People v. Johnson ( 2022 )


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  •          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
    CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    MICHAEL RAYMOND JOHNSON,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    S070250
    Ventura County Superior Court
    CR 39376
    January 3, 2022
    Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger,
    and Jenkins concurred.
    Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Lavin*
    concurred.
    __________________________
    *     Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
    District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
    to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    S070250
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    A jury convicted defendant Michael Raymond Johnson of
    first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), attempted murder (Pen.
    Code, §§ 187, 664), one count each of kidnapping and spousal
    rape (Pen. Code, §§ 207, subd. (a), 262, subd. (a)(1)), and of being
    a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, former § 12021,
    subd. (a)(1)). It found true the special circumstances of
    intentionally killing a peace officer engaged in the performance
    of his duties, and murder during the commission of a kidnapping
    (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(7), (17)(B)), as well as various
    sentencing enhancements. The jury returned a verdict of death
    at the penalty phase. The court denied the automatic motion to
    modify the verdict (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)), imposed the
    death sentence, and imposed stayed sentences for the remaining
    counts. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
    We affirm the judgment.
    I.    THE FACTS
    According to the evidence presented at his trial, in July
    1996, defendant armed himself and kidnapped his wife, G.A.,
    from her workplace. She eventually accompanied defendant to
    a remote mountain area where he forced her to engage in sexual
    activity. Later that day, after defendant and G.A. had returned
    to G.A.’s home, the police, responding to a 911 call, arrived and
    removed G.A. from the house. Defendant then shot and killed
    one officer at the scene, 26-year-old Ventura County Deputy
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Sheriff Peter Aguirre, and fired several rounds toward another
    officer, Deputy Sheriff James Fryhoff, who was able to disable
    defendant with return gunfire.
    A. Guilt Phase
    1. Prosecution Evidence
    Defendant and G.A. married in 1985 but they had little
    contact over the following years. They reestablished contact and
    began a romantic relationship in early 1996. G.A., her 15-year-
    old daughter from a different relationship, D.G., and D.G.’s
    boyfriend, Francisco, lived together in a one-bedroom house in
    Ojai. Defendant began living at the house with G.A., D.G., and
    Francisco in June 1996.
    On July 14, defendant and G.A. went to a secluded
    mountain area to “make love” at a spot they had visited for this
    purpose a few times before. They removed their clothes, but
    then defendant became angry and jealous when G.A. told him
    she had come there before with D.G.’s father. G.A. explained to
    defendant that it was a long time ago, and G.A. and defendant
    then had sex.
    On an unspecified date around that same time, G.A. was
    at home in the shower laughing about something. Defendant,
    who was also home, accused her of being in the shower with
    Francisco. G.A. told defendant he was “crazy” because she had
    been alone in the bathroom and Francisco had been in the living
    room with D.G..
    On July 15, when G.A. returned home from work, she
    learned that defendant had moved out. On the phone, defendant
    told G.A. that she was not good enough for him and he wanted
    a divorce. He said he moved out because he thought G.A. had
    been talking to Francisco in the shower and he was jealous.
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    On the afternoon of July 17, defendant came to the
    residence where G.A. worked as a housekeeper, followed her
    into the house, and threw a gun on a bed. He had another gun
    in his pocket. He told G.A., “I love you, I can’t leave, I have to
    stay close to you.” G.A. told defendant that he could not stay
    with her because she needed to work. Defendant repeatedly told
    G.A. that he had to stay with her, “every minute of every day.”
    He told her he would take her to Wisconsin but that they first
    needed to rob a bank because they did not have money. G.A.,
    who was doing laundry while they spoke, explained that she
    needed to work to support her daughter and could not leave.
    Defendant said he would take G.A. by force.
    G.A. had not seen defendant like this before. He was
    acting strangely, “crazy,” and speaking rapidly and loudly. He
    had a pistol and became angry when G.A. tried to convince him
    to give her the pistol. He mentioned a movie he was going to
    write that they had previously joked about, called “Crazy Love,”
    which was a story in which defendant thought he and G.A. were
    both crazy. He told G.A. they were in the movie at that moment.
    While defendant and G.A. were still at her employer’s
    house, defendant told G.A. he wanted her to remove Francisco
    from her home. G.A. called her daughter at G.A.’s house and
    told her that she and Francisco needed to leave, mentioning that
    defendant had two “pistolas.”
    Shortly after, G.A.’s employer called to tell G.A. she was
    free to leave. To convince defendant to leave, G.A. suggested
    they go for a ride. She suggested they each leave in their own
    car, but defendant insisted they travel in one car. They left for
    G.A.’s house.
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    When they arrived at G.A.’s home, D.G. and Francisco
    were still there, along with other children. Defendant said
    everyone could stay except Francisco. G.A. insisted that
    everyone leave because she was afraid defendant might shoot
    the children. G.A. did not feel that she could get away from
    defendant. She told defendant, “Let’s go cruising.” Because he
    believed he was being followed, defendant took D.G.’s dog with
    them because it would bark when it saw people it did not
    recognize.
    They returned to the mountain spot they had visited on
    July 14. Defendant wanted to move further up the mountains,
    but G.A. did not want to, so defendant stopped where they were.
    G.A. testified that defendant kept looking around, “scared,” and
    said that someone was following him. They brought pillows and
    a blanket from the car, secured the dog to a tree, undressed, and
    lay down. G.A. explained that she removed her clothes because
    defendant was removing his clothes like they had done at this
    location a few times before to have sex, but they had never before
    had sex while defendant possessed guns.
    G.A. testified at trial that defendant then got on top of her
    and tried to have sex. She testified that defendant was unable
    to get an erection or ejaculate and did not penetrate her vagina.
    But she remembered telling Sergeant Garcia that they had sex.
    The jury heard G.A.’s grand jury testimony in which she said
    that defendant was able to insert his penis inside her vagina “a
    little bit.”
    After about 20 minutes, G.A. told defendant, “Let’s go,”
    because the mosquitos were biting her. Defendant packed
    everything up and they left for G.A.’s home. After they arrived
    at the house, D.G., who had left the house earlier, called G.A.
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    and asked if she should call the police. G.A. said yes. D.G. called
    and informed an emergency operator that G.A. was in danger,
    that defendant had two guns, and that he had made G.A. remove
    D.G. from the house. D.G. reported that defendant had a
    criminal record and was planning to rob a bank. Police were
    dispatched to G.A.’s house.
