Com. v. Taylor, C. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S16018-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CLARENCE TYRONE TAYLOR
    Appellant                  No. 1090 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000785-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and OTT, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED JUNE 02, 2015
    Appellant, Clarence Tyrone Taylor, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered on May 29, 2014 in the Criminal Division of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Lancaster County. We affirm.
    The facts in this case are not in dispute. In December 2012, the Child
    Predator Section of the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General
    commenced an investigation in response to an incident in which D.W., a
    15-year-old male, reported that he received inappropriate messages on
    Facebook from Appellant, an associate pastor at the church D.W. attended.
    During the investigation, Special Agent Britteny Baughman with the Office of
    the Attorney General obtained consent to access D.W.’s Facebook account
    and assume D.W.’s identity in order to communicate with Appellant.
    J-S16018-15
    Between December 4, 2012 and December 13, 2012, Appellant
    communicated through Facebook and by text message with an individual he
    believed to be D.W., but who was actually Special Agent Baughman. During
    these exchanges, Appellant sent explicit messages and several times asked
    if he could meet D.W. Appellant also asked D.W. to send a nude photograph
    of himself.      During one of these exchanges, Appellant sent D.W. a
    photograph of an exposed penis.
    Eventually, investigators learned that Appellant lived approximately
    250 feet away from D.W.            Due to Appellant’s proximity to D.W., agents
    obtained a search warrant and an arrest warrant. On December 13, 2012,
    Appellant insisted upon meeting D.W. when Appellant returned home from
    work.    When Appellant arrived at home, law enforcement officers arrested
    him and charged him with one count each of unlawful contact with a minor, 1
    criminal use of a communication facility,2 and solicitation to commit sexual
    abuse of children.3
    On January 27, 2014, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, a jury
    found Appellant guilty of all offenses.          On May 29, 2014, the trial court
    sentenced     Appellant     to   an   aggregate    term   of   three   to   six   years’
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512.
    3
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902(a) and 6312.
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    incarceration, followed by four years’ probation.            In addition, over the
    objection of counsel,4 the trial court ordered Appellant to register as a sex
    offender for the remainder of his life because he had two qualifying
    convictions for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14 and 9799.15 of the Sex
    Offenders     Registration     and    Notification   Act   (SORNA),   42   Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 9799.10-9799.40.
    Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion but, on June 27, 2014,
    he filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. On July 28, 2014, Appellant
    timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter,
    the trial court issued its opinion on August 25, 2014.
    Appellant raises a single issue for our consideration on appeal.
    Where [Appellant’s] offenses involved a single course of
    conduct and one intended victim, should he have been
    sentenced to 25 years of sex offender registration,
    pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A. §§] 9799.14 and 9799.15, rather
    than lifetime registration?
    Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    Appellant’s brief advances a straightforward claim in support of his
    request for relief. Appellant maintains that he should have been sentenced
    to a 25-year registration period under §§ 9799.14 and 9799.15, rather than
    ____________________________________________
    4
    In his objection, trial counsel argued that Appellant should be subject to a
    25-year registration period because his two convictions involved only one
    criminal episode and one victim.
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    lifetime registration, because his offenses involved a single course of conduct
    and one intended victim. In leveling his claim, Appellant points out that his
    crimes were nonviolent, occurred over a short span of time, and involved
    only text or other forms of digital messaging to an undercover police officer.
    Appellant relies on the decision of the Commonwealth Court in A.S. v.
    Pennsylvania State Police, 
    87 A.3d 914
     (Pa. Commwlth. 2014) and our
    Supreme Court’s Opinion in Support of Reversal in Commonwealth v.
    Gehris, 
    54 A.3d 862
     (Pa. 2012) to support his contention that this Court
    should vacate the lifetime registration aspect of his sentence and substitute
    a registration period of 25 years.
    Our standard and scope of review over Appellant’s contentions are well
    settled.
