United States v. Hector Galvez Quebedo , 788 F.3d 768 ( 2015 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-2246
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Hector Tomas Galvez Quebedo
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
    ____________
    Submitted: February 13, 2015
    Filed: May 29, 2015
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Hector Tomas Galvez Quebedo ("Galvez") pleaded guilty pursuant to a Fast-
    Track plea agreement to illegal reentry following an aggravated-felony conviction,
    in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a) and (b)(2). In the plea agreement, Galvez waived
    the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Finding that Galvez had previously
    been deported after a conviction for a felony that was a "crime of violence," the
    district court1 applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii),
    calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 37–46 months' imprisonment, and
    sentenced Galvez to 37 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Galvez argues that (1) the
    government breached the plea agreement by introducing evidence and argument that
    he was convicted of a felony crime of violence, and (2) the district court erred in
    applying the 16-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). We conclude that the
    government did not breach the plea agreement and that, as a result, the appeal waiver
    is valid and enforceable. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
    I. Background
    Galvez was charged in a single-count indictment with illegal reentry following
    an aggravated-felony conviction, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a) and (b)(2).
    Galvez pleaded guilty pursuant to a Fast-Track plea agreement. See U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1
    ("Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4
    levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General
    of the United States and the United States Attorney for the district in which the court
    resides."); United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 
    659 F.3d 704
    , 707 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Since
    the Commission's incorporation of § 5K3.1 into the Guidelines, the Attorney General
    has authorized such programs in several districts along the southwest and western
    borders of the United States, as well as in Nebraska and North Dakota . . . ."
    (quotation and citation omitted)).
    The plea agreement set forth the factual basis for the plea, providing, in
    relevant part:
    5.     Defendant is a convicted aggravated felon in that on September
    12, 2006, in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles,
    State of California[,] he was sentenced upon conviction for
    1
    The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the District of Nebraska.
    -2-
    assault with a deadly weapon, an aggravated felony, and
    sentenced to 365 days in jail.
    (Emphasis added.) The factual basis gave no further details about this California
    conviction, such as whether the sentence was suspended, whether the state court
    imposed a term of probation, when the state court entered the judgment of conviction,
    or whether the state court declared the offense a "misdemeanor."
    "The parties agree[d] that the facts in the 'factual basis' paragraph of this
    agreement, if any, are true . . . ." Additionally, "[t]he parties agree[d] that all
    information known by the office of United States Pretrial Service may be used by the
    Probation Office in submitting its presentence report, and may be disclosed to the
    court for purposes of sentencing."
    Part V of the plea agreement set forth the parties' sentencing recommendations,
    providing, in relevant part:
    A.       Sentencing Guideline Calculations.
    Although the parties understand that the Guidelines are advisory
    and only one of the factors the court will consider under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) in imposing a sentence, the parties will jointly
    recommend the following Base Offense Level, Specific Offense
    Characteristics, Adjustments and Departures (if applicable). Unless
    otherwise stated, all agreements as to sentencing issues are made
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B).2
    2
    Rule 11(c)(1)(B) provides:
    If the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to either a charged
    offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may specify
    that an attorney for the government will . . . recommend, or agree not to
    oppose the defendant's request, that a particular sentence or sentencing
    -3-
    1.    The parties agree that Base Offense Level 8 applies,
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a).
    2.    If the defendant is found to be entitled to an offense
    level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) for
    acceptance of responsibility, the United States
    hereby moves that the court reduce the defendant's
    offense level by one additional level, pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), if that paragraph otherwise
    applies.
    3.    The parties agree that at the time of sentencing, the
    United States will make a non-binding
    recommendation to the court that the defendant
    should receive a 4[-]level downward departure,
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. For a defendant
    determined to fall within Criminal History Category
    VI or found to have a felony conviction for a
    "serious violent offense," as determined by the
    United States after review of the presentence
    investigation report, the parties agree that the United
    States will make a non-binding recommendation to
    the court that the defendant should receive a 2[-]
    level downward departure.
