James Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys , 767 F.3d 379 ( 2014 )


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  •                                PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-2173
    JAMES OWENS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    BALTIMORE CITY STATE’S ATTORNEYS OFFICE; MARVIN BRAVE,
    Individually and in his Official Capacity as an Assistant of
    the Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office; BALTIMORE CITY
    POLICE DEPARTMENT; GARY DUNNIGAN, Individually and in his
    Official Capacity as an Officer and Detective of the
    Baltimore City Police Department; JAY LANDSMAN, Individually
    and in his Official Capacity as an Officer and Detective of
    the Baltimore City Police Department; THOMAS PELLIGRINI,
    Individually and in his Official Capacity as an Officer and
    Detective of the Baltimore City Police Department,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell III, District Judge.
    (1:11-cv-03295-GLR)
    Argued:   January 28, 2014            Decided:   September 24, 2014
    Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
    opinion.   Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
    Traxler concurs as to Parts III., IV.A., and V. and dissents as
    to Parts II. and IV.B., and Judge Wynn concurs, except for Part
    III.   Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Wynn each wrote a separate
    opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    ARGUED: Charles N. Curlett, Jr., LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore,
    Maryland; Laura Ginsberg Abelson, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.   Daniel C. Beck, BALTIMORE
    CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland; Michele J. McDonald,
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,
    for Appellees.   ON BRIEF: Joshua R. Treem, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN &
    LEVY, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.       Douglas F.
    Gansler, Attorney General, H. Scott Curtis, Assistant Attorney
    General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore,
    Maryland; George A. Nilson, BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    2
    DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
    James    Owens       brought    this       action       under   
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    against      the     Baltimore       City    State’s           Attorney’s        Office,   an
    assistant       State’s        Attorney,          the     Baltimore         City      Police
    Department, and several Baltimore City police officers.                               In his
    complaint,      Owens      alleges     that       the     defendants        violated       his
    constitutional rights by intentionally withholding exculpatory
    evidence     during     his    1988    trial       for    the     rape     and    murder   of
    Colleen Williar.           The district court dismissed the complaint in
    its   entirety       against   all    defendants          on    statute-of-limitations
    grounds.      In the alternative, the court held that the Baltimore
    City State’s Attorney’s Office enjoyed sovereign immunity, the
    individual      police      officers        enjoyed       qualified        immunity,       and
    Owens’s      cause    of    action     against      the        Baltimore     City     Police
    Department failed to state a claim on which relief could be
    granted.      For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate
    in part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    I.
    Owens appeals the dismissal of his complaint for failure to
    state a claim.         Accordingly, we recount the facts as alleged by
    Owens   in    his     complaint,      accepting          as    true   all    well-pleaded
    3
    facts.     See Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 
    669 F.3d 428
    , 430 n.1
    (4th Cir. 2012).
    A.
    In    the   early    morning    hours    of   August    2,    1987,    Colleen
    Williar    was   raped,   robbed,    and     murdered   in   the     second-floor
    bedroom of her Baltimore City apartment.              The following day, one
    of   Williar’s     neighbors,   James       Thompson,   contacted         the   city
    police department to inquire about a reward it had offered for
    information relating to Ms. Williar’s death.                  Thompson claimed
    that he had found a knife outside of Ms. Williar’s apartment the
    previous evening, which he had carried home and cleaned before
    realizing    its   connection   to    the    crime.     Over       the    course   of
    Thompson’s conversation with police, however, it became apparent
    that Thompson had not simply “happened” on the knife, as he
    originally claimed.         Rather, in response to questioning from
    Officers    Thomas   Pelligrini,      Gary    Dunnigan,      and    Jay    Landsman
    (collectively, “the Officers”), Thompson asserted that he had
    retrieved the knife at the behest of his friend, James Owens.
    The Officers executed a search warrant at Owens’s apartment, but
    found no physical evidence linking Owens to the crime.                          Even
    though the search was fruitless, police arrested Owens on the
    basis of Thompson’s statement.          A grand jury then indicted Owens
    for Ms. Williar’s murder, rape, and burglary.
    4
    On the eve of Owens’s trial, Assistant State’s Attorney
    (“ASA”) Marvin Brave, the prosecutor assigned to Owens’s case,
    began to question the veracity of Thompson’s version of events.
    When ASA Brave raised these concerns with Thompson, the witness
    retracted his statement and offered another explanation for the
    knife’s acquisition.        This time, Thompson stated that the knife
    belonged to him, but he claimed that it had gone missing after
    Owens visited Thompson at his home.                The day after Ms. Williar’s
    murder, Owens assertedly returned the knife to Thompson, who
    noticed blood on the weapon’s blade and handle.                         When Thompson
    questioned Owens about the origin of the blood, Owens denied
    using the weapon and told Thompson to keep quiet about it.
    At trial, ASA Brave presented only this third version of
    events to the jury.         Brave never informed defense counsel about
    Thompson’s    earlier      accounts,       and    thus,    when     cross-examining
    Thompson,    defense      counsel    was       unaware    that    the    witness    had
    changed     his   story    several       times     over     the    course     of    the
    investigation.
    Nevertheless, defense counsel apparently cast enough doubt
    on   Thompson’s    testimony        to   prompt      ASA    Brave       to   seek   out
    additional evidence of Owens’s guilt.                    To this end, mid-trial,
    ASA Brave ordered testing of a pubic hair found on Ms. Williar’s
    body.     When the results were returned, however, they indicated
    that Thompson -- not Owens -- matched the sample.                            Concerned
    5
    that Thompson was involved in the crimes, ASA Brave instructed
    the Officers to reinterrogate Thompson.
    At ASA   Brave’s   direction,         Officers    Pelligrini,     Dunnigan,
    and     Landsman    brought    Thompson         into     the     stationhouse     and
    questioned him for two hours.             The Officers accused Thompson of
    lying on the witness stand, warned him that he “was in a lot of
    trouble,” and asserted that he could be charged with a crime for
    his    misrepresentations      to   the       jury.      After    receiving     their
    warnings, Thompson stated that he wanted to change his story yet
    again.     In fact, over the course of the two-hour interview,
    Thompson changed his story five additional times.
    In his first new attempt, Thompson told the Officers that
    he and Owens had broken into Ms. Williar’s apartment on the day
    of the murder only to find Ms. Williar already dead in her
    bedroom.     When the Officers replied that they did not believe
    him,     Thompson    offered    another        iteration.          This   time,   he
    contended that Owens had raped and murdered Ms. Williar upstairs
    while    Thompson    waited    downstairs        in    the     living   room.     The
    Officers responded that there was evidence that Thompson had
    been on the second floor, and thus, his amended account could
    not be true.        After this prompt, Thompson admitted that he had
    been on the second floor, but insisted that he had hidden in the
    bathroom during Owens’s crimes.                 The Officers again rejected
    Thompson’s story, stating that investigators had found physical
    6
    evidence of Thompson’s presence in Ms. Williar’s bedroom.                                      In
    response,      Thompson      admitted      that       he    had   been     in    the    bedroom
    while Owens raped and killed Ms. Williar, but he insisted that
    he had refused to participate in any assault.                               At this point,
    the   Officers        informed       Thompson       that    his    pubic    hair       had   been
    found     on    Ms.    Williar.          Faced       with    the    forensic       evidence,
    Thompson offered a fifth version of events.                              In this account,
    Thompson claimed that he and Owens had broken into Ms. Williar’s
    apartment with the intent to steal her jewelry.                              When the pair
    found the victim alone in her bedroom, Owens raped and killed
    her, while Thompson masturbated at the foot of her bed.
    After the Officers elicited this latest account, Officer
    Landsman       told    ASA     Brave     about       Thompson’s       final      version       of
    events.        None     of     the    Officers       disclosed       that       Thompson      had
    offered several other accounts of what happened, all of which
    differed dramatically from the version of events related to ASA
    Brave as well as from the physical evidence.
    Following        his     conversation         with    the    Officers,       ASA       Brave
    immediately called Thompson back to the witness stand and had
    him   share     with     the    jury     his    new    account       of    what    happened.
    However, because only the Officers knew of the inconsistencies
    in Thompson’s statements, neither ASA Brave nor defense counsel
    questioned Thompson about the four inconsistent versions of the
    story that the witness had offered before he settled on his
    7
    final account.        Moreover, neither ASA Brave nor the Officers
    told defense counsel about the discovery of Thompson’s pubic
    hair.    Indeed, when defense counsel inquired about whether there
    had been forensic testing of the hair, ASA Brave represented to
    the court that “there [hadn’t] been any match made” between the
    sample and a suspect. 1
    The jury convicted Owens of burglary and felony murder, and
    the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the
    possibility of parole.       Owens filed an unsuccessful appeal, and,
    over the course of the next two decades, several unsuccessful
    state-court    petitions    for     post-conviction   relief.       In   2006,
    however,   a   state     court    granted   Owens’s   request      for   post-
    conviction DNA testing.          The results were returned some months
    later and indicated that Owens’s DNA did not match the blood and
    semen evidence found at the scene of the crime.
    On June 4, 2007, a state court granted Owens’s “petition to
    reopen   his   Post    Conviction    Proceeding”   and   ordered    that   “by
    agreement of Counsel and this Honorable Court, . . . Petitioner
    1
    Owens also alleges that ASA Brave withheld impeachment
    evidence with respect to a different witness:      Larry Oliver,
    Owens’s cellmate.    Specifically, Owens asserts that ASA Brave
    intentionally withheld the fact that he had promised leniency to
    Oliver, who testified that Owens confessed to him in their jail
    cell.      Because  the    issues  involved   in this   asserted
    nondisclosure are identical to those involved in ASA Brave’s
    nondisclosures regarding Thompson and the DNA evidence, we focus
    only on those facts for the sake of simplicity.
    8
    shall be granted a new trial.”                     During the next sixteen months,
    Owens remained in state prison awaiting retrial.                        On October 15,
    2008, the State’s Attorney entered a nolle prosequi, dropping
    the charges against him.                 On that date, after Owens had spent
    more than twenty years in prison, the state court ordered him
    released from incarceration.
    B.
    On    October      12,     2011,     a    few     days    before   the    three-year
    anniversary of the nolle prosequi, Owens filed this action under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
            against    the        Mayor     and   City     Council   of
    Baltimore,       the   Baltimore      City      State’s       Attorney’s      Office,   ASA
    Brave,     the    Baltimore       City        Police     Department     (“BCPD”),       and
    Officers Pelligrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman.                         In his complaint,
    Owens alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional
    rights by intentionally and in bad faith withholding exculpatory
    and impeachment evidence at his 1988 trial.
    All     defendants         moved     to       dismiss     the   complaint.         The
    Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office asserted that it was
    not an entity amenable to suit, and that even if it were, it was
    an “arm of the State,” immune from liability.                           The individual
    Officers,     the      BCPD,    and   ASA      Brave     all    moved   to    dismiss   on
    statute-of-limitations grounds.                     Alternatively, the individual
    Officers asserted that qualified immunity protected them from
    9
    suit, and the BCPD maintained that Owens failed to state a claim
    on which relief could be granted.
    After Owens voluntarily dismissed the claims against the
    Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the district court, in an
    oral ruling, dismissed the claims against the other defendants.
    The court initially determined that Owens’s claims were time
    barred because the limitations period for his causes of action
    commenced when the state court granted Owens’s request for a new
    trial,    not    (as   Owens    claimed)       on   the   date   that   prosecutors
    entered    the   nolle   prosequi.         Although       the    limitations   issue
    disposed of all of Owens’s claims, the court went on to briefly
    address the defendants’ alternative grounds for dismissal.                     In a
    series of rulings, the court determined that the Baltimore City
    State’s Attorney’s Office was entitled to sovereign immunity,
    that   the   individual        Officers    and      the   BCPD   were   entitled   to
    qualified immunity, and that Owens’s complaint failed to state a
    claim against the BCPD.          Owens noted a timely appeal.
    We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
    de novo.     Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 
    7 F.3d 1130
    , 1134 (4th
    Cir. 1993).       At this stage in the proceedings, we “accept as
    true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,”
    and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
    E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 
    637 F.3d 435
    , 440 (4th Cir. 2011).           To prevail, Owens must “state a claim
    10
    to relief that is plausible on its face.”                    Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (emphasis added and internal quotation
    marks    omitted).       A    claim    has     “facial    plausibility    when    the
    plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
    the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.”          
    Id.
    II.
    We    first     consider      whether     the     applicable     statute   of
    limitations bars all of Owens’s claims.
    Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations.
    Thus, to determine the timely filing of a § 1983 claim, courts
    borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-
    law cause of action.                See 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    (a).            For § 1983
    suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury suit.                            See
    Owens   v.    Okure,    
    488 U.S. 235
    ,    249–50    (1989).      Maryland    law
    affords plaintiffs three years to file a personal-injury action.
    See 
    Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101
    .                      Hence, a three-
    year limitations period applies to Owens’s claims.
    The parties agree that Owens had three years to file his
    § 1983 action.         They disagree, however, as to the date on which
    this    three-year     limitations      period     began    to   run.     Appellees
    contend that the three-year clock on Owens’s claims began to run
    on June 4, 2007, the date on which the state court vacated his
    11
    conviction and granted him a new trial.                           Appellees’ Br. 24.
    Because Owens filed suit more than three years after this date
    (on    October      12,    2011),      the   Appellees      maintain         that    all     of
    Owens’s     claims    are       time    barred.       Id.        Owens,      by    contrast,
    maintains that the statute of limitations for his claims did not
    begin   to    run    until      October      15,    2008    --    the       date   on   which
    prosecutors        filed    a     nolle      prosequi,      finally         resolving       the
    proceedings against him.                Appellant’s Br. 22.             Because he filed
    suit within three years of this date, Owens contends that he met
    the operative deadline.
    Although     state       law    determines     the    applicable           statute    of
    limitations for § 1983 claims, federal law governs the date on
    which that limitations period begins to run.                           Wallace v. Kato,
    