    At the house, defendant wanted to have sex but G.A. told
    defendant to take a shower. G.A wanted to distract defendant
    and for him to surrender to the police. Defendant told G.A. to
    take a shower with him, so they got in the shower together.
    While showering, defendant kept the guns on a window ledge
    near his hands. At no point that day did G.A. feel she could get
    away from defendant.
    Meanwhile, Deputies Aguirre and Steven Sagely
    responded to the domestic disturbance call, with Deputies
    Fryhoff and David Sparks responding as backup. Fryhoff and
    Sparks took positions at the rear of the house while Aguirre and
    Sagely approached the front and knocked on the front door.
    Knowing it was the police, G.A. went to the front door in
    her towel. Sagely saw G.A. appearing upset, like she had been
    crying and she was trying to speak. As G.A. was stepping
    outside and Aguirre was stepping inside, G.A. told the officers
    that defendant had guns.
    The officers remaining outside then heard rapid gunfire
    from inside the house. While looking in a window, Fryhoff
    observed defendant running for the front door, so Fryhoff ran
    toward the front of the house. As he rounded the front corner,
    he saw defendant on the front lawn, face Fryhoff and fire several
    rounds toward him. While taking cover, Fryhoff was able to
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    shoot defendant in the chest, and then saw him lying naked on
    his back with two guns nearby.
    The officers found Aguirre inside the house, lying on his
    back, between a wall and a large potted plant in a corner,
    “[b]leeding profusely from the face,” and struggling to breathe.
    Deputy Aguirre died from his injuries that were caused by
    gunshot wounds. His gun was fully loaded and holstered.
    After the shootout, defendant was taken into custody and
    transported to a hospital for treatment of his chest gunshot
    wound. Psychiatrist Donald Patterson, retained by the district
    attorney’s office, interviewed defendant that night while he was
    receiving treatment in a hospital emergency room.
    The prosecution played portions of the interview during
    the trial. Defendant described his intense feelings of jealousy
    for G.A. and belief that she was unfaithful. He confessed to
    kidnapping her at gunpoint. He also described jumping out from
    behind a wall and shooting Aguirre after he saw the police
    pulling G.A. out of the house. He described feeling as if he had
    been in a movie that afternoon but explained that he was
    conscious of what he had done and that his acts had been a
    passive suicide attempt.
    The prosecution presented expert testimony on three
    subjects — Deputy Aguirre’s gunshot wounds, bullet forensics,
    and blood spatter patterns — to support its theory that
    defendant shot and killed Aguirre in an execution style. As to
    the first subject, Deputy Aguirre’s gunshot wounds, he suffered
    three — one in his left arm and two entering the left and right
    side of his forehead — all with exit wounds. The medical
    examiner, who autopsied Aguirre’s body, opined: Each of the
    head gunshot wounds likely caused instantaneous loss of
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    consciousness and motor skills. Aguirre would have been
    incapable of shielding himself once he received the first of the
    head wounds. Based on stippling wounds on Aguirre’s right
    forehead, the gun’s muzzle was approximately 12 to 18 inches
    from Aguirre’s head when the bullet entered the right side of his
    forehead. Stippling wounds are caused when the muzzle of a
    gun is sufficiently close to the target so that gunpowder released
    with the bullet’s discharge impacts the skin and causes injuries.
    Second, the prosecution’s ballistics expert opined: The
    trajectory of a bullet that passed into the floor in the part of the
    house where Aguirre was shot was consistent with being the
    final shot into Aguirre. Two magazines of ammunition found in
    a fanny pack in the home and two boxes of ammunition found in
    a suitcase in defendant’s car were consistent with those fired
    from the Colt .45-caliber and Beretta .32-caliber semiautomatic
    handguns found outside near defendant when he was arrested.
    Third, a blood spatter analyst testified about the three
    areas of blood spatter events on the walls and objects in the area
    where Deputy Aguirre was shot. The expert opined: One of the
    blood spatter deposits, indicating a high velocity event
    (gunshot), occurred while Aguirre’s head was about 13 inches
    from the floor, facing up, between a wall and a potted plant in
    the corner. The bullet trajectory that went into the floor was
    consistent with the bullet wound in Deputy Aguirre’s right
    forehead that had the stippling pattern. A spatter pattern on
    Aguirre’s hand suggested that it had been in a defensive
    position.
    The prosecution also presented evidence about
    defendant’s criminal record to show he faced a potential life
    sentence when he armed himself on the day of the shooting. A
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Ventura County deputy district attorney testified as an expert
    on sentencing, that defendant had served a prison term and had
    convictions for five felonies including two serious felonies. He
    explained that a person with two prior serious felonies faced a
    sentence of 25 years to life upon conviction of a new felony.
    Defendant’s parole officer from 1991 testified about his practice
    of reviewing with parolees the conditions of their parole prior to
    their release date, including the requirement that parolees must
    refrain from possessing firearms. He would advise parolees that
    it is a felony for a felon to possess a firearm. He recalled
    defendant signing a parole form that informed defendant that
    he was prohibited from possessing firearms.
    2. Defense Evidence
    To contest the prosecution’s case on premeditation, the
    defense presented wound ballistics, crime reconstruction, and
    optometry evidence, as well as evidence of defendant’s behavior
    immediately after the shooting.         To contest the special
    circumstance allegations of intentionally killing a peace officer
    engaged in the performance of his duties, and murder during the
    commission of a kidnapping, it also presented an expert on
    police practices and evidence that defendant did not kidnap G.A.
    A defense expert on wound ballistics, Dr. Martin Fackler,
    opined that based on the forensic evidence, which included
    Deputy Aguirre’s stippling wound and the angles of bullet
    trajectories within G.A.’s house, it was impossible to determine
    the sequence of the shots fired and whether Aguirre or
    defendant or both were in motion when the shots were fired. It
    was possible that defendant shot Aguirre deliberately after
    Aguirre was on the ground, but it was also possible, and a “little”
    more likely based on the rapidity of the shots, that defendant
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    shot Aguirre while defendant was running by, and Aguirre was
    falling to the ground.
    The crime scene reconstructionist similarly opined that
    the physical evidence did not support conclusions as to the
    sequence of shots fired and whether the shooting was execution
    style, but rather that the evidence was consistent with
    defendant firing the gun while either or both he and Deputy
    Aguirre were in motion and that the final shot to Aguirre’s head
    occurred while he was incapacitated and falling but not yet on
    the ground. He viewed the “scene as a dynamic, fast-moving
    sequence of events” with continuing changes in the position and
    distance between defendant and Deputy Aguirre. Defendant
    could have been running by as he fired the gun.