    [T]he “application of a statute is a question of law, and our
    standard of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Baird, 
    856 A.2d 114
    , 115 (Pa. Super. 2004). When interpreting a statute,
    the Statutory Construction Act dictates our approach. See 1
    Pa.C.S.A. § 1921; Baird, 
    supra at 115
    . “[T]he object of all
    interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
    effectuate the intention of the General Assembly ....” 
    Id.
     “[T]he
    best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a
    statute.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, [] 
    834 A.2d 1127
    , 1132
    (Pa. 2003).
    Commonwealth v. Merolla, 
    909 A.2d 337
    , 346 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    Applying this standard, Appellant asks us to consider whether his
    convictions for unlawful contact with a minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1))
    and solicitation to commit sexual abuse of children (18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902(a)
    and 6312), which were entered at the same time following his trial before a
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    jury, constitute two separate convictions under §§ 9799.14 and 9799.15 of
    SORNA.      We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable statutory
    provisions and then turn to the relevant case law.
    Section 9799.14 of SORNA establishes a three-tier classification
    system for sexual offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(b)-(d) (specifying
    sex crimes that qualify for classification as either tier I, tier II, or tier III
    offenses). SORNA classifies the crimes of unlawful contact with a minor and
    criminal solicitation to commit sexual abuse of children as tier II offenses.5
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(b)(9) and (22), the Commonwealth asserts
    in its brief that Appellant’s conviction for criminal solicitation to commit
    sexual abuse of children constituted a tier I offense. Commonwealth Brief at
    6. This assertion appears to rest on the assumption that Appellant was
    convicted for soliciting an offense defined at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
    Our review of the certified record reveals that Appellant’s conviction related
    to a different subsection of § 6312. Both the criminal complaint and
    information lodged against Appellant charged him with violating § 6312(b),
    inasmuch as he requested photographs depicting D.W. in the nude. Section
    6312(b) makes it a crime for a person to photograph, videotape, or depict
    on computer or film a minor engaged in a prohibited sexual act. 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(b). In contrast, § 6312(d) makes it an offense for a
    person to intentionally view or knowingly possess child pornography. 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
    Since the charging documents and testimony in this case support a
    conviction under § 6312(b), we shall treat Appellant’s conviction as arising
    under that subsection and overlook the assertion set forth in the
    Commonwealth’s brief. We note, however, that this is largely a distinction
    without a difference. SORNA classifies a conviction under § 6312(d) as a tier
    I offense but categorizes a conviction under § 6312(b) as a tier II offense.
    Compare 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(b)(9) (classifying a § 6312(d) conviction
    as a tier I offense) with § 9799.14(c)(4) (classifying a § 6312(b) conviction
    as a tier II offense). Nevertheless, whether Appellant was convicted of two
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Id. at § 9799.14(c)(4) (sexual abuse of children), (c)(5) (unlawful contact
    with a minor), and (c)(18) (making solicitation of a listed offense a tier II
    crime).   Section 9799.14 further provides, however, that tier III crimes
    include “[t]wo or more convictions of offenses listed as [t]ier I or [t]ier II
    sexual offenses.” Id. at § 9799.14(d)(16).
    Section 9799.15 of SORNA sets forth the registration requirements for
    individuals who have committed offenses that fall within each tier described
    in § 9799.14.6     Under § 9799.15, “[a]n individual convicted of a [t]ier III
    sexual offense shall register for the life of the individual.”            Id. at
    § 9799.15(a)(3). Applying these statutory provisions, Appellant is subject to
    SORNA’s lifetime registration requirement because his two tier II convictions
    deem him to be a tier III offender under § 9799.15(a)(3).
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    tier II offenses, or one tier I offense and one tier II offense, the net result is
    that Appellant is deemed to have committed a tier III offense. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(16) (defining tier III offenses to include “[t]wo or
    more convictions of offenses listed as [t]ier I or [t]ier II sexual offenses”).
