Belcher v. Dept. Of Veterans Affairs , 490 F. App'x 353 ( 2012 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    ROBERT L. BELCHER,
    Claimant-Appellant,
    v.
    ERIC K. SHINSEKI,
    SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2011-7181
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims in Case No. 09-622, Judge William P.
    Greene, Jr.
    ___________________________
    Decided: July 24, 2012
    ___________________________
    ZACHARY M. STOLZ, Chisholm Chisholm & Kilpatrick,
    LLP, of Providence, Rhode Island, argued for claimant-
    appellant. Of counsel was THOMAS R. BENDER.
    STACEY K. GRIGSBY, Attorney, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-
    appellee. With her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assis-
    BELCHER   v. SHINSEKI                                   2
    tant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director,
    and MARTIN F. HOCKEY, Assistant Director. Of counsel on
    the brief were MICHAEL J. TIMINSKI, Deputy Assistant
    General Counsel, and DANA RAFFAELLI, Attorney, United
    States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington,
    DC.
    __________________________
    Before LOURIE, PROST, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    INTRODUCTION
    Veteran Robert L. Belcher (“Belcher”) appeals the de-
    cision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
    Claims (“Veterans Court”) in Belcher v. Shinseki, No. 09-
    0622, 
    2010 WL 5377718
     (Vet. App. Dec. 21, 2010). In its
    decision, the Veterans Court affirmed the December 12,
    2008 decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”)
    that denied service connection for post-traumatic stress
    disorder (“PTSD”). Specifically, the Board denied Mr.
    Belcher’s claimed in-service stressors finding that they
    could not be corroborated. Belcher, 
    2010 WL 5377718
    , at
    *1. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Belcher served on active duty with the Marine
    Corps from November 1952 to October 1955. On Septem-
    ber 8, 2005, he filed a claim for disability compensation
    for PTSD. Mr. Belcher claimed that his PTSD stems from
    two incidents or stressors: (1) a near drowning experience
    in a swimming pool during boot camp; and (2) an am-
    phibious landing training in Iwo Jima where Mr. Belcher
    and several others fell into the ocean. On March 14, 2006,
    a Department of Veterans Affairs regional office (“RO”)
    denied the claim, finding that his claimed stressors could
    3                                       BELCHER   v. SHINSEKI
    not be corroborated and that he lacked a confirmed diag-
    nosis of PTSD. In response to the decision, Mr. Belcher
    filed a notice of disagreement and requested a hearing
    before a decision review officer. On April 10, 2007, the
    RO issued a statement of the case, denying the claim for
    lack of evidence corroborating the occurrence of the al-
    leged in-service stressors.
    Mr. Belcher appealed to the Board. Upon acknowl-
    edging that Mr. Belcher had a provisional diagnosis of
    PTSD, 1 the Board began its analysis with a discussion of
    Mr. Belcher’s claimed stressors. The Board found that
    the record, including testimony from Mr. Belcher, his
    wife, and friends, did not contain credible supporting
    evidence that his claimed stressors occurred. To begin,
    the Board determined that Mr. Belcher did not engage in
    combat and, thus, could not avail himself of the more
    relaxed evidentiary standard for combat-related stressors
    under 
    38 U.S.C. § 3.304
    (f). With respect to his claimed
    stressors, the Board explained that the boot camp inci-
    dent was anecdotal in nature, and as a result, unverifi-
    able. The Board also found no evidence in the record to
    support Mr. Belcher’s account of the amphibious landing
    exercise. Therefore, on December 12, 2008, the Board
    denied Mr. Belcher’s claim for entitlement to disability
    compensation for PTSD.
    On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Belcher argued
    that the Board failed to provide an adequate statement of
    reasons or bases for its determination that his claimed in-
    1
    According to 
    38 C.F.R. § 3.304
    (f), service con-
    nection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnos-
    ing the condition in accordance with 
    38 C.F.R. § 4.125
    (a)
    of this chapter; (2) a link, established by medical evidence,
    between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and
    (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-
    service stressor occurred.
    BELCHER   v. SHINSEKI                                      4
    service stressor, related to the alleged events in Iwo Jima,
    could not be corroborated. Belcher, 
    2010 WL 5377718
    , at
    *1. In particular, he argued that his stressor was verified
    by: (1) his lay statements that allege that he fell from a
    ship near Iwo Jima, cut his hand, and nearly drowned; (2)
    records that show he was on a ship near Iwo Jima; and (3)
    evidence of a scar on his hand at separation from duty. 
    Id.
    The Veterans Court affirmed the December 2008 Board
    decision. Mr. Belcher timely appealed his case to this
    court.
    DISCUSSION
    Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans
    Court is limited by statute. 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (a). We have
    jurisdiction to review a decision of the Veterans Court
    “with respect to the validity of a decision of the [Veterans]
    Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . .
    or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination
    as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the [Veter-
    ans] Court in making the decision.” 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (a).
    Our authority extends to deciding all relevant questions
    of law, and we can set aside a regulation or an interpreta-
    tion of a regulation relied upon by the Veterans Court
    when we find it to be “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse
    of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
    contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
    immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
    limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or without
    observance of procedure required by law.” Jones v. West,
    