    549 U.S. 384
    , 388 (2007).               Federal law, in turn, “conform[s] . .
    to common-law tort principles” for purposes of determining this
    date.       
    Id.
         “Under those principles, it is the standard rule
    that    accrual      occurs      when     the    plaintiff       has    a    complete       and
    present cause of action” against a defendant –- that is, when
    the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.                                    
    Id.
    (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
    In    Wallace,      however,       the    Supreme    Court       recognized        that
    limitations on common-law torts do not always begin on the date
    that a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.
    Wallace,     549    U.S.    at    388.          Accordingly,      it    found      that     the
    12
    “standard        rule”     does    not    always       control       the    start       of    the
    limitations period for a § 1983 claim.                       Id.; see also Devbrow v.
    Kalu, 
    705 F.3d 765
    , 767 (7th Cir. 2013) (relying on Wallace to
    hold   that       there    is     no   “single       accrual      rule     for    all   § 1983
    claims”).
    Instead, the Wallace Court held that to determine the date
    of accrual for a particular § 1983 claim, a court must look to
    the common-law tort that is most analogous to the plaintiff’s
    § 1983 claim and determine the date on which the limitations
    period for this most analogous tort claim would begin to run.
    Id.; see also Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., -- F.3d --,
    
    2014 WL 2937039
            (10th       Cir.    2014)    (noting       that       “[f]ollowing
    Wallace, we determine the accrual date of Plaintiff’s claim by
    looking     to     the     accrual      date    for     the       common-law      tort       most
    analogous     to     her    § 1983       claim”);      Devbrow,       705    F.3d       at    767
    (holding that a court “use[s] the [accrual] rule that applies to
    the common-law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim
    the    plaintiff          asserts”).           For     most       common-law       torts,      a
    plaintiff’s cause of action accrues, and the limitations period
    commences, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his
    injury (hence, the “standard rule”).                             But if the common law
    provides      a     “distinctive          rule”       for        determining       when       the
    limitations period for a particular tort begins to run, a court
    must   “consider[]”         this       “refinement”         in    determining       when     the
    13
    limitations     period        for    the    plaintiff’s      analogous       claim   under
    § 1983 should commence.             Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
    In    Wallace,    the    Supreme          Court    addressed    a    § 1983   claim
    alleging an unconstitutional detention by police officers.                                549
    U.S.    at   388.       The    Court       recognized      the   “standard     rule”      for
    accrual, but because it found the tort of false imprisonment to
    be the tort most analogous to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, it
    considered the “common law’s distinctive treatment” of that tort
    in   determining    the       start     of       the   limitations     period      for    the
    plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.              Id.
    The Court noted that Wallace could have brought his claim
    under § 1983 “immediately upon his false arrest.”                             Id. at 390
    n.3.     This was so because Wallace’s injury commenced at that
    date, and “a person falsely imprisoned has the right to sue on
    the first day of his detention.”                       Id. (citation omitted).            The
    Supreme Court went on to explain, however, that under the common
    law, the statute of limitations for false imprisonment does not
    begin to run at the outset of a plaintiff’s false imprisonment;
    rather,      limitations        begin       to     run    only   at    the    end    of     a
    plaintiff’s false imprisonment.                    Id. at 389.        Deferring to the
    common law’s “distinctive rule,” the Court selected the date on
    which   Wallace’s       false       imprisonment         ended   –-   not    the   date    on
    which it began -– as the start of the operative limitations
    period.      Id. at 391-92.            With this start date established, the
    14
    Court held that Wallace’s § 1983 claim accrued on the date that
    he was arraigned by a magistrate, i.e., the date on which his
    false imprisonment ended.           Id.
    Here,    the    parties    acknowledge     that,    unlike    in    Wallace,
    false imprisonment is not the tort “most analogous” to Owens’s
    § 1983 claims.        Instead, they properly agree that the tort of
    malicious prosecution, which the Wallace Court recognized as an
    “entirely     distinct”      tort,    provides     the    closest     analogy        to
    Owens’s Brady-like claim.            See Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).       Malicious prosecution redresses injuries a plaintiff
    sustains as a result of a defendant’s improper initiation or
    maintenance of formal proceedings against him.                   See Lambert v.
    Williams, 
    223 F.3d 257
    , 260 (4th Cir. 2000).                       Because Owens
    contends that the Appellees violated due process by maintaining
    proceedings against him without disclosing exculpatory evidence,
    malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to his § 1983
    claims.     Thus, following Wallace, we must determine the start
    date of Owens’s § 1983 claims by looking to the start date of
    the   common-law      tort   most    analogous    to     his   claims    –-     here,
    malicious prosecution.
    Under     the   common     law,     the   limitations      period       for    a
    plaintiff’s     malicious       prosecution      claim    commences      when       the
    proceedings brought against him are resolved in his favor.                          W.
    Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 119 (5th ed.
    15
    1984); see also 3 Dan B. Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 590
    (2d ed. 2011); 8 Stuart M. Speiser, et al., The American Law of
    Torts § 28.5 (2011); 1 Fowler V. Harper, et al., Harper, James,
    and Gray on Torts § 4.4 (3d ed. rev. 2006).                                 To satisfy this
    favorable-termination          requirement,          a       plaintiff      must       show     that
    the proceedings against him were favorably terminated “in such
    manner that [they] cannot be revived.”                        Keeton, et al. at § 119.
    “This      is   true,   for    example,      of      an       acquittal          in    court,     a
    discharge . . . upon preliminary hearing, [or] the entry of a
    nolle   prosequi.”          Id.;   see    also       Speiser,         et    al.       at   § 28.5;
    Harper, et al. at § 4.4.              It is not true of “[a]ny disposition
    of the criminal action which does not terminate it but permits
    it to be renewed.”            Keeton, et al. at § 119 (emphasis added).
    Under the common law, such terminations “cannot serve as the
    foundation for [a malicious prosecution] action,” and thus, the
    limitations      period     for    malicious      prosecution              claims      does      not
    begin to run until a truly final disposition is achieved.                                  Id.
    The grant of a new trial does not terminate the proceedings
    against a defendant “in such a manner that [they] cannot be
    revived.”        Keeton, et al. at § 119.                       Rather, it provides a
    procedural       victory,     which      simply      postpones             the    proceedings’
    ultimate outcome.         See Harper, et al. at § 4.4 (“The termination
    in   the    plaintiff’s       favor   must      be       a    final    one,       and      if   the
    proceedings are immediately renewed for the same offense, they
    16
    are    sufficient         to    bar       plaintiff’s         action     for       malicious
    prosecution until they are finally determined.”).
    Because      the   grant      of   a   new   trial      does    not   trigger       the
    limitations         period     for    a    malicious       prosecution         claim,      the
    statute of limitations on Owens’s § 1983 claims did not begin to
    run on      the    date   he    was   granted       a   new    trial.        Instead,      the
    operative         limitations     period      began      to     run    on    the    date     a
    malicious prosecution claim became ripe at common law, i.e., the
    date on which the nolle prosequi was entered.                           It was only on
    this       date    that      proceedings       against        Owens     were       favorably
    terminated        in   such    manner      that     they      could    not   be     revived.
    Because Owens filed suit within three years of this date, the
    statute of limitations does not bar his present cause of action. 2
    Contrary to the Appellees’ suggestion, Heck v. Humphrey,
    
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994), does not require a different result.                               Heck
    held that a prisoner may not file suit under § 1983 as long as a
    § 1983 judgment in his favor would imply the invalidity of his
    2
    This is not to say that Owens could not have filed suit
    immediately upon his discovery of the Appellees’ asserted
    suppression of material exculpatory evidence.   See Wallace, 549
    U.S. at 390 n.3; but see Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 486-87
    (1994) (holding that the date of accrual for a § 1983 claim is
    delayed if a § 1983 judgment in a plaintiff’s favor would imply
    the   invalidity  of  the   plaintiff’s  criminal   conviction).
    Although the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
    the proceedings against Owens were favorably and finally
    terminated, because he knew of his alleged injury before then,
    he was entitled to seek relief earlier.    Wallace, 549 U.S. at
    390 n.3.
    17
    criminal conviction.             See id. at 487.              In this case, as the
    Appellees point out, the Heck bar to suit was removed as soon as
    the state court invalidated Owens’s conviction and granted him a
    new trial.      But contrary to the Appellees’ contention, removal
    of the Heck bar did not compel Owens immediately to proceed
    under § 1983.       This is so because the statute of limitations for
    the most analogous common-law tort, malicious prosecution, did
    not   begin    to   run    until       the    proceedings          against        Owens   were
    finally     terminated     in    his    favor       and    could       not    “be    revived,”
    Keeton, et al. at § 119, i.e., when the prosecutor filed the
    nolle prosequi.        Up until this point, Owens remained imprisoned,
    and   the   prosecutor      could      –-     and    for     sixteen         months    did    –-
    proceed against him without the need to seek reindictment.
    The partial dissent recognizes that Heck does not resolve
    the   statute-of-limitations            issue       before       us.         It   nonetheless
    maintains that Owens’s claims are time barred because, in the
    dissent’s view, the statute of limitations on Owens’s § 1983
    claims began to run when he was granted a new trial, or                               when he
    possessed sufficient facts to know about the Appellees’ illegal
    suppression of evidence, i.e., whenever Owens could have brought
    his Brady-like claim.
    The    dissent      both   acknowledges             that,    in    determining         the
    start   date   of   Owens’s       §    1983    claims,       a    court       must    look    to
    malicious prosecution as the closest “common law analogue,” and
    18
    recognizes that the date of favorable termination is the date
    triggering the onset of limitations for a malicious prosecution
    claim.     But the dissent maintains that we adhere too closely to
    the malicious prosecution analogue.                     In the dissent’s view, a
    court should consider the “underlying purpose of the elements of
    the common law analogue” and borrow this onset date for a § 1983
    claim only    if     doing   so     would     serve     that   underlying   purpose.
    Because the dissent concludes that borrowing the onset date for
    malicious prosecution would not serve this underlying purpose,
    it believes we should not borrow its onset date here.
    We recognize the important distinctions between malicious
    prosecution torts and Owens’s Brady-like claims.                       But we cannot
    agree with the dissent that those distinctions somehow permit us
    to jettison the common law date on which limitations begin to
    run in determining the date on which limitations begin to run
    for an analogous § 1983 claim.                     Neither precedent nor logic
    permits this result.
    The    common    law    does      act    as   a    mere   “starting   point”    in
    “defining    the   elements       of    damages        and   the   prerequisites    for
    their recovery” under § 1983.                 Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    ,
    257-58 (1978) (emphasis added).                   But the dissent cites no case
    in which the Supreme Court has used the common law as merely the
    “starting point” in resolving a statute-of-limitations question
    in a § 1983 action.           This is so because the Court has never
    19
    sanctioned such an approach.               Rather, in resolving the precise
    question at issue here -- when the statute of limitations for a
    § 1983 claim begins to run -- the Wallace Court applied the
    distinctive common law rule for the most analogous tort.                           549
    U.S. at 388-89 (“[T]o determine the beginning of the limitations
    period     in   this     [§     1983]      case,    we     must   determine     when
    petitioner’s false imprisonment came to an end.”).                      Moreover, in
    Heck, the majority expressly relied on malicious prosecution’s
    favorable termination requirement to delay the accrual of the
    plaintiff’s Brady-based § 1983 claim.                    Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 484
    .3
    That the Supreme Court would require courts to analogize to the
    tort of malicious prosecution for purposes of delaying the onset
    of a Brady claim, yet eschew the very same analogy for purposes
    of    calculating     the     onset   of   limitations      for   a   Brady    claim,
    strikes    us   as    exceedingly       unlikely.        Accordingly,     we   cannot
    endorse the partial dissent’s analysis.
    Furthermore, even if, as the dissent argues, a court should
    consider the policy and “underlying purpose of the elements of
    the    common   law    analogue”      to    determine      when   the    statute    of
    limitations begins to run, we would reach the same result.                         For
    3
    In doing so, the Supreme Court majority expressly rejected
    the suggestion in Justice Souter’s concurring opinion that the
    Court had adhered too closely to the common law analogue. Heck,
    