    6
    Recently, the Commonwealth Court declared certain aspects of
    § 9799.15(g) of SORNA, requiring registrants to update in person changes in
    their registration information such as temporary lodging, cellular telephone
    numbers, and motor vehicle operated, to be unconstitutional. Coppolino v.
    Noonan, 
    102 A.3d 1254
    , 1277-1279 (Pa. Commwlth. 2014). Although the
    Commonwealth Court determined that the “in person” requirement was
    unconstitutional, the Court found that this provision was severable from the
    remainder of the statutory scheme. Since § 9799.15(g) has no application
    to this case, and because the Commonwealth Court found the offending
    terms of § 9799.15(g) to be severable from the remaining provisions, we
    see no impediment to the application of the remaining pertinent sections of
    the statute in this case.
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    We turn now to consider the relevant interpretive case law.           In
    Commonwealth v. Merolla, 
    909 A.2d 337
     (Pa. Super. 2006), this Court
    considered statutory construction issues very similar to those Appellant
    raises in this appeal.      In that case, the defendant, Alfred Merolla, entered
    nolo contendere pleas to two counts of indecent assault and one count of
    statutory sexual assault stemming from his attacks on three female victims,
    all less than 16 years of age. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Merolla
    to register with the state police for a period of ten years.                The
    Commonwealth filed a post-sentence motion requesting, among other
    things, that the trial court direct Merolla to register for life.     After that
    motion was denied by operation of law, the Commonwealth appealed.
    On appeal, this Court considered whether Merolla’s pleas to two
    separate counts of indecent assault, entered at the same time, constituted
    two convictions under the registration provisions of Megan’s Law II, a
    predecessor to SORNA.7 As a case of first impression, this Court looked, for
    ____________________________________________
    7
    By way of background, we recite our Supreme Court’s summary of the
    legislative history of Megan’s Law.
    The Act of October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079 (Spec.Sess. No. 1), now
    known as Megan's Law I, was to a significant extent ruled
    unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Donald Williams, 
    733 A.2d 593
     (Pa. 1999).     The General Assembly subsequently
    enacted Megan's Law II, whose constitutionality th[e Supreme]
    Court substantially upheld in Commonwealth v. Gomer
    Williams, 
    832 A.2d 962
     (Pa. 2003). In the Act of November 24,
    2004, P.L. 1243 (known as Megan's Law III), the General
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    purposes of initial comparison, to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
    Three Strikes Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714, in Commonwealth v. Shiffler,
    
    879 A.2d 185
     (Pa. 2005). This Court found that the Three Strikes Statute
    applied “[w]here the person had at the time of the commission of the
    current offense previously been convicted of two or more such crimes[.]”
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2) (emphasis added).              We also acknowledged the
    Supreme Court’s conclusion that the legislature adopted the Three Strikes
    Statute to implement a sentencing philosophy that “punish[ed] more
    severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity despite the
    theoretical effects of penal discipline.”         Merolla, 
    909 A.2d at 346
    . Lastly,
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Assembly addressed several matters, including that portion of
    Megan's Law II held to be unconstitutional in Gomer Williams,
    concerning the penalty provisions that attached to sexually
    violent predators who failed to comply with registration and
    other requirements of the act. In the Act of November 29, 2006,
    P.L. 1567 (effective January 1, 2007), the General Assembly
    amended the legislation once again, with respect to matters not
    pertinent to the disposition of the present appeal. See
    Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    935 A.2d 865
     passim (Pa. 2007), for a
    more detailed discussion of the history of these successive
    legislative acts that individually and collectively herein shall also
    be referred to simply as “Megan's Law.”
    Commonwealth v. Leidig, 
    956 A.2d 399
    , 400 n.1 (Pa. 2008). Megan’s
    Law was again amended, see Act 98 of 2008, P.L. 1352, effective December
    8, 2008, and Act 111 of 2011, P.L. 446, effective December 20, 2011.
