People v. Wright ( 2021 )


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  •         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
    CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    WILLIAM LEE WRIGHT, JR.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    S107900
    Los Angeles County Superior Court
    KA048285-01
    December 16, 2021
    Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court,
    in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and
    Lui* concurred.
    *
    Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal,
    Second Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief
    Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    S107900
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    A jury convicted defendant, William Lee Wright, Jr., of the
    first degree murder of Philip Curtis, and found true the special
    circumstance allegations that he committed the murder during
    the commission of a robbery and a burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
    subd. (a) [murder], 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i) [robbery murder],
    190.2, subd. (a)(17) [burglary murder].)1 The jury also convicted
    defendant of the attempted murders of Julius Martin, Douglas
    Priest, Mario Ralph, and Willie Alexander (§ 664; § 187,
    subd. (a)) and of robbery against Martin (§ 211). The jury found
    true several sentence enhancements connected to the additional
    charges. The jury returned a death verdict, and the trial court
    sentenced defendant to death in 2002. This appeal is automatic.
    (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment in its entirety.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    A. Guilt Phase
    1. Prosecution Case
    a. Long Beach Incident
    On February 17, 2000, at approximately 2:00 a.m.,
    defendant visited the Long Beach apartment of Douglas Priest
    1
    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
    Penal Code.
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    and Julius Martin, and he knocked on the door.2 Priest had
    fallen asleep facedown on the living room floor after consuming
    approximately six beers and one or two shots of tequila. He
    awoke from the knock but did not move. Martin answered the
    door and let defendant inside. Defendant indicated he was there
    to buy marijuana, which Priest and Martin sold from the
    apartment along with cocaine. Martin told defendant that they
    had none. Defendant asked when they would have drugs
    available, to which Martin replied, “Probably tomorrow.”
    Defendant stood up to leave and Martin followed him to
    the door. Defendant turned around, pulled a knife from his right
    side and a gun from his left side and said, “This is a jack move.”
    Meanwhile, Priest could hear Martin and defendant talking but
    he did not move. Although he could not identify all of what was
    said, the conversation made him uncomfortable. Defendant said
    to Martin, “You think I’m bullshitting?” Defendant then
    stabbed Priest in the back. Defendant said to Martin, “Give it
    up,” and Martin produced $70 in cash from his pocket.
    Defendant asked, “Is that it?”        Martin replied, “Yeah.”
    Defendant ordered Martin to lie facedown on the ground and not
    look up. Martin complied. Defendant shot Martin twice in the
    back of the head. Martin lost consciousness.
    After Priest heard the gunshots, he heard defendant open
    the door to leave and looked over his shoulder to see who had
    been in the apartment. He the saw the man’s profile and
    recognized defendant based on his profile as well as his voice.
    2
    Julius Martin was unavailable to testify at trial. The
    prosecution read into the record his preliminary hearing
    testimony.
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    He knew defendant as “Mad,” a person who lived in a nearby
    building and frequently came to the apartment. Priest testified
    that he had no doubt that defendant was the man who stabbed
    him, noting that defendant had a distinctive voice and he had
    known defendant for a few months prior to the incident.
    Once defendant left the apartment, Priest stood up, locked
    the door, and called 911. He checked on Martin, who was
    bleeding profusely out of the top of his head. Martin regained
    consciousness and responded to Priest calling his name. The
    police and paramedics arrived, and both men were taken to the
    hospital.
    After he was admitted to the hospital, a detective
    attempted to ask Priest questions. Priest did not cooperate. He
    explained he was in pain at the time and on medication. He also
    believed the police were treating him like a suspect, rather than
    a victim. After they checked his hands for gunpowder residue
    he declined to speak with them further.
    Four or five days later, Long Beach Police Detective Philip
    Cloughesy interviewed Martin in the hospital. Martin related
    that an individual he knew as “Mad” shot him, and that he knew
    “Mad” to be a member of the Crips street gang. He told
    Cloughesy that “Mad” lived around the corner from him, and he
    had known “Mad” for about one year. Martin said that Priest
    awoke after the individual had already left the apartment.
    About one month after the incident, Priest saw a picture
    of defendant on the television news. He called Martin and said
    he saw “Mad” on the news being arrested by Ontario Police, put
    into a police car, and taken to jail in connection with a separate
    incident. Martin turned on his television news and also
    recognized defendant. He called the detective investigating his
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    shooting and explained that he saw the man who shot him on
    the news.
    Priest subsequently identified defendant at a live lineup,
    at the preliminary hearing, and at trial. Martin identified
    defendant at a live lineup and at the preliminary hearing.
    At the preliminary hearing, Martin acknowledged that on
    the night of the incident he did not tell officers that the man who
    shot him lived around the corner. He further acknowledged not
    telling the officers that he gave defendant $70, nor that he sold
    marijuana out of his apartment.           At trial, Priest also
    acknowledged not telling officers that the man who stabbed him
    lived nearby, explaining that he had never been to defendant’s
    residence.
    b. Pomona Incident
    Mario Ralph, Phillip Curtis, and Willie Alexander sold
    rock cocaine from a house in Pomona. On March 21, 2000,
    between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., defendant went to the house
    and bought $50 of rock cocaine. Curtis handled the transaction
    while Ralph was “on point” — meaning, Ralph would pat those
    who entered the house and then watch the person to make sure
    “things were straight.” Ralph did not pat down defendant
    because he knew him; he had seen defendant approximately
    three times that week. He knew defendant to be a member of
    the Duroc gang.
    After purchasing the $50 of rock cocaine, defendant sought
    to buy a larger quantity of drugs, but the men did not have more;
    Curtis asked defendant to come back at a later time. Defendant
    returned about one hour later. When defendant knocked on the
    door, Ralph was resting in one of the bedrooms. Ralph heard a
    lot of cussing and then heard defendant say, “Mother fuckers.
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    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    Duroc. Where is the dope at?” Ralph then heard three gunshots.
    He ran into the front room to see Curtis and Alexander had each
    been shot. Curtis was leaning over a table gasping for air and
    trying to pull a gun out of his pants pocket. Alexander was
    sitting on the couch with his cell phone in his hand.
    Ralph saw defendant standing in the room. He reached
    for the gun that Curtis had put on the table. When Ralph’s back
    was turned to defendant, as his hand grabbed the gun,
    defendant shot Ralph twice in the back. Ralph turned and tried
    to shoot defendant. He fired two shots before running out of
    bullets. Ralph briefly collapsed but managed to stand back up.
    He saw defendant run around the house and pick up the couch,
    asking, “Where’s the motherfucking dope?”
    Scared, Ralph ran toward the door to leave the house.
    Defendant ran toward the door at the same time. Ralph made
    it through the front door first, but defendant ran past him and
    entered a waiting car. Ralph briefly tried to run after the car.
    Ralph returned to the house. He threw Curtis’s gun on to
    the roof and then, once inside the house, flushed the remaining
    rock cocaine down the toilet. Ralph checked on Curtis, who said
    “What should I do? He shot me in the heart.” Ralph ran outside
    again and asked a neighbor to call 911. At that point Ralph was
    having difficulty breathing and “everything was moving
    slow[ly].” Alexander walked outside and sat with Ralph on the
    porch to wait for the police and paramedics to arrive. Ralph
    thought he was going to die, so he sat there “trying to let it
    happen.”
    Sergeant Mark Warm was the first officer to arrive. Ralph
    approached him screaming that he had been shot, and Warm
    called an ambulance. Ralph gave Warm a description of the
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    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    shooter. At that time, Alexander walked toward Warm and
    Ralph. Alexander appeared to be in shock and was unable to
    answer any questions. Curtis was later found in the house and
    subsequently pronounced dead.
    When Ralph was in the hospital, his cousin brought him a
    local newspaper in which Ralph saw a photograph of defendant.
    Ralph called the detectives and explained that he saw a
    newspaper picture of the man who shot him.             Ralph
    subsequently identified defendant in a photographic lineup.
    Ralph also identified defendant at a live lineup, at the
    preliminary hearing, and at trial.
    As a result of being shot, Ralph had been hospitalized
    several times, lost a kidney and 100 feet of intestines, and used
    a colostomy bag. Occasionally he had difficulty eating and
    drinking.
    c. The Investigation
    In Long Beach, officers recovered a small amount of
    marijuana and a .357 caliber revolver from the apartment. They
    also recovered a bullet fragment laying on Martin’s shirt, which
    had been left on the floor after paramedics treated him at the
    scene.
    Following the Pomona incident, a crime scene investigator
    recovered Curtis’s handgun, a .380 caliber semiautomatic, in a
    walkway area between the Pomona house and a neighboring
    house. He also recovered two spent shell casings inside the
    house. The investigator located, inside a bedroom closet, a
    bullet that he testified had been fired from the front of the house
    and gone through several walls before landing in the closet.
    The doctor who performed the autopsy on Curtis testified
    that he died from a single gunshot wound to the chest. He
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    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    recovered a .32 caliber bullet from Curtis’s vertebra. The bullet
    entered the left side of the chest, went through the heart, and
    into the upper abdomen, where it lodged in a vertebra.
    On March 24, 2000, Ontario Police Officer Joseph Giallo
    arrested defendant in an Ontario apartment for an unrelated
    incident. Defendant and his future wife, Janice Marrow-Wright,
    were the only people present in the apartment. When Giallo
    searched the apartment in conjunction with the arrest, he
    located a dark-colored .32 caliber revolver under couch cushions.
