Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen , 54 Cal. 2d 684 ( 1960 )

GIBSON, C. J.

Plaintiff, a public corporation organized under the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957, operates facilities for the transportation of passengers in the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino. (Stats. 1957, eh. 547.)¹ The two principal transit companies in the Los Angeles area were acquired by plaintiff, and the employees of those companies, subject to normal turnover, are now employees of plaintiff. Defendant brotherhood is the exclusive bargaining representative of certain of plaintiff’s employees, such as conductors, motormen, motor-coach operators, ground loaders, and trafficmen. This action was brought to obtain a declaratory judgment that plaintiff’s employees represented by defendant brotherhood are without the legal right to strike because they are employees of a public corporation. The trial court so held, and defendants have appealed.

In the absence of legislative authorization public employees in general do not have the right to strike (see 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, 1159-1161), and the questions presented here are whether the act creating the transit authority gave its employees such a right and, if so, whether the statute is constitutional as applied to the employees represented by the brotherhood.

Subdivision (c) of section 3.6 of the act provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.... Notwithstanding any other provision of this act. .. the authority . . . shall enter into a written contract with the accredited representative of [its] employees governing wages, salaries, hours and working conditions. . . .’’ (Italics added.)

Language identical with the italicized words of subdivision (e) first appeared in section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 Stat. 70; 29 U.S.C., § 102), and it has been contained in

section 923 of our Labor Code since 1937.² The identical language was also used in section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (48 Stat. 195, 198), section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, 452), and section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 140; 29 U.S.C., § 157). The courts have uniformly interpreted these words as including the right to strike peacefully to enforce union demands with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions. (Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 468, 474-475 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546] ; Amalgamated Association etc. M.C.E. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1951), 340 U.S. 383, 389, 398 [71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364, 22 A.L.R. 2d 874]; International Union of United Automobile etc. Workers of America v. O’Brien (1950), 339 U.S. 454, 456-457 [70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978] ; Collins Baking Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 193 F.2d 483, 486; National Labor Relations Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505; G. C. Breidert Co. v. Sheet Metal etc. Assn., 139 Cal.App.2d 633, 638 [294 P.2d 93].) The cases have applied the language to a number of specific situations and have determined that it includes other activities as well as strikes but does not sanction all collective conduct of workingmen or all kinds of strikes; for example, sit-down strikes have not been included within the right to engage in other concerted activities. (See International Union of United Automobile etc. Workers of America v. O’Brien (1950), supra, 339 U.S. 454, 457-459; International Union etc. A.F.L. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1949), 336 U.S. 245, 255 et seq. [69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651] ; Park & T.I. Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 604-605 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].)

When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in the identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended that the language as used in the later enactment would be given a like interpretation. This rule is applicable to state statutes which are pattemed after federal statutes. (Scripps etc. Hospital v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 669, 677 [151 P.2d 109, 155 A.L.R. 360]; Holmes v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 426, 430 [110 P.2d 428] ; Union Oil Associates v. Johnson, 2 Cal.2d 727, 734 [43 P.2d 291, 98 A.L.R. 1499].) Although the cases which have interpreted the italicized words involved private employees, the act before us incorporates the exact language, consisting of 16 words, found in the earlier statutes, and it is unlikely that the same words would have been repeated without any qualification in a later statute in the absence of an intent that they be given the construction previously adopted by the courts.

Terms such as “concerted activities” are commonly used by courts as well as legislative bodies to refer to strikes. This court, for example, on a number of occasions has used the words “concerted action” as an inclusive term referring to strikes, picketing, and boycotts. (See, e.g., Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees etc., Local No. 88, 53 Cal.2d 455, 469 et seq. [2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76] ; Park & T.l. Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 603 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426]; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 729 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900].) Our codes provide that technical words and phrases, and others which have acquired “a peculiar and appropriate” meaning in law, are to be construed according to such meaning. (Civ. Code, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 16.)

Other provisions of the act support the conclusion that the Legislature granted plaintiff’s employees the right to strike. The employees of the two transit companies taken over by plaintiff had the right to strike prior to acquisition, and the act provides that, when plaintiff acquires any privately owned public utility, it must observe all labor contracts of the utility and that no employee “shall suffer any worsening of his wages, seniority, pension, vacation or other benefits by reason of the acquisition.” (Italics added.) (§ 3.6, subd. (e).) The fact that the Legislature contemplated a right to strike on the part of plaintiff’s employees also appears from subdivision (h) of section 3.6 which provides that plaintiff’s statutory obligation to bargain collectively extends to all matters which are “proper subjects of collective bargaining with a private employer.” The question whether employees may strike and the circumstances under which they may do so are proper subjects of collective bargaining, and clauses relating to strikes are commonly found in collective bargaining contracts. When these provisions of the act are considered together with the express requirement that plaintiff bargain collectively, it is obvious that the legislative intent was to depart from the traditional system of fixing the terms and conditions of governmental employment and to establish for plaintiff and its employees a system comparable to that existing between a privately owned public utility and its employees. A further indication of such an intent is found in subdivision (g) of section 3.6, which provides that plaintiff, when authorized by its employees, may make deductions from their wages and salaries for the payment of union dues or for “any purpose for which deductions may be authorized by the employees of any private employer. ’ ’ To carry out its intent the Legislature chose the language which is found in statutes relating to private employees and which has been given a definite meaning through interpretation by the courts.