    An optometrist who examined defendant in 1994 testified
    that defendant had 20/400 vision, which meant that he could
    only see at 20 feet what a person with normal vision could see
    at 400 feet. Movement and backlighting also affect a person’s
    vision. A person with 20/400 vision, however, could discern
    whether a person was lying on the ground, the location of the
    person’s head, whether he was wearing a badge and gun belt,
    and whether he was bleeding.
    To show that defendant’s behavior was rash and
    delusional rather than premeditated, the defense additionally
    presented testimony of a sheriff’s deputy, that he heard
    defendant repeatedly mumbling “Hare Krishna” while he lay
    naked on the ground after the shootout with Fryhoff.
    As part of its challenge to the special circumstance of
    shooting a police officer while engaged in the performance of his
    duties, the defense presented the testimony of Roger Clark, an
    expert on police practices. Clark opined that under the
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    circumstances, a reasonable and well-trained officer would not
    have concluded that exigent circumstances warranted police
    entry because the purported victim was already outside and
    nothing “was emanating from inside the house to indicate that
    there [was] a crime being committed or someone in danger
    which would create the emergency for the officer, necessitate the
    officer to go in.” A reasonable officer would have coordinated
    with his partners instead of entering the house.
    Regarding the kidnapping offenses including the
    kidnapping special circumstance, the defense read into the
    evidence the following portions of Sergeant Garcia’s interview of
    G.A.: Garcia asked G.A. if defendant made any threat like he
    would kill or shoot her if she would not come with him. G.A.
    responded that defendant showed her the gun but did not point
    it at her and that he told G.A. that if she did not come with him,
    he would stay with her because he did not want to be without
    her for one minute. She told Sergeant Garcia that she felt afraid
    and hurt because defendant had forced G.A. to remove her
    daughter from the house that day. Because defendant had guns,
    G.A. explained that she was forced to leave with him so that
    there was “no danger to my children.” Defendant did not at any
    time that day say anything to G.A. about shooting or killing
    anyone.
    3. Rebuttal Evidence
    The prosecution presented a police practices expert, who
    opined that under the circumstances, a reasonable police officer
    would determine that immediate entry into G.A.’s home was
    necessary to protect the officers and the purported victim, G.A.,
    because the lighting conditions did not allow the officers to see
    inside, and because the police needed to investigate an ongoing
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    domestic disturbance situation. Without entering the house,
    Aguirre would have been unable to fulfill his role as the officer
    protecting the contacting officer because he was not in a position
    to determine where “the threat” was coming from. A reasonable
    police officer would not believe that retreat or doing nothing was
    a safe alternative because of the limited opportunity for the
    officers to conceal themselves and the limited exit available from
    the gated property. Officers are trained to respond quickly in
    this scenario.
    B. Penalty Phase
    1. Prosecution Evidence
    The prosecution presented evidence of the impact of 26-
    year-old Aguirre’s death on his family, friends, and fellow
    officers (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a)), defendant’s criminal
    activity involving the use or threatened use of force or violence
    (id., factor (b)), and his prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)).
    Deputy Aguirre and his wife met in high school and had a
    three-year-old daughter for whom Aguirre was the primary
    caretaker while both he and his wife worked. Aguirre’s wife
    described the pain and loss she felt. Their daughter also felt the
    loss and had continued to ask when her father was returning.
    Aguirre’s daughter had been unable to continue kindergarten.
    Aguirre’s mother described Aguirre’s generosity, close
    relationship with his daughter, and educational aspirations,
    and described seeing Aguirre’s injured body at the hospital and
    the effect of his death. Aguirre’s sister-in-law described the
    positive influence and support Aguirre had provided when she
    was struggling with substance abuse and teenage motherhood.
    Aguirre’s childhood best friend described his struggle with
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Aguirre’s death and recalled Aguirre’s positive qualities
    including his sense of humor.
    Fryhoff, Sparks, and other officers also described Aguirre
    as a kind, religious family man, and described their deep
    feelings of loss and guilt and the long-lasting impacts that
    Aguirre’s death had on the sheriff’s department. They described
    the experience of discovering Aguirre bleeding and dying in the
    house and the trauma experienced by the sheriff’s department
    that day.
    A local teenager remembered Aguirre’s approachability
    and that he stood out as an officer who showed an active interest
    and support toward him and other teenagers in the community.
    The prosecution presented three incidents of criminal
    activity in which defendant used force or violence. In December
    1986, defendant carjacked a woman at gunpoint, throwing her
    purse out the window when she exited her car. Defendant had
    also robbed a McDonald’s restaurant at gunpoint. In November
    1993, someone in a white truck hit pedestrian Johnny Reeves,
    collided with a parked vehicle, and drove away. In 1995,
    defendant reported to the sheriff’s department that in
    November 1994, after his brother told him that gang members
    had assaulted him, defendant had gotten in his truck and
    started driving because he had decided to hit the first person
    who he saw that looked like a gang member. He saw a
    pedestrian that he thought fit the description, hit him, and
    drove off, possibly hitting another car. Defendant reported the
    incident to take responsibility as part of his Alcoholics
    Anonymous (AA) efforts and explained he had also reported it to
    the sheriff’s department a year earlier.
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    The prosecution reminded the jury of the guilt phase
    evidence concerning defendant’s prior felony convictions.
    2. Defense Evidence
    Pursuant to Penal Code section 190.3, factors (d), (h), and
    (k), the defense presented evidence that defendant struggled
    with schizophrenia and his crimes derived from his mental
    disease, he served in the army during the Vietnam War under
    difficult conditions, he would make a positive adjustment to
    prison, he had worked as a rehabilitation counselor, and he had
    sought help for his mental health difficulties.
    Defendant served in the military starting in 1965 at age
    18 and was stationed in Vietnam under dangerous conditions.
    His battery unit second commander remembered defendant as
    a “hard worker” and a “smart kid.” Another soldier serving in
    the same unit testified that defendant served as a radio
    telephone operator (RTO), which was a “very hazardous”
    assignment that usually required volunteers because most
    RTOs would be “cracking up or burning out.” Defendant served
    as an RTO on more than one occasion. Defendant was once
    found absent without leave while in Vietnam and was “issued
    an undesirable discharge certificate.”