    Defendant’s ex-wife, Toni Wright, testified that on March 22,
    2000, she had seen defendant in possession of a small dark-
    colored handgun.
    Dale Higashi, a senior criminalist with the Los Angeles
    County Sheriff’s Department, studied the ballistics evidence.
    He examined Curtis’s .380 caliber semiautomatic handgun,
    which was found at the Pomona house, and the .32 caliber
    revolver found at the Ontario apartment where defendant was
    arrested.    Higashi also scrutinized the .32 caliber bullet
    recovered from Curtis’s body and the .32 caliber bullet recovered
    from the Pomona house closet, and he concluded they had both
    been fired from the dark-colored revolver found when defendant
    was arrested. After examination, Higashi also concluded the
    bullet fragment recovered from the Long Beach apartment was
    fired by defendant’s revolver.
    Higashi additionally inspected the two shell casings found
    in the Pomona house and concluded they had been fired from
    Curtis’s .380 semiautomatic handgun.
    2. Defense Case
    Long Beach Police Officer Joseph Seminara responded to
    the Long Beach apartment on February 17, 2000. Seminara
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    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    briefly questioned Priest and Martin at the apartment. Priest
    told him that he was asleep on the floor and woke up to the
    sound of gunshots. Priest said he had no idea how he had been
    stabbed and that the assailant had already fled the scene when
    he awoke. Seminara testified that Priest was being treated by
    paramedics at the time he was being questioned and appeared
    to be in pain. Martin told Seminara that he did not know how
    Priest had been stabbed. It was clear to Seminara that Martin
    had been shot “several times” in the head and appeared to be in
    pain as paramedics were treating him. Seminara and Martin
    spoke for less than 30 seconds.
    Alexander testified at trial for the defense.          He
    acknowledged being at the Pomona house on March 21, 2000,
    but claimed he did not remember who else was there with him.
    He denied knowing that narcotics were sold from the house.
    When defense counsel asked if defendant was the man who shot
    them, Alexander said, “I’m sorry, that’s not the person. I ain’t
    never seen him before.” He also denied at the preliminary
    hearing that defendant was the shooter.
    On cross-examination, Alexander admitted being arrested
    for selling rock cocaine in another drug house a few months after
    the Pomona shooting. He was serving a six-year prison sentence
    on that charge and did not receive any benefit in that case for
    testifying in defendant’s trial. Alexander agreed with the
    prosecutor’s statement that an inmate in prison “might have to
    pay a price” for cooperating with law enforcement and testifying
    in court.     Alexander acknowledged previously identifying
    defendant as the shooter in a live lineup but claimed he did not
    actually know who shot him and he “just chose anybody.”
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    Detective Gregg Guenther spoke with Ralph multiple
    times after the Pomona incident. Ralph told Guenther that the
    shooter had used a small black semiautomatic pistol. He also
    told the detective that he had seen the shooter approximately 10
    times before the incident. He did not initially tell Guenther that
    he had fired shots with Curtis’s gun. Guenther could not recall
    whether gunshot residue tests were performed on the hands of
    Alexander or Curtis and did not believe a residue test had been
    performed on Ralph.
    3. Prosecution Rebuttal
    Detective Guenther testified that he interviewed
    Alexander in the hospital. Alexander told him that he saw the
    man who had shot him, Curtis, and Ralph in a local newspaper
    and on television. Guenther showed Alexander a photo lineup
    at the hospital, during which Alexander identified defendant as
    the person who shot the three men. At a subsequent live lineup,
    Alexander again identified defendant as the assailant. Shortly
    after Alexander was sent to prison on the cocaine charges,
    Guenther spoke with him to determine whether Alexander
    would still testify in defendant’s case. He told the detective that
    now that he was in prison, he could not testify without facing
    retaliation.
    Prior to the preliminary hearing, Detective Guenther and
    his partner drove Alexander from prison to the city jail so that
    he could testify without having to ride on statewide
    transportation with other inmates. During the drive, Alexander
    told Guenther that he could not testify against defendant out of
    concern for his own safety. The night before the hearing, at the
    city jail, Alexander again expressed concern about his own
    safety if he were to testify.
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    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    B. Penalty Phase
    1. Prosecution Case
    The prosecution introduced evidence of two prior felony
    convictions: second degree robbery at a restaurant in 1989 and
    evading a police officer in 1999.
    The prosecution also introduced several acts or threats of
    violence: (1) on June 23, 1992, defendant fired shots at a rival
    gang member’s residence; (2) on September 6, 1994, defendant
    attacked a fellow inmate in prison and refused to comply with
    officer commands; (3) on March 22, 2000, defendant shot his ex-
    wife in her face; (4) on March 23–24, 2000, when officers tried to
    take him into custody, defendant barricaded himself and five
    hostages in the apartment, fired approximately 14 shots at
    police officers, and was eventually taken into custody after tear
    gas was deployed; (5) on June 28, 2001, a corrections officer
    found an inmate-manufactured spear in defendant’s jail cell; (6)
    on July 10, 2001, defendant threw bleach at a corrections
    officer’s face and was found in possession of razor blades, fishing
    line, and extra linens in his jail cell; and (7) on October 28, 2001,
    defendant threatened a corrections officer and then physically
    attacked him.
    2. Defense Case
    Janice Marrow-Wright, defendant’s wife, testified
    regarding the hostage incident on March 23, 2000. She stated
    that she, her mother, her three nephews, and defendant were
    present at her mother’s apartment that day. She denied that
    defendant ever prevented her, her mother, or the children from
    leaving the house. She said she did not release the children once
    hostage negotiations began because she did not trust the police.
    She asserted that defendant had never been disrespectful to
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    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    anyone in her presence. During cross-examination, Marrow-
    Wright denied telling the police that she and her mother had
    been through a “traumatic experience” when speaking about the
    hostage situation and denied saying that defendant had
    previously abused her. She also denied telling the police that
    defendant was a “gangster,” that she regretted meeting him,
    and that he had dangerous friends. On cross-examination,
    Marrow-Wright testified that she married defendant in August
    2000, after he was already incarcerated. She explained that
    there was no marriage certificate because it “was done as an
    agreement” as a “common law” marriage.
    Juanita Anderson testified that she was a friend of
    defendant’s family and had known him for 30 years. She related
    that defendant was always respectful and kind to her and would
    call her weekly to check in on her.
    Donell Walls testified that he had known defendant from
    the time they met in elementary school. Defendant was a
    generous person, a friend to him, and treated his family well.
    During cross-examination, he acknowledged that defendant
    may have had “psychological problems” when they were in high
    school and recalled that defendant had difficulty understanding
    some things while playing football.
    Melinda Mix testified that she had been friends with
    defendant for 15 years. She knew him to be a good person and
    had never seen him be disrespectful to anyone. During cross-
    examination, she explained that they had dated, and she still
    considered herself to be his girlfriend. She knew he was in a
    relationship with Marrow-Wright but was unaware that they
    had married.
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    David Jimenez, a psychologist, evaluated defendant
    through three face-to-face interviews, communication with
    defendant’s parents, a review of relevant police reports, and a
    study of two prior psychological evaluations. During their first
    interview, defendant complained of difficulty sleeping and the
    effects of the antipsychotic medication he was taking. During
    their second interview, defendant was not compliant and
    refused to answer Dr. Jimenez’s questions. During their third
    interview, Dr. Jimenez attempted to administer two
    psychological tests but did not believe defendant gave “his best
    efforts” and did not include the results from the tests in his
    report. He attempted to see defendant for a fourth visit, but
    defendant declined to meet with him.
    Defendant told Dr. Jimenez that he joined the Duroc gang
    at the age of nine and that one of his “homeboys” died in his
    arms when he was 15 years old. Defendant said that he had
    attempted suicide when he was 12 or 13 years old, but his
    parents told Dr. Jimenez that they “could not recall anything of
    that nature.” Defendant also reported that he had used PCP on
    more than 100 occasions, liked rock cocaine and marijuana, and
    consumed alcohol daily.
    Dr. Jimenez testified that on at least two occasions,
    defendant attempted to fake a mental disorder or illness.
    Because defendant did not fully comply with the evaluations,
    partly because he was feigning mental illness, Dr. Jimenez could
    not rule out a mental disorder.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Counsel’s Representation
    Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible
    error when it denied his request for self-representation under
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    Faretta v. California (1975) 
    422 U.S. 806
     (Faretta), made two
    days prior to the scheduled trial date. He further contends the
    trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
    substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 118
    (Marsden).
    1. Factual Background
    The parties first appeared before the assigned trial court
    in September 2001 and set a trial date of March 12, 2002. At
    the next hearing on December 17, 2001, the parties confirmed
    they would be ready to proceed on March 12 and had no pending
    motions. On March 4, 2002, defense counsel moved to continue
    the trial date. He explained that he was still receiving discovery
    and had neither identified nor interviewed all potential
    witnesses. At a hearing on March 12, counsel proposed to set
    March 26 for motions and April 29 for trial. The prosecution
    and trial court agreed.
    On Monday, April 29, 2002, the parties met for a trial
    readiness conference. The court set Wednesday, May 1, 2002,
    as the first day of trial and then asked the parties if there was
    anything to discuss. Defense counsel stated that the previous
    Wednesday, defendant indicated that he was considering
    moving to represent himself. When defense counsel followed up
    with defendant that morning, he confirmed it was his desire to
    proceed in propria persona. The trial court asked defendant why
    he wanted to represent himself. Defendant replied, “I have a
    right under Faretta, don’t I?” The court said yes, but that the
    question was why he wanted to so proceed. Defendant replied,
    “Conflict between me and my attorney.” The court cleared the
    courtroom to conduct a Marsden hearing.