    512 U.S. at
    484 n.4.     Yet it is precisely this argument from
    Justice Souter, rather than the majority’s reasoning, on which
    the dissent relies in criticizing us.
    20
    the “strong judicial policy against the creation of conflicting
    resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction”
    furthered        by     malicious       prosecution’s             favorable         termination
    requirement, Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 484
    , is also implicated in the
    Brady context.           By setting different dates for the beginning of
    the limitations period for a claimant’s § 1983 Brady claim on
    the one hand, and his malicious prosecution claim on the other,
    the    dissent        would    permit       a   claimant     to     bring      a    state    claim
    (based on the same conduct) long after the time for bringing the
    § 1983 claim had expired.                   The limitations period on the § 1983
    claim might even have run before the state claim ever ripened,
    forcing a claimant to bring separate actions that could produce
    different        and     potentially            conflicting       results.            Thus    the
    dissent’s approach would hardly accord with the “strong judicial
    policy against the creation of conflicting resolutions.”                                Id.
    In    sum,     we     take    the       Supreme     Court    at     its      word.      We
    determine       when     the    statute         of    limitations      on      a    plaintiff’s
    § 1983 claim begins to run by looking to the common-law tort
    most    analogous        to    the    plaintiff’s           claim.        In       general,    the
    limitations       period        for   common          law   torts    commences         when   the
    plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.                                 But if the
    common law provides a “distinctive rule” for determining the
    start date of the limitations period for the analogous tort, a
    court        should     consider       this       rule      in    determining         when    the
    21
    limitations      period     for    the   plaintiff’s        claim   begins    to    run.
    Wallace,      549    U.S.   at    388-89.        Application    of   this     rule   to
    Owens’s claims sets the start of the limitations period at the
    date of the nolle prosequi.                 Because Owens filed suit within
    three years of this date, his claims were timely filed.
    III.
    Even if Owens’s suit is timely, the Baltimore City State’s
    Attorney’s Office contends that the suit must be dismissed as to
    it because it is not an entity capable of being sued. 4
    The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the law
    of the state in which the district court sits determines an
    entity’s capacity to be sued.               Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b).            Maryland
    courts have had no occasion to address whether the Baltimore
    City       State’s   Attorney’s     Office       may   be   sued.     But     Maryland
    courts’       treatment     of    analogous       agencies    confirms       that    the
    4
    Relatedly, in his appellate brief, Assistant State’s
    Attorney Brave contends that absolute prosecutorial immunity
    requires dismissal of the claims against him. Brave waived this
    defense, however, by failing to raise it in the district court.
    See Tully v. Barada, 
    599 F.3d 591
    , 594 (7th Cir. 2010); Collyer
    v. Darling, 
    98 F.3d 211
    , 222 (6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, because
    absolute immunity attaches to functions, not offices, see Harlow
    v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 808-09 (1982), the district court
    must determine whether Brave was performing prosecutorial
    functions at the time he allegedly committed the asserted
    constitutional violations, cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 
    509 U.S. 259
    , 273 (1993) (holding that absolute immunity does not attach
    to prosecutors performing “investigatory functions”).
    22
    “Baltimore    City      State’s   Attorney’s    Office”    is   not   a     suable
    entity.
    In   Boyer    v.    State,   Maryland’s    highest    court     made    clear
    that, absent a statutory or constitutional provision creating a
    government agency, an “office” or “department” bears no unique
    legal identity, and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law.
    See 
    594 A.2d 121
    , 128 n.9 (Md. 1991).                  In Boyer, the court
    considered whether the “Charles County Sheriff’s Department” was
    an entity amenable to suit.         
    Id.
        It concluded:
    We are unaware of any statute, public general or
    public local, establishing an entity known as the
    Charles County “Sheriff’s Department.”     The sheriff
    for each county is a constitutional officer under Art.
    IV, § 44, of the Constitution of Maryland.       [But]
    [n]either the Constitution nor any other provision of
    law creates a governmental agency known as the
    “Sheriff’s Department.”  Consequently, the motion for
    summary judgment on behalf of the Charles County
    ‘Sheriff’s Department’ correctly asserted that the
    ‘Sheriff’s Department’ is not an entity capable of
    being sued.
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Like    the   “Sheriff’s     Department”     at   issue    in    Boyer,    no
    constitutional or statutory provision establishes a “Baltimore
    City State’s Attorney’s Office.”               The “State’s Attorney” for
    each county and Baltimore City is a constitutional officer, but
    Maryland law creates no “State’s Attorney’s Office.”                      Cf. Md.
    Const. art. V, § 7 (“There shall be an Attorney for the State in
    each county and the City of Baltimore, to be styled ‘the State’s
    23
    Attorney.’”); Md. Ann. Code, Crim. Proc. § 15-102 (“[A] State’s
    Attorney shall, in the county served by the State’s Attorney,
    prosecute and defend on the part of the State all cases in which
    the State may be interested.”).
    Indeed,     Maryland     law    delegates      many      of   the     functions     a
    hypothetical      “State’s     Attorney’s         Office”      would    perform      to   a
    separate “Office of the State’s Attorney’s Coordinator.”                               See
    id. § 15-302       (describing       the   functions      of    the    Office     of   the
    State’s Attorney’s Coordinator, including training each State’s
    Attorney’s      professional     staff      and    performing       legal      research).
    Unlike    the     “Baltimore     City      State’s    Attorney’s          Office,”     the
    “Office   of     the   State’s    Attorney’s         Coordinator”         is   expressly
    created by statute.       See id. § 15-301(a)(1) (“There is an office
    of State’s Attorney’s Coordinator.”).                 That the Maryland General
    Assembly knew how to create such an office, yet failed to do so
    with respect to the “entity” here, confirms that the “Baltimore
    City State’s Attorney’s Office” bears no unique legal identity.
    Cf.   Sosa   v.    Alvarez-Machain,         
    542 U.S. 692
    ,      711   n.9   (2004)
    (“[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of
    the statute and different language in another, the court assumes
    different    meanings     were    intended.”         (internal        quotation      marks
    omitted)).
    Owens notes that Title 15 of the Maryland Code of Criminal
    Procedure, which establishes the duties of a State’s Attorney,
    24
    is entitled “Office of the State’s Attorney.”                              Based on this
    title, Owens contends that the Maryland General Assembly has
    established a “State’s Attorney’s Office,” which may be sued
    under Maryland law.            Reply Br. at 2.                 This argument fails,
    however, for two reasons.             First, as the Supreme Court has long
    held, a statute’s title provides little assistance to courts
    interpreting     statutory      provisions.             See,   e.g.,       Bhd.    of   R.R.
    Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 
    331 U.S. 519
    , 528-29 (1947)
    (“[T]he title of the statute and the heading of a section cannot
    limit the plain meaning of the text.                    For interpretive purposes,
    they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous word
    or phrase.”).         Second, even if we were to consider the title
    heading, it is clear that the title refers to the position of
    the   State’s         Attorney,       not     a        separate,      suable       office.
    Undoubtedly, a plaintiff may sue the State’s Attorney, i.e., the
    person who holds the position.                   See S.C. State Ports Auth. v.
    Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 
    243 F.3d 165
    , 170 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[S]tate
    officers   may    be    sued    for    money      damages      in    their    individual
    capacities,      so    long    as    relief       is    sought      from    the    officer
    personally.”),        aff’d,   
    535 U.S. 743
        (2002).      But     the   heading
    fails to establish the legal identity -– and thus the suability
    -- of a “State’s Attorney’s Office,” separate and apart from the
    person who occupies the position or office.
    25
    Our    friend’s        partial    dissent        suggests      that    the      Maryland
    Constitution         creates    a     “Baltimore        City     State’s         Attorney’s
    Office” amenable to suit under Maryland law.                               But, in fact,
    nearly     every     provision        of     law     cited    for    this       proposition
    regulates the State’s Attorney, not a State’s Attorney’s Office.
    See, e.g., Md. Const. art. V, § 9 (“The State’s Attorney shall
    perform    such      duties     and        receive    such     salary      as     shall   be
    prescribed      by    the    General       Assembly.”        (emphasis      added));      id.
    (“[T]he State’s Attorney for Baltimore City shall have the power
    to appoint a Deputy and such other Assistants as the Supreme
    Judicial     Bench     of    Baltimore        City     may    authorize         or   approve
    . . . . ” (emphasis added)); see also 
    Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 15-102
     (“[A] State’s Attorney shall, in the county served by
    the State’s Attorney, prosecute and defend on the part of the
    State all cases in which the State may be interested.” (emphasis
    added)).        Far from establishing a State’s Attorney’s Office,
    these provisions create and administer the position of State’s
    Attorney –- a position Owens could have reached, but did not, by
    suing the Baltimore City State’s Attorney in his individual or
    official capacity.
    To    be    sure,      close   inspection        of     Maryland’s      Constitution
    does reveal a passing reference to “the office of the State’s
    Attorney.”       Md. Const. art. V, § 9 (“[E]xpenses for conducting
    the office of the State’s Attorney . . . shall be paid by the
    26
    Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to the extent that the total
    of them exceeds the fees of his office.”).                       But this passing
    reference to an “office” seems to us nothing more than shorthand
    for the position of State’s Attorney.                 Moreover, the reference
    fails to distinguish the case at hand from Boyer.                        For there,
    although     the   Maryland    Code   made      a   passing      reference    to   the
    Charles County “Sheriff’s department,” Maryland’s highest court
    held that Maryland law failed to “establish[] an entity known as
    the Charles County ‘Sheriff’s Department.’”                      594 A.2d at 128
    n.9; see Md. Code Ann., Local Gov’t § 12-203(b)(1) (formerly Md.
    Code, art. 25, § 3) (“The County Commissioners of Charles County
    shall establish a separate pension plan for sworn employees of
    the   Charles      County    Sheriff’s        department      . . . .”      (emphasis
    added)).     To remain faithful to the court’s analysis in Boyer,
    we    must   similarly      hold   that       the   “Baltimore       City    State’s
    Attorney’s Office” is not a suable entity.
    In conclusion, we hold that the “Baltimore City State’s
    Attorney’s Office” is a term of convenience only.                     It refers to
    the   collection     of     government    employees        who    work   under     the
    supervision of the Baltimore City State’s Attorney.                      It is not
    an entity amenable to suit. 5
    5
    Because we hold that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s
    Office is not a suable entity, we do not address its alternative
    argument, i.e., that the State’s Attorney’s Office is an arm of
    (Continued)
    27
    IV.
    We next consider the qualified-immunity defense asserted by
    Officers Pelligrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman.
    Qualified    immunity    protects    government       officials   from
    liability for “civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
    violate clearly established . . . rights of which a reasonable
    person   would   have   known.”     Harlow,   
    457 U.S. at 818
    .   The
    doctrine is designed to square two important interests:                “the
    need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
    [their] power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
    from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform
    their duties reasonably.”         Pearson v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    ,
    231 (2009).
    the State entitled to sovereign immunity.     We note, however,
    that the partial dissent focuses its arm-of-the-State analysis
    on a single factor –- whether a judgment against the Baltimore
    City State’s Attorney’s Office would be paid by the City of
    Baltimore –- to conclude that the State’s Attorney’s Office
    lacks immunity from suit.      Although the Supreme Court had
    previously regarded this factor as the most important, it has
    subsequently abandoned this view.   See Fed. Maritime Comm’n v.
    S.C. Port Auth., 
    535 U.S. 743
    , 765 (2002); U.S. ex rel. Oberg v.
    Ky. Higher Educ. Student Loan Corp., 
    681 F.3d 575
    , 580 n.3 (4th
    Cir. 2012).   Accordingly, when engaging in an arm-of-the-State
    analysis, a court must also consider at least three other
    factors -- the degree of autonomy exercised by an entity,
    whether an entity is involved with state concerns, and how an
    entity is treated under state law –- without giving preeminence
    to any single factor. See Oberg, 681 F.3d at 580.
    28
    Qualified immunity protects public officials from suit when
    the state of the law is such that they would not have known that
    their        conduct   violates        statutory        or    constitutional         rights.
    Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    131 S. Ct. 2074
    , 2083 (2011).                             See, e.g.,
    Pinder v. Johnson, 
    54 F.3d 1169
    , 1177–78 (4th Cir. 1995) (en
    banc).        The defense does not shield officials, however, when
    they have acted “incompetent[ly]” or have “knowingly violate[d]
    the law.”          Malley v. Briggs, 
    475 U.S. 335
    , 341 (1986).                           See,
    e.g., Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 
    738 F.3d 107
    , 125 (4th Cir.
    2013); Brockington v. Boykins, 
    637 F.3d 503
    , 507–08 (4th Cir.
    2011); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 
    447 F.3d 292
    ,
    321 (4th Cir. 2006).
    To     establish    a      qualified-immunity             defense,       a     public
    official must demonstrate that (1) a plaintiff has not alleged
    or shown facts that “make out a violation of a constitutional
    right,”       or   that   (2)    “the     right    at    issue    was    [not]       ‘clearly
    established’ at the time of” its alleged violation.                                  Pearson,
    