    ***
    C.    Adjustments, Departures & Reductions Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    .
    The parties agree that defendant may not request or recommend
    additional downward adjustments, departures, including criminal
    history departures under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, and sentence reductions
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    , and that the United States may oppose any such
    range is appropriate or that a particular provision of the Sentencing
    Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not
    apply (such a recommendation or request does not bind the court). . . .
    -4-
    downward adjustments, departures, and sentence reductions not set forth
    in Section V, paragraph A, above.
    D.     Criminal History
    The parties have no agreement concerning the defendant's
    Criminal History Category, except that if defendant is determined to be
    a Career Offender, the parties agree that the defendant is automatically
    a Criminal History Category VI pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).
    (Emphasis added.)
    The plea agreement contained no paragraph similar to ¶ C prohibiting the
    government from requesting or recommending additional upward adjustments,
    departures, or variances.
    The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver in which Galvez "knowingly
    and expressly waive[d] any and all rights to appeal [his] conviction and sentence."
    After the district court accepted Galvez's guilty plea, the probation office
    prepared a presentence report (PSR). The revised PSR calculated a base offense level
    of 8 but then determined that "a sixteen-level increase [was] warranted" to the offense
    level, explaining:
    If an illegal alien found in the U.S. is found to have been convicted of
    a felony that is a crime of violence, a sixteen-level enhancement is
    warranted pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). On September 12,
    2006, the defendant was sentenced in the Los Angeles (CA) Superior
    Court (Case #PA057087-01) to three years probation for assault with
    a deadly weapon. On January 5, 2012, the term of probation was
    revoked and the defendant was sentenced to three years prison.
    According to the court documents, the defendant was charged with an
    aggravated felony. Therefore, a sixteen-level increase is warranted.
    -5-
    (Emphases added.) Galvez received a three-level reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 21.
    The PSR calculated a criminal history category of III. A total offense level of
    21 combined with a criminal history category of III yielded an advisory Guidelines
    range of 46–57 months' imprisonment. The maximum term of imprisonment was 20
    years. The PSR then assessed the impact of the plea agreement; because the probation
    "officer found that the felony conviction was for a 'serious violent offense,'" the PSR
    concluded that the government should "make a non-binding recommendation that the
    defendant receive a two-level downward adjustment to the total offense level." This
    downward adjustment resulted in a total offense level of 19 and a Guidelines range
    of 37–46 months' imprisonment.
    Galvez objected to the 16-level enhancement in the PSR, arguing:
    "This paragraph improperly applies a sixteen-offense-level enhancement
    under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) only
    applies to prior 'felony' convictions, which application note 2 defines as
    an offense 'punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.'
    (Emphasis added). Defendant's prior conviction was under California
    Penal Code § 245(a)(1), a divisible statute, which allows for a sentence
    of imprisonment 'in county jail for not exceeding one year.' On
    September 12, 2006, the Superior Court of the State of California for the
    County of Los Angeles imposed a sentence of 365 days in the Los
    Angeles County Jail. (See Rule 16 Material, a[t] 63). The subsequent
    probation violation is not relevant to the application of
    § 2L1.2(b)(1[)](A)(ii). And the fact that Defendant is guilty of violating
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a) and (b)(2) does not impact the application of this
    calculation because 'aggravated felony' under § 1326(b)(2) involves
    offenses punishable by terms of imprisonment that could be equal to or
    exceeding one year."
    -6-
    The probation officer responded, in relevant part:
    Although the defendant's original sentence resulted in 365 days jail and
    three years probation, the charging documents note, "On or about
    August 1, 2006, in the County of Los Angeles, the crime of assault with
    a deadly weapon, in violation of penal code section 245(a)(1), a felony,
    was committed by Hector Tomas Galvez, who did willfully and
    unlawfully commit an assault upon Patricia Hernandez with a deadly
    weapon, to wit, a knife. NOTICE: The above offense is a serious felony
    within the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7(c)." Furthermore, the
    defendant was sentenced to 3 years incarceration from violating
    probation further underscoring this offense was a felony.