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    The court asked defendant what conflict he had with
    counsel. Defendant said, “I have a witness that has got some
    information, a witness to help me in my case. And my attorney
    [is] refusing to call her back, or to call her to get this information.
    Plus, I don’t see where — where the defense is being put up on
    my behalf.” Defense counsel explained that the witness
    defendant referred to was his girlfriend. Counsel said he had
    spoken to defendant’s girlfriend “numerous times” throughout
    the case, but “it got to a position where I felt that she was what
    I refer to as an intermeddler in the case. And I have indicated
    to Mr. Wright that . . . I am not discussing anything with her
    anymore.” Counsel continued, “He did indicate that she had
    some information. She said that all along. Nothing helpful has
    come forward. I had my investigator contact her. She made
    some calls over to my investigator’s office and never gave us any
    information. And as I refer to it, she is an officious intermeddler
    as far as I am concerned. And I indicated to her if she [has] any
    information, she can give it to my investigator. And that hasn’t
    happened, and I don’t have any faith that she has any
    information in regards to that.”
    The court asked defendant what information his girlfriend
    had. He replied, “The addresses of the peoples that was — that
    supposed to had did one of these crimes, [sic] supposed to be a
    witness to come forth and bring up their names. I don’t have
    them.” The court asked why she had not given that information
    to defense counsel. Defendant said, “She have called numerous
    times to the investigator and [defense counsel]. Nobody has
    returned her calls.” The court offered to have defendant’s
    girlfriend come into court and give the information to defense
    counsel that way. Defense counsel responded, “She could have
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    given it to [defendant], your honor, and he could have given it
    the investigator. That hasn’t happened either.”
    The court noted that defendant had a second concern and
    asked for him to elaborate. Defendant said, “There is no defense
    being put up on my behalf.” Defense counsel explained that he
    had discussed defense strategy with defendant numerous times
    and outlined that the defense would be “basically through cross-
    examination of the witnesses. And I pointed out to him what
    I thought would be helpful to us in the testimony and various
    witnesses, particularly Willie Alexander at the preliminary
    hearing testified on our behalf. And that’s where I stand in
    regards to that.” The court asked defendant if he had anything
    more to add; he declined. The court brought the prosecutor back
    into the courtroom and resumed proceedings in open court.
    The trial court found there was insufficient conflict to
    warrant changing defense counsel and denied the Marsden
    motion. The court continued, “The issue about representing
    yourself, you can always represent yourself. I am required, as
    you know, to let you do that as long as you understand what you
    are getting yourself into. And it is your belief that you can do a
    better job than your attorney on this?” Defendant responded,
    “Yes.” The court reminded defendant that trial was starting two
    days later, regardless of whether defendant proceeded by
    himself. “We have set the date. We have 200 jurors coming in.
    We have cleared this court’s calendar. The witnesses have been
    subpoenaed for that particular date. . . . We have set it on
    Wednesday so we can have the jurors actually present and give
    them the questionnaires that will be necessary in this case.
    There is no good cause to put the matter over. If you wish to
    represent yourself, certainly at any stage you can do that. And
    but [sic] you should understand you won’t even be in the pro.
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    per. [housing] module by the time we start trial. That won’t
    happen until the weekend. You do understand all of this?”
    Defendant confirmed that he did.
    The court asked defendant if he understood that he would
    be treated as an attorney, would not receive any assistance from
    the court, and would be required “to do it all just like the
    prosecutor is on his own to do it all.” Defendant replied, “Yes.
    I just need time to prepare for my case.” The court told
    defendant he did not have more time because trial was set for
    Wednesday. Defendant said he would not be ready by then, to
    which the court replied that if defendant was not prepared in
    two days, he could not represent himself. Defendant stated that
    he had the right to represent himself. The court explained, “You
    have the right to go to trial, and you also have the right to
    represent yourself. And they are in conflict right now. I am not
    putting the case over. Why didn’t you bring this up before?”
    Defendant said, “Just really transpired when I talked to my
    lawyer to cross-examine one of the deputies. I feel he wasn’t
    aggressive enough, and this is a death penalty case.” The court
    asked defendant if he believed he could do a better job than
    counsel. Defendant said yes, but he needed time to prepare his
    case. The court asked defendant if he had represented himself
    before. Defendant said, “No, I haven’t. But I been in the courts
    long enough to know how to represent myself.”
    The judge reiterated that defendant could represent
    himself, but the trial date would not be continued. Defendant
    again said that he could not be ready within two days. The court
    asked defendant if he had previously discussed self-
    representation with defense counsel. Defendant said he first
    brought it up the previous Wednesday. The court reminded
    defendant that the case had been ongoing for more than one
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    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    year. Defendant replied, “You put me in a position I am going
    to represent myself, but I am not going to be ready on
    Wednesday.” The court said, “That is up to you. The first thing
    I am going to do is allow you to fill in the pro. per. advisement
    form. And I want you to think about this a little while because
    obviously you didn’t know I was going to say no [continuance].
    But now you know I am going to say no as far as a continuance
    is concerned. We are going to trial Wednesday. You can either
    do it by yourself, which I am telling you is a terrible mistake.
    I am not going to equivocate with you. Or you can go to trial
    with [defense counsel].” Defendant again said he would not be
    ready to go by Wednesday. The trial court said, “But that is not
    the issue. Those are your two choices. Either going to trial by
    yourself Wednesday, or [defense counsel] represents you. I want
    you to think about it while you fill in that piece of paper.”
    The court took a break and reconvened fifteen minutes
    later to review defendant’s self-representation advisement form.
    When the court asked defendant if he had any questions about
    anything on the form, defendant replied, “No.” The court noted
    that defendant had not filled in the portion indicating what
    crimes he would be charged with, and asked defendant what
    crimes he was charged with. Defendant replied, “Murder and 4
    counts of attempted murder and a robbery.” The court then
    asked defendant, “And what kind of continuance are you asking
    for?” Defendant said, “Some time to prepare for my case.” The
    court asked again how much time he needed. Defendant said,
    “I don’t know. A month, two.”
    The trial court noted that defense counsel had represented
    defendant at the preliminary hearing, at which time defendant
    had a chance to evaluate counsel’s ability to cross-examine
    witnesses. The court asked defendant why he did not raise the
    17
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    issue at that time. Defendant said he did not notice an issue
    until recently. Defendant continued, “If the court [is] going to
    deny me time to prepare for my case, I will proceed with
    [counsel].”
    The court denied defendant’s Faretta motion as untimely.
    In the course of noting the areas on the form that defendant
    failed to initial, the court further stated that it did not believe
    defendant thoroughly understood what he was trying to do. The
    court opined that defense counsel “is doing a very good job for
    you. He has filed and argued numerous motions on your behalf.
    He has been able to keep out some of the penalty phase evidence
    that the People, after being forced to review by [defense counsel],
    have decided not to bring forward. The court denied the People’s
    request for one piece of penalty phase evidence. So he is doing
    a good job. His job is also to evaluate the evidence before putting
    it on. And I think, again, he is doing a fine job. He has
    experience in this area. He knows what he is doing. The court
    is going to deny the request for pro. per. status based on the fact
    that it is untimely. And the defendant would clearly need time
    to prepare.”
    Voir dire commenced on Wednesday, May 1, 2002, as
    planned.
    2. Motion for Self-Representation
    The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a
    criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to
    represent himself if he voluntarily and intelligently so chooses.
    (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–836.) A trial court must
    grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if the request
    is made within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of
    trial, is unequivocal, and is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
    18
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    intelligently. (People v. Lynch (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 693
    , 721
    (Lynch).) If a self-representation motion is untimely, it is
    “within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine
    whether such a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro
    se.” (People v. Windham (1977) 
    19 Cal.3d 121
    , 124 (Windham).)
    We first analyze whether the trial court abused its
    discretion in finding the motion untimely under Lynch. “We
    have long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is made
    ‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ ”
    (People v. Johnson (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 475
    , 499 (Johnson).) “[T]he
    ‘reasonable time’ requirement ‘must not be used as a means of
    limiting a defendant’s constitutional right of self-
    representation,’ but rather to prevent the defendant from
    ‘misus[ing] the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably
    delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration
    of justice.’ ” (Ibid.)
    We have routinely declined to identify a specific period in
    time at which a self-representation motion is untimely. “[W]e
    have held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on
    the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
    p. 722.) In People v. Frierson (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 730
    , 742, we held
    that a motion for self-representation made two days before the
    set trial date was made on “the eve of trial” and thus untimely.
    In People v. Clark (1992) 
    3 Cal.4th 41
    , 99, we found a Faretta
    motion was untimely when it was made several days after the
    case had been continued day-to-day “in the expectation that the
    motions would be concluded and jury selection set to begin at
    any time.” In People v. Valdez (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 73
    , 102, we held
    the Faretta motion “made moments before jury selection was set
    to begin” was untimely.
    19
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    We also have held that Faretta motions “made long before
    trial were timely.” (Lynch, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at p. 723; see
    People v. Stanley (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 913
    , 932 [Faretta motion
    made nearly two years before trial was timely]; People v. Dent
    (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 213
    , 221 [Faretta motion made four months
    before trial was timely].) “Nevertheless, our refusal to identify
    a single point in time at which a self-representation motion filed
    before trial is untimely indicates that outside these two extreme
    time periods, pertinent considerations may extend beyond a
    mere counting of the days between the motion and the scheduled
    trial date.” (Lynch, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at p. 723, fn. omitted.)