    555 U.S. at 232
    .
    A qualified immunity defense can be presented in a Rule
    12(b)(6)       motion,    but,    as    the   Second         Circuit    has   noted,    when
    asserted at this early stage in the proceedings, “the defense
    faces    a     formidable       hurdle”    and     “is   usually       not    successful.”
    Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 
    463 F.3d 167
    , 191–92 (2d
    Cir. 2006).        This is so because dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
    29
    appropriate only if a plaintiff fails to state a claim that is
    plausible on its face.              Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    .               A claim has
    “facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
    court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
    liable   for    the    misconduct      alleged.”            
    Id.
          To   satisfy    the
    standard, a plaintiff must do more than allege facts that show
    the “sheer possibility” of wrongdoing.                       
    Id.
         The plaintiff’s
    complaint      will    not     be    dismissed    as        long    as    he    provides
    sufficient detail about his claim to show that he has a more-
    than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.                              Bell Atl.
    Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2006).
    On the one hand, Owens alleges that Officers Pelligrini,
    Dunnigan,      and     Landsman       violated        his     clearly      established
    constitutional        rights    by    acting     in    bad        faith   to    suppress
    material evidence supporting his innocence.                       On the other hand,
    the Officers maintain, and the district court held, that Owens
    has not pled a plausible claim, Appellees’ Br. at 41–42, and
    that even if he has, the rights he asserts were not clearly
    established in 1988 -- the date of their alleged violation, 
    id.
    at 29–40.      We address each argument in turn.
    A.
    In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 87 (1963), that prosecutors’ suppression of evidence
    “favorable to an accused” violates the Due Process Clause when
    30
    the evidence proves “material either to guilt or to punishment.”
    A   year       after    Brady,         we      concluded      that     police      officers’
    suppression of evidence also violates the Constitution.                                    See
    Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 
    331 F.2d 842
    , 846–47 (4th
    Cir. 1964).          Specifically, in Barbee, we found that a police
    officer’s         failure     to       disclose       exculpatory        evidence     to     a
    prosecutor violates a defendant’s due process rights.                                
    Id. at 847
    .     “It makes no [constitutional] difference,” we explained,
    “if the withholding [of evidence] is by officials other than the
    prosecutor.         The police are also part of the prosecution and the
    taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State’s
    Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure.”                             
    Id. at 846
    ; see
    also Strickler v. Greene, 
    527 U.S. 263
    , 280–81 (1999) (“[Brady]
    encompasses evidence known only to police investigators and not
    to the prosecutor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).                                   In
    Goodwin      v.    Metts,     
    885 F.2d 157
    ,   163–64     (4th    Cir.     1989),    we
    reaffirmed our Barbee decision, holding that a police officer
    violates       a    criminal           defendant’s       constitutional          rights     by
    withholding exculpatory evidence from prosecutors.
    To   make      out    a     claim      that     the    Officers        violated    his
    constitutional rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence, Owens
    must allege,         and     ultimately        prove,    that    (1)     the    evidence    at
    issue    was      favorable       to    him;    (2)   the     Officers    suppressed       the
    31
    evidence in bad faith; 6 and (3) prejudice ensued.                         See Monroe v.
    Angelone,        
    323 F.3d 286
    ,    299–300      (4th    Cir.   2003).        Prejudice
    ensues     if    “there   is      a   reasonable     probability”         that   the    jury
    would     have    reached     a    different       result    had   the    evidence      been
    properly disclosed.            United States v. Bagley, 
    527 U.S. 667
    , 682
    (1985).          The    adjective         “reasonable”      is     important     in    this
    context.         See Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 434 (1995).                          As
    the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he question is not whether
    the   defendant        would      more     likely    than    not     have    received     a
    different        verdict”      had     the   evidence       been    disclosed.          
    Id.
    Rather, the question is whether, in the absence of disclosure,
    the   defendant        “received      a    fair    trial,   understood      as    a    trial
    resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”                       
    Id.
    Owens       alleges      that       Officers    Pelligrini,         Dunnigan,     and
    Landsman, at the direction of ASA Brave, subjected Thompson, the
    State’s star witness, to a lengthy mid-trial interrogation, in
    6
    As recognized in Jean v. Collins, 
    221 F.3d 656
    , 660 (4th
    Cir. 2000) (“Jean II”) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), police
    officers and prosecutors have different obligations with respect
    to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.        Under Brady, a
    prosecutor violates the Constitution whenever he fails to
    disclose   material,   exculpatory    evidence,   even   if   the
    nondisclosure was purely accidental.    See 
    373 U.S. at 87
    .   The
    Sixth Circuit has applied this same absolute standard to police
    officers. See Moldowan v. City of Warren, 
    578 F.3d 351
    , 388-89
    (6th Cir. 2009).    But other courts have followed the lead of
    Jean II to conclude that police officers commit constitutional
    violations only when they suppress exculpatory evidence in bad
    faith.   See Porter v. White, 
    483 F.3d 1294
    , 1308 (11th Cir.
    2007); Villasana v. Wilhoit, 
    368 F.3d 976
    , 980 (8th Cir. 2004).
    32
    which they threatened and cajoled him to change his testimony
    repeatedly      so   as      to    strengthen        the    State’s    then-“failing
    prosecution.”        Owens asserts that the Officers elicited from
    Thompson a succession of vastly different accounts of his and
    Owens’s involvement in Ms. Williar’s rape and murder.                               These
    accounts ranged from Thompson’s insistence that he had nothing
    to do with the crimes, to his admission that he had broken into
    Ms.    Williar’s      apartment       (but       stayed     downstairs),       to    his
    contention that he had remained in the upstairs bathroom and
    only heard the assault on Ms. Williar, to his final story, in
    which he asserted that he had masturbated at the foot of the bed
    while Owens raped and killed Ms. Williar.
    Moreover,     Owens    alleges    that        Thompson   repeatedly      changed
    his story only because the Officers provided additional details
    about the crime, which they pressured Thompson to incorporate so
    as    to    incriminate   Owens      more     directly.         When   the    interview
    ended, the Officers told ASA Brave only about the witness’s last
    version of events.            That is, Owens alleges that ASA Brave did
    not know (and so could not and did not tell defense counsel)
    that Thompson had offered several other accounts of the crimes,
    all of which conflicted with the iteration Thompson ultimately
    told the jury.
    We     have   little         difficulty        concluding       that    Owens’s
    allegations      state    a       plausible      §   1983   claim.       First,       the
    33
    information      Officers       Pelligrini,        Dunnigan,       and     Landsman
    assertedly withheld from ASA Brave was favorable to Owens.                         Had
    the   Officers    properly        disclosed      Thompson’s      statements,       his
    inconsistencies        would   have       lent   support    to    the     contention
    advanced by Owens’s defense that Thompson, not Owens, had raped
    and murdered Ms. Williar.             At a minimum, the inconsistencies
    would have aided Owens in his attempt to discredit Thompson’s
    testimony and sow reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.
    See   Bagley,    473    U.S.   at   676     (holding   that      Brady’s    duty    to
    disclose evidence encompasses impeachment evidence).
    Second, Owens has offered specific allegations as to the
    Officers’ bad faith.           He asserts that these experienced police
    officers willfully, consciously, and in bad faith “chose not to
    disclose” the multiple revisions to Thompson’s statement that
    they elicited from him during their hours-long interrogation.
    Further, he alleges that the Officers told ASA Brave about the
    final version of the story almost as soon as the witness had
    said it.      The temporal proximity between Thompson’s succession
    of narratives and the Officers’ report to the prosecutor lends
    support     to    the     contention        that    Thompson’s          inconsistent
    narratives    were     fresh   in   the    Officers’     minds,    and    thus,    the
    Officers’    omissions     were     not    accidental,     but    intentional      and
    malicious.
    34
    Finally,       Owens’s   allegations     satisfy   Brady’s    materiality
    requirement.        Owens asserts that Thompson was the State’s “star
    witness,” and that in post-trial proceedings, ASA Brave admitted
    that without Thompson, “the case could not have gone forward.”
    Certainly,     it    is   plausible    that   impeachment   of    such     a    key
    witness could have altered the outcome at trial.                  We emphasize
    that Brady does not require that disclosure probably would have
    modified a trial’s result.            Strickler, 
    527 U.S. at
    289–90.            On
    the contrary, it is enough that the suppression of evidence cast
    serious doubt on the proceedings’ integrity.              
    Id.
         If Owens can
    prove    his   allegations,      they    would    certainly      satisfy       this
    requirement. 7
    7
    The Officers unpersuasively contend that Owens’s Brady
    claim fails because he obtained his release from prison on the
    basis of newly discovered DNA evidence rather than the
    undisclosed Brady material.      But contrary to the Officers’
    assertion, courts routinely consider the Brady claims of § 1983
    plaintiffs exonerated on the basis of newly discovered DNA
    evidence. See, e.g., Holland v. City of Chicago, 
    643 F.3d 248
    ,
    250, 255-56 (7th Cir. 2011).    Moreover, adopting the Officers’
    rule would have the perverse effect of discriminating against
    innocent plaintiffs.   For although a § 1983 plaintiff need not
    establish that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he
    was convicted, see Strickler, 
    527 U.S. at 289-90
    ; Poventud v.
    City of New York, 
    750 F.3d 121
    , 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc), if
    he can prove his innocence –- for example, because DNA evidence
    completely exonerates him –- the Officers’ rule would prevent
    that plaintiff from recovering for the Brady violation that put
    him in prison.    We see no reason to insulate from liability
    police officers who withhold exculpatory evidence in bad faith
    merely because unrelated DNA evidence later came to light
    proving the plaintiff’s innocence.
    35
    B.
    We    next      turn    to     the       question       of        whether       Owens’s
    constitutional rights were “clearly established” in February and
    March 1988, when the Officers acted.
    i.
    For a right to be clearly established, its contours “must
    be sufficiently clear [such] that a reasonable official would
    [have] underst[ood] that what he is doing violates that right.”
    Anderson v. Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 640 (1987).                           “This is not
    to   say   that    an    official      action       is   protected        by     qualified
    immunity unless the very action in question has previously been
    held [to be] unlawful.”                Hope v. Pelzer, 
    536 U.S. 730
    , 739
    (2002).    Rather, liability obtains if the state of the law is
    such that it would have been “apparent” to an officer that his
    conduct violated constitutional law.                Anderson, 
    483 U.S. at 640
    .
    In evaluating whether qualified immunity exists, we must
    keep in mind that it is the plaintiff’s constitutional right
    that must be clearly established, not a plaintiff’s access to a
    monetary       remedy.      Thus,      a    right    does        not    become       clearly
    established only if a plaintiff has successfully enforced it
    through    a    § 1983   action.           Hope,   
    536 U.S. at 741
    .        On   the
    contrary, a right may be clearly established by any number of
    sources,       including    a     criminal         case,     a     statute,          or   the
    Constitution      itself.       See,       e.g.,   
    id.
         (relying      on    the    Eighth
    36
    Amendment to conclude that a right was clearly established);
    Collier    v.    Dickinson,            
    477 F.3d 1306
    ,    1312    (11th       Cir.     2007)
    (relying on a statute to determine that a right was clearly
    established); Cinelli v. Cutillo, 
    896 F.2d 650
    , 655 (1st Cir.
    1990) (relying on habeas and criminal cases to determine that a
    right was clearly established).
    Furthermore, to be clearly established, a right need not be
    one    with   respect           to    which     all    judges    on    all    courts        agree.
    Rather, “[i]f the unlawfulness is apparent, the fact that some
    court may have reached an incorrect result will not shield a
    defendant’s      violation            of    a   clearly     established           right.”      See
    Wilson v. Layne, 
    141 F.3d 111
    , 122 (4th Cir.), aff’d, 
    526 U.S. 603
        (1999).           Thus,       although     judicial      disagreement         about     the
    existence       of       a    right    is     certainly     a   factor       we    consider     in
    determining whether a right has been clearly established, see
    Pearson, 
    555 U.S. at 245
    , disagreement alone does not defeat a
    plaintiff’s      claim          in    every     instance.       The    Supreme       Court     has
    never sanctioned such a rule, see, e.g., Hope, 
    536 U.S. at
    745-
    46    (holding       a       right    was   clearly     established      and       rejecting    a
    qualified-immunity defense notwithstanding the contrary views of
    three dissenting justices and the court of appeals), and neither
    have we, see, e.g., Henry v. Purnell, 
    652 F.3d 524
    , 536–37 (4th
    Cir.    2011)    (en          banc)    (rejecting      a   qualified-immunity           defense
    over a three-judge dissent).
    37
    With    these    principles    in    mind,     we    consider     whether    the
    constitutional rights Owens asserts were clearly established as
    of February and March 1988, the time of the alleged violations.
    ii.
    As outlined above, the Supreme Court held in 1963 that a
    prosecutor may not suppress material exculpatory evidence during
    a   defendant’s      criminal   trial.         Brady,     
    373 U.S. at 87
    .    In
    Barbee, decided a year after Brady, we held that “[t]he police
    are also part of the prosecution,” and thus, they too violate
    the Constitution if and when they suppress exculpatory evidence.
    