    Defendant’s mother observed he was “quiet and
    withdrawn” after returning from the Vietnam War. After he
    returned, he would often be gone for long periods of time and
    show up unexpectedly, homeless. During the early 1990s,
    defendant exhibited odd behavior around food, such as having
    bad dreams when he ate pork and asking his parents to remove
    bacon fat from the refrigerator because he believed it was
    contaminating his food.
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    In 1981, defendant worked in exchange for room and board
    for Jane Siemon, a Wisconsin dairy farmer. One day, Siemon
    sent some soup to her husband and defendant while they were
    working on the farm. Defendant, believing Siemon was trying
    to poison him, refused to eat her cooking for the remaining
    several months on the farm.
    A Ventura County social worker performed a psychiatric
    assessment of defendant in 1994 and concluded he had organic
    delusional disorder related to brain damage from the “heavy
    use” of marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines. She based her
    conclusion on defendant’s description of several delusions, e.g.,
    that he was in an “underground” war against those who sought
    to brainwash “organic eaters” by poisoning the food, water, and
    air. Defendant believed that “people who inhabit the real
    world,” including his parents, sought to control and read his
    mind. Defendant’s self-reported story of hitting a pedestrian
    believing he was a gang member was evidence of delusional
    disorder. Defendant did not appear to be seeking “benefits,” but
    instead wanted treatment because he believed himself to be a
    danger to others and wanted to rehabilitate himself so that he
    could return to work.
    A county drug and alcohol counselor saw defendant for six
    months in 1994. Defendant had sought help because he believed
    he was a danger to himself or others. He explained in a letter
    to the counselor that he had stolen his employer’s car, but that
    the employer had agreed “to drop all charges” if defendant would
    seek mental health treatment.         Defendant did not miss
    appointments, which he would attend by bicycling from Ventura
    to Ojai and appeared “[v]ery much” committed to his
    rehabilitation. But defendant was also facing homelessness and
    feared returning to prison.
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    County psychologist Lisa Kus diagnosed defendant in
    1994 with organic delusional disorder based on his history of
    substance abuse.   Several months later, when defendant
    returned because his delusions were persisting, she referred
    him to a psychiatrist who prescribed an antipsychotic
    medication.    Another psychiatrist on the staff, however,
    evaluated defendant and concluded that he did not need
    medication.    Dr. Kus did not diagnose defendant with
    schizophrenia because she could not rule out that his delusions
    were unrelated to his substance abuse history, but she was “very
    confident” he suffered from a delusional disorder and described
    at length the delusions he had self-reported. She noted that
    defendant had stated that he believed he needed to maintain his
    sobriety because he did not want to go back to jail, but that he
    appeared sincere in seeking help.
    A county psychiatrist saw defendant in 1995 and
    prescribed him with Haldol, an antipsychotic medication. The
    psychiatrist observed defendant to exhibit symptoms of delusion
    including the belief that his son wanted to harm him and had
    staged an event to intimidate him.
    Defendant earned a certificate of completion for a two-year
    alcohol and drug studies program at Oxnard College around
    1996. Defendant’s professor in the program said defendant was
    an “excellent student.”
    Defendant volunteered as a counselor during 1995 and/or
    1996 in a Salvation Army substance abuse rehabilitation
    program. Defendant’s supervisor, who was the director of the
    program, said defendant was a “superior” worker and “very
    committed,” “extremely caring,” and an “extremely good
    listener.” He had one of the “highest graduation rate[s]” for his
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    caseload of participants and “the actual rehabilitation of the
    men that worked for [defendant] was better than most.”
    Defendant’s supervisor at Primary Purpose, a recovery home for
    addicts where defendant worked as a paid detoxification
    specialist in 1995, rated defendant’s work as “excellent” and
    “dependable.” Defendant listened well to the clients and
    assisted them with placement in long-term programs “very
    well.”
    Defendant’s supervisor at Tiber House, a sober living
    residence for mentally ill men, said defendant was the “best
    house manager” the facility had.         During his yearlong
    employment starting in 1995, defendant demonstrated that he
    cared “very much” about the residents, providing counseling and
    support “[e]very chance he got,” often at his own expense and
    time. Defendant was a “very good listener,” and was viewed as
    compassionate and trustworthy. Defendant also appeared to “be
    struggling with something,” and was committed to his own
    recovery and “constantly attending” AA meetings. Defendant’s
    role was to counsel the residents and oversee the house, and he
    received free board in exchange.
    Psychologist Charles Hinkin, assistant professor at the
    University of California at Los Angeles School of Medicine and
    director of the neuropsychology assessment lab at the West Los
    Angeles VA Medical Center, has treated veterans for brain
    diseases including schizophrenia. He reviewed defendant’s
    records and the police investigation files and interviewed and
    tested defendant for approximately eight hours.         Hinkin
    concluded defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia that
    manifested at approximately age 32.
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    Hinkin noted that defendant had suffered several
    paranoid delusions over the previous 20 years, some of which
    defendant had noted in his interview with Dr. Patterson upon
    his arrest, such as his belief that he was part of a world of
    organic eaters forced underground to wage war against others
    and that his parents were Nazis who wanted to poison him
    through food. He had also believed that he was a “warrior for
    Krishna” and robbed a McDonald’s to show that “killing sacred
    cows” was evil. He also had delusions that his father had
    molested defendant’s son, that G.A. was having an affair with
    Francisco, that he was in a movie on the day of the shooting, and
    that his son intentionally made him ill and staged a gang fight
    in order to intimidate him. Hinkin noted that defendant also
    reported to Patterson that he had experienced a “lot of
    hallucinations” while taking Haldol.
    Hinkin explained that an example of the “flat affect”
    typical of schizophrenia was defendant’s lack of emotional
    response during the interview with Patterson and his
    explanation to Patterson that he was not feeling any emotion,
    where a normal person would have had a “huge emotional
    response” to the events on the day of the shooting.
    Hinkin testified that defendant’s various test results and
    overall history, including accounts of others such as the
    Wisconsin farmer, suggested that defendant was schizophrenic
    and not feigning mental illness. Defendant had a significant
    score on the paranoid schizophrenia scale on a standardized test
    he took in 1974.
    Hinkin opined defendant suffered from a psychotic episode
    of schizophrenia during the shooting and the days preceding it.
    Defendant was “under the influence of extreme mental or
    17
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    emotional disturbance” that day, his capacity to conform his
    conduct to the law was impaired, and he committed the offense
    because of the disease. Hinkin noted that defendant had
    erroneously believed that Francisco had been in the shower with
    G.A., stated he believed he was in a movie, was hysterically
    laughing according to an account by G.A. that Hinkin had
    reviewed, seemed agitated and scared, kept looking around and
    took G.A.’s dog because he thought he was being followed, and
    reported to Patterson “kind of having [a] delusion” that day.