    In Lynch, we concluded that “a trial court may consider
    the totality of circumstances in determining whether a
    defendant’s pretrial motion for self-representation is timely.”
    (Lynch, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) We held that a trial court
    may properly consider “not only the time between the motion
    and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether
    trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses
    and the reluctance or availability of crucial trial witnesses, the
    complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial proceedings, and
    whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to assert his
    right of self-representation.” (Ibid.)
    We have declined to articulate what standard a reviewing
    court should apply in determining whether a request for self-
    representation is timely. (Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 501.)
    And yet defendant’s claim here fails under both de novo review
    and a more deferential standard.
    Defendant acknowledges that his request was made close
    in time to the scheduled trial start date. He asserts, however,
    that under the totality of circumstances his request was
    20
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    nonetheless timely. We disagree. Defendant brought this
    motion two days before the scheduled trial date and conditioned
    his motion on the grant of a continuance, telling the court that
    if he did not have time to prepare, he would proceed with
    counsel. Further, he could not identify with any degree of
    precision how much time he thought he would need, opining
    perhaps a month or maybe two.
    Defendant argues it is significant that at the time he made
    his motion, neither the prosecution nor defense counsel
    indicated readiness to proceed. However, on April 11, 2002, the
    parties had stated that there were no witness issues to report,
    discussed evidence to be presented during trial, and confirmed
    that previous issues with discovery had been resolved. On April
    15, 2002, the parties discussed the juror questionnaires and
    whether defendant would be shackled. At the conclusion of the
    hearing, the parties confirmed there was nothing else to discuss
    before the trial readiness conference on April 29. On April 29,
    the trial court stated, “Today was really a clean-up day. Make
    sure we are ready to go, and that there are no problems.” When
    the court asked if either party had anything to discuss, defense
    counsel explained, for the first time, that defendant wanted to
    represent himself. Although neither party explicitly stated
    readiness to proceed, neither party stated otherwise when asked
    if there were any problems, and the record strongly supports a
    conclusion that the parties were prepared to proceed at that
    time and the court understood that each party was so prepared.
    Finally, the fact that trial started two days after defendant’s
    motion, as planned, further indicates that the parties were
    ready to proceed on time.
    Defendant argues he could not have asserted his right to
    represent himself sooner because his concerns had not arisen
    21
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    until right before he brought his motion, but the record does not
    support this. Defendant informed the trial court on April 29
    that he had concerns about his lawyer cross-examining one of
    the deputies, and defendant now contends this was raised as
    soon as practicable after he had an opportunity to discuss this
    concern with counsel.       The hearing at which the cross-
    examination occurred took place on April 11, 2002; defendant
    waited 18 days to assert his Faretta right. Counsel told the trial
    court during the Marsden hearing that he had explained the
    trial strategy to defendant numerous times prior, not simply at
    their meeting four days prior when defendant first told counsel
    he was interested in representing himself. When the court
    invited defendant to comment, he did not challenge counsel’s
    statement. Defendant expressed additional concerns to the trial
    court regarding counsel’s alleged refusal to contact his girlfriend
    for information. The record indicates that this was an ongoing
    issue between defendant and counsel and not something that
    arose just before defendant made his Faretta motion.
    Moreover, the trial court expressed skepticism concerning
    whether defendant intended to seriously represent himself or
    whether he merely sought to delay trial. After defendant
    complained that counsel had not returned his girlfriend’s calls,
    the trial court offered to have her come to court to address
    counsel. Defendant did not offer a response to the court’s
    invitation. Later, the court asked defendant why he did not
    make his request sooner and stated that it would not continue
    the trial. Defendant interrupted the court and challenged it by
    stating that the court could “either just deny me and I put it up
    for appeal, or grant me my motion to — .” The court cut off
    defendant and said, “It seems to me you are setting up another
    issue for appeal that you are not really . . . taking to be serious.”
    22
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    In further support of his argument that his motion was
    timely under Lynch, defendant asserts the prosecution’s case
    was straightforward, and there had been only minimal
    discovery. Yet he fails to persuasively articulate in what way
    this case, consisting of one murder and four attempted murders
    arising out of two separate incidents, was straightforward. Nor
    does he address how a sudden switch to self-representation
    could have occurred without unduly disrupting the ongoing
    process.
    Defendant contends a continuance would not have
    impaired the prosecution’s ability to produce its witnesses. A
    continuance, however, could have impaired the prosecution’s
    ability to produce Julius Martin, one of its key witnesses. The
    prosecution had a right to present Martin’s live testimony as the
    preferred form of evidence. (See People v. Reed (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 217
    , 225 [“The fundamental purpose of the unavailability
    requirement is to ensure that prior testimony is substituted for
    live testimony, the generally preferred form of evidence, only
    when necessary”].) As defendant acknowledges, Martin was
    suffering ongoing health issues as a result of the shooting.
    Martin was ultimately ruled unavailable to testify as a witness;
    the prosecution introduced his preliminary hearing transcript
    into the record. Defendant argues that because Martin was able
    to testify live during the penalty phase, a continuance would
    have been favorable because Martin may have recovered enough
    to testify live during a later-held guilt phase trial as well. This
    circumstance was unknown at the time, however, and the
    prosecution could rightly have had concerns regarding how
    Martin’s health would change if the trial was continued.
    23
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    Under the totality of circumstances described in Lynch,
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant’s
    Faretta motion to be untimely.
    Defendant asserts that even if his request to represent
    himself was properly deemed untimely, the trial court
    nonetheless abused its discretion in denying the motion. We
    analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
    an untimely motion under Windham, supra, 
    19 Cal.3d 121
    ,
    which states that once a trial court has ruled a Faretta motion
    untimely, it must exercise discretion in determining whether to
    grant or deny a defendant’s request for self-representation. (Id.
    at p. 131.) In Windham, we explained that when a defendant
    requests to represent himself in the middle of trial, the court
    must inquire into the specific factors underlying the request.
    (Id. at p. 128.) Additionally, “other factors to be considered by
    the court in assessing such requests made after the
    commencement of trial are the quality of counsel’s
    representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity
    to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and
    stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which
    might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a
    motion.” (Ibid.)
    We discern no abuse in the court’s decision to deny the
    motion.   The court found defense counsel was acting
    competently on defendant’s behalf, noting that he had filed and
    argued numerous motions and prevented the prosecution from
    introducing certain penalty phase evidence.             Although
    defendant exhibited no prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the
    court further found defendant’s reasons for his request to be
    inadequate, noting that defendant did not appear to fully
    understand what he was “getting [himself] into” by asking to
    24
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    represent himself. Finally, the court found that granting
    defendant’s motion would cause disruption and delay in trial
    proceedings due to the accompanying request to continue.
    The Attorney General argues that defendant’s motion was
    equivocal in any event. Because the trial court properly denied
    defendant’s motion to represent himself, we need not determine
    whether his request was equivocal.
    Finally, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the
    timeliness requirement. We have repeatedly held that a Faretta
    motion may be denied if not made within a reasonable time prior
    to the commencement of trial. (See Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
    p. 499 [a trial court has the discretion to deny an untimely
    motion for self-representation]; Lynch, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at
    pp. 721–722 [“ ‘the right of self-representation is not absolute’ ”
    and may be denied if the motion is deemed untimely]; People v.
    Hamilton (1988) 
    45 Cal.3d 351
    , 369 [a Faretta motion must be
    timely “for purposes of invoking an absolute right of self-
    representation”]; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127–128 [“in
    order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional
    right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial
    should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a
    reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].) Contrary
    to defendant’s argument, the timing of a Faretta motion is only
    one of several factors considered before a trial court can hold a
    motion untimely (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726), and we
    have never held that timeliness alone is a sufficient basis on
    which to deny a Faretta motion. Defendant does not present a
    persuasive reason to revisit precedent on this matter.
    25
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    3. Motion to Substitute Counsel
    Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion
    when it denied his Marsden motion because the record showed
    counsel was constitutionally deficient.
    “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed
    counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate
    representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to
    explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific
    instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”
    (People v. Johnson (2018) 
    6 Cal.5th 541
    , 572; People v. Vines
    (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 830
    , 878.) We review a trial court’s decision
    not to discharge appointed counsel under the deferential abuse-
    of-discretion standard. (People v. Jones (2003) 
    29 Cal.4th 1229
    ,
    1245.)
    Defendant acknowledges that after he requested the trial
    court relieve counsel, the court properly permitted him to
    explain the basis for his motion. He asserts, however, that the
    court erred in failing to act on the information it received
    regarding counsel’s alleged failure to follow up with defendant’s
    girlfriend about alleged exculpatory information. Counsel
    confirmed that he had contacted defendant’s girlfriend on
    several occasions but had not obtained information from her
    concerning a potential third-party culpability defense, nor was
    he investigating third-party culpability in defendant’s case.
    Defendant asserts that this in itself established that counsel’s
    performance was constitutionally inadequate, and hence the
    trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. He
    further asserts the court did not conduct an adequate inquiry.
    First, defendant fails to establish the trial court’s inquiry
    was inadequate.    As observed earlier, the court heard
    26
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    defendant’s complaint regarding his attorney’s failure to obtain
    information from defendant’s girlfriend and requested that
    counsel respond. Defense counsel explained to the court that he
    had spoken to defendant’s girlfriend several times, and she
    refused to provide any information to him. He instructed her to
    contact his investigator if she had any information, which she
    did not do.      Defense counsel stated that, based on his
    interactions with defendant’s girlfriend, he did not believe she
    had any helpful information for the defense team. When
    defendant mentioned he was also concerned about an alleged
    lack of a defense case, the court again asked counsel to respond.