    However the language of § 9795.1(b)(1) was unaffected by these changes.
    The various amendments to Megan’s Law do not affect our statutory
    construction analysis in this case since the operative SORNA language at
    issue here is virtually unchanged from its predecessor provisions found in
    prior versions of Megan’s Law.
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    J-S16018-15
    we noted the Supreme Court’s opinion that, in order to conform to the
    legislature’s intent, application of the Three Strikes Statute required a
    specific sequence of events: first offense; first conviction; first sentencing;
    second offense; second conviction; and second sentencing. Id. at 345.
    The opinion of this Court in Merolla identified substantial distinctions
    between the registration requirements found in Megan’s Law II and the
    Three Strikes Statute.        We began with the plain terms of the respective
    provisions.    Much like the language found in § 9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA,
    the lifetime registration provision contained in Megan’s Law II provided that
    “[a]n individual with two or more convictions of any of the offenses set forth
    in subsection (a)” shall be subject to lifetime registration.8 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9795.1(b)(1). Distinguishing this language from that of the Three Strikes
    Statute, we noted that Megan’s Law II did not require a previous conviction.
    Merolla, 
    909 A.2d at 346
    .              Next, we observed that the registration
    provisions in Megan’s Law II were not punitive in nature and that the law
    was based on concern for public safety and not enhanced punishment for
    repeat offenders.       
    Id.
        We therefore held that the sequence of events
    described in Shiffler did not apply and its was irrelevant that Merolla was
    not sentenced for his first offense before the commission of his second
    crime. 
    Id. at 347
    . For these reasons, we found that Merolla was subject to
    ____________________________________________
    8
    Merolla’s indecent assault convictions were listed in subsection (a) of 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1(b)(1).
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    lifetime registration under § 9795.1(b)(1) since his simultaneous guilty pleas
    to two separate counts of indecent assault qualified as two convictions under
    the registration provisions of Megan’s Law II.
    This Court next encountered the claim that simultaneous convictions
    do   not    support     lifetime    registration   under   Megan’s   Law   III   in
    Commonwealth v. Gehris, 
    996 A.2d 541
     (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished
    memorandum).         In that case, the defendant, Patrick Gehris, repeatedly
    engaged in sexually explicit communications with an individual he believed
    to be a 13-year-old girl.9 During this time, Gehris solicited nude pictures of
    the girl, forwarded digital images of his penis to the individual he believed to
    be the girl, and arranged to meet the girl in a motel room. Because of these
    activities, the Commonwealth charged Gehris with multiple offenses and he
    eventually pled guilty to, inter alia, one count of criminal solicitation to
    commit sexual exploitation of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902 and 6320, and
    criminal solicitation to commit sexual abuse of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902
    and 6312(b).         Because these offenses were listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9795.1(b)(1), the trial court found that Gehris was subject to lifetime
    registration.
    ____________________________________________
    9
    In fact, these exchanges occurred online with a Pennsylvania State Police
    officer trained to pose as a teenager in order to investigate potential sexual
    predators.
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    Gehris appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering lifetime
    registration where the underlying criminal conduct for his convictions arose
    from a single, non-violent episode involving one victim. In an unpublished
    memorandum, we sustained the trial court’s ruling and cited our prior
    decision in Merolla as support. Commonwealth v. Gehris, 
    996 A.2d 541
    (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum) at 6.
    Gehris pursued further review and an evenly divided panel of our
    Supreme Court affirmed.     Commonwealth v. Gehris, 
    54 A.3d 862
     (Pa.
    2012) (per curiam). In her Opinion in Support of Affirmance (OISR), Justice
    Todd found that the registration requirement was adopted to protect the
    public, not to escalate punishment for repeat offenders.           
    Id. at 862
    .
