
    importing extraneous goals from [the ’614 patent] . . . .”);
    J.A. 3155 (“De Gennes provides these functions, which a
    POSA reading Burren (rather than reading the goals of
    [the ’614 patent] with hindsight) would have considered
    highly relevant.”). Thus, Mylan’s reply also did not argue
    that de Gennes is analogous to the ’614 patent.
    In a footnote, Mylan further argues that it carried its
    burden by arguing at oral argument before the Board that
    Burren and the ’614 patent have the same problem. Appel-
    lee’s Br. 27 n.2. Although Mylan argued that Burren and
    the ’614 patent address the “same problem,” Mylan pointed
    to a different problem than it relied upon to argue that de
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    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
    Gennes was analogous. Compare Decision at *8 (“Peti-
    tioner defines the problem as ‘axial[ ] fixation and support
    of two components relative to one another.’”), with J.A.
    3705 (“They’re both interest[ed] in solving the same issue
    and that is on the Burren side accommodating various car-
    tridge lengths and on the [’614 patent] side identifying the
    cartridges.” (emphases added)). Recognizing that Mylan
    raised a new problem, the Board questioned whether de
    Gennes “address[ed] that problem at all,” and Mylan ex-
    plained that de Gennes “address[es] the holding, the taking
    up end play in a bearing by applying axial force to hold one
    component and abut it against another[.]” J.A. 3706. Re-
    gardless, Mylan’s conclusory statements arguing that Bur-
    ren and the ’614 patent address the “same problem” are
    insufficient to carry its burden to argue de Gennes is anal-
    ogous to the ’614 patent. See Magnum Oil, 
    829 F.3d at 1380
    (holding that conclusory statements that “[t]he same anal-
    ysis” applied to different prior art did not provide sufficient
    evidence to base its legal conclusion of obviousness).
    We do not interpret the Board’s decision as concluding
    that Mylan argued de Gennes is analogous to the ’614 pa-
    tent. To the contrary, the Board appears to have agreed
    that “Petitioner and Petitioner’s declarant refer to Burren
    when identifying a problem.” Decision at *8 n.4. Because
    Mylan argued that de Gennes is analogous to another prior
    art reference and not the challenged patent, Mylan did not
    meet its burden to establish obviousness premised on de
    Gennes. Thus, the Board’s factual finding that de Gennes
    is analogous to the ’614 patent is unsupported by substan-
    tial evidence.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We have considered the parties’ other arguments and
    find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, we re-
    verse.
    REVERSED