Leblanc v. United States , 410 F. App'x 323 ( 2011 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    ELWOOD J. LEBLANC, JR. and JANICE L.
    LEBLANC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2010-5073
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in Case No. 05-CV-743, Judge Francis M. Allegra.
    ___________________________
    Decided: February 7, 2011
    ___________________________
    THOMAS E. REDDING, Redding & Associates, P.C., of
    Houston, Texas, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With
    him on the brief were TERESA J. WOMACK and SALLIE W.
    GLADNEY.
    DEBORAH K. SNYDER, Attorney, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Tax Division, United States Department of
    Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-
    appellee. With her on the brief were JOHN A. DICICCO,
    LEBLANC   v. US                                            2
    Acting Assistant Attorney General, and BRUCE R.
    ELLISEN, Attorney.
    __________________________
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, GAJARSA and PROST, Circuit
    Judges.
    RADER, Chief Judge.
    On summary judgment, the United States Court of
    Federal Claims determined that Elwood J. LeBlanc, Jr.
    and Janice L. LeBlanc had no entitlement to a refund for
    federal income tax paid in connection with their invest-
    ments in a partnership. LeBlanc v. United States, 90 Fed.
    Cl. 186, 195-96, 203 (Fed. Cl. 2009). The trial court also
    refused to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
    Id. Because the
    trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    over this refund claim, this court reverses the jurisdic-
    tional finding and remands the case with instructions to
    dismiss.
    I
    The LeBlancs became limited partners in Agri-Cal
    Venture Associates (“ACVA”) in 1986. On its partnership
    tax return for tax year 1986, ACVA claimed a net loss of
    approximately $34 million. Based on their distributive
    share of these losses, the LeBlancs reported a loss deduc-
    tion of $69,380 on their 1986 joint federal income tax
    return. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) disallowed
    approximately $33 million of the claimed losses, in part
    because it found that “[t]he partnership’s activities consti-
    tuted a series of sham transactions lacking economic
    substance.” J.A. 97-101. In response, some of the part-
    ners filed a petition in the United States Tax Court seek-
    ing readjustment of partnership items.
    In 1999, the LeBlancs abandoned their partnership
    3                                             LEBLANC   v. US
    interest in ACVA. Then in 2000, while the partnership-
    level proceeding before the Tax Court was still pending,
    they settled their 1986 income tax liability with the IRS.
    Under that partner-specific settlement agreement, the
    IRS allowed them to report about half of the previously
    disallowed losses.
    The Tax Court issued its decision in the partnership-
    level proceeding in 2001, reducing ACVA’s net loss in tax
    year 1986 by approximately $16 million based on its
    finding that the partnership’s activities “lacked economic
    substance.” J.A. 179-80.
    In 2002, the LeBlancs filed a refund claim for their
    1999 tax year. They claimed an ordinary loss of $34,084
    and sought a refund of $8,789 “[t]o reflect loss on partner-
    ship interest abandonment” for ACVA. J.A. 192-93, 199.
    The IRS disallowed their refund claim. The LeBlancs
    filed this refund suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
    In their amended complaint, the LeBlancs alleged
    that “[a]s an indirect consequence of the settlement, there
    was a substantial basis in the partnership interest and a
    resulting loss upon the abandonment of the partnership,
    which loss is the basis of this claim for refund.” J.A. 242.
    The Government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for
    summary judgment that the LeBlancs’ basis in their
    partnership interest was zero at the time of the alleged
    abandonment, precluding the claimed loss. The trial
    court found that it had jurisdiction but granted the Gov-
    ernment’s motion for summary judgment. This court has
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
    II
    This court reviews without deference the trial court’s
    determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction.
    LEBLANC   v. US                                          
    4 Wilson v
    . United States, 
    405 F.3d 1002
    , 1008 (Fed. Cir.
    2005).
    In Schell v. United States, 
    589 F.3d 1378
    (Fed. Cir.
    2009), a decision that issued after the trial court had
    already decided the instant case, this court was presented
    with a nearly identical set of facts and concluded that the
    trial court lacked jurisdiction. Like the LeBlancs, the
    Schell taxpayers invested in partnerships that reported
    losses and then reported their pro rata share of the loss
    on their tax returns. 
    Id. at 1380.
    The IRS found that the
    partnerships’ activities were sham transactions, lacking
    economic substance, and disallowed the claimed losses.
    
    Id. While partnership-level
    proceedings challenging these
    findings were pending in the Tax Court, the taxpayers in
    Schell entered into partner-specific settlement agree-
    ments with the IRS, allowing them to report approxi-
    mately half of the previously disallowed losses. 
    Id. The Tax
    Court later found that the partnerships’ transactions
    “lacked economic substance.” 
    Id. After the
    partnerships at issue terminated, the Schell
    taxpayers filed a refund claim, contending that “as a
    direct consequence of the settlement . . . there was a
    substantial basis in the partnership interest and a result-
    ing loss upon the dissolution and termination of the
    partnership, which loss is the basis of this claim for
    refund.” 
    Id. The IRS
    rejected their refund claim, and the
    taxpayers in Schell filed a complaint at the Court of
    Federal Claims. 
    Id. The Court
    of Federal Claims dis-
    missed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and this
    court affirmed on appeal. 
    Id. at 1380-81,
    1384.
    As this court explained in Schell, “a sham transaction,
    devoid of economic substance, cannot be the basis for a
    deductible loss.” 
    Id. at 1382.
    Consequently, the refund
    claim was necessarily based on the assertion that the
    5                                           LEBLANC   v. US
    partnerships’ transactions were not shams. Because the
    question as to whether a partnership transaction was a
    sham is a partnership item, Keener v. United States, 
    551 F.3d 1358
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009), such refund claims are
    attributable to a partnership item. Under the Tax Equity
    and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”), the
    Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear partner
    refund claims where the refund is “attributable to part-
    nership items.” I.R.C. § 7422(h). Accordingly, the Court
    of Federal Claims correctly found that it lacked jurisdic-
    tion over the refund claim in Schell. 
    Id. The same
    reasoning applies to the LeBlancs. Their
    refund claim rests on the assertion that ACVA’s transac-
    tions were not shams and thus is attributable to a part-
    nership item.     Because the facts in this case are
    indistinguishable from the facts in Schell, this court
    reverses the trial court’s jurisdictional finding and re-
    mands with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-5073

Citation Numbers: 410 F. App'x 323

Judges: Gajarsa, Prost, Rader

Filed Date: 2/7/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023