The right of public employees to strike has been sustained in two other jurisdictions even though the statutes did not, as here, contain provisions which specifically authorized the public employees in question to engage in collective bargaining and other concerted activities. Local 266 etc. A.F.L. v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30 [275 P.2d 393, 396 et seq.], involved employees of an irrigation district which under section 7 of article 13 of the Arizona Constitution was declared to be a political subdivision of the state “and vested with all the rights, privileges and benefits, and entitled to the immunities and exemptions granted municipalities and political subdivisions under this Constitution or any law of the state or of the United States.” A statute provided that the district could enter into “all necessary contracts.” The court, stating that the function of the district, which supplied power to 100,000 users, was business and economic and not political and governmental, held that the provision permitted but did not require collective bargaining contracts and that since such contracts were legal the employees could strike to enforce a demand for collective bargaining. Board of Education v. Public School Employees’ Union, 233 Minn. 144 [45 N.W.2d 797, 800 et seq., 29 A.L.R.2d 424], concerned the interpretation of a Minnesota statute, applicable to employees generally, which prohibited the issuance of injunctions against strikes. The statute excepted from its provisions policemen, firemen, or any other public officials charged with duties relating to public safety, and the court held that this exception by implication precluded the issuance of an injunction against a strike by school janitors. It was reasoned that the specific exclusion of some public employees indicated an intent to include all others. It is obvious that these two cases go much further in construing statutes in favor of the right of public employees to strike than we are required to go here, since the public employees involved in this case are specifically given the right to bargain collectively and to engage in other concerted activities in aid of such bargaining.

No case has been found which has denied public employees the right to strike where, as here, the employees were specifically authorized by statute to bargain collectively and engage in other concerted activities. The following cases are distinguishable because the public employees did not have the benefit of such legislation: Newmarker v. Regents of University of Calif., 160 Cal.App.2d 640, 646 et seq. [325 P.2d 558] ; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles etc. Council, 94 Cal.App. 2d 36, 46 et seq. [210 P.2d 305] ; Norwalk Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269 [83 A.2d 482, 484 et seq., 31 A.L.R.2d 1133]; City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507 [131 A.2d 59, 61 et seq.]; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Grand River Dam Authority,-Okla.-[292 P.2d 1018,1020 et seq.] ; City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance,-R.I.-[141 A.2d 624, 627 et seq.]; Weakley County Municipal Electric System v. Tick (Tenn. App.), 309 S.W.2d 792, 801 et seq.; Pori of Seattle v. International Longshoremen’s & W. U., 52 Wn.2d 317 [324 P.2d 1099, 1101 et seq.]. Some of these cases are also distinguishable upon other grounds. For example, in the two California cases as well as the one from Tennessee it was held that collective bargaining contracts would be illegal under statutes setting forth particular methods of establishing wages and working conditions and that, accordingly, a strike to enforce collective bargaining demands would be a strike for an unlawful purpose. Here, as we have seen, the employer must bargain collective!y and must enter into a written contract with the brotherhood to establish wages and working conditions.

The case of United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 Ü.S. 258 [67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884], cited by plaintiff, is not helpful in determining the proper construction of statutory language permitting employees to engage “in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” The meaning of the quoted words was not at issue and was not discussed by the court. It was there held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits injunctions against strikes, does not apply to governmental employees, the court following the rule of construction that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect. (330 U.S. at p. 270 et seq.) The act before us, unlike the Norris-LaGuardia Act, does not affect employees generally but deals specifically with the employees of plaintiff, a public corporation, and with no one else. The rule of construction relied upon in the United Mine Workers ease obviously has no application to the situation presented here. Nor is plaintiff’s position supported by the analogous rule of construction that statutes in derogation of sovereignty are to be strictly construed in favor of the state. The act expressly declares that it “shall be liberally construed to carry out the objects and purposes and the declared policy of the State of California as in this act set forth.” (§12.1.) The Legislature, as we have seen, has made clear its purpose of creating an employment relationship comparable to that existing between a privately-owned public utility and its employees, and, if plaintiff’s employees were unable to strike, they would be in a far less advantageous position than private employees with respect to collective bargaining. Arbitration procedure authorized by subdivision (e) of section 3.6 in the event of a dispute over wages, hours, or working conditions obviously was not intended to take the place of the right to strike. This procedure may be had only “upon the agreement of both” plaintiff and the brotherhood, and in the present case the district rejected a request for arbitration.