    (Emphases added.)
    The district court issued tentative findings as to Galvez's objection to
    application of the 16-level enhancement, stating that "the government must be
    prepared to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant's prior
    offense was a felony within the meaning of section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the
    Guidelines, in light of Eighth Circuit precedent." (Emphasis added.)
    The government responded to Galvez's objections to the PSR. The government
    set forth the following time line of Galvez's prior conviction.
    9-12-06: Defendant pleads nolo contendre, via felony information to the
    felony of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal
    Code § 245(a)[(]1[)]. Immediately thereafter the court ordered that
    imposition of sentence be suspended and that the defendant be placed on
    probation for a period of three years with one of the conditions of
    probation being a jail term of 365 days to be served in the Los Angeles
    County Jail.
    -7-
    3-16-07: Probation violation hearing scheduled. Defendant did not
    appear and a bench warrant was issued.
    12-06-11: Defendant arrested on bench warrant.
    1-05-12: Defendant's probation is revoked and his sentence (emphasis
    added) is imposed, specifically a sentence of three years in state prison
    and credit for time served.
    The government then argued that
    both counsel for the government and (it is believed) the defendant,
    mistakenly agreed in the plea agreement that the defendant was
    "sentenced" to 365 days in jail. However, a diligent review of the court
    records determines that the defendant's sentence, in fact, did not take
    place until January 25, 2012, when he was sentenced to three years in
    state prison.
    Under California law, where the offense is alternately a felony or
    misdemeanor (a wobbler), it is regarded as a felony for every purpose
    until judgment. People v. Banks, 
    53 Cal. 2d 370
    , 387.
    (Emphases added.)
    Following the government's response, Galvez filed an "Objection to the
    Government's Proffered Evidence, Motion to Strike Response and Index, and Motion
    for Specific Performance of the Plea Agreement" in which he argued that his
    "[c]ounsel did not 'mistakenly agree' to this language." According to Galvez, when
    the government asked his "counsel why Mr. Galvez's proposed language was needed,
    defense counsel replied that 'it might matter for sentencing purposes.'" Galvez
    maintained that he and the government "clearly and unambiguously stipulated that
    [his] 2006 California offense resulted in a sentence of '365 days in jail.'" He asserted
    that the government's response to his objection contradicting this stipulation
    -8-
    "amounts to a breach of the plea agreement and the government's submissions should
    be rejected and the Response and Index stricken from the record in this case." He
    moved for specific performance of the plea agreement. Galvez also objected to the
    use of his three-year sentence for violating his probation in connection with applying
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
    An evidentiary hearing was held at which the government stated that the parties
    agreed that Galvez "was an aggravated felon" and confirmed that defense counsel
    asked the government "to put that language in there as to the sentenced to 365 days
    in jail." The government argued that whether Galvez "was sentenced to 10 days or 20
    days is irrelevant . . . at least from the California perspective in applying the Penal
    Code, 17.1 of what they determine is misdemeanors and what isn't." According to the
    government, the California state court imposed a suspended sentence without ever
    stating that the offense "was to be considered a misdemeanor." The government
    contended that "the actual judgment . . . didn't occur until six years after he plead
    guilty . . . and was put on a probationary sentence"; therefore, the offense is "a felony
    under the guidelines" and "the 16-level enhancement should be imposed." (Emphasis
    added.) Thereafter, the district court overruled Galvez's objection to the government's
    argument and introduction of evidence.
    The government introduced into evidence the following documents: (1) the
    Information charging Galvez with violating § 245 (as previously set forth in the
    probation officer's response to Galvez's objection); (2) the electronic docket from the
    California state court; (3) the state probation officer's report; and (4) the minute order
    from the California state court.