    Counsel stated that he had gone over defense strategy with
    defendant “numerous times” and explained he would primarily
    focus on the cross-examination of witnesses. The trial court
    provided defendant “full opportunity to air all of his complaints,
    and counsel to respond to them.” (People v. Smith (2003)
    
    30 Cal.4th 581
    , 606; see People v. Abilez (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 472
    ,
    488 [dismissing the defendant’s complaint that the trial court’s
    inquiry was insufficient when the court gave the defendant the
    chance to discuss his complaints and counsel the chance to
    respond].) No more was necessary.
    Second, the court did not abuse its discretion when it
    denied the Marsden motion. Defendant’s complaints regarding
    counsel’s investigation and trial strategy were “tactical
    disagreements, which do not by themselves constitute an
    ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 1158
    ,
    1192.)     Defendant presented no evidence that counsel’s
    performance was so deficient that constitutionally ineffective
    representation was likely to result.
    27
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    B. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct
    Defendant      contends    the     prosecutor    presented
    inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence that severely
    biased the jury against him and led to a conviction based not on
    the evidence but on his perceived character and history. He
    specifically challenges the introduction of two pieces of evidence:
    (1) that defendant’s ex-wife, Toni Wright, observed defendant
    point a gun at someone; and (2) a statement from an expert
    witness that defendant had been in prison for a “long, long time”
    prior to the trial.
    1. Factual Background
    During the guilt phase, the prosecutor sought to introduce
    evidence that defendant shot his ex-wife, Toni Wright, in the
    head. He argued that the evidence was relevant because
    defendant shot her with a small, dark-colored revolver within a
    day or two of the Pomona incident. Experts linked bullets from
    the Long Beach and Pomona incidents to the revolver used to
    shoot Ms. Wright, and because defendant raised the issue of
    identity, the prosecutor argued that this incident was relevant
    to identity and intent with respect to the charged offenses.
    Defense counsel objected, arguing that there was no indication
    Ms. Wright could identify which gun was used against her. He
    continued, “And this is the District Attorney’s effort to try to
    bootstrap some evidence that is tremendously prejudicial to my
    client and will have little or no probative value in regards to the
    charges that he is on trial for.” The court ruled that Ms. Wright
    could testify that she knew defendant had a black handgun but
    could not testify about the shooting. The court found that “the
    prejudice far outweighs any probative value or any relevance. It
    is just — it is too much, quite frankly, for the amount of relevant
    28
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    material in there. But she can come in and say she saw him
    hold a black handgun.”
    When the prosecutor called Ms. Wright, he asked, “On
    March the 22nd of the year 2000, did you see William Wright
    with a small, dark-colored handgun?” She replied, “Yes.” He
    continued, “Did you see him point that gun at somebody?” She
    replied, “Yes.” After asking Ms. Wright to identify defendant in
    the courtroom, the prosecutor asked, “When you saw him point
    the handgun at somebody, was that in the city of Ontario?” At
    that point defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. He
    argued that the prosecutor’s question was prejudicial to
    defendant and against what the parties had previously agreed
    upon. The prosecutor argued that his question was not in
    conflict with the court’s prior ruling. He continued, “If it is,
    I didn’t ask who he pointed it at.”
    The trial court agreed that the prosecutor’s line of
    questioning had gone too far but found the error harmless. The
    court noted that the prosecutor did not ask about how the gun
    was used, and the fact that it was pointed “just indicates to the
    jurors how she was able to see it.” The court denied the motion
    for a mistrial. When questioning resumed, the prosecutor asked
    Ms. Wright, “When you observed Mr. Wright with the gun, that
    was not in any kind of drug house, was it?” She replied, “No.”
    The prosecutor asked her no more questions.
    The prosecutor also called David Bly, a Los Angeles
    County Sheriff’s Department detective, to testify as an expert
    witness on gangs. Bly explained his knowledge of the Duroc
    Crips gang and asserted, based on his review of records in which
    defendant admitted he was a member and based on defendant’s
    tattoos, that defendant was a member of the gang. During cross-
    29
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    examination, Bly confirmed that he had neither interviewed
    defendant nor had any personal contact with him. Defense
    counsel asked Bly, “Now you indicated that you have met a
    number of Duroc gang members; is that correct?” After Bly
    answered affirmatively, counsel asked approximately how
    many. Bly replied, “Over a hundred, say a hundred to 200.”
    On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Bly, “Sir, if there
    is a particular member that is not in the community for a long,
    long time, you might not come in contact with him; is that
    correct?” After Bly confirmed that was correct, the prosecutor
    continued: “If he is living somewhere else or if he is incarcerated
    perhaps or something like that, you wouldn’t know; is that
    correct?”
    Defense counsel objected to this question, arguing that the
    prosecutor “is trying to give the insinuation that my client was
    in custody and I think that’s improper to put that off to the jury.”
    The prosecutor replied, “Judge, I never on direct asked this man
    if he had personal contact with [defendant]. Counsel on cross,
    for whatever reason, chose to ask that. Once he asked that,
    I simply have a right to inquire of Mr. Bly, if someone is not in
    the community, I didn’t say simply in custody, I said if someone
    is not in the community, living someplace else or in custody, you
    wouldn’t be coming in contact with him? That is clearly a
    permissible question based on what counsel asked. I never
    asked that witness anything on direct plus the witness testified
    at the prelim so counsel cannot say he was in any way surprised
    by what he might or might not say. And he cross-examined the
    witness at the prelim. So I think, under those circumstances,
    it’s clearly, that limited question is clearly permissible.” The
    trial court overruled the objection, finding the question was
    within the scope of cross-examination and permissible. The
    30
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    court continued, “I don’t think that counsel is honing in and
    I will not permit counsel to hone in on that issue. I think it was
    broad enough. And it was a reasonable question, given the
    cross-examination.”
    2. Discussion
    Defendant argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial
    misconduct by failing to abide by the court’s prohibition against
    soliciting evidence of defendant’s use of the handgun. He also
    argues the prosecutor’s questions to Bly constituted an improper
    attempt to “rehabilitate” a witness who had, in fact, not been
    challenged in that respect on cross-examination.
    “ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding
    prosecutorial misconduct are well established. “ ‘A prosecutor’s
    . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when
    it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects
    the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial
    of due process.” ’ ” [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that
    does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is
    prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves
    “ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to
    persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
    Hill (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 800
    , 819.)
    As an initial matter, we note that defendant has forfeited
    his prosecutorial misconduct allegation as to the questioning of
    Ms. Wright. “ ‘To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial
    misconduct, the defense must make a timely objection at trial
    and request an admonition; otherwise, the point is reviewable
    only if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by
    the misconduct.’ ” (People v. Silva (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 345
    , 373.)
    Defense counsel did not request a curative admonition after the
    31
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    trial court agreed that the prosecutor’s questioning had gone too
    far. Further, he cannot establish that an admonition would not
    have cured any alleged harm.
    In any event, we need not decide whether the prosecutor
    committed misconduct because any possible error was harmless.
    Defendant contends Ms. Wright’s testimony was prejudicial
    because it implied he was “the type of person who used guns
    against people,” and thus made it more likely for the jurors to
    believe he was the one who committed the charged offenses. On
    this record, however, there were many facts that undermined
    the defense theory, regardless of the challenged line of
    questioning. The jury heard evidence that defendant shot
    Martin, Curtis, Ralph, and Alexander. The jury also heard
    testimony that the bullets recovered from Curtis’s body, and
    from the Pomona and Long Beach crime scenes, were fired from
    the gun found in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest.
    Finally, we note that the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Wright how
    the gun was used. In light of the other substantial and properly
    adduced evidence regarding defendant’s gun usage, testimony
    that Ms. Wright saw defendant pointing a gun did not render
    defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair under either federal or
    state standards.
    When examining Detective Bly, the prosecutor’s follow-up
    question suggesting incarceration as a hypothetical explanation
    for a gang member’s absence was improper. The prosecutor’s
    question, however, did not render defendant’s trial
    fundamentally unfair. In People v. Bolden (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 515
    , a police officer witness mentioned meeting the defendant at
    a parole office. (Id. at p. 554.) The prosecutor interrupted and
    clarified that he sought a physical address, not a description of
    the meeting place. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of
    32
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    defendant’s motion for a mistrial, noting that it was “doubtful
    that any reasonable juror would infer from the fleeting reference
    to a parole office” that defendant had a prior conviction, and that
    the incident was not significant in the context of the entire guilt
    trial. (Id at p. 555.) In the present case, the prosecutor’s brief,
    hypothetical reference to incarceration was not significant given
    the overwhelming evidence presented against defendant during
    the trial. (See also People v. Rolon (1967) 
    66 Cal.2d 690
    , 693
    [“[a]n improper reference to a prior conviction may be grounds
    for reversal in itself [citations] but is nonprejudicial ‘in the light
    of a record which points convincingly to guilt’ ”].) It is not
    reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a result
    more favorable to defendant but for the prosecutor’s question.
    C. Asserted Vouching for the Credibility of a
    Witness
    Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly vouched
    for the credibility of a witness when he elicited testimony from
    victim Mario Ralph that the prosecutor had introduced Ralph to
    the prosecutor’s own daughter. Defendant further asserts the
    trial court abused its discretion when it denied his subsequent
    motion for a mistrial.