    331 F.2d at 846
    .
    In     1976,    we   applied        Barbee’s        holding      expressly   to
    impeachment evidence.       In both United States v. Sutton, 
    542 F.2d 1239
     (4th Cir. 1976), and Boone v. Paderick, 
    541 F.2d 447
     (4th
    Cir. 1976), we overturned a defendant’s criminal conviction on
    the ground that police had suppressed exculpatory information
    bearing on the veracity of a witness’s testimony.                        See Sutton,
    
    542 F.2d at
    1241 n.2, 1243; Boone, 
    541 F.2d at 453
    .                            As in
    Barbee, we reiterated that where “material evidence which tends
    to exculpate the defendant is not disclosed,” the failure to
    disclose it “is not neutralized because it was in the hands of
    the police rather than the prosecutor.”                 Boone, 
    541 F.2d at
    450–
    51.
    38
    Finally,      in     Goodwin,    
    885 F.2d at 163-64
    ,     we   applied
    Barbee’s logic to § 1983 cases.                   See also Carter v. Burch, 
    39 F.3d 257
    , 263-64 (4th Cir. 1994).                     In Goodwin, we upheld a jury
    award of thousands of dollars against a South Carolina police
    officer who, in 1983, failed to disclose exculpatory evidence.
    In   doing       so,    we     rejected    the    officer’s       qualified-immunity
    defense because we determined that a “reasonable officer [acting
    in 1983] would have known that a prosecution carried out without
    . . . disclosure of exculpatory information would violate the
    constitutional rights of the criminal defendants.”                        
    885 F.2d at 164
    . 8       Goodwin thus capped an unbroken chain of circuit precedent
    affirming        –-    then    reaffirming       –-    that    criminal    defendants’
    rights are violated by police officers’ malicious suppression of
    evidence.
    The partial dissent offers a different view.                     It maintains
    that the law was not clearly established in 1988 because the
    cases decided before that date -- Barbee, Sutton, and Boone –-
    imposed no independent obligation on police officers to disclose
    8
    We were not alone.    Other circuits have similarly held
    that by 1988, police officers violated the Constitution by
    suppressing exculpatory evidence in bad faith.        See, e.g.,
    McMillian v. Johnson, 
    88 F.3d 1554
    , 1569 (11th Cir. 1996)
    (discussing 1987 police action); Walker v. City of New York, 
    974 F.2d 293
    , 299 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing 1971 police action);
    Jones v. City of Chicago, 
    856 F.2d 985
    , 995 (7th Cir. 1988)
    (discussing 1981-82 police action); Geter v. Fortenberry, 
    849 F.2d 1550
    , 1559 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing 1982 police action).
    39
    exculpatory evidence.             The dissent insists that Barbee, Sutton,
    and   Boone        stand   only    for     the     proposition    that     “a   police
    officer’s knowledge of exculpatory evidence will be imputed to
    the prosecutor for Brady purposes.”                   This holding, the dissent
    contends,          fails     to    notify        police    officers        of    their
    susceptibility to suit, and thus, the Officers in the case at
    hand enjoy qualified immunity.
    We cannot agree.            Qualified immunity exists to ensure that
    “public officials performing discretionary functions [are] free
    to act without fear of retributive suits . . . except when they
    should have understood that particular conduct was unlawful.”
    Limone v. Condon, 
    372 F.3d 39
    , 44 (1st Cir. 2004).                         Ever since
    it first articulated the contours of modern qualified-immunity
    doctrine,         the   Supreme    Court     has     emphasized     that    qualified
    immunity assesses the apparent unlawfulness of conduct.                             See
    Harlow, 
    457 U.S. at 819
     (“[W]here an official could be expected
    to    know    that      certain     conduct      would    violate     statutory      or
    constitutional rights . . . , a person who suffers injury caused
    by such conduct may have a cause of action.” (emphasis added));
    see also 
    id.
     (explaining that qualified immunity provides “no
    license      to    lawless    conduct”      (emphasis     added));       Mitchell    v.
    Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 526 (1985) (explaining that qualified
    immunity concerns “whether the conduct of which the plaintiff
    complains violated clearly established law” (emphasis added)).
    40
    Barbee, Sutton, and Boone each held that certain conduct by
    police       officers     -–       the    suppression        of    material        exculpatory
    evidence –- results in the violation of criminal defendants’
    rights.        Whether or not an officer’s knowledge is “imputed” to
    the prosecutor does not affect the lawfulness of the officer’s
    own    conduct.         See    Limone,       
    372 F.3d at 47
       (rejecting       police
    officers’ argument that law was not clearly established because
    cases    announcing       plaintiff’s             constitutional        right       referenced
    “the     State’s”       obligations,            not    those      of   police       officers).
    Barbee, Sutton, and Boone taught police officers how to conform
    their conduct to the law.                       These cases each held that if a
    police officer suppresses material exculpatory evidence, courts
    will         invalidate        a         defendant’s         criminal         sentence        as
    unconstitutional.             A police officer acting after the issuance of
    these decisions, like each of the Officers here, could not have
    thought that the suppression of material exculpatory evidence
    would pass constitutional muster.                      See, e.g., Cinello, 
    896 F.2d at 655
        (holding        that       police       officers     were       on    notice    of
    constitutional          right’s          existence       because       prior        cases    had
    invalidated criminal sentences based on similar misconduct).
    Goodwin     recognized            this    reality,      and     held    in    light    of
    Barbee, Sutton, and Boone that a police officer’s obligation to
    disclose material exculpatory evidence was clearly established
    by 1983, five years prior to the Brady violations alleged in
    41
    this       case.     Yet    the   dissent    suggests      that   our   reliance    on
    Goodwin retroactively subjects the Officers to liability.                          Not
    so.    For although Goodwin issued after the Officers in this case
    acted,      Goodwin    announced     no     new   rule    of   constitutional      law.
    Rather, it         merely   held,   in    light    of    the   constitutional      rule
    already established by Barbee, Sutton, and Boone, that a police
    officer’s      duty    to   disclose      material      exculpatory     evidence    was
    clearly established in 1983.              If a right was clearly established
    in 1983 (as Goodwin held), it must have been clearly established
    in 1988 (when the Officers acted).                       To hold to the contrary
    would directly conflict with Goodwin. 9
    9
    In hopes of convincing us to the contrary, the Officers
    rely on Jean v. Collins, 
    155 F.3d 701
     (4th Cir. 1998) (“Jean
    I”), vacated, 
    526 U.S. 1142
     (1999), which they contend renders
    the state of our precedent uncertain.     That opinion, however,
    does not assist them. Jean I addressed conduct that took place
    in 1982 –- predating the conduct we held unconstitutional in
    Goodwin, and six years before the conduct at issue in this case.
    Moreover, soon after the issuance of Jean I, the Supreme Court
    vacated the decision for further consideration in light of
    Wilson v. Layne, 
    526 U.S. 603
     (1999). See Jean v. Collins, 
    526 U.S. 1142
     (1999).    On remand, because the en banc court was
    equally divided, the district court’s denial of relief was
    affirmed. Those judges voting to affirm concluded that summary
    judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff had failed to
    offer sufficient evidence of the Officers’ unconstitutional
    conduct.     Jean II, 
    221 F.3d at 663
     (Wilkinson, C.J.,
    concurring).    These judges nonetheless left intact Barbee,
    Sutton, Boone, and Goodwin, and expressly affirmed that “a
    police officer’s actions in failing to turn over materially
    exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor” violates a criminal
    defendant’s constitutional rights.  
    Id. at 659
     (quotation marks
    and alterations omitted).
    42
    Indeed, if the dissent is correct and Barbee, Sutton, and
    Boone     announced    no    rule    of   constitutional   law    applicable    to
    police     officers,        then    Goodwin    was   wrongly     decided.      For
    according to the dissent’s view, Goodwin acted in the absence of
    any prior circuit precedent to hold that a constitutional right
    was clearly established and so a police officer did not enjoy
    qualified immunity.            We cannot endorse such an extraordinary
    view of our precedent.
    In sum, our precedent unmistakably provides that, by 1988,
    a police officer violates clearly established constitutional law
    when he suppresses material exculpatory evidence in bad faith.
    Accordingly, we hold that the Officers were clearly on notice of
    the impermissibility of their conduct in 1988, the time of the
    alleged violations. 10
    10
    The Officers unpersuasively rely on three unpublished
    post-1988 opinions to bolster their contention that the rights
    Owens asserts were not clearly established in 1988. But, as we
    have   repeatedly   explained,    unpublished   opinions are  not
    precedent in this circuit. See, e.g., Hogan v. Carter, 
    85 F.3d 1113
    , 1118 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Thus, these unpublished
    opinions cannot alter the clear rule set forth in the published
    opinions discussed above.      Nor do they reflect the kind of
    judicial disagreement that makes qualified immunity appropriate.
    Just as a dissent does not articulate the law of the case,
    unpublished opinions do not articulate the law of the circuit.
    Both may reflect judicial disagreement about whether a right is
    in fact clearly established, but neither can displace the
    circuit’s binding authority.     Cf. Brockington, 637 F.3d at 507
    (holding   that   unpublished    decisions    suggesting that  no
    constitutional right was violated did not entitle a defendant to
    qualified immunity).
    43
    V.
    Finally, we address whether Owens has stated a plausible
    claim against the BCPD.
    A.
    Section   1983     provides    that    “[e]very    person,”      who,    under
    color of state law causes the violation of another’s federal
    rights shall be liable to the party injured by his conduct.                    See
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .        In Monell v. New York City Department of
    Social Services, 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690 (1978), the Supreme Court
    held that municipalities qualify as “persons” under the statute,
    rendering them amenable to suit.
    Unlike    public     officials,       municipalities       do    not     enjoy
    qualified immunity.       See Owen v. City of Independence, 
    445 U.S. 622
    , 638 (1980).      Accordingly, claims against municipalities are
    measured    against     current     law,    without     regard       to     whether
    municipalities’ obligations were clearly established at the time
    of the alleged violations.          
    Id. at 634
    ; see also Barber v. City
    of Salem, 
    953 F.2d 232
    , 237-38 (6th Cir. 1992).
    For these reasons, the district court erred in dismissing
    Owens’s    claims   against   the    BCPD    on   the   basis    of       qualified
    immunity.     Apparently recognizing this, the BCPD does not now
    contend that it has immunity.          Rather, it argues that dismissal
    of the claim against it was nonetheless proper because Owens has
    assertedly “failed to plead sufficient facts” to set forth a
    44
    plausible Monell claim.            Appellees’ Br. 43.                     We turn to that
    argument.
    B.
    Although     municipalities,           unlike         public   officials,         cannot
    claim    immunity      from    suit,    the        Supreme      Court       has    expressly
    cabined their liability:          under Monell, a municipality is liable
    only for its own illegal acts.                     See 
    436 U.S. at 691
     (stating
    that a municipality “cannot be held liable solely because it
    employs a tortfeasor” (emphasis in original)); see also Connick
    v. Thompson, 
    131 S. Ct. 1350
    , 1359 (2011) (“[Municipalities] are
    not     vicariously     liable     under          § 1983       for    their       employees’
    actions.”).       Pursuant to this standard, a municipality is liable
    under § 1983 if it follows a custom, policy, or practice by
    which     local    officials      violate         a    plaintiff’s          constitutional
    rights.       Monell,    
    436 U.S. at 694
    .           Only    if    a   municipality
    subscribes to a custom, policy, or practice can it be said to
    have committed an independent act, the sine qua non of Monell
    liability.
    Here,    Owens    alleges    that       the      BCPD     violated       his      federal
    constitutional rights pursuant to a municipal custom, policy, or
    practice.         Specifically,        he    alleges          that    “[a]t       all    times
    relevant to this case,” the BCPD “maintained a custom, policy,
    and/or     practice”      of     condoning            its     officers’        conduct       in
    “knowingly,       consciously,         and        repeatedly         with[holding]          and
    45
    suppress[ing]”       exculpatory          evidence.          Owens’s      complaint       thus
    alleges a theory of custom “by condonation.”                          Spell v. McDaniel,
    