    The docket sheet for the California state court shows that Galvez was arraigned
    on September 12, 2006, at which time he waived his arraignment, reading of the
    information, his right to confrontation/cross-examination, his right to subpoena
    witnesses, and his right against self-incrimination. Galvez, with the court's approval,
    -9-
    pleaded "nolo contendere to Count 02[,] a violation of Section 245(A)(1)." The court
    found Galvez "guilty." Galvez "waive[d] arraignment for judgment and state[d] there
    is no legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced." The court ordered the
    following judgment:
    Imposition of sentence suspended[.] Defendant placed on formal
    probation for a period of 003 years under the following terms and
    conditions: Serve 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail less credit for 62
    days. Defendant given total credit for 62 days in custody 42 days actual
    custody and 20 days good time/work time fortwith plus $20.00 court
    security assessment (pursuant to 1465.8(A)(1) P.C.)
    (All caps omitted; formatting altered.)
    On December 19, 2011, the state probation officer filed his report. Under
    "Record Bureau Clearance," the probation officer wrote, "Probation violation in lieu
    of filed, Count 02: 245(A)(1) PC (Force/ADW Not Firearm:[ ]GBI
    Likely)—Warrant—XNV PA057087-01 . . . ." (All caps omitted.) The probation
    officer indicated that Galvez had not reported for probation supervision since the
    grant date and had not made any payments toward his financial obligations.
    According to the report, "[p]robation was originally granted on 09/12/2006." (All
    caps omitted). The probation officer recommended that the court find Galvez "in
    violation of probation, probation remain revoked[,] and sentence imposed." (All caps
    omitted).
    Thereafter, a violation hearing was held on January 5, 2012. At the hearing, the
    California state court advised Galvez of his rights to a hearing on the probation
    violation, and Galvez waived his rights to a revocation hearing. Galvez stipulated to
    a violation of probation, and the court found that Galvez was in violation of
    probation. The court ordered as follows, in relevant part:
    -10-
    Probation to remain revoked[.] Sentence is imposed as follows[:]
    As to Count (02): Serve 003 years in any state prison[.] Court selects the
    mid term of 003 years as to Count 02.
    (All caps omitted; formatting altered.)
    After hearing all argument and evidence, the district court overruled Galvez's
    objection to application of the 16-level enhancement, explaining:
    And while I understand that under the plea agreement there's a
    reference to the 365 days, the fact is he did end up with three years in
    prison, a sentence of three years in prison and it was for a felony that
    was a crime of violence.
    And I also go back to the original logic behind the guidelines, that
    they're supposed to provide some consistency nationwide. And your
    client was found guilty of a crime of violence that carried a potential
    penalty of one year or more in prison —more than one year in prison.
    The government moved for a two-level downward departure based on the Fast-
    Track plea agreement, and the district court granted the motion, thereby reducing the
    total offense level from 21 to 19. With a criminal history category of III, Galvez's
    resulting Guidelines range was 37–46 months' imprisonment. The district court
    sentenced Galvez to 37 months' imprisonment and advised Galvez that he had waived
    his right to appeal as part of the plea agreement.
    II. Discussion
    Galvez argues that the government breached the plea agreement in arguing for
    a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) by offering
    evidence and argument that contradicted the factual stipulation in the plea agreement
    that his 2006 California conviction resulted in a "sentence[] of 365 days in jail."
    -11-
    According to Galvez, the district court erroneously failed to exclude, and relied on,
    the government's improperly offered evidence and argument at sentencing. Galvez
    contends that because the government breached the plea agreement, he is entitled to
    proceed with this appeal despite the appeal waiver and to request specific
    performance of the plea agreement and resentencing by a different district judge.
    Galvez also argues that the district court procedurally erred in concluding that
    Galvez's 2006 California conviction was a felony crime of violence and, as a result,
    erred in imposing the 16-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). According
    to Galvez, because a sentence of 365 days in jail is a misdemeanor for the purposes
    of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), the enhancement does not apply and the Guidelines range was
    improperly calculated. Additionally, he asserts that the district court erred in
    including time for Galvez's post-deportation probation revocation in calculating the
    time "punishable" under the California statute.