    James Park, a psychologist and institutional adjustment
    expert, reviewed defendant’s correctional records and opined
    that defendant would be a “reasonably good prisoner” and good
    worker. Defendant had previously received “recognition of
    outstanding performance” working on a prison building retrofit
    project. Based on research and his experience working in the
    Department of Corrections, Park opined that older prisoners
    like defendant (age 50 at the time of trial) are more likely to
    “conform” and have a positive effect on other inmates.
    Defendant had no history of violence in his earlier
    incarcerations and was unlikely to be dangerous.               The
    prosecution questioned Park at length about Park’s background
    and work history at the Department of Corrections, and about
    prisoners’ access to exercise facilities, cable television, medical
    care, education, and visitors.
    3. Rebuttal Evidence
    The jury heard additional portions of defendant’s
    interview with Patterson. In it, defendant described his
    evaluations by the various Ventura County mental health staff,
    the “real frightening” hallucinations he experienced while
    taking Haldol, his attendance in recovery programs, and his
    18
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    self-diagnosis of schizophrenia. He described experiencing
    delusional thinking when in close emotional relationships such
    as with G.A. and with his son. He explained that he did not form
    close bonds with friends or family and avoided his son because
    he would become “pretty emotional,” and his delusional thinking
    would become “amplified.” Defendant experienced “intense
    paranoia” and a desire to kill his father when he believed he had
    molested defendant’s son. He also described his criminal
    history, including robbing a McDonald’s as part of a “religious
    battle” and that he “sorta had that delusion today too.” He
    explained that he had reported his delusions to prison staff
    while he was incarcerated for the McDonald’s robbery.
    Patterson had been a court-retained psychiatric expert in
    criminal and other matters for over 40 years. He interviewed
    defendant on the night of the shooting so he could evaluate his
    mental status in that timeframe. Defendant appeared in
    contact    with     reality,    unparanoid,     nondelusional,
    nonhallucinatory, unconfused, responsive, and coherent, and
    had well-organized speech.
    Patterson also reviewed defendant’s mental health and
    other records. He agreed with the Ventura County mental
    health professionals’ diagnosis of organic delusional disorder
    given defendant’s 20-year history of abusing alcohol, marijuana,
    and methamphetamine, but there was not information available
    as to how often and what quantity of substances defendant had
    consumed. The difference between delusional disorder and
    schizophrenia, Patterson opined, was that the former was
    characterized by “non-bizarre” as opposed to bizarre delusions,
    e.g., believing one’s internal organs have been replaced. The
    belief that one was being poisoned or followed, or that a partner
    was unfaithful, were examples of non-bizarre delusions because
    19
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    such events could actually happen. Paranoid schizophrenics are
    characterized by delusions of persecution and are suspicious of
    others. The schizophrenic is not in contact with reality, whereas
    a person with a delusional disorder can function except in the
    areas of his or her delusion. Patterson agreed periods of
    remission can occur when the schizophrenic individual is better
    functioning, but the paranoia is nonetheless present. The
    schizophrenic individual tries to control exposure to upsetting
    events to avoid paranoid episodes.
    Patterson opined defendant’s delusions were substance-
    induced delusions. He acknowledged that the Diagnostic and
    Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-
    IV) ruled out substance-based delusional disorder as a diagnosis
    if the subject had been substance free for four weeks. Even
    though defendant had denied ingesting drugs for over two years,
    Patterson hypothesized that defendant’s belief that his father
    had molested his son was the result of drug use. Patterson
    acknowledged that defendant had provided a lot of truthful
    information in his interview, but believed defendant was trying
    to manipulate him.
    Patterson concluded defendant was not suffering from
    delusional disorder on the day of the shooting and was able to
    wholly control his behavior. Defendant was apparently capable
    of enjoying sexual relationships with G.A., did not lack
    motivation as evidenced by his work at Tiber House and
    Primary Purpose, maintained good eye contact during the
    interview, and was not scattered in his discussion of topics,
    which all indicated the absence of schizophrenia.
    Defendant’s classmate at Oxnard College testified that
    defendant told her he began using LSD in high school.
    20
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    A. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress His
    Statements Made to Patterson
    Defendant contends his rights under the Fifth and
    Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution were
    violated when, after he had been arrested, law enforcement
    representatives repeatedly disregarded his multiple invocations
    of both his rights to silence and to have counsel present and
    ultimately coerced his confession. The trial court found that
    defendant had invoked his rights to silence and to have counsel
    and accordingly suppressed some of his statements made during
    one of the earlier encounters with law enforcement. The court
    found, however, that defendant initiated the later discussion
    with Patterson and knowingly and voluntarily waived his
    earlier invocation of his rights.
    Defendant argues Patterson unlawfully interrogated him
    in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
    384 U.S. 436
    (Miranda) and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 
    451 U.S. 477
    (Edwards), ultimately obtaining his admissions and confessions
    that were subsequently admitted against him during the
    prosecution’s case-in-chief. The Attorney General does not
    dispute that defendant initially invoked both his rights to
    silence and to have counsel present but contends defendant
    himself eventually initiated the communication with Patterson
    that led to his statements, and therefore the trial court properly
    denied the motion to suppress.
    While the issue is close, we agree with the trial court that
    the record, particularly the recorded interview, demonstrates
    that defendant initiated the conversation freely and that he
    knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Nonetheless, we are troubled by the earlier law
    enforcement conduct. In a three-hour period, while defendant
    was at the hospital receiving treatment for a fresh gunshot
    wound, law enforcement officials repeatedly approached
    defendant to obtain a statement, impermissibly interviewed
    him, angrily confronted him about Aguirre’s murder, and sent a
    psychiatrist to defendant’s hospital room to interview him.
    Within this timeframe, defendant invoked his right to silence
    each time he was asked, on four occasions, and on at least two
    of those occasions also requested an attorney. The trial court
    acknowledged that statements were taken from defendant after
    he had invoked these rights and appropriately suppressed
    statements related to them. But we agree with the trial court
    that defendant initiated the subsequent conversation with
    Patterson and did so with a knowing and voluntary waiver and
    therefore the statements to Patterson were admissible.
    1. Factual Background
    a. Earlier Law Enforcement Contacts with
    Defendant
    After he was arrested, paramedics transported defendant
    to Ojai Valley Community Hospital at about 6:15 p.m. for
    treatment of his injuries that included the chest gunshot wound.