There is no merit in plaintiff’s claim that provisions of the act granting plaintiff managerial discretion with respect to such matters as the fixing of salaries show that subdivision (c) of section 3.6 was not intended to give the employees the right to strike. The act specifically provides that, “notwithstanding any other provision,” plaintiff must enter into a written contract governing working conditions with the accredited representative of the employees. In order to obtain such a contract the employees are authorized to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of colleetive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The employees’ right to engage in other concerted activities, which, as we have seen, includes the right to strike, is thus an integral part of the bargaining process. Plaintiff’s duty to bargain collectively of course interferes with its managerial discretion, but under the act its obligation in this respect takes precedence over other provisions.

In passing upon the constitutionality of the act as applied to the employees represented by the brotherhood, we are not confronted with the problems which might be posed by legislation giving the right to strike to public employees such as policemen, firemen, and public officers exercising a portion of the state’s sovereign powers. Plaintiff’s contention is that subdivision (c), as above construed, is invalid because it assertedly constitutes a delegation of governmental authority to private persons and is discriminatory. We do not agree.

Permitting employees to strike does not delegate to them authority to fix their own wages to the exclusion of the employer’s discretion. In collective bargaining negotiations, whether or not the employees strike, the employer is free to reject demands if he determines that they are unacceptable. Plaintiff claims that its position differs from that of private employers, arguing that it could be compelled by mandamus to provide service even though its employees were on' strike. However, there is nothing in the act warranting the conclusion that plaintiff does not have discretion to reject unacceptable demands of striking employees, and it could not be forced to provide service where this would require it to abandon that discretion. No case has been found holding that a statute permitting public employees to strike constitutes an improper delegation of governmental authority, and courts both in this state and elsewhere, although not specifically discussing the delegation point, have recognized that statutes which permit strikes by publicly employed teachers, electrical workers, maintenance workers, and longshoremen may be validly enacted. (Local 266 etc. A.F.L. v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. (Ariz.), supra, 275 P.2d 393, 396 et seq.; Board of Education v. Public School Employees’ Union (Minn.), supra, 45 N.W.2d 797; see Newmarher v. Regents of University of Calif., supra, 160 Cal.App.2d 640, 646; City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild (N.H.), supra, 131 A.2d 59, 62; Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen’s & W. U. (Wash.), supra, 324 P.2d 1099, 1102-1103.)

The fact that statutes creating other transit systems do not contain provisions similar to the one involved here with respect to the right to strike cannot be a proper basis for a claim that subdivision (c) is discriminatory. Section 1.1 of the act provides that because of the “unique problem” presented in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and the facts and circumstances relative to the establishment of a mass rapid transit system there, the adoption of a “special act” and the creation of a “special authority” are required. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived which would support a classification made by the Legislature, the existence of that state of facts is presumed, and one who challenges the classification has the burden of showing that it is arbitrary. (State v. Industrial Acc. Com., 48 Cal.2d 365, 371-372 [310 P.2d 7]; City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal.2d 804, 811 [306 P.2d 453].) The Legislature could have concluded that conditions existing in the area relating to the availability of transit workers made it necessary to give plaintiff’s employees the right to strike in order to obtain an experienced and efficient working force. For example, at the time the act was adopted in 1957, transit service was principally provided in the area by privately-owned utilities whose employees were represented by labor unions and had the right to strike, and many of these employees might have refused to work for plaintiff if deprived of that right. The act contemplated that plaintiff would acquire such utilities and, as we have seen, provided that their employees should not suffer any loss of benefits. Plaintiff has made no showing that the conditions which exist with respect to other transit systems are the same as those in the Los Angeles area.

The judgment is reversed.

Traynor, J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.

1 The act was amended in 1959 (Stats. 1959, eh. 519), and, unless otherwise noted, references in this opinion to the act are to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 as amended in 1959.

The act declares that plaintiff is a "public corporation of the State of California” and that it is not a state agency as defined by section 11000 of the Government Code, which provides that as used in title 2 of the code "state agency” includes every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, and commission.

2 Sention 923 of the Labor Code provides in part: "Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman . . . shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers ... in the designation of . . . representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” (Italics added.)