    "We review questions regarding the interpretation and enforcement of plea
    agreements de novo." United States v. Noriega, 
    760 F.3d 908
    , 910 (8th Cir. 2014)
    (quotation and citation omitted). If the government breached the plea agreement, then
    Galvez would be entitled to proceed with this appeal challenging application of the
    enhancement despite the appellate waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 
    512 F. App'x 648
    , 654 (8th Cir. 2013) ("'When the government fails to fulfill the terms of a
    plea agreement, an unsatisfied defendant may seek specific performance or may seek
    to withdraw his plea.'" (quoting United States v. Kelly, 
    18 F.3d 612
    , 615–16 (8th Cir.
    1994)); United States v. Sayles, 
    754 F.3d 564
    , 568 (8th Cir. 2014) ("Maurice waived
    his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement; however, because the government
    breached the plea agreement, the appeals waiver is unenforceable." (citaiton
    omitted)).
    "[I]n determining whether the government has fulfilled its obligations under
    a plea agreement, we look to the agreement's provisions." United States v. Kramer,
    
    12 F.3d 130
    , 131 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The government does not breach
    -12-
    a plea agreement by advocating for a particular enhancement in a case in which that
    enhancement "was an issue that [was] not . . . agreed to or specifically listed in the
    [plea] agreement." Noriega, 760 F.3d at 912 (quotation and citation omitted); see also
    id. at 911 ("Because the plea agreement contained no provision limiting the scope of
    relevant conduct or defining Noriega's role in the offense and because the
    Government unequivocally stood by its stipulation to a base offense level of 36, we
    conclude that the Government did not breach the plea agreement by introducing the
    additional evidence to establish Noriega's role under USSG § 3B1.1(a)." (citation
    omitted)).
    By contrast, we have held that the government breached a plea agreement by
    actively arguing for an enhancement in a case in which the plea agreement
    specifically stipulated to an offense level that did not account for such enhancement.
    United States v. Fowler, 
    445 F.3d 1035
    , 1038 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The plea agreement
    in this case clearly bound both the government and Fowler to recommend an adjusted
    offense level of 25 for his conduct. Instead, once the PSR calculated Fowler's
    adjusted offense level to be 29 due to application of the career-offender enhancement,
    the government followed suit."). And, "[w]e have previously held that the
    introduction of evidence contrary to a specific stipulation amounts to a breach of the
    plea agreement." United States v. E.V., 
    500 F.3d 747
    , 753 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
    added) ("[T]he parties' specific agreement in this case that the offense characteristics
    of section 2D1.1(b) did not apply precluded the government from introducing
    evidence to the contrary, either as purported rebuttal evidence or pursuant to the more
    general agreement that the parties could seek departures from the applicable guideline
    range.").
    In summary, we must distinguish cases in which, for example, "the
    Government breached a plea agreement when it stipulated to a drug quantity and
    corresponding base offense level and then initiated an effort at the sentencing hearing
    to obtain a higher drug quantity and base offense level" in direct contravention of the
    -13-
    stipulation, from cases in which, for example, "the Government made clear at
    sentencing that it intended to honor the stipulated base offense level . . . and then
    sought a[n] . . . enhancement for which there was no such stipulation." Noriega, 760
    F.3d at 911–12 (citing United States v. Lara, 
    690 F.3d 1079
    , 1081–83 (8th Cir. 2012);
    United States v. DeWitt, 
    366 F.3d 667
    , 671–72 (8th Cir. 2004)).
    Here, the plea agreement set forth the parties' agreement "that Base Offense
    Level 8 applies, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a)," and the government honored this
    stipulated base offense level at sentencing. Likewise, the government honored the
    plea agreement's provision to recommend only a two-level departure pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 in the event it determined after review of the PSR that Galvez's
    prior conviction was "a felony conviction for a 'serious violent offense.'" But the plea
    agreement did not prohibit the government from seeking sentencing enhancements
    for which there was no stipulation, such as a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). While ¶ C of the plea agreement prohibited Galvez from
    "request[ing] or recommend[ing] additional downward adjustments, departures,
    . . . and sentence reductions," the plea agreement contained no paragraph prohibiting
    the government from requesting or recommending additional upward adjustments,
    departures, or variances.