    At approximately 7:00 p.m., Ventura County Sheriff’s Detective
    Robert Young contacted defendant in the emergency room to
    obtain a statement about shooting Deputy Aguirre. Defendant
    was lying in a hospital gurney, naked with a cloth over his lower
    body, handcuffed by both hands to the gurney, and connected to
    monitors, intravenous fluids, and a urinary catheter.
    Young informed defendant he was under arrest for the
    suspected murder of a police officer, advised him of his Miranda
    22
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    rights, and asked if he was willing to talk. Defendant responded
    “no.”
    Young then informed Michael Bradbury, the District
    Attorney of Ventura County, that defendant had “refused to
    waive his Miranda rights and discuss the shooting” but had not
    requested legal counsel. At 7:20 p.m., Bradbury approached and
    spoke with defendant at his hospital gurney in the emergency
    room to verify that defendant was “advised of [his] rights to
    remain silent,” did not want to talk to the police, and understood
    he would need to initiate further discussion if he decided to talk.
    According to Bradbury, defendant opened his eyes, and affirmed
    he did not want to talk, stating, “Yes, I feel a little bit in shock
    right now. I may want to talk to you later.”
    A few minutes later, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Detective
    Young and district attorney investigators Richard Haas and
    Dennis Fitzgerald contacted defendant at his hospital gurney in
    the emergency room to obtain his consent to search G.A.’s
    house.1 After defendant gave consent, Haas asked defendant
    about his living situation and his occupation. Following
    defendant’s response that he was a resident manager at a
    facility for patients with a dual diagnosis of mental illness and
    chemical dependency, Young asked defendant whether he was
    “a patient there or just the, uh, manager?” Defendant responded
    he was the manager but that he had “been a mental health
    patient,” explaining, “two years ago I went into the mental
    health system.” Haas asked for the name of the facility where
    1
    “Miranda [is] not violated when an officer ask[s] for and
    obtain[s] consent to search after the defendant had exercised his
    privilege against self-incrimination.” (People v. James (1977)
    
    19 Cal.3d 99
    , 115 .)
    23
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    defendant was the residential manager. Defendant responded,
    “Tyber House for men with dual diagnosis.” Haas asked if there
    was “chemical dependency as well as mental problems”;
    defendant responded, “I have both, I have what they call a dual
    diagnosis.” Haas asked, “what was your chemical dependency?”
    Defendant responded, “marijuana.” Haas asked, “If we had
    someone come out and talk to you like a psychiatrist, would you
    be willing to talk to him?” Defendant responded, “Yes, the last
    time I talked to one was probably a year and a half ago.” Haas
    asked, “[D]o you have a regular one or anything or?” Defendant
    responded, “No. A year and a half ago it took me nine months
    to see a psychiatrist (unintelligible) I saw a counselor and [then]
    a psychologist (unintelligible) psychiatrist.” The investigators
    did not readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before asking
    these questions. Haas testified at the suppression hearing that
    he would have asked defendant if he would speak to a
    psychiatrist even if defendant had invoked his right to counsel.
    As noted below, the trial court found that Haas and Young
    violated defendant’s right to silence by continuing to interview
    him after he had given consent to search the house.
    At 8:25 p.m., Detective Young returned to defendant’s
    hospital room to ask for a statement, reminding defendant he
    had purportedly told District Attorney Bradbury that he might
    be willing to speak after he felt more comfortable. Defendant
    responded “no,” explaining, “I think I told [Bradbury] that, uh, I
    think I’m in a state of shock right now and I’m kinda confused
    so I’d rather wait to talk to a lawyer, I think that’d be a good
    idea.” Young asked defendant if he wanted to talk to a lawyer
    and defendant responded, “I think so . . . I think that’d be a good
    idea.”
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    At about 8:50 p.m., just before leaving the hospital, Young
    returned to defendant’s room to address him. Upset, Young told
    defendant that he had not just shot a “uniform” but rather had
    killed a “living, productive human being, unlike” defendant. He
    told defendant that he wanted him to know the name of the
    deputy he had murdered, that he was 26 years old and had a
    wife and a child, and that he wanted him to remember Deputy
    Aguirre and his family “every minute of every day for the rest of
    his life.” According to Young and a nurse who overheard the
    encounter, defendant responded that he sensed that Young was
    angry.
    b. Patterson Contacts Defendant
    Defendant was then transferred to another hospital.
    There, psychiatrist Donald Patterson began observing
    defendant in the hospital’s trauma observation room starting at
    approximately 9:15 p.m. The district attorney’s office had called
    Patterson on the evening of the homicide and retained him to
    interview defendant close in time to the events that day to
    evaluate his mental state as a homicide suspect. Patterson had
    conducted 17 such evaluations of homicide suspects on behalf of
    the district attorney’s office in the previous six years. He
    explained that his purpose was to determine defendant’s mental
    status close in time to the earlier events that day but that
    “eliciting incriminating information” . . . “was not the purpose of
    my interview.”
    Deputy District Attorney Richard Holmes, along with a
    district attorney investigator, met Patterson at the hospital,
    gave him a tape recorder and a Miranda advisement card, and
    instructed him to contact defendant. Patterson was aware that
    the district attorney’s office would be paying his fee. Holmes
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    informed Patterson that defendant had been advised of his
    Miranda rights and had been unwilling to talk but had stated
    he might be willing to talk later. Holmes confirmed Patterson
    was there to engage defendant in conversation, explaining at the
    suppression hearing that he told Patterson: “I’d like you to go
    in and do your usual thing, advise him of his rights, tell him who
    you are, who you work for, and see if he wants to talk now.”
    Holmes was unaware that defendant had invoked his
    right to counsel to Detective Young. Had Holmes known
    defendant had invoked his right to counsel earlier in the
    evening, he would not have permitted Patterson to speak with
    defendant. Holmes explained, “[b]ecause it’s improper. If — if
    someone has unequivocally invoked counsel, it’s improper for
    law enforcement to contact him. And I would — I would stay
    absolutely away from there.” He testified further, “[I]t’s not at
    all proper if they’ve invoked their right to counsel, and I just
    simply stay away from — if somebody invokes the right to
    counsel, I would let Dr. Patterson watch and observe and that
    would be it.”