    824 F.2d 1380
    , 1390 (4th Cir. 1987).                              Under this theory of
    liability, a city violates § 1983 if municipal policymakers fail
    “to   put    a     stop   to     or       correct       a    widespread         pattern     of
    unconstitutional conduct.”                Id. at 1389.            Owens alleges that by
    failing     to    correct      its    officers’           pervasive       suppression       of
    evidence, the BCPD injured him, committing an independent act
    that renders it liable under § 1983.
    Prevailing      under     such       a    theory       is    no    easy     task.      A
    plaintiff must point to a “persistent and widespread practice[]
    of municipal officials,” the “duration and frequency” of which
    indicate     that    policymakers          (1)      had      actual      or     constructive
    knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to
    their “deliberate indifference.”                     Id. at 1386–91 (alterations
    omitted).        Both knowledge and indifference can be inferred from
    the “extent” of employees’ misconduct.                        Id. at 1391.          Sporadic
    or isolated violations of rights will not give rise to Monell
    liability; only “widespread or flagrant” violations will.                                  Id.
    at 1387.
    Although      prevailing       on    the      merits    of    a    Monell    claim    is
    difficult,       simply   alleging        such      a   claim      is,    by    definition,
    easier.     For to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
    a complaint need only allege facts which, if true, “‘state a
    46
    claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”                               Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
     (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (emphasis added).
    The recitation of facts need not be particularly detailed, and
    the chance of success need not be particularly high.                           See Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. at 678
    ; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.                       A plaintiff fails to
    state a claim only when he offers “labels and conclusions” or
    formulaically      recites      the     elements         of    his    § 1983        cause   of
    action.    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    .
    In support of his claim, Owens alleges that “[r]eported and
    unreported cases from the period of time before and during the
    events    complained    of”     establish         that    the    BCPD    had      a   custom,
    policy,    or   practice       of   knowingly       and       repeatedly       suppressing
    exculpatory     evidence       in   criminal        prosecutions.              He     further
    alleges that “a number of motions were filed and granted during
    this time period that demonstrate that [the BCPD] maintained a
    custom,    policy,   or    practice       to      allow       this    type   of       behavior
    either    directly   or    .    .   .   by    condoning         it,   and/or        knowingly
    turning a blind eye to it.”              The assertions as to “reported and
    unreported cases” and numerous “successful motions” are factual
    allegations, the veracity of which could plausibly support a
    Monell    claim.       That     BCPD     officers         withheld      information         on
    multiple occasions could establish a “persistent and widespread”
    pattern of practice, the hallmark of an impermissible custom.
    Spell, 
    824 F.2d at 1386
    .                If (but only if) the duration and
    47
    frequency      of    this    conduct    was     widespread   and     recurrent,    the
    BCPD’s    failure      to    address     it     could    qualify     as    “deliberate
    indifference.”        
    Id. at 1391
    .
    Urging a different result, the BCPD contends that Owens
    alleges nothing more than “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
    harmed-me accusation[s].”              See Appellees’ Br. 47 (quoting Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. at 678
    ).             We recognize, of course, that courts have
    dismissed Monell claims when the plaintiff has alleged nothing
    more than a municipality’s adherence to an impermissible custom.
    But Owens has done more than that:                 Owens has alleged facts          –-
    the existence of “reported and unreported cases” and numerous
    “successful motions” –- which, if true, would buttress his legal
    conclusion.
    Owens’s      brief,     but     non-conclusory,       allegations       closely
    resemble those in Haley v. City of Boston, 
    657 F.3d 39
     (1st Cir.
    2011).        There, a defendant was convicted of murder when two
    Boston police officers suppressed a witness’s statement casting
    doubt on his guilt.           
    Id. at 45
    .         The defendant discovered this
    Brady material, and after thirty-four years in prison, obtained
    his release; he then sued the Boston Police Department under
    § 1983.        The    First     Circuit       reversed    the    district     court’s
    dismissal of the claim, holding that the defendant had stated a
    plausible Monell claim against the Boston Police Department in
    view     of   the    “wholly     unexplained”       nature      of   its    officers’
    48
    suppression of evidence and the alleged (but not identified in
    the    opinion    or   record)     “volume    of    cases”    involving    similar
    violations in the Boston Police Department.                  Id. at 53; see also
    Complaint, Haley v. City of Boston, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 379
     (D.
    Mass. 2009) (No. 1:09-cv-10197).             The Haley court concluded that
    this “volume” of other cases documenting officers’ suppression
    of     evidence   lent    credence    to     the    claim     that    policymakers
    “encouraged, or at least tolerated” an impermissible practice.
    Haley, 
    657 F.3d at 53
    .           Accordingly, “[a]lthough [the complaint
    was] couched in general terms,” the court concluded that the
    complaint nonetheless “contain[ed] sufficient factual content to
    survive a motion to dismiss.”          
    Id.
    The same reasoning applies here.             Of course, to prevail on
    the merits, Owens will have to do more than allege a pervasive
    practice of BCPD misconduct; he must prove it.                        But at this
    early stage in the proceedings, we must conclude that Owens has
    pled     sufficient      factual    content    to     survive    Rule     12(b)(6)
    dismissal.
    VI.
    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of
    district court to the extent it dismisses Owens’s claims against
    the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office.                        We vacate the
    judgment in all other respects.                We remand the case to the
    49
    district   court   for   further   proceedings   consistent   with   this
    opinion.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
    50
    TRAXLER, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
    I concur in parts III, IV.A, and V of the majority opinion.
    However, I respectfully dissent from parts II and IV.B.                   First,
    I believe that Owens’ Brady claims were untimely because they
    accrued    when   he     discovered    the     exculpatory   and     impeaching
    evidence that had not been disclosed, not when the proceeding
    was subsequently terminated via entry of the nolle prosequi.
    Second,    I   would    conclude    that    the   district   court      correctly
    determined     that    the    individual     defendants   were     entitled   to
    qualified immunity because it was not clearly established in the
    spring    of   1988    that   a   police    officer’s   failure    to   disclose
    exculpatory evidence made the officer potentially liable for a
    violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.
    I.
    I turn first to the question of whether Owens’ claims are
    completely time-barred.           Because “[t]here is no federal statute
    of limitations for § 1983 claims, . . . the state limitations
    period which governs personal injury actions is applied.”                  Lewis
    v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 
    947 F.2d 733
    , 735 (4th Cir. 1991)
    (per curiam); see Wallace v. Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 387 (2007).                  In
    this case, we apply Maryland’s three-year limitations period for
    personal injury actions.          See 
    Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101
    .    This much is beyond debate.             When Owens’ § 1983 claim
    accrued, however, is a more difficult question.
    51
    “[T]he    accrual   date   of   a    §   1983   cause    of    action   is   a
    question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to
    state law.”     Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.            In addressing this very
    issue, the Supreme Court stated that the “standard rule” for
    determining the date a cause of action accrues is to determine
    “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,
    that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”
    Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).                    Generally
    speaking, a federal claim “accrues when the plaintiff knows or
    has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or
    her injury has occurred,” and therefore “we typically determine
    the accrual of a § 1983 action by looking to the event that
    should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her
    rights.”      D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 
    747 F.3d 378
    , 384 (6th Cir.
    2014) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see
    Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 
    64 F.3d 951
    , 955 (4th Cir.
    1995) (en banc) (explaining that under federal law, a cause of
    action accrues “when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts
    about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal
    his cause of action.”); cf. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (observing
    that, under the standard rule, there can be no dispute that
    petitioner    could   have   filed   suit      as    soon    as    the   allegedly
    wrongful arrest occurred . . . so that statute of limitations
    would normally commence to run from that date”).
    52
    Owens’ claim is based on the defendant police officers’
    failure      to    disclose    exculpatory       evidence—a     due    process   claim
    that    clearly      arises    pursuant     to    Brady    v.    Maryland.       Thus,
    “application          of    the     general      rule     would       indicate   that
    [plaintiff’s § 1983] cause of action [based on Brady] accrued—
    and    the    limitations      period   began—when        [plaintiff]     discovered
    that the exculpatory evidence in question had not been disclosed
    to him.”           D’Ambrosio, 747 F.3d at 384 (emphasis added); see
    Julian v. Hanna, 
    732 F.3d 842
    , 849                      (7th Cir. 2013).         Owens
    clearly knew about at least some of the exculpatory evidence—
    specifically the fact that James Thompson gave police several
    different versions of his testimony before and during trial—as
    early    as       October   1989,   when   the     Maryland      Court   of   Special
    Appeals recounted the shifting testimony in an opinion affirming
    Owens’ conviction.            At the very latest, Owens was aware of the
    exculpatory and impeachment evidence at issue in this appeal in
    June 11, 2008, when his counsel filed a motion to exclude that
    evidence at his retrial and detailed the evidence discovered
    after the original trial.
    But this does not end the analysis.                      In determining the
    accrual date of a § 1983 claim, we should consider the most
    analogous common-law cause of action as a guidepost.                          Assuming
    the most analogous common law tort is malicious prosecution, its
    “favorable termination” requirement constitutes a “distinctive
    53
    rule” of accrual that displaces the general rule that a claim
    accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his
    injury.       See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.                       Because the favorable-
    termination element “constitutes a prerequisite for recovery” on
    a   malicious      prosecution          claim,       it    naturally          “establishes       the
    time from which the claim accrues”). See Lambert v. Williams,
    
    223 F.3d 257
    , 262 n.3 (4th Cir. 2000).
    I    part     ways    with       my    friends        in    the     majority         on   the
    application of the “favorable termination” requirement in this
    context.       The     majority         notes      that     in     order       to    satisfy     the
    favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim,
    the    plaintiff      must    demonstrate            that    the    criminal          proceedings
    against him have been terminated in such a way that they cannot
    be revived.          See Poventud v. City of New York, 
    750 F.3d 121
    ,
    130-31 (2nd Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Under the common law any
    final      termination       of    a    criminal          proceeding       in       favor   of   the
    accused,      such    that        the    proceeding         cannot       be     brought      again,
    qualifies as a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious
    prosecution action.”).                  Following this approach, they conclude
    that    the   proceedings          were      not     formally      terminated          until     the
    nolle prosequi was entered.
    In my view, the majority adheres a bit too rigidly to the
    common-law analogue rather than using it as a “starting point”
    that “provides a useful guidepost in making sense of alleged
    54
    constitutional injuries” for determining the contours of claims
    of constitutional violations under § 1983.”                              Becker v. Kroll,
    