    During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Ralph,
    “You and I have talked about this case on several occasions; is
    that correct?” Ralph confirmed that they had. The prosecutor
    asked, “Have I ever allowed you to read the reports of any of the
    interviews you had with the police?” Ralph replied, “No.” The
    prosecutor continued, “Have I ever allowed you to read your
    preliminary hearing, your testimony at the preliminary
    hearing? After Ralph said no, the prosecutor said, “But you and
    I have talked about the case?” Ralph said, “Yes, we have.”
    33
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    Defense counsel followed up on that line of questioning
    during cross-examination. Counsel confirmed that Ralph had
    not read any reports or the preliminary hearing transcript, and
    then counsel asked Ralph approximately how many times he
    had talked with the prosecutor. Ralph said they spoke every
    time he went to court. Defense counsel asked if they ever
    discussed Ralph’s testimony. When Ralph said no, defense
    counsel asked what they did talk about. Ralph explained,
    “Mainly how I was doing. And sometimes I asked him certain
    things on, you know, what’s going on. And I guess like
    sometimes I told him that I don’t want to be here involved with
    this. I wished at the last testimony I told ya’ll, the last
    courtroom, ya’ll could have taken that and let me live my life.
    I don’t want to be doing this.” Defense counsel asked Ralph if
    he remembered testifying at the preliminary hearing when the
    prosecutor “stopped the testimony, carried you out and talked to
    you and brought you back and put you back on the stand; did
    that happen?” Ralph confirmed that it did.
    On redirect examination, the prosecutor revisited the
    subject. He asked Ralph, “Now you were asked a number of
    questions about a conversation or some questions about
    conversations that we have had. You have come to court a
    number of times; is that correct?”              Ralph answered
    affirmatively, and he also confirmed that he had testified twice
    before: at the preliminary hearing and also in trial the previous
    day. The prosecutor asked, “Now each time the case has been
    set, either in Pomona or before this judge or other judges in this
    building, you have come to court and the judge would tell you
    what day you would have to return; is that correct?” Ralph
    replied, “Yes.” The prosecutor said, “And I would be there on
    those occasions; is that correct?” Ralph replied, “Yes.” The
    34
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    prosecutor continued, “And we would have general
    conversations?” After Ralph confirmed, the prosecutor said,
    “I asked you about your health?” Ralph said yes. The prosecutor
    continued, “How work is going, things like that?” Ralph again
    said yes. The prosecutor said, “On one occasion did I introduce
    you to my daughter?” Ralph replied, “Yes, you did.”
    Defense counsel asked for a sidebar and moved for a
    mistrial. He argued, “I think the District Attorney’s misconduct,
    turning this into a personal matter between him, his personal
    relationship between him and this witness I think is totally
    improper.” The court denied the motion, ruling, “The questions
    on cross-examination went to the area of conversations between
    the prosecutor and the witness. He is entitled to go into what
    the conversations were, whether they were innocent or whether
    they directed the witness to testify in a certain way.” Defense
    counsel argued, “I’m having real difficulty what kind of
    relevancy his introduction of this particular witness has to do
    with anything other than trying to bolster this witness’
    credibility by showing he would go so far as to introduce him to
    his family members.” The court agreed that “in and of itself,
    that would be improper, but it’s an overlap area, and I think he
    is entitled to, on his effort to rehabilitate the witness, to go into
    every area that they discussed. Otherwise the area, it’s open
    for, you know, any type of inference by the jury. So the objection
    is overruled.”
    “A prosecutor is prohibited from vouching for the
    credibility of witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of
    their testimony by referring to evidence outside the record.”
    (People v. Frye (1998) 
    18 Cal.4th 894
    , 971.)          Similarly,
    “ ‘[i]mpermissible “vouching” may occur where the prosecutor
    places the prestige of the government behind a witness through
    35
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    personal assurances of the witness’s veracity or suggests that
    information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s
    testimony.’ ” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 1293
    , 1329.)
    “However, so long as a prosecutor’s assurances regarding the
    apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are
    based on the ‘facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably
    drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal
    knowledge or belief,’ [the prosecutor’s] comments cannot be
    characterized as improper vouching.” (Frye, supra, at p. 971.)
    “A court should grant a mistrial ‘ “only when a party’s
    chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably
    damaged.” ’ [Citation.] This generally occurs when ‘ “ ‘ “the
    court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by
    admonition or instruction.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] We review the trial
    court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.”
    (People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 581.)
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
    defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Importantly, defendant
    cannot establish prejudice. The jury heard evidence that Ralph
    was a drug dealer who associated with gang members and that
    he attempted to destroy evidence by flushing drugs down the
    toilet and hiding Curtis’s gun. The jury also heard that Ralph
    failed to tell investigating officers about the drugs or that he
    fired Curtis’s gun before trying to hide it.
    It is not reasonably likely that the jury was unduly
    influenced concerning Ralph’s credibility by the prosecutor’s
    comment. (See People v. Medina (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 694
    , 758.)
    Because the elicited testimony was not prejudicial, the trial
    court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for a
    mistrial based on that brief question and Ralph’s response.
    36
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    D. Asserted Erroneous Admission of Evidence
    Defendant contends the admission of assertedly irrelevant
    testimony about negative fingerprint evidence bolstered the
    prosecution’s case and denied him a fair trial.
    As the final witness in its case in chief, the prosecution
    called Peter Kergil, a forensic specialist employed by the Los
    Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Kergil explained that his
    expertise was fingerprint identification. After Kergil testified
    that he had conducted no forensic work on the case, nor was he
    aware of any facts concerning the case, defense counsel objected
    to his testimony on relevancy grounds. Counsel argued, “This
    witness has testified he did no work at all on this case. And
    I don’t know if there has been any fingerprint evidence. There
    has been nothing introduced in regard to fingerprint evidence in
    this case, and I would ask that his testimony be excluded.” The
    prosecutor responded that he calls a “negative fingerprint
    expert” on every case he tries. He explained that jurors watch a
    lot of crime shows and see fingerprints lifted off every surface
    “all the time,” but Kergil would explain that usable fingerprints
    are found on a firearm only rarely, in approximately eight to ten
    percent of cases. The prosecutor continued, “The first thing that
    will happen when they go back to jury deliberation, Judge, is the
    jurors will start talking about fingerprint evidence. Even
    though neither one of us mentioned the word, we did get into
    [gunshot residue] the other day, and they will say, ‘If
    [defendant] was in that apartment, they would have put
    evidence on [that] his fingerprints were on the gun.’ That is my
    experience in trying cases.”
    The trial court overruled the objection, commenting: “The
    People are required to prove [their case] beyond a reasonable
    37
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    doubt. And if they want to shut down any doors of concern by
    the jurors, I think that is fine. Also, it seems to me, that if
    anybody is going to argue fingerprints, that this gives them a
    basis in fact to do that.”
    Kergil initially testified that as a general matter he can
    recover a fingerprint from items or surfaces approximately
    30 percent of the time when he examines such evidence. He
    explained that there are several reasons why someone’s
    fingerprint might not be left on a surface after touching it. The
    prosecutor asked, “Now, a firearm, for example, again, we watch
    TV. We always see a firearm is collected in evidence, and it is
    immediately taken to a lab, and somebody lifts a print off the
    firearm, and that print is able to be identified to the person that
    committed the crime.” The prosecutor asked Kergil how often
    an expert is able to lift a fingerprint from a firearm, to which
    Kergil replied approximately 8 to 10 percent.
    Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.)
    Evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency in reason to prove or
    disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
    determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “The trial
    court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of
    evidence [citation], and we will not disturb the court’s exercise
    of that discretion unless it acted in an arbitrary, capricious or
    patently absurd manner [citation].” (People v. Jones (2013)
    
    57 Cal.4th 899
    , 947.)
    Defendant contends the testimony about the absence of
    fingerprint evidence in this case was irrelevant because it did
    not address a disputed fact. He argues that the absence of
    fingerprints was not an issue before the jury. Defendant also
    argues the admission of irrelevant evidence violated his rights
    38
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    to due process and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. We
    are not persuaded.
    In United States v. Feldman (9th Cir. 1986) 
    788 F.2d 544
    ,
    the federal appellate court held that testimony regarding the
    absence of fingerprint evidence on direct examination was
    proper. (Id. at pp. 554–555.) The court noted that it was
    “standard and proper litigation technique” to anticipate the
    opposing party’s argument and forestall it with one’s own
    presentation. (Id. at p. 555; see also United States v. Christophe
    (9th Cir. 1987) 
    833 F.2d 1296
    , 1300 [trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in permitting FBI agent to testify regarding the lack
    of fingerprint evidence].) The fact that the defense had not yet
    raised the issue of the absence of fingerprints, therefore, did not
    preclude the prosecution from introducing Kergil’s testimony.
    Further, defendant fails to show prejudice from admission
    of the evidence. Despite defendant’s claim to the contrary, the
    testimony did not encourage the jury to speculate that there was
    fingerprint evidence connecting defendant to the crime scene
    that the jury did not hear. The trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in admitting testimony about the absence of
    fingerprint evidence in this case. Because the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion, admission of the evidence did not violate
    defendant’s right to due process, nor did it render his trial
    fundamentally unfair. (See People v. Partida (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 428
    , 439 [erroneous admission of evidence “results in a due
    process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally
    unfair”].)
    E. Asserted Instructional Errors
    Defendant raises several allegations of instructional error.