    Patterson observed defendant for about an hour during
    which a surgery resident evaluated defendant’s injuries. In
    Patterson’s presence, defendant reported to the surgery resident
    that he was experiencing chest and neck pain, and discomfort
    and numbness, and noted to the surgery resident his
    understanding that it was “against the rules to give prisoners
    anything for pain.” The surgery resident explained, “it’s not
    against the rules, however, the doctor needs to evaluate you
    when you’re not under the influence of any medication because
    if we give you something that altered your sensorium. Then
    we’re not gonna be able to treat[]you appropriately so when the
    doctor says that they’ve gotten all the information that they
    26
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    need, then that will be —” The surgery resident testified at the
    hearing that she told defendant this — that she needed to delay
    the administration of pain medication — so that the surgery
    resident could assess defendant.         Defendant was still
    handcuffed to his gurney and connected to monitors,
    intravenous fluids, and a urinary catheter.
    At approximately 10:04 p.m., Patterson introduced
    himself to defendant as “a psychiatrist from Santa Barbara.”
    Defendant responded, “I heard you were going to come here.”
    Patterson told defendant “the DA’s office [had] asked me to come
    and talk with ya.” Defendant responded, “Great.”
    Regarding defendant’s Miranda rights, Patterson told
    defendant: “And I have to advise you of your rights the same as
    you’ve probably been advised already, namely that you don’t
    have to cooperate with us, you have the right to remain silent,
    don’t have to talk with me or ask — tell me anything about
    yourself or answer any of my questions.” He said further, “And
    anything you say could be used against you in a court of law. I
    will make a report of it, and you subsequently will see it, a copy
    of my report, and if you can’t afford to provide yourself an
    attorney at this point, it’s the responsibility of the County of
    Ventura to obtain such legal aid for you, get you an attorney.”
    Patterson did not tell defendant that he had the right to have an
    attorney present before and during the questioning.
    Patterson asked, “So, the next thing then in knowing these
    things, are you willing to talk with me about yourself?”
    Defendant declined to talk, explaining, “I don’t think so. I’m
    facing very serious charges and I think I’d rather talk to a
    lawyer first.” He stated further, “That be okay? I think right
    27
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    now I’m in a state of shock and kind of confused and I don’t know
    that the information I’d give you would be that accurate.”
    Patterson responded, “I see. Well, that’s your decision,
    you have to make that — ” Defendant repeated, “that’s the
    decision I’ve made.” Patterson responded, “I’m gonna just stay
    around here with you and let you get back from X-ray and see
    how you’re getting along and see if you still feel, feel that way
    or — [¶] . . . [¶] — cause at some point you did say that you
    would be willing to talk to me and so —.” He stated further,
    “And it’s up to you, you can still refuse it, but you did say that
    at one time.”
    Defendant responded, “I did say that, yeah.” Patterson
    stated, “So I, I’ll wait a little bit and they’re gonna take you over
    to X-ray and get going and get these other things, your medical
    condition taken care of. But I’ll be around for a little while.”
    Defendant responded, “Alright.”
    After this exchange, Patterson stepped out of the room
    momentarily to inform Deputy District Attorney Holmes, who
    had been waiting in the hallway, that defendant had refused to
    waive his Miranda rights. Holmes testified Patterson did not
    tell him that defendant had invoked counsel but instead told
    him that defendant had declined to talk and had said he might
    be willing to talk later. Holmes directed Patterson “to follow the
    defendant wherever he went and just observe him.” Ventura
    County District Attorney Bradbury testified at the suppression
    hearing that in homicide investigations, the district attorney’s
    office would dispatch a psychiatrist to observe the suspect even
    if he were unwilling to talk. Patterson followed defendant’s
    gurney when he was transported to the X-ray room at 10:05
    p.m., remained with him for about 15 minutes while his X-rays
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    were taken, and then followed him at 10:21 p.m. back to the
    observation room, where they waited for the surgery resident for
    about five minutes. Patterson stood near the foot of defendant’s
    gurney about two feet to the side.
    When the surgery resident returned, she explained to
    defendant in Patterson’s presence that doctors would operate on
    defendant to remove lead fragments from beneath his
    diaphragm but that the resident would first insert a tube into
    defendant’s chest to drain blood that had accumulated there. A
    few seconds after this conversation, which was approximately
    20 minutes after defendant had invoked his right to counsel to
    Patterson, defendant turned to Patterson, who was then the
    only other person in the room, and said, “[s]till here, huh?”
    Patterson responded, “Yeah, just, just in case you’re — I can, I
    can, whatever.” Defendant said Patterson had a “kind face.”
    Patterson thanked him.          Defendant stated, “The last
    psychiatrist I talked to, made me very angry, you know.”2
    Patterson asked defendant for the psychiatrist’s name.
    Defendant gave the names of two psychiatrists he had seen;
    Patterson said he did not know them. Defendant volunteered
    2
    The parties’ transcripts interpret the audio of this
    comment differently.     The prosecution transcript instead
    interprets this comment as: “The last psychiatrist I talked to,
    maybe you know him?” The trial court did not specifically rule
    on this statement. We adopt the defense version because
    Patterson agreed at the suppression hearing that this is what
    defendant said. Regardless of which version we adopt, the two
    statements are not substantively different for purposes of our
    analysis, especially since the record is undisputed that
    defendant began the conversation by telling Patterson, “Still
    here, huh?”
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    information about his previous efforts to seek treatment
    through the county mental health department.
    Following a brief pause during which apparently the
    surgery resident had reentered the room and could be heard
    talking, defendant asked Patterson, “You wanna talk about it?”
    Patterson responded, “Sure.” Defendant stated, “I’ll talk, and
    you can listen.” Patterson agreed, and stated, “Cause you, you
    don’t mind, and we could just talk about what has happened or
    something.”
    Defendant then volunteered further information about his
    mental health history, including earlier diagnosis of organic
    delusional disorder. Defendant explained he had attempted to
    see a psychiatrist at the county mental health department and
    become “very angry” because the psychiatrist did not think
    defendant would become a mental health patient and did not
    schedule him for another appointment. Defendant explained
    that being in an “intense emotional relationship” had
    “amplified” his delusional thinking. Patterson asked defendant
    questions about his delusions and whether medication had
    helped. Defendant subsequently reiterated that being in an
    “emotional relationship” (referring to G.A.) had “[s]tirred things
    up” and that he felt like he was “in a movie” that afternoon.
    Defendant volunteered that he was “aware of everything
    that happened that day” and after responding to Patterson’s
    question about why defendant did what he did (defendant said
    he did not know why), defendant sought to limit the topics of
    conversation:
    “DEFENDANT: I think I’d be better off talking to you
    about emotional states than about actual specific facts.
