Swartz v. Municipality of Anchorage , 436 P.3d 1104 ( 2019 )


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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
    CAROLINE K. SWARTZ,
    Court of Appeals No. A-12810
    Appellant,               Trial Court No. 3AN-14-6816 CR
    v.
    OPINION
    MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,
    Appellee.                 No. 2635 — February 15, 2019
    Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District,
    Anchorage, Jennifer Henderson, Judge.
    Appearances: Shaul L. Goldberg, Denali Law Group,
    Anchorage, for the Appellant. Sarah E. Stanley, Assistant
    Municipal Prosecutor, and William D. Falsey, Municipal
    Attorney, Anchorage, for the Appellee.
    Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg,
    Judges.
    Judge ALLARD.
    In January 2015, Caroline K. Swartz pleaded guilty to driving while license
    suspended or revoked in violation of the Anchorage Municipal Code.1 Pursuant to a
    Criminal Rule 11 agreement, Swartz was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment with 90
    1
    See Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 09.28.019.
    days suspended, a $500 fine with $250 suspended, 3 years’ probation, and 80 hours of
    mandatory community work service — i.e., community work service hours that were
    mandated by the municipal ordinance as a condition of her probation.2
    As part of her plea agreement, Swartz agreed that she would complete her
    community work service hours within six months, and she further agreed that any
    uncompleted portion of the 80 hours of community work service “will convert to jail”
    if it was not completed by the court’s deadline. No conversion rate was specified in the
    plea agreement.
    Swartz ultimately completed only 8 hours of the mandated 80 hours of
    community work service, leaving 72 hours uncompleted. The Municipality petitioned
    the court to revoke Swartz’s probation and argued that the 72 hours of community work
    service should be automatically converted into 9 days in jail pursuant to the plea
    agreement.
    The court held a hearing on the petition in February 2017. At that hearing,
    Swartz argued that the court had no authority to convert her community work service to
    jail time because the Alaska legislature had recently amended state law to prevent such
    conversions. Swartz also argued that conversion to jail time was impermissible even
    before the change of law under our 2000 decision, State v. Fogg.3 The Municipality
    argued that the change in law did not apply to Swartz’s case and that Fogg was
    inapplicable. According to the Municipality, the court had the authority to convert
    2
    See former AMC 09.28.019.B, C (2014) (requiring court to impose 80 hours of
    community work service as a mandatory condition of probation for a defendant’s first
    conviction for driving while license suspended/revoked); see also former AS 28.15.291
    (2014) (imposing the same requirement under state law). In 2016, both the Municipality and
    the State eliminated the mandatory community work service hours for this offense. See AO
    2016-83(s) § 6; SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 105.
    3
    State v. Fogg, 
    995 P.2d 675
     (Alaska App. 2000).
    –2–                                       2635
    community work service hours into jail time under the municipal code. The Municipality
    also emphasized that Swartz had agreed to the conversion as part of her original plea
    agreement.
    The district court judge agreed with the Municipality and imposed 9 days
    of jail time for the 72 hours of uncompleted community work service. Swartz now
    appeals, arguing that the 9 days of jail time was unlawfully imposed. For the reasons
    explained here, we conclude that the court erred in imposing the 9 days of jail time.
    Why we conclude that the court erred when it imposed 9 days of jail time
    In 2016, the Alaska legislature amended AS 12.55.055 to expressly prohibit
    courts from converting uncompleted community work service hours into jail time.4
    Subsection (g) of AS 12.55.055 now declares:
    (g) The court may not
    (1) offer a defendant convicted of an offense the option
    of serving jail time in lieu of performing uncompleted
    community work previously ordered by the court; or
    (2) convert uncompleted community work hours into
    a sentence of imprisonment.
    The legislature also added subsection (h) to AS 12.55.055, which requires the court to
    instead convert any uncompleted community work hours into a monetary fine according
    to a specified formula.5
    4
    SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 76.
    5
    Subsection (h) provides:
    (h) If a court orders community work as part of the defendant’s
    sentence under this section, the court shall provide notice to the
    defendant at sentencing and include as a provision of the
    judgment that if the defendant fails to provide proof of
    community work within 20 days after the date set by the court,
    the court shall convert those community work hours to a fine
    (continued...)
    –3–                                           2635
    Both of these provisions went into effect on July 12, 2016, and they are
    applicable to all “community work service imposed on or after [July 12, 2016] for
    offenses committed on or after [that] effective date.”6 Thus, if Swartz were being
    sentenced for conduct occurring on or after July 12, 2016, there would be no question
    that the court would not be permitted to convert her uncompleted community work
    service to jail time.
    The complication we face in Swartz’s case is that the community work
    service hours at issue here were imposed in 2015, prior to the change in state law.
    Moreover, the parties specifically agreed, as part of their plea agreement, that any
    uncompleted community work service hours would be converted to jail time. Seemingly,
    then, the question before us is whether this provision of the plea agreement is enforceable
    despite the change in the law.
    But we conclude that we need not resolve that question in the context of this
    case. Rather, we conclude that the conversion provision of the plea agreement is not
    enforceable for a different reason: The provision fails to define a material term of the
    agreement — namely, what conversion rate should apply.
    One reasonable interpretation of the agreement is that one hour of
    community work service would equal one hour in jail. Thus, 72 hours of community
    work service left incomplete would mean 72 hours (3 days) in jail. However, at Swartz’s
    probation revocation sentencing, the district court judge viewed the community work
    service hours as comprising ten 8-hour work days, with each of these ten days translating
    5
    (...continued)
    equal to the number of uncompleted work hours multiplied by
    the state’s minimum hourly wage and issue a judgment against
    the defendant for that amount.
    AS 12.55.055(h); see also SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 76.
    6
    SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 185(f)(3).
    –4–                                       2635
    into a full 24-hour day in jail. Thus, the district court concluded that Swartz’s remaining
    72 hours of community work service translated into 9 days of jail time.7 This is the
    sentence the court imposed.
    Given the failure of the parties to identify the conversion rate that would
    apply here, we strike as unenforceable the provision of the plea agreement requiring
    uncompleted community work service hours to convert to jail time. The Municipality
    is free to seek withdrawal from the plea agreement if it believes that the failure of this
    provision materially alters or defeats the plea agreement. Alternatively, the parties may
    simply renew the probation revocation proceedings, and the district court may revoke an
    appropriate portion of Swartz’s suspended jail time, in accordance with the Chaney
    criteria, for Swartz’s failure to complete the community work service required by her
    conditions of probation.8
    Conclusion
    The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and this case is remanded
    for further proceedings in accordance with the guidance provided here.
    7
    It is not clear where this conversion rate comes from. It is possible that it was reverse
    engineered from AS 12.55.055(d), which permits sentencing courts to offer a defendant the
    option of performing community work service in lieu of a sentence of imprisonment at a
    substitution rate of 8 hours of community work for each day of imprisonment. But such
    reverse engineering is contrary to our reasoning in Fogg. See State v. Fogg, 
    995 P.2d 675
    ,
    676-67 (Alaska App. 2000) (concluding that the trial court’s ability to convert statutorily-
    mandated community work service hours into other penalties is limited to what the legislature
    expressly authorized).
    8
    See State v. Chaney, 
    477 P.2d 441
    , 444 (Alaska 1970); AS 12.55.005 (codifying the
    Chaney criteria).
    –5–                                          2635
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2635 A-12810

Citation Numbers: 436 P.3d 1104

Filed Date: 2/15/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023