    Furthermore, the plea agreement provided that the probation office could use
    "all information known" in the PSR and disclose such information "to the court for
    sentencing purposes." The PSR disclosed that Galvez "was sentenced in the Los
    Angeles (CA) Superior Court . . . to three years probation for assault with a deadly
    weapon" but subsequently had that term of probation revoked and was "sentenced to
    three years [in] prison"; as a result, the PSR recommended application of the 16-level
    enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for a felony crime of violence. A review of
    the plea agreement reveals that it "did not obligate the government to object to
    recommendations made in the presentence report." United States v. Has No Horses,
    
    261 F.3d 744
    , 750 (8th Cir. 2001).
    -14-
    Thus, the plea agreement did not preclude the government from arguing for the
    application of a 16-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). But Galvez's
    argument is that the factual stipulation that he was "sentenced to 365 days in jail" for
    his California conviction of assault with a deadly weapon—which he characterizes
    as a misdemeanor—effectively precluded the government from arguing or producing
    evidence that he committed a felony crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)
    because his sentence was exactly one year. This section provides that "[i]f the
    defendant previously was deported . . . after . . . a conviction for a felony that is . . . a
    crime of violence . . . increase by 16 levels." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). "For
    purposes of subsection (b)(1)(A), (B), and (D), 'felony' means any federal, state, or
    local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." Id., cmt.
    2. (emphasis added).
    Galvez's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California
    Penal Code § 245(a) is a "wobbler" offense. The "violation was punishable by
    'imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for
    not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or
    by both the fine and imprisonment.'" United States v. Adams, 
    716 F.3d 1066
    , 1070
    (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
    Cal. Penal Code § 245
    (a)(1)). Under California law, "[a]n
    offense punishable either by imprisonment in the state prison or by a county jail
    sentence is said to 'wobble' between the two punishments and hence is frequently
    called a 'wobbler' offense." 
    Id.
     (quotations and citations omitted).
    Under California Penal Code § 17(b),
    [w]hen a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court,
    either by imprisonment in the state prison or imprisonment
    in a county jail . . . it is a misdemeanor for all purposes
    under the following circumstances:
    -15-
    (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than
    imprisonment in the state prison or imprisonment in a
    county jail under the provisions of subdivision (h) of
    Section 1170 [or]
    ***
    (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without
    imposition of sentence and at the time of granting
    probation, or on application of the defendant or probation
    officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a
    misdemeanor.
    (Emphases added.)
    "Under California law, where the offense is alternatively a felony
    or misdemeanor, it is regarded as a felony for every purpose until
    judgment." [United States v.] Robinson, 967 F.2d [287,] 293 [(9th Cir.
    1992)]. In Robinson, the Ninth Circuit held that where a court granted
    probation and suspended imposition of a sentence after conviction,
    imposed a nine month jail term, never entering judgment and never
    declaring the offense to be a misdemeanor, the prior conviction (battery
    on a police officer) was a felony and California Penal Code §§ 17(b)(1)
    and (3) did not apply. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that California Penal
    Code § 17(b)(1) did not apply because no judgment was rendered and
    § 17(b)(3) did not apply because the convictions were never declared to
    be misdemeanors. Id. The Ninth Circuit has also stated:
    Clearly, "[a]n order granting probation is not a judgment."
    People v. Smith, 
    195 Cal. App. 2d 735
    , 737, 
    16 Cal. Rptr. 12
     (1961). Furthermore, when a sentencing court grants
    probation after a conviction, it may suspend the imposition
    of sentence, in which case no judgment of conviction is
    rendered, or it may impose sentence and order its execution
    to be stayed. In the latter case only, a judgment of
    -16-
    conviction is rendered. People v. Arguello, 
    59 Cal. 2d 475
    ,
    476, 
    30 Cal. Rptr. 333
    , 
    381 P.2d 5
     (1963).
    
    Id.
    Adams, 716 F.3d at 1070–71.