    Moreover, since § 9795.1 did not reflect a recidivist philosophy, there was no
    need to depart from the plain language of the statute.       Id.   Applying this
    approach, Justice    Todd determined that the       timing    of the    multiple
    convictions was irrelevant under § 9795.1, “even when two convictions
    [arose] out of two separate criminal acts against a single victim … during
    one criminal episode.” Id. Thus, the lifetime registration requirement found
    in § 9795.1 attached at the moment when a defendant acquired two or more
    convictions for specified offenses. Id.
    In his Opinion in Support of Reversal, then Chief Justice Castille found
    that § 9795.1 embraced a recidivist philosophy. Id. at 878. Thus, although
    first-time and lesser offenders such as Gehris might qualify for lifetime
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    registration under the literal requirements of § 9795.1, Chief Justice Castille
    argued that such defendants should be given an opportunity for reform
    pursuant to lesser sanctions so long as it was clear that their offenses were
    part of the same course of criminal conduct.         Id. at 879.     Chief Justice
    Castille was also persuaded by other factors in the case, including the non-
    violent nature of Gehris’ crimes, the lack of harm to an actual victim, Gehris’
    voluntary participation in treatment, his expressions of remorse, and
    testimony establishing that Gehris did not qualify as a sexually violent
    predator and that he was a good candidate for rehabilitation. Id. Although
    Gehris       sets out the relevant arguments we consider in this appeal, the
    opinion of an evenly divided Supreme Court merely affirms a decision of this
    Court     but    carries     no   precedential   authority   in    future   cases.
    Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
    985 A.2d 928
    , 937-938 (Pa. 2009) (“This
    Court has made it clear that per curiam orders have no stare decisis
    effect.”).
    Our next opportunity to address the issue currently before us came in
    Commonwealth v. Mielnicki, 
    53 A.3d 930
     (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished
    memorandum).        There, the Commonwealth charged the defendant, Adam
    Mielnicki, with 100 counts of sexual abuse of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 6312(d), for possessing child pornography between December 8, 2009 and
    February 18, 2010.         The information also charged Mielnicki with separate
    counts of disseminating child pornography by means of a computer facility,
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    J-S16018-15
    18 Pa.C.S.a. § 7512(a), during this same period.              Mielnicki thereafter pled
    guilty to five counts of sexual abuse of children and the trial court ordered
    lifetime registration under § 9795.1(b)(1).            After the trial court denied
    reconsideration of its registration order, Mielnicki appealed.
    On appeal, Mielnicki argued that the trial court erred in ordering
    lifetime registration in view of his concurrent pleas to multiple counts of
    sexual abuse of children which stemmed from a single investigation. Again,
    we   affirmed   the   trial   court   based     upon    our    decision   in   Merolla.
    Commonwealth v. Mielnicki, 
    53 A.3d 930
     (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished
    memorandum) at 3-5.           On July 2, 2013, our Supreme Court granted
    Mielnicki’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Mielnicki,
    
    71 A.3d 245
     (Pa. 2013). After argument, however, the Court, on December
    15, 2014, dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. Commonwealth
    v. Mielnicki, 
    105 A.3d 245
     (Pa. 2013).
    The Commonwealth Court also examined the question presently before
    us in A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
    87 A.3d 914
     (Pa. Commwlth.
    2014).     The Commonwealth Court summarized the facts in that case as
    follows:
    This action arose out of the interactions between A.S., who was
    21 years old at the time of the incident, and a 16–year–old
    female minor who engaged in consensual sexual relations.
    Because the age of consent in Pennsylvania is 16, the
    consensual sex between those individuals was not a crime. See
    Section 3122.1 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1. While
    it is not a crime to have sex with a 16–year–old minor,
    somewhat anomalously, it is a crime to photograph or cause to
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    J-S16018-15
    be photographed a 16-year-old having consensual sex and
    causing a minor to take photographs of herself engaging in the
    sexual acts.    A.S. admitted that he met the victim online,
    developed a relationship with her which led to consensual sex,
    and that he persuaded the victim to take photographs of herself
    in various sexual positions with her digital camera. He also used
    the minor's digital camera to photograph the two engaging in
    sexual relations.
