Robert Joseph Castillo v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                                        In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-12-00561-CR
    NO. 09-12-00562-CR
    ____________________
    ROBERT JOSEPH CASTILLO, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    _______________________________________________________                ______________
    On Appeal from the 410th District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 10-10-11851 CR
    ________________________________________________________               _____________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The appellant, Robert Joseph Castillo, challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting his conviction on two counts for possessing a controlled
    substance, methamphetamine. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to
    support the jury’s verdicts, and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    1
    Background
    The indictment alleges that on or about October 7, 2010, Castillo knowingly
    possessed with intent to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an
    amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety
    Code Ann. § 481.112(d) (West 2010). A separate count of the indictment alleges
    that on or about October 27, 2010, Castillo knowingly possessed with intent to
    deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of four hundred
    grams or more. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(f) (West 2010).
    The jury charge included instructions on the law of parties, authorizing the jury to
    convict Castillo of the October 7 and October 27 offenses if it determined that
    Castillo had solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Juan Fidel
    Saenz to knowingly possess with intent to deliver methamphetamine as charged in
    the respective counts of the indictment. The jury found Castillo guilty on both
    counts. On the first count, concerning the offense of October 7, 2010, the trial
    court assessed punishment at thirty years in prison; on the other, the trial court
    assessed punishment at thirty-five years in prison. The trial court ordered Castillo’s
    sentences to run concurrently.
    2
    Standard of Review
    We review a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the verdict to determine if a rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see also Williams v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    ,
    750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing the evidence, we give deference to the
    jury’s responsibility to “fairly [] resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
    evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
    
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2007).
    Under Texas law, a person is a criminally responsible party to an offense “if
    the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which
    he is criminally responsible, or by both.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01 (West
    2011). A person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another if, acting
    “with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits,
    encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the
    offense[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02 (West 2011).
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under the law of parties, we
    may consider events occurring “before, during[,] and after the commission of the
    3
    offense.” Wygal v. State, 
    555 S.W.2d 465
    , 468-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
    Because it may be as probative as direct evidence, “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone
    is sufficient to establish guilt.” Guevara v. State, 
    152 S.W.3d 45
    , 49 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2004). “There must be sufficient evidence of an understanding and common
    design to commit the offense[,]” but “[e]ach fact need not point directly to the guilt
    of the defendant, as long as the cumulative effect of the facts are sufficient to
    support the conviction under the law of parties.” Gross v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 181
    ,
    186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “However, mere presence of a person at the scene of
    a crime, or even flight from the scene, without more, is insufficient to support a
    conviction as a party to the offense.” 
    Id. A police
    informant testified for the State during Castillo’s trial. When
    weighing the sufficiency of corroborating evidence under the covert agent rule, we
    “must exclude the testimony of the covert agent from consideration and examine
    the remaining evidence (i.e., non-covert agent evidence) to determine whether
    there is evidence that tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the
    offense.” Malone v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 253
    , 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.141 (West 2005).
    4
    Analysis
    Castillo argues the evidence is legally insufficient because the evidence fails
    to affirmatively link the methamphetamine associated with either transaction
    involving Saenz to him. The evidence admitted at trial shows that on October 7,
    Saenz sold a baggie containing 27.92 grams of methamphetamine to an undercover
    officer. The undercover officer testified at Castillo’s trial. The evidence also shows
    that on October 27, the police stopped Saenz while he was driving a car and seized
    442.23 grams of methamphetamine from him. Other testimony admitted at trial
    reflects that Castillo and Saenz were being observed by undercover officers before
    the offenses at issue occurred, and there is testimony indicating that Castillo was
    involved in setting up the meetings that led to the October 7 sale and to the
    October 27 seizure of methamphetamine. An undercover officer testified that
    before the date the two offenses occurred, Castillo told him that Saenz would be
    acting on his behalf in connection with their transactions for drugs.
    Other direct evidence was admitted at trial to support the jury’s conclusion
    that Castillo and Saenz were jointly engaged in selling methamphetamine. The
    State introduced a recording of Castillo telling the informant and the undercover
    officer that Saenz would act for Castillo most of the time. Phone records were
    admitted during trial that are consistent with the testimony that Castillo and Saenz
    5
    were in contact with one another on the dates in question as well as at other times
    relevant to the various drug transactions at issue. Also, in a search of Castillo’s
    home, police found a substance that is commonly used to cut methamphetamine
    and other paraphernalia used to weigh and package methamphetamine.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that
    Castillo arranged for both deliveries, accompanied Saenz to the locations of the
    exchanges, monitored the deliveries from nearby, and obtained some of the money
    from one of the transactions. From the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer
    that Castillo and Saenz were active participants in a methamphetamine operation.
    Although Saenz handed the undercover officer the methamphetamine at issue on
    October 7, and the methamphetamine seized on October 27 was taken from Saenz,
    the jury could rationally find that Castillo aided Saenz in his possession of the
    contraband by arranging for the deliveries and watching over the transfers.
    Castillo’s activities before, during, and after Saenz delivered methamphetamine to
    an undercover policeman demonstrate that he was not merely present with Saenz
    while Saenz had the drugs on his person, but that Castillo assisted Saenz in
    accomplishing the transfers and controlling the contraband so that it could be
    delivered to another.
    6
    When Saenz testified, he claimed that he had sole possession of the
    methamphetamine and he explained that Castillo had currency from one of the
    transactions because he gave Castillo the money to pay a debt. However, in
    judging Saenz’s credibility, the jury could rationally reject Saenz’s account,
    believing instead that Castillo had the money from the transaction because he was
    involved with Saenz in selling drugs. The jury’s conclusion is also supported by
    Saenz’s testimony that Castillo received and communicated with him about people
    who were asking to purchase drugs.
    We hold that from the evidence admitted at trial, the jury could rationally
    find the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    . We overrule Castillo’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    HOLLIS HORTON
    Justice
    Submitted on July 18, 2013
    Opinion Delivered September 18, 2013
    Do Not Publish
    Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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