    We find no merit in his contentions.
    39
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    1. Circumstantial Evidence
    Defendant asserts the trial court erred when instructing
    the jury regarding circumstantial evidence.
    In the course of discussing jury instructions with counsel,
    the trial court raised questions about the issue of circumstantial
    evidence. The court noted that it had formerly instructed juries
    by using both CALJIC No. 2.01, “Sufficiency of Circumstantial
    Evidence — Generally,” and CALJIC No. 2.02, “Sufficiency of
    Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Specific Intent or Mental
    State.” The court observed that recent case law clarified it was
    error to instruct with both, and that a court should give one or
    the other. The court explained that it had tentatively included
    CALJIC No. 2.01 in the instruction packet because “there was
    quite a bit of circumstantial evidence. Specifically the gun, the
    recovery of the gun and the bullets that were found at various
    locations and in the decedent’s body, according to the expert,
    matching the gun that it was fired from. That and also
    assuming that they accept Mr. Priest’s testimony, essentially he
    said he saw, he heard the defendant.           And from that,
    circumstantially, he decided that it was defendant, although he
    glimpsed something from the back of the sides. All that I think
    is circumstantial evidence, but I’m open to argument.”
    Defense counsel agreed with the trial court, expressing a
    preference for using CALJIC No. 2.01. The prosecutor explained
    that he did not believe the case rested substantially on
    circumstantial evidence. He argued that the matter was
    “basically an eyewitness identification case,” and asserted that
    CALJIC No. 2.01 would conflict with CALJIC No. 2.91
    concerning eyewitness identification. He agreed that the
    firearm evidence was an important part of the prosecution’s case
    40
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    but noted that “if we rely just on the firearm evidence alone
    without the identification, the court probably wouldn’t let it go
    to the jury.” The trial court said it was “on the fence” and was
    trying to determine whether the circumstantial evidence was
    incidental to, or corroborative of, the direct evidence.
    After considering the matter, the trial court explained,
    “I do believe that the circumstantial evidence is tangential or
    corroborative. The main thrust of all of this is really whether
    they can believe the witnesses, eyewitness testimony. And I do
    agree with the argument. I hadn’t thought of it before that it
    seems somewhat inconsistent with the eyewitness identification
    instruction.” The court stated that on reflection it would
    instruct the jury not with CALJIC No. 2.01, but with CALJIC
    No. 2.02.3
    3
    The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version
    of CALJIC No. 2.02, as follows (the modified portion is
    italicized): “The specific intent or mental state with which an
    act is done may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the
    commission of the act. However, a finding of guilt as to any
    crime or special circumstance or special allegation may not be
    based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved
    circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that
    the defendant had the required specific intent or mental state
    but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.
    Also, if the evidence as to any specific intent or mental state
    permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to
    the existence of the specific intent or mental state and the other
    to its absence, you must adopt that interpretation which points
    to its absence. If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the
    evidence as to the specific intent or mental state appears to you
    to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be
    unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation
    and reject the unreasonable.” The unmodified version read:
    41
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    Defendant asserts CALJIC No. 2.01 was appropriate and
    necessary because the evidence concerning counts 1 (attempted
    murder of Martin), 3 (attempted murder of Priest), 5 (attempted
    murder of Alexander), and 6 (murder of Curtis) was primarily
    circumstantial.
    “CALJIC No. 2.02 was designed to be used in place of
    CALJIC No. 2.01 when the defendant’s specific intent or mental
    state is the only element of the offense that rests substantially
    or entirely on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Honig (1996)
    
    48 Cal.App.4th 289
    , 341.) “It should not be given where the
    evidence is either direct or, if circumstantial, is not equally
    consistent with a conclusion of innocence.” (Ibid.)
    “An instruction on the principles contained in CALJIC
    No. 2.01 ‘must be given sua sponte when the prosecution
    substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt.”
    (People v. Rogers (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 826
    , 885 (Rogers).) The
    instruction should not be given “simply because the
    incriminating evidence is indirect . . . but is appropriate only
    when ‘guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating
    circumstances.’ ” (People v. Heishman (1988) 
    45 Cal.3d 147
    ,
    167.) A trial court need not give the instruction “when
    circumstantial evidence is merely incidental to and
    corroborative of direct evidence, due to the ‘danger of misleading
    and confusing the jury where the inculpatory evidence consists
    wholly or largely of direct evidence of the crime.’ ” (People v.
    McKinnon (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 610
    , 676 (McKinnon).)
    “However, you may not find the defendant guilty of the crime
    charged [in Count[s] . . . and], [or] [the crime[s] of . . . which [is
    a] [are] lesser crime[s]],] [or] [find the allegation to be true,]
    unless . . . .”
    42
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    As the prosecution argued, its case rested primarily on the
    eyewitness testimony from Martin, Priest, and Ralph. Priest
    identified defendant as the person he heard speaking just before
    hearing gunshots fired from defendant’s location and
    subsequently finding Martin shot. After he heard the gunshots,
    Priest looked over and recognized defendant’s profile as
    defendant walked out of the apartment. Martin testified that
    defendant was the person who pulled out a gun, ordered him to
    lie on the floor, and then shot him. He further identified
    defendant as the man who stabbed Priest in the back. Ralph
    identified defendant as the individual who shot Alexander and
    Curtis. He had heard defendant’s voice prior to hearing
    gunshots coming from defendant’s location, and after the
    shooting, he saw defendant holding a gun.
    Although he testified for the defense and disavowed his
    previous identifications, Alexander admitted on cross-
    examination that he had identified defendant as the shooter
    during a live lineup. At the hospital, he told a detective that he
    saw the man who shot him, Curtis, and Ralph, and he had seen
    a photo of that person in a newspaper and on television.
    Alexander identified defendant as the shooter in a photo lineup.
    In addition to testimony by the eyewitnesses, the
    prosecution presented circumstantial evidence in the form of
    ballistics evidence. A criminalist with the Sheriff’s department
    testified that the bullets recovered at both scenes and from
    Curtis’s body were fired from the gun found in defendant’s
    possession.
    In Rogers, the defendant presented an argument similar
    to defendant’s here. The trial court instructed the jury with
    CALJIC No. 2.02, rather than CALJIC No. 2.01, and we
    43
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    concluded the trial court erred in doing so. (Rogers, 
    supra,
    39 Cal.4th at p. 885.) The prosecution’s case regarding the
    identity of the assailant rested on two pieces of circumstantial
    evidence: the defendant’s possession of the murder weapon and
    his admission that he killed another victim under similar
    circumstances. (Ibid.) There was no direct evidence linking the
    defendant to the murder and no eyewitnesses saw the defendant
    with the victim. We concluded the error was harmless, however,
    because the evidence supporting the jury’s guilt determination
    was strong. (Id. at p. 886.) Unlike Rogers, which lacked direct
    evidence, several eyewitnesses in the present case placed
    defendant at both the Long Beach scene and the Pomona scene.
    The jury also heard ballistics evidence linking defendant to the
    murder which bolstered the direct evidence presented.
    Although none of the eyewitnesses testified that they saw
    defendant pull the trigger of the gun that shot Alexander,
    Martin, and Curtis, Alexander did tell a detective that he saw
    the man who shot them and identified defendant as that person.
    At trial, Martin and Priest identified defendant as the sole
    perpetrator, placed him at the scene with a handgun, and
    described a robbery during which the three victims were shot.
    In McKinnon, the prosecution’s case rested on testimony
    from a witness that the defendant confessed to shooting the
    victim in the head. (McKinnon, 
    supra,
     52 Cal.4th at p. 676.)
    The circumstantial evidence presented related to defendant’s
    possession of the murder weapon one week after the crime. We
    upheld the trial court’s decision not to instruct with CALJIC No.
    2.01, noting that while the incriminating effect of the
    circumstantial evidence “was indeed substantial, it
    complemented, and was merely corroborative of, defendant’s
    admissions.” (Id. at p. 676.) As discussed, here, defendant’s
    44
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    guilt was established primarily by direct witness testimony.
    Any circumstantial evidence was corroborative of the
    eyewitness testimony. Because the prosecution presented to the
    jury ample direct evidence of defendant’s identity, the trial court
    did not err when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.02.
    2. Witness Identification
    Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed
    the jury regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification,
    violating his right to due process.
    The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.92
    regarding factors to consider in proving identity by eyewitness
    testimony. By this, the jury was directed to “consider the
    believability of the eyewitness as well as other factors which
    bear upon the accuracy of the witness’ identification,” including
    “[t]he extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain
    of the identification.” Defendant asserts that a witness’s
    certainty of his identification is irrelevant and does not indicate
    eyewitness reliability, and it was error for the jury to consider
    that as a factor.
    We recently addressed a jury instruction regarding an
    eyewitness’s level of certainty in People v. Lemcke (2021)
    
    11 Cal.5th 644
     (Lemcke). In Lemcke, the defendant and his
    girlfriend attacked a woman at a motel. (Id. at p. 648.) The
    victim identified the defendant in a photographic lineup later
    that day, and again approximately three months later. (Id. at
    pp. 648–649.) The defense called an expert witness who
    testified at length regarding the reliability of eyewitness
    identifications. (Id. at 650–652.) The trial court instructed the
    jury with CALCRIM No. 315, providing 15 factors the jury
    should consider when evaluating the credibility and accuracy of
    45
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    eyewitness identification evidence. (Id. at 652.) On appeal, the
    defendant argued that the certainty instruction violated his due
    process rights to a fair trial.