    Thus, under California law, a violation of § 245 is "regarded as a felony for
    every purpose until judgment." Robinson, 967 F.2d at 293. But "[a]n order granting
    probation is not a judgment." Smith, 195 Cal. App. 2d at 737. Nor is a "judgment of
    conviction . . . rendered" when the court grants probation after a conviction and
    "suspend[s] the imposition of sentence." Arguello, 
    59 Cal. 2d 475
    , 476. Furthermore,
    California § 17(b)(3) is inapplicable unless "the court declares the offense to be a
    misdemeanor."
    In the present case, the parties stipulated only that Galvez was "sentenced to
    365 days in jail" for violating California Penal Code § 245. The factual basis of the
    plea agreement gave no further details about this California conviction, such as
    whether the sentence was suspended, whether the state court imposed a term of
    probation, when the state court entered a judgment of conviction, or whether the state
    court declared the offense a "misdemeanor"—all facts necessary to determine whether
    Galvez's conviction was a misdemeanor or felony. At sentencing, the government
    submitted (1) the Information charging Galvez with violating § 245, (2) the electronic
    docket from the California state court, (3) the state probation officer's report, and (4)
    the minute order from the California state court. None of these documents
    contradicted the parties' stipulation that Galvez was "sentenced to 365 days in jail."
    Instead, the documents confirmed Galvez's 365-day sentence but also provided
    additional detail about the imposition of this "sentence" necessary for determining
    whether the conviction was a misdemeanor or felony under California law, and
    correspondingly, for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Specifically, these documents
    explained that the California state court imposed a "suspended" sentence, placed
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    Galvez on "formal probation," and ordered Galvez to "serve 365 days in Los Angeles
    County Jail." After Galvez violated his probation, the California state court revoked
    his probation and "imposed" a three-year prison sentence. Thus, the government's
    evidence offered in support of the enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) did not
    contradict the factual stipulation of the plea agreement; instead, such evidence further
    explained the factual stipulation. Cf. E.V., 
    500 F.3d at 753
     ("We have previously held
    that the introduction of evidence contrary to a specific stipulation amounts to a
    breach of the plea agreement." (emphasis added)).
    Galvez also points to the government's argument that
    both counsel for the government and (it is believed) the defendant,
    mistakenly agreed in the plea agreement that the defendant was
    "sentenced" to 365 days in jail. However, a diligent review of the court
    records determines that the defendant's sentence, in fact, did not take
    place until January 25, 2012, when he was sentenced to three years in
    state prison.
    At sentencing, the government maintained that it did not believe that Galvez "was
    sentenced, per se, . . . in 2006 when the California court put him on probation."
    According to the government, Galvez's "actual conviction judgment . . . was six years
    later when he eventually violated probation, was picked up after three or four years;
    and that the sentencing, in fact, occurred at that particular time when he was
    ultimately sentenced to state prison for three years." The government's argument must
    be viewed in conjunction with the evidence that it offered in support of the
    enhancement. When viewed in context, the government was arguing that while
    Galvez did serve 365 days in jail in September 2006, this sentence did not constitute
    a "judgment" because, as a matter of California law, an order granting probation is
    not a judgment, and no judgment of conviction is rendered when a court imposes a
    suspended sentence. As a result, Galvez's actual judgment of conviction was not
    rendered until the California state court sentenced him to three years'
    -18-
    imprisonment—a term exceeding one year under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)—following his
    probation violation. Thus, California Penal Code § 17(b)(1) did not apply, and
    Galvez's conviction was a felony, not a misdemeanor. Furthermore, the government's
    argument was that because the California state trial court never declared the
    conviction to be a misdemeanor, California Penal Code § 17(b)(3) did not apply.
    In summary, we find nothing in the government's evidence or argument that
    contradicted the parties' factual stipulation or otherwise breached the plea agreement.
    The government was free to argue for an enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and
    present evidence in support of that enhancement.
    III. Conclusion
    Because the government did not breach the plea agreement, the appeal waiver
    is valid and enforceable; therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
    ______________________________
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