    194 F.3d 1345
    , 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (d)(1). This court’s jurisdiction, however, does not
    extend to the ability to review factual determinations or
    the application of a law or regulation to a particular set of
    facts unless a constitutional issue is presented. 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (d)(2).
    5                                       BELCHER   v. SHINSEKI
    Here, the Veterans Court found that the “record failed
    to reveal documentation of the triggering event or any
    records of Mr. Belcher’s medical treatment following the
    incident.” Belcher, 
    2010 WL 5377718
    , at *1. For example,
    although recognizing that Mr. Belcher has a scar on his
    hand and that he was stationed aboard a ship near Iwo
    Jima, the Veterans Court determined that these facts do
    not serve to corroborate the alleged in-service event
    claimed to be the triggering stressor. 
    Id.
     The Veterans
    Court did not require corroboration of every detail of the
    alleged stressor, but nevertheless, concluded that the
    evidence presented was insufficient to provide support
    that he fell from a ship, nearly drowned, and injured his
    hand. 
    Id.
     Thus, the Veterans Court held that the Board’s
    finding was plausibly based on all of the evidence of
    record and supported by an adequate statement of rea-
    sons or bases. 
    Id.
    We have no jurisdiction over this case because the
    Veterans Court’s decision was based on factual determi-
    nations and/or the application of a law or regulation to a
    particular set of facts. Under the guise of a legal chal-
    lenge, Mr. Belcher contends that the Veterans Court
    applied “too stringent a standard under both 
    38 U.S.C. § 1154
    (a) and 
    38 C.F.R. § 3.304
    (f).” Specifically, he argues
    that the Veterans Court erred by requiring “meaningful
    support” to his allegation that he fell from a ship, nearly
    drowned, and injured his hand when the statute and
    regulation require only “credible supporting” evidence
    that the stressor occurred. The Veterans Court’s use of
    the word “meaningful” as opposed to “credible,” however,
    is a distinction without a difference in this instance. A
    review of the Veterans Court’s decision shows it did not
    interpret a rule of law or any statute or regulation or any
    interpretation thereof. Rather, the Veterans Court af-
    firmed the Board’s finding that the evidence did not
    BELCHER   v. SHINSEKI                                   6
    support Mr. Belcher’s claimed non-combat related
    stressor. Thus, Mr. Belcher’s arguments merely challenge
    the weight given to the evidence, which we lack jurisdic-
    tion to review. See, e.g., Maxson v. Gober, 
    230 F.3d 1330
    ,
    1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The weighing of this evidence is
    not within our appellate jurisdiction.”). This appeal is
    therefore dismissed.
    DISMISSED
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-7181

Citation Numbers: 490 F. App'x 353

Judges: Lourie, Per Curiam, Prost, Wallach

Filed Date: 7/24/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023