    Although Lemcke concerned a challenge to CALCRIM
    No. 315, we noted that CALJIC No. 2.92 is similarly worded and
    found no material distinction between the two instructions.
    (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 656, fn. 6.) We acknowledged
    research that has found eyewitness confidence to be an
    unreliable indicator of accuracy and referred to the Judicial
    Council and its Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury
    Instructions an evaluation of “whether or how the instruction
    might be modified to avoid juror confusion regarding the
    correlation between certainty and accuracy.” (Id. at p. 647.) We
    held, however, that the instruction did not violate the
    defendant’s due process rights. (Id. at 661.) We observed that
    the defense expert witness had testified that certainty is
    generally not predictive of accuracy, and defense counsel had
    cross-examined the victim and the investigating officers
    regarding her identifications and the procedures used. (Id. at
    p. 660.)
    Although the defense below did not present an eyewitness
    identification expert as had occurred in Lemcke, defendant’s
    primary trial strategy was to discredit Ralph, Priest, and
    Martin, and to imply that the eyewitnesses were testifying
    falsely. At no point did defendant argue that the witnesses
    mistook his identity. This was in contrast to Lemcke, where the
    defense strategy focused on questioning the victim’s
    identification of the defendant. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
    pp. 652–653.) The instant case involved the identification of
    defendant by multiple witnesses, and, unlike in Lemcke, at least
    46
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    two of the witnesses had known defendant in some capacity
    prior to the attack.
    Further, here the trial court’s instructions as a whole
    properly instructed the jury how to evaluate the evidence
    presented. The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No.
    2.20 concerning the believability of a witness and CALJIC No.
    2.21.2 concerning a witness who is willfully false. When
    considered “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and
    the trial record’ ” (People v. Foster (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 1301
    , 1335,
    italics omitted), the trial court’s use of CALJIC No. 2.92 did not
    violate defendant’s due process rights.
    3. Felony Murder
    Defendant contends the court erroneously instructed the
    jury on felony murder and first degree murder in light of the fact
    that the information charged him with only second degree
    murder under section 187.
    The amended information charged defendant in count 6
    with murder as follows: “On or about March 21, 2000, in the
    County of Los Angeles, the crime of murder, in violation of Penal
    Code section 187(a), a Felony, was committed by William Lee
    Wright, Jr., who did unlawfully and with malice aforethought,
    murder Phillip Curtis, a human being.” Count 6 further alleged
    that defendant committed the murder while engaged in the
    commission of the crimes of robbery and burglary within the
    meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
    The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder with
    CALJIC No. 8.21 as follows: “The unlawful killing of a human
    being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which
    occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the
    crime of robbery or burglary is murder of the first degree when
    47
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime.
    The specific intent to commit robbery or burglary and the
    commission or attempted commission of such crime must be
    proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    The trial court properly instructed the jury on first degree
    murder. We have previously held that “in instructing a jury on
    first degree murder when the information charged malice
    murder under section 187, a trial court does not violate a
    defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process, notice,
    proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or a unanimous verdict.”
    (People v. Carey (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 109
    , 132.) The information
    charged defendant with a robbery and burglary special
    circumstance, sufficiently putting defendant on notice that the
    prosecution was proceeding on a felony-murder theory. (See
    ibid.)
    Defendant further argues that because the information
    charged only second degree murder, the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to try him for first degree murder. We have
    repeatedly rejected this jurisdictional argument. (People v.
    Lopez (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 339
    , 360 (Lopez); People v. Hughes (2002)
    
    27 Cal.4th 287
    , 369; People v. Silva (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 345
    , 367;
    People v. Carpenter (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 312
    , 394–395.) Defendant
    offers no persuasive reason for us to revisit these holdings.
    4. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
    Defendant contends several guilt phase instructions
    undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    As observed earlier, the trial court instructed the jury by
    using a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.02 that discussed the
    relationship between the reasonable doubt requirement and
    48
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    circumstantial evidence. (See ante, fn. 9.) As relevant here, the
    instruction provided that if “one interpretation of the evidence
    as to the specific intent or mental state appears to you to be
    reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you
    must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the
    unreasonable.” Defendant contends the instruction “informed
    the jurors that if appellant reasonably appeared to be guilty,
    they could find him guilty — even if they entertained a
    reasonable doubt as to guilt.” We have previously rejected
    defendant’s contention, holding that such a direction “is entirely
    consistent with the rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
    because an unreasonable inference pointing to innocence is, by
    definition, not grounds for a reasonable doubt.               The
    circumstantial evidence instructions are thus correct.” (People
    v. Brasure (2008) 
    42 Cal.4th 1037
    , 1058.) We need not revisit
    this conclusion now.
    Defendant next claims that four additional instructions
    individually and collectively conflicted with the reasonable
    doubt standard:      CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1 (Discrepancies in
    Testimony); 2.21.2 (Witness Willfully False); 2.22 (Weighing
    Conflicting Testimony); and 2.27 (Sufficiency of Testimony of
    One Witness). He asserts these instructions “urged the jury to
    decide material issues by determining which side had presented
    relatively stronger evidence,” thus replacing the reasonable
    doubt standard with the preponderance of the evidence
    standard. As defendant concedes, we have previously rejected
    his contention. (See People v. Whalen (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 1
    , 70;
    People v. Tate (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 635
    , 697–698.) Defendant
    provides no persuasive reason to revisit our prior holdings.
    49
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    F. Challenges to the Death Penalty Law
    Defendant presents several challenges to California’s
    death penalty law that our prior decisions have considered and
    rejected. He provides no basis necessitating us to reexamine the
    following conclusions:
    “California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the
    class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not
    violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citation.] Section 190.2, which
    sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death may
    be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth
    Amendment.” (People v. Williams (2013) 
    58 Cal.4th 197
    , 294.)
    The death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to
    require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating
    factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
    doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation
    beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the
    appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
    Snow (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 43
    , 126, fn. omitted (Snow).) These
    conclusions are not altered by the United States Supreme
    Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 
    530 U.S. 466
    ,
    or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
    536 U.S. 584
    . (People v. Simon (2016)
    
    1 Cal.5th 98
    , 149.) The high court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida
    (2016) 
    577 U.S. 92
    , which invalidated Florida’s capital
    sentencing scheme, does not invalidate California’s law because
    our sentencing scheme is “ ‘materially different from that in
    Florida.’ ” (People v. Becerrada (2016) 
    2 Cal.5th 1009
    , 1038; see
    also People v. Rangel (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 1192
    , 1235, fn. 16.)
    “Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the
    crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the
    50
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” (People v.
    Kennedy (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 595
    , 641.)
    “CALJIC No. 8.88’s use of the words ‘so substantial,’ its
    use of the word ‘warrants’ instead of ‘appropriate,’ its failure to
    instruct the jury that a sentence of life is mandatory if
    mitigation outweighs aggravation, and its failure to instruct the
    jury on a ‘presumption of life’ does not render the instruction
    invalid.” (People v. Rountree (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 823
    , 862–863.)
    The death penalty statutory scheme is not invalid for
    failing to require written findings. (Lopez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
    p. 370.)
    A trial court “need not and should not instruct the jury as
    to any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase.”
    (People v. Blair (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 686
    , 753.)
    “The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC
    No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor must it identify
    which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating.”
    (People v. Cook (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 566
    , 618.)
    “The adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in statutory
    mitigating factors (d) and (g) of section 190.3 do not prevent the
    jury from considering mitigating evidence.” (People v. Leonard
    (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 1370
    , 1429 (Leonard).)
    “The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that
    statutory factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) in section 190.3 are
    relevant only as mitigating factors, not as aggravating factors.”
    (Leonard, at p. 1430.)
    “Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial
    or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.” (Snow,
    supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126.)
    51
    PEOPLE v. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
    “The capital sentencing scheme does not violate equal
    protection by denying to capital defendants procedural
    safeguards that are available to noncapital defendants.” (People
    v. Thomas (2012) 
    53 Cal.4th 771
    , 836 (Thomas).)
    California’s death penalty does not violate international
    law or international norms of decency.               (Thomas, 
    supra,
    53 Cal.4th at p. 837.)
    G. Cumulative Error
    Defendant contends reversal is warranted because of the
    cumulatively prejudicial effect of the guilt and penalty phase
    errors. We have found one error and assumed one more, both in
    connection with defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
    Even aggregated, these errors are harmless under any standard.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    We Concur:
    CORRIGAN, J.
    LIU, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    GROBAN, J.
    JENKINS, J.
    LUI, J. *
    *
    Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal,
    Second Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief
    Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    52
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
    argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Wright
    __________________________________________________________
    Procedural Posture (see XX below)
    Original Appeal XX
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted (published)
    Review Granted (unpublished)
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S107900
    Date Filed: December 16, 2021
    __________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Los Angeles
    Judge: Norman P. Tarle
    __________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders,
    under appointments by the Supreme Court, Kathleen M. Scheidel and
    Alison Bernstein, Assistant State Public Defenders, and Alyssa
    Mellott, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General,
    Dane R. Gillette and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys
    General, James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney General,
    Jaime L. Fuster and Kim Aarons, Deputy Attorneys General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
    publication with opinion):
    Alyssa Mellott
    Deputy State Public Defender
    1111 Broadway, 10th Floor
    Oakland, CA 94607
    (510) 267-3300
    Kim Aarons
    Deputy Attorney General
    300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702
    Los Angeles, CA 90013
    (213) 269-6092