    494 F.3d 904
    , 913-14 (10th Cir. 2007); see Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 493
    (recognizing that the common law is a “‘starting point’ for the
    analysis under § 1983” but that our analysis should never be
    “slavishly    derived”        from    the    common          law)   (internal        quotation
    marks omitted) (Souter, J., concurring); Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 258 (1978) (recognizing common-law tort rules as the
    “starting point for the inquiry under § 1983”).
    Indeed,     it     is   appropriate           to       consider       the     underlying
    purpose of the elements of the common law analogue to determine
    whether they can be imported for accrual purposes under § 1983.
    See Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 484
     (taking into account the purpose of
    the     favorable       termination          requirement).                  The     favorable
    termination     requirement          is     intended          to    guard     against     “the
    possibility of the claimant . . . succeeding in the tort action
    after    having        been    convicted          in         the    underlying        criminal
    prosecution,      in     contravention         of        a    strong     judicial        policy
    against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out
    of the same or identical transaction.”                        Kossler v. Crisanti, 
    564 F.3d 181
    , 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).       Thus,     this       element      is         satisfied      where    a   prior
    criminal case against the plaintiff has been disposed of in a
    way that indicates the plaintiff’s innocence.                                See Murphy v.
    55
    Lynn, 
    118 F.3d 938
    , 948 (2d Cir. 1997); see Restatement (Second)
    of Torts § 660 cmt. a; see also Taylor v. Gregg, 
    36 F.3d 453
    ,
    456 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Uboh v. Reno, 
    141 F.3d 1000
    ,
    1004 (11th Cir. 1998).
    This    reasoning     makes    little     sense    when    considering       the
    accrual date for Brady claims under § 1983.                   For a Brady claim,
    the    plaintiff      need   only    demonstrate      “that   prejudice       resulted
    from     the   suppression.”          Vinson,     436    F.3d     at   420.      “[A]
    defendant’s right to pre-trial disclosure under Brady is not
    conditioned on his ability to demonstrate that he would or even
    probably would prevail at trial if the evidence were disclosed,
    much less that he is in fact innocent.”                   Poventud, 750 F.3d at
    133    (internal      quotation     marks    omitted).        Brady    is   meant    to
    ensure    a    fair    trial;     “[t]he     remedy     for   a   Brady     claim    is
    therefore a new trial, as proof of the constitutional violation
    need not be at odds with [defendant’s] guilt.”                         Id.; see id.
    (“[T]he remedy for a Brady violation is vacatur of the judgment
    of conviction and a new trial in which the defendant now has the
    Brady material available to [him].”); accord Julian, 732 F.3d at
    849 (“Unlike [a] malicious prosecution claim, [a] Brady claim
    may have accrued when [the criminal defendant/§ 1983 plaintiff]
    was granted a new trial . . . before the charges against him
    were dropped; and ordinarily a Brady claim does not accrue until
    that happens.         But although [plaintiff’s] ordeal was not over
    56
    (because he was subject to being retried), his Brady claim was
    ripe.     The exculpatory evidence had been revealed; the harm the
    alleged Brady violation had done could not be affected by a
    retrial.” (internal citations omitted)). 1
    Accordingly,   I   would   conclude      that   the    proceedings       were
    “favorably terminated” when Owens’ conviction was vacated and he
    was granted a new trial on June 7, 2007.                The Brady violation
    was complete; “the harm the alleged Brady violation had done
    could not be affected by a retrial.”             Julian, 732 F.3d at 849
    His claim was therefore ripe and, assuming he knew about the
    undisclosed exculpatory evidence in question at that point, the
    limitations period began running at that time.                    Alternatively,
    as   previously   noted,   Owens   at    the   latest       was   aware   of   the
    exculpatory evidence       by June 11, 2008, when his attorney filed
    a motion to exclude that evidence at his retrial.                   Either way,
    Owens’ claims are untimely.
    1
    In finding my position unfaithful to the judicial policy
    against the creation of conflicting resolutions, my colleagues
    incorrectly assume that if a Brady claim and a malicious
    prosecution claim produce different results, they will have
    produced conflicting results. But that is not so for reasons I
    have already suggested.      A Brady claim under § 1983 seeks
    relief, regardless of the plaintiff’s guilt or innocence, for
    the deprivation of a fair trial as a result of the prosecution’s
    failure   to  disclose   exculpatory  evidence.    A   malicious
    prosecution claim seeks to remedy the seizure of the plaintiff
    pursuant to legal process that was unsupported by probable
    cause.   It would be perfectly consistent to succeed on a Brady
    claim but fail on a malicious prosecution claim.
    57
    II.
    As   discussed      above,    I    believe    Owens’       claims    are   time-
    barred.     But even if the claims were timely filed, I believe his
    claims     against   the     individual         officers     fail    on     qualified
    immunity grounds.         To satisfy the “clearly established” prong of
    the qualified immunity analysis, “a right must be sufficiently
    clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
    what he is doing violates that right.”                Reichle v. Howards, 
    132 S. Ct. 2088
    , 2093 (2012) (alterations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).        That is, “existing precedent must have placed
    the   statutory      or     constitutional         question       beyond     debate.”
    Ashcroft    v.   al-Kidd,    
    131 S. Ct. 2074
    ,     2083    (2011).       “This
    clearly     established      standard      protects        the    balance     between
    vindication of constitutional rights and government officials’
    effective performance of their duties by ensuring that officials
    can reasonably anticipate when their conduct may give rise to
    liability for damages.”            Reichle, 
    132 S. Ct. at 2093
     (emphasis
    added) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).                           In
    applying the “clearly established” standard, we “ordinarily need
    not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court
    of appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case
    arose.     If a right is recognized in some other circuit, but not
    in this one, an official will ordinarily retain the immunity
    defense.”     Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 
    178 F.3d 231
    , 251 (4th
    58
    Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation
    omitted).     In deciding “whether the right at issue was clearly
    established at the time of the officer’s conduct,” Meyers v.
    Baltimore     Cnty.,      Md.,    
    713 F.3d 723
    ,     731   (4th    Cir.      2013)
    (emphasis     added)      (internal      quotation      marks       omitted),       we    are
    interested in relevant decisions that were decided before the
    conduct   currently       at   issue      occurred,         not   decisions       announced
    afterward—even if those post-dated decisions involved underlying
    violations that occurred prior to the alleged violations in this
    case, see Fields v. Prater, 
    566 F.3d 381
    , 390 (4th Cir. 2009)
    (qualified         immunity        protects           defendants           from      being
    “retroactively subject to significant penalties at law for which
    they did not have proper notice”).
    Owens was convicted by a jury in March 1988 and sentenced
    in   April    1988.       Accordingly,         for    qualified       immunity       to    be
    overcome,     it   must    have    been    clearly      established        at     least    by
    early 1988 that a police officer violated a criminal defendant’s
    due process rights by failing to furnish exculpatory evidence to
    a prosecutor.         Cf. United States v. Smith Grading & Paving,
    Inc.,   
    760 F.2d 527
    ,      532    (4th    Cir.    1985)       (“No    due    process
    violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a
    defendant in time for its effective use at trial.”).                                 Owens
    relies on a variety of decisions that both pre-date and post-
    date defendants’ conduct in the spring of 1988.                             In my view,
    59
    none of these decisions had placed the “constitutional question
    beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 
    131 S. Ct. at 2083
    , by the late spring
    of    1988.    Accordingly,         I   would     affirm     the    district       court’s
    conclusion     that      the      individual      officers         were       entitled    to
    qualified immunity.
    A.    Decisions Pre-Dating April 1988
    Owens contends that law enforcement officers have been on
    notice since this court’s 1964 decision in Barbee v. Warden, Md.
    Penitentiary, 
    331 F.2d 842
     (4th Cir. 1964), that an officer’s
    failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor made
    the officer potentially liable for a violation of a criminal
    defendant’s      constitutional         rights.        In   Barbee,       we    granted    a
    defendant’s habeas petition to set aside his conviction “because
    the    prosecutor       failed,    either    through        lack    of    his     personal
    knowledge or for some other reason, to disclose at the trial
    potentially      exculpatory        evidence      in    the    possession          of    the
    police.”      
    Id. at 843
    .         In doing so, the court rejected the idea
    that the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence was
    excused when the police failed to turn such information over to
    the    state’s     attorney.            Barbee     therefore        stands       for     the
    proposition      that    a   police     officer’s      knowledge         of    exculpatory
    evidence will be imputed to the prosecutor for Brady purposes.
    See United States v. Sutton, 
    542 F.2d 1239
    , 1241 n.2 (4th Cir.
    1976) (reversing conviction for failure to disclose exculpatory
    60
    evidence despite prosecutor’s lack of knowledge because “legally
    what   [the         officer]      knew    must     be   imputed           to    the     prosecutor”
    (citing     Barbee,         
    331 F.2d at 846
    )).           Barbee       simply     did    not
    establish that a law enforcement officer                            violates a defendant’s
    due    process         rights       by     failing       to        turn        over     potentially
    exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor; see Jean v. Collins, 
    155 F.3d 701
    , 710 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Jean I”) (explaining
    that Barbee did not “impose[] a constitutional duty on police
    officers to give evidence to a prosecutor” but “held simply that
    the police’s knowledge of such evidence would be imputed to the
    prosecutor in deciding whether the prosecutor had fulfilled his
    Brady duties”), vacated on other grounds, 
    526 U.S. 1142
     (1999).
    To   the       same     effect      is    United       States       v.     Sutton,       which
    reversed      a      bank    robbery      conviction          on    direct        appeal    on    the
    ground      that      the     government          failed       to     disclose          exculpatory
    evidence.            See    
    542 F.2d at 1240
    .        The        court       reached    this
    conclusion even though the prosecuting attorney apparently had
    no knowledge of such evidence, concluding that “legally what
    [the officer] knew must be imputed to the prosecutor.”                                      
    Id.
     at
    1241 n.2.           And Boone v. Paderick, also cited by the majority,
    granted     habeas         relief    based       on    the    prosecution’s             failure    to
    disclose        a     law    enforcement           agent’s          promise        of     favorable
    treatment to a key government witness.                              See 
    541 F.2d 447
    , 448
    (4th     Cir.       1976).         Boone        even    less        clearly       supports       this
    61
    proposition         as     the     prosecutor      testified       in   the     habeas
    proceedings that he did not deny that the officer told him of
    the promises and stated that he simply could not remember.
    B.    Decisions Post-Dating April 1988
    Owens also relies on Goodwin v. Metts, a 1989 decision in
    which the court let stand a jury award against a police officer
    on a common law malicious prosecution cause of action.                         See 
    885 F.2d 157
    , 166-67 (4th Cir. 1989).                  Goodwin did not address any
    due process claims based on Brady.                   Owens’ reliance on Goodwin
    is based on the court’s statement that “[a] reasonable officer
    would have known [in 1983, when the salient events occurred,]
    that    a   prosecution           carried   out    without       probable    cause    or
    disclosure         of     exculpatory       information      would      violate      the
    constitutional rights of the criminal defendants.”                       
    Id. at 164
    .
    Assuming Owens is correct that Goodwin puts officers on notice
    that   they     “could       be    liable    for    their    failure    to    disclose
    exculpatory evidence,” Brief of Appellant at 40, such notice was
    not provided until September 1989, when Goodwin was decided.
    Owens’ trial took place between February and April 1988; thus,
    Goodwin would have been of no value to the defendant police
    officers      in    this     case,      whose    failure    to    disclose    evidence
    occurred before Goodwin was decided.
    Owens makes much of the fact that the conduct at issue in
    Goodwin –      for       which    the   individual    officers     there     were    held
    62
    liable – happened in 1983.                 But for purposes of determining
    “clearly established law” in the context of qualified immunity,
    the relevant precedents “can only be applied prospectively” and
    “cannot be imputed retroactively to an officer in this circuit
    whose    allegedly     tortious      conduct    predated”     the   decision   in
    question.      Hill v. Crum, 
    727 F.3d 312
    , 322 (4th Cir. 2013).
    Thus, it only matters when the case was decided, not when the
    underlying conduct occurred. 2          As the next section demonstrates,
    our court later was sharply divided over the value of these
    cases to a plaintiff suing individual officers.
    C.    Jean v. Collins I & II
    Both Owens and the individual defendants claim support from
    the two Jean v. Collins decisions.               These decisions reveal only
    that, even in 1998, this court was very much split over whether
    Barbee, Goodwin and Carter established that a police officer
    could    be   liable    for    his     failure     to   disclose     exculpatory
    information.      In    Jean    I,    we    affirmed    the   district   court’s
    conclusion that the defendant police officers were entitled to
    qualified immunity because “the relevant sources of law do not
    clearly establish that in 1982 police themselves labored under
    2
    Like Goodwin, Carter v. Burch, 
    34 F.3d 257
     (4th Cir.
    1994), was decided too late to be of any value to the officers
    in this case. Carter upheld an award of nominal damages against
    a police officer who failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in
    connection with a trial occurring in March 1988; the court,
    however, did not decide Carter until 1994.
    63
    federal constitutional duties with respect to the disclosure of
    evidence to the prosecution.”       
    155 F.3d at 712
    .       Of particular
    relevance were the majority’s observations regarding Barbee:
    We believe that Jean misapprehends the essential
    holding of Barbee. Barbee did not require police, as
    a constitutional matter, to furnish evidence to a
    prosecutor. Instead, as this circuit later explained,
    Barbee held simply that the police’s knowledge of such
    evidence would be imputed to the prosecutor in
    deciding whether the prosecutor had fulfilled his
    Brady duties.
    