    As a result of this conduct, A.S. pled guilty in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) to one count
    of violating Section 6312(b) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 6312(b) (sexual abuse of children), one count of violating
    Section 6318(a)(5), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(5) (unlawful contact
    with a minor), and one count of violating Section 6301, 18
    Pa.C.S. § 6301 (corruption of minors). As a result of [A.S.’s]
    guilty pleas, the trial court sentenced A.S. to two concurrent 5-
    to 23–month terms of imprisonment and a consecutive 5–year
    probationary term.
    A.S., 
    87 A.3d at 916-917
     (record citations omitted).
    At sentencing, the trial court advised A.S. that he would be subject to
    the reporting requirements set forth in § 9795.1. According to the
    Commonwealth Court, the sentencing hearing transcript established that the
    trial court, the prosecuting attorney, and A.S. all believed that A.S. would be
    subject to a ten-year, not lifetime, registration requirement. On August 2,
    2002, upon his release from imprisonment, A.S. registered with the
    Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) as a sex offender as required by Megan's
    Law II. Following the expiration of the ten-year period in August 2012, A.S.
    asked the PSP to remove his name from the sex offender registry. PSP
    refused, explaining that, because A.S. pled guilty to one count each of
    sexual abuse of children and unlawful contact with a minor, he was subject
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    to lifetime registration under § 9795.1(b)(1) as “an individual with two or
    more convictions of ... the offenses set forth in subsection (a).” 10      42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1(b)(1).
    Based on PSP's refusal to remove his name from the registry, A.S. filed
    a mandamus petition asking the Commonwealth Court to order PSP to
    change A.S.'s lifetime registration designation under § 9795.1(b) to a
    10-year registration designation under § 9795.1(a). Adopting the rationale
    set forth in Chief Justice Castille’s OISR in Gehris, the Commonwealth Court
    granted A.S.’s motion for summary relief.11 See A.S., 
    87 A.3d at 920-923
    .
    We carefully reviewed the relevant appellate decisions that have
    considered the issue before us.           Decisions issued by the Commonwealth
    Court do not constitute binding precedent for the Superior Court.       Wells
    Fargo Bank N.A. v. Spivak, 
    104 A.3d 7
    , 16 (Pa. Super. 2014). However, a
    prior published opinion issued by a panel of this Court constitutes binding
    precedential authority.      See Commonwealth v. Beck, 
    78 A.3d 656
    , 659
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[a] panel [of this Court] is not empowered to overrule
    ____________________________________________
    10
    Sexual abuse of children and unlawful contact with a minor were each
    listed offenses under § 9795.1(a)(1) of the Sentencing Code.
    11
    On April 25, 2014, our Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction for
    purposes of reviewing the Commonwealth Court’s decision in A.S. See A.S.
    v. Pennsylvania State Police, 24 MAP 2014 (Pa. April 25, 2014). Our
    independent research into the status of A.S. has revealed that the Supreme
    Court deferred briefing in that matter pending resolution of Mielnicki.
    However, in light of Mielnicki’s dismissal, the Court reset the briefing
    schedule in A.S. The briefing schedule in A.S. has now closed.
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    another panel of the Superior Court”). In Merolla, this Court considered the
    issue now before us and held that simultaneous convictions for two listed
    offenses qualified as two convictions for purposes of the sexual offender
    registration   law.      Appellant     clearly   fits   that   criterion   in   this   case.
    Accordingly, we conclude, based upon Merolla, that Appellant is not entitled
    to relief on his claims.12
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/2/2015
    ____________________________________________
    12
    Since Morella held that multiple simultaneous convictions supported
    lifetime registration under a similar predecessor statute, we need not
    remand this matter for further proceedings to determine whether Appellant’s
    conduct constituted a “single criminal episode” for purposes of SORNA’s
    registration requirements. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/14, at 6.
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