    Id. at 710
    .     Regarding Goodwin and Carter, the en banc court
    recognized that these decisions “now [in 1989] provide notice to
    police officers that they can be subject to monetary damages
    under section 1983 for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence
    to the prosecutor,” but that because “[t]hese decisions . . .
    postdate the events in this case . . . we do not adopt the
    dissent’s theory that proper notice to defendants can be notice
    after the fact.”   
    Id.
     at 710 n.3. 3
    On remand, the en banc court did not revisit the clearly
    established   prong,   again   affirming,   this   time   by   an   equally
    3
    Thus, Jean I did not acknowledge that Goodwin and Carter
    provided such notice with respect to conduct occurring after
    1982.   Since Goodwin and Carter were decided in 1989 and 1994,
    respectively, it would not be possible for those decisions to
    afford notice with respect to conduct occurring prior to 1989.
    Even though Jean I was vacated and remanded, see 
    526 U.S. 1142
     (1999), for reconsideration in light of Wilson v. Layne,
    
    526 U.S. 603
    , 609 (1999), the Supreme Court did not address Jean
    I’s conclusion that, as of 1982, police had no constitutional
    duty to provide evidence to a prosecutor.
    64
    divided court, the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
    See Jean v. Collins, 
    221 F.3d 656
     (4th Cir. 2000) (“Jean II”)
    The    concurring      opinion        for   affirmance,        having       concluded       that
    there    was    no   constitutional           violation        because       the     officer’s
    failure to disclose was in good faith, took the position that
    that    the    Brady     disclosure         duty   is    one       that    rests     with    the
    prosecution rather than with the police .                            See 
    id.
     at 660–62.
    By    contrast,      the      dissenting      opinion,         arguing       for     reversal,
    assumed the contrary view that officers owe an independent duty
    under Brady to disclose exculpatory information.                                   See 
    id. at 664
    .
    Although      judicial         unanimity         is     not        required     for     a
    constitutional right to be clearly established, that the judges
    of this court so fervently disagreed in 1998 and 2000 about the
    existence, contours and scope of an officer’s                                constitutional
    duty to disclose exculpatory evidence strongly suggests that the
    right was not clearly established at the time of Owens’ trial in
    1988.    See Swanson v. Powers, 
    937 F.2d 965
    , 968 (4th Cir. 1991)
    (“Since qualified immunity is appropriate if reasonable officers
    could    disagree        on     the    relevant     issue,          it    surely     must     be
    appropriate       when        reasonable      jurists        can     do     so.”     (citation
    omitted)); see also Wilson v. Layne, 
    526 U.S. 603
    , 618 (1999)
    (“If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is
    65
    unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing
    side of the controversy.”).
    In sum, I would conclude that the defendant police officers
    are   entitled      to   qualified    immunity        as    it   was   not   clearly
    established    at    the   time    they    failed     to    disclose    exculpatory
    evidence   that     police   officers      had    a    constitutional        duty   to
    disclose      exculpatory         evidence       to        criminal     defendants.
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the grant
    of qualified immunity to the individual officers. 4
    4
    My friends in the majority characterize as “extraordinary”
    my view that none of the decisions they cite—most notably
    Barbee, Sutton, Boone and Goodwin—placed the “constitutional
    question beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083, for
    officers’ conduct occurring prior to the issuance of Goodwin,
    the most recent of these.     Given that more than half of the
    members of the en banc court in 1998 espoused this view,
    including two judges currently still sitting on the court, it is
    hardly a stunning or unsupportable one.     See Jean v. Collins,
    
    155 F.3d 701
     (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (authored by Wilkinson,
    C.J., and joined by Niemeyer, J.), vacated on other grounds, 
    526 U.S. 1142
     (1999).
    66
    WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
    I agree with nearly all aspects of the thoughtful and well-
    reasoned majority opinion.               The only issue on which I part ways
    with    the     majority        is    whether      the    Baltimore         City      State’s
    Attorney’s Office is an entity amenable to suit.                                I conclude
    that it is, and I would remand for the district court to fully
    consider whether the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is
    entitled      to   sovereign         immunity.      Accordingly,           on   this      issue
    alone, I respectfully dissent.
    I.
    Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
    us to look to the “law of the state where the court is located”
    to determine whether an entity that is not an individual or a
    corporation        has   the    capacity      to   be    sued.        Fed.      R.   Civ.    P.
    17(b)(3).       I agree with the majority that Maryland’s courts do
    not yet appear to have determined whether the Baltimore City
    State’s Attorney’s Office has the capacity to be sued.                                    But a
    close    look      at    the    Maryland       Constitution          and     the     Maryland
    Criminal Procedure Code convince me that it is.
    The    Maryland    Constitution         establishes       a    State’s        Attorney
    for    each   county      and    for    the    City      of   Baltimore—and          it    goes
    further with specific provisions that apply only to “the State’s
    Attorney for Baltimore City.”                    Md. Const. art. V, § 9.                    For
    67
    example, the Constitution provides “that the State’s Attorney
    for Baltimore City shall have the power to appoint a Deputy and
    such other Assistants as the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City may
    authorize    or    approve[.]”       Id.         Maryland’s     Constitution      also
    specifies salaries for Baltimore’s State’s Attorney, Baltimore’s
    Deputy   State’s        Attorney,    and        Baltimore’s     Assistant    State’s
    Attorneys.        Id.     Finally,    it    states     that   the     “expenses   for
    conducting the office of the State’s Attorney . . . shall be
    paid by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore[.]”                    Id.
    Not surprisingly, then, Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Code
    acknowledges      the    existence    of        the   “Office    of    the   State’s
    Attorney” that the Maryland Constitution created.                     Md. Code Ann.
    Crim. Proc. § 15.         Not only is Criminal Procedure Code Title 15
    named “Office of the State’s Attorney,” * id., but it defines
    “State’s Attorney” as “the individual holding that office under
    Article V, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution[,]” id. § 15-101.
    *
    The majority opinion states that the title of the code
    section “provides little assistance to courts interpreting
    statutory provisions.” Ante at 25. Although this is certainly
    a valid canon of construction, it has no relevance here for two
    reasons.   First, we are not interpreting the Maryland Criminal
    Procedure Code itself; we are determining whether a particular
    thing—the   Baltimore  City   State’s  Attorney’s Office—has   a
    distinct legal identity.     Second, that particular canon of
    construction applies when the statute subject to interpretation
    contains “some ambiguous word or phrase.” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen
    v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 
    331 U.S. 519
    , 528–29 (1947).       The
    majority points to nothing ambiguous in the statute that might
    trigger the application of that canon.
    68
    It sets forth all of the duties and powers possessed by that
    Office, 
    id.
     §§ 15-102–109, and it distinguishes the Office of
    the State’s Attorney from the Office of the State Prosecutor,
    which was established to be “an independent unit in the Office
    of the Attorney General.”             Id. § 14-102(a)(2).
    Were    this    a    case   about    a    sheriff’s   department,   I,    too,
    would perceive the need to “remain faithful to the [Maryland
    Court of Appeals’s] analysis in Boyer.”                  Ante at 27.       But this
    is a case about the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office,
    not a sheriff’s department.                All the Boyer court concluded was
    that there is no such thing as the “Charles County ‘Sheriff’s
    Department,’” which was how the plaintiff in that case named the
    defendant in his complaint.             Also, with one exception, the Boyer
    court consistently referred to the entity in that case as the
    Charles       County       “Sheriff’s      Department”—with     quotation       marks
    around “Sheriff’s Department.”                  It should come as no surprise,
    then, that the Boyer court determined that the Charles County
    “Sheriff’s Department” is not a legal entity; after all, the
    Boyer court explained that they could find nothing “establishing
    an entity known as the Charles County “‘Sheriff’s Department.’”
    Boyer v. State, 
    594 A.2d 121
    , 128 n.9 (Md. 1991).                      In short,
    nothing in Boyer persuades me that the Maryland Court of Appeals
    used    that    case       to   set   forth      an   analytical   framework      for
    69
    determining         whether     entities      other       than    the     Charles      County
    Sheriff’s Department are amenable to suit.
    Unlike the majority, I do not read footnote 9 in Boyer to
    stand for the broad assertion of Maryland state law that “absent
    a statutory or constitutional provision creating a governmental
    agency,      an     ‘office’     or     ‘department’        bears     no      unique       legal
    identity, and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law.”                                 Ante
    at 23.       Instead, that footnote explains why the Maryland Court
    of   Appeals        determined         that     the      Charles     County         Sheriff’s
    Department was not a governmental agency or a stand-alone legal
    entity capable of being sued.                   In other words, the absence of
    any mention of the Charles County Sheriff’s Department either in
    the Maryland Constitution or in any other state statute confirms
    only the legal nonexistence of that particular department.
    But even assuming for the sake of argument that footnote 9
    in   Boyer    stands      for    the    broad      proposition      that      the    majority
    opinion      ascribes      to    it,     I    would      still     conclude         that     the
    Baltimore         City   State’s       Attorney’s        Office     is    a    governmental
    agency    amenable       to     suit    for   the      reasons     stated      above.        To
    reiterate,        the    Maryland      Constitution        clearly       establishes        the
    Baltimore         City   State’s       Attorney’s        Office,     and      the    Maryland
    Criminal     Procedure        Code     provides        additional    evidence        of     that
    Office’s      existence.              Because      I     think     that       the    Maryland
    70
    Constitution is clear, I find it outside of our purview to add
    our gloss to it.
    The majority opinion suggests that the establishment of the
    Office of the State’s Attorney’s Coordinator provides evidence
    “[t]hat the Maryland General Assembly knew how to create such an
    office, yet failed to do so with respect to the” Baltimore City
    State’s      Attorney’s       Office.      Ante   at     24.         The     majority    is
    persuaded that the absence of a similar statute creating the
    Baltimore     City     State’s      Attorney’s    Office       “confirms”       that    the
    Office “bears no unique legal identity.”                       
    Id.
          But “[a]s one
    court   has    aptly    put    it,    ‘[n]ot    every    silence       is    pregnant.’”
    Burns v. United States, 
    501 U.S. 129
    , 136 (1991) (quoting Ill.
    Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 
    707 F.2d 273
    , 277 (7th Cir.
    1983)), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Booker,
    
    543 U.S. 220
        (2005).         I   conclude      that     a    more    reasonable
    interpretation of the fact that the Maryland General Assembly
    has    not    enacted     a    statute     establishing        the     Baltimore       City
    State’s Attorney’s Office is that the Maryland Constitution had
    already done so.
    Finally, even if I thought that Maryland law was unclear on
    this    point,    I     am    not    persuaded    that     the       majority    opinion
    captures the way that the Maryland Court of Appeals would rule
    on the issue.         “The highest state court is the final authority
    on state law, but it is still the duty of the federal courts,
    71
    where the state law supplies the rule of decision, to ascertain
    and apply that law even though it has not been expounded by the
    highest court of the State.”           Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,
    
    311 U.S. 169
    , 177 (1940) (citations and footnote omitted).                         When
    the state law is unclear, we “must apply the law . . . as it
    appears the highest court of that state would rule.”                       Brendle v.
    General Tire & Rubber Co., 
    505 F.2d 243
    , 245 (4th Cir. 1974)
    (emphasis added).
    II.
    Because     I    would   hold   that      the   Baltimore      City    State’s
    Attorney’s Office is a legal entity capable of being sued, I
    would   also     reach    the   question    of    whether      the   district   court
    erred in determining that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s
    Office is entitled to sovereign immunity.                 Although the Eleventh
    Amendment prevents plaintiffs from suing states and “arms of the
    state” in federal court, “Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
    extend to counties and similar municipal corporations[,] . . .
    even    if   [they]     exercise   a   slice     of    State     power.”     Cash    v.
    Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    242 F.3d 219
    , 222 (4th                       Cir. 2001)
    (quotations marks and citations omitted); Monell v. Dep’t of
    Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 691 (1978).
    When an entity has both state and local characteristics,
    “the    entity’s       potential   legal    liability”      is    relevant    to    the
    72
    Eleventh Amendment inquiry.                Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
    Doe, 
    519 U.S. 425
    , 431 (1997).                       “Because the State treasury
    factor     is    ‘the     most      salient        factor    in     Eleventh        Amendment
    determinations,’ a finding that the State treasury will not be
    affected by a judgment against the governmental entity weighs
    against finding that entity immune.”                         Cash, 
    242 F.3d at 224
    (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 
    513 U.S. 30
    , 48
    (1994)).        If the state would not be liable for judgment, courts
    consider    several        additional     factors,          including     the       amount   of
    control that the state exercises over the entity, the scope of
    the entity’s concerns, and the way in which state law treats the
    entity to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the lawsuit.
    
    Id.
    In his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Owens
    argued that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is not
    entitled        to     sovereign     immunity        because        it   is     a    “hybrid”
    governmental unit “created by State law but funded and overseen
    by a city or county government.”                     J.A. 75.        Furthermore, Owens
    attached    exhibits        to     his   opposition          that    show     the     State’s
    Attorney on the City of Baltimore’s organization chart and as a
    line item on the City’s general fund budget.                                [J.A. 88–90.]
    Owens    also        specifically    requested        the    opportunity        to    conduct
    discovery on the matter.             J.A. 82.
    73
    But when it orally granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
    the    district    court   failed   to   analyze   the   case   law   discussed
    above or to explain why it was rejecting Owens’s arguments in
    favor of Defendants’ arguments.               Further, the district court
    failed to give the parties a “reasonable opportunity to present
    all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”               Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 12(d).         Instead, it simply declared that “based upon the
    arguments as well as the case law cited in the briefs in this
    case, . . . the State’s Attorneys [sic] Office is a State agency
    and it certainly is entitled to [] sovereign immunity.”                   J.A.
    355.
    In the end, I would reverse and remand the case to the
    district court with instructions to treat Defendants’ motion to
    dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and to allow Owens to
    pursue reasonable discovery as to the sovereign immunity issue.
    See Plante v. Shivar, 
    540 F.2d 1233
    , 1235 (4th Cir. 1976).
    74
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-2173

Citation Numbers: 767 F.3d 379

Filed Date: 9/24/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

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