    “PATTERSON: Okay.
    30
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    “DEFENDANT: I’m sure my lawyer wouldn’t appreciate
    it, you know?
    “PATTERSON: Well, he can, he can get a copy of what
    you’re talking about, you know, if that’s —
    “DEFENDANT: Well, I think you, you probably deal with
    emotional states rather than facts anyway, but
    (unintelligible) if you’re giving some type of a diagnosis.”
    They continued to discuss defendant’s role as a resident
    manager at the dual diagnosis facility and his involvement with
    AA meetings. Defendant eventually introduced a new topic,
    that he had had “another violent episode” about ten years earlier
    in which he robbed a McDonald’s restaurant. Defendant mostly
    talked and Patterson would ask questions including whether
    defendant tried to seek help for his delusions in prison and
    whether his delusions were part of his legal defense for the
    robbery.
    Defendant explained that he diagnosed himself with
    schizophrenia after his own study and that he avoided being
    close to his family because the emotions would exacerbate his
    delusions. Defendant explained that he married G.A. so she
    could get a green card, that they had not been in contact for
    many years, and that he recontacted her recently so he could get
    a divorce. Patterson asked if G.A. was “involved in this thing
    tonight . . . .” Defendant responded that he had kidnapped G.A.
    and continued to explain that he had shot Aguirre. Regarding
    G.A., he explained, “I kidnapped her, you know” and “pulled a
    gun on her and I said we’re gonna be together forever.”
    Regarding Aguirre, defendant explained that he saw Aguirre
    enter the home and tell defendant to put his hands up.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Defendant “just jumped out and shot” Aguirre. He explained, “I
    was getting what I wanted . . . .”
    When medical staff had arrived to move defendant,
    Patterson offered to return, stating, “I’ll see if I can come back,
    but, uh, maybe if it doesn’t bother you to talk to me anyway.”
    Defendant responded Patterson, “Yeah, you’re a very good
    listener, that’s (unintelligible).” Defendant later explained, “I’m
    kinda, you know, uh, self-diagnosing, nobody else will diagnose
    me.” Patterson responded, “Trying, trying to figure yourself out,
    huh?” Defendant agreed, “Yeah, I mean I’m just confused, you
    know?” He discussed at length his own efforts, through classes,
    reading articles, and study of the DSM-IV, to diagnose himself
    and understand his condition.
    After defendant explained “what happened” that day,
    defendant and Patterson discussed defendant’s reasons for
    speaking with Patterson:
    “DEFENDANT: I started out by just not wanting to tell
    you exactly what happened —
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: — but it ended up that way.
    “PATTERSON: Well, we went sort of round and round —
    “DEFENDANT: At this point I don’t have anything to
    lose by being honest and saying what happened.
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: And I understand my lawyer’s really
    going to be pissed and so forth.
    “PATTERSON: Um-hum.
    “DEFENDANT: So then (unintelligible)
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    “PATTERSON: You can certainly talk, and he’ll get what
    we’re talking about.
    “DEFENDANT: I’m sure he will, yeah.
    “PATTERSON: And uh —
    “DEFENDANT: And I don’t know why they, why they say
    don’t say nothing, because if you did something and people
    know you did it, there’s people (unintelligible) —
    “PATTERSON: They saw you.
    “DEFENDANT: . . . you know, they saw me, right. How
    are you gonna say you didn’t? I mean that, what are you
    accomplishing, you know, I think the situ — I think it’s
    best to be honest, that way you get to the root of it.
    “PATTERSON: Um-hum.
    “DEFENDANT: You know, I mean it’s not normal
    behavior.
    “PATTERSON: Um-hum.
    “DEFENDANT: It’s not, you know the average person
    wouldn’t (unintelligible) something like that.
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: So you know.
    “PATTERSON: But you have given me some insight into
    the way you were feeling and as you say a part of a —
    “DEFENDANT: Yeah, after I’d talked to you a little bit I
    thought well, it’s probably more beneficial to me to give
    him as much information as I can while I’m uh —
    “PATTERSON: While you’re fresh, fresh from it.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    “DEFENDANT: Yeah, I, I’m not under the influence of
    any chemicals or drugs yet, they’re gonna sedate me pretty
    soon. And it’s fairly close to the time of the incident.
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: And the closer the better I would think.
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: You know. Time can alter the way you
    see things.”
    When Patterson prepared to depart, defendant stated:
    “Yeah, it’s probably better if you write your report as quickly as
    possible so you can (unintelligible)” and remarked, “You had a
    kind face. . . . I think that’s [an] asset in your business.”
    During various points in the conversation, the surgery
    resident or other medical staff entered the room to perform
    medical procedures on defendant including prepping him for the
    chest tube insertion, drawing blood, and administering local
    anesthesia and intravenous sedation.       At one point the
    conversation paused, apparently while the chest tube was
    inserted.
    c. Trial Court Findings and Rulings
    The defense moved to suppress the statements defendant
    made to Patterson, contending that the police and prosecution
    had failed to cease efforts to interrogate defendant despite his
    invocations of his rights to silence and counsel, and that
    defendant had not waived his Miranda rights nor initiated the
    discussion with Patterson.
    After a multiday hearing, the trial court found that
    defendant invoked his right to silence when Detective Young
    Mirandized him in their first encounter, Young and Investigator
    34
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Haas violated defendant’s Miranda rights by continuing to
    question him after he had given consent to search G.A.’s house,
    and defendant later invoked his right to counsel to Young. It
    excluded portions of the interview conducted by Young and
    Haas.
    The court found, however, that defendant initiated the
    discussion with Patterson when he said to him, “Still here, huh,”
    and that he invited Patterson to talk more, told him that he
    (defendant) would talk and that Patterson could listen, and
    picked the topic of conversation. The court concluded that the
    subsequent contact by Patterson was attenuated from
    defendant’s earlier invocations. The court found “as a fact the
    defendant, for whatever reason — and I believe the reason was
    he wanted to talk to the psychiatrist — initiated the
    conversation, controlled the conversation, directed the
    conversation and took it to the places he wished to go.”
    The court concluded that Patterson’s request to interview
    defendant after he had invoked counsel to Detective Young of
    the sheriff’s department did not violate Edwards because the
    district attorney’s office had “come down a separate path” from
    the sheriff’s department and retained Patterson for its own
    purpose of evaluating defendant’s mental state. The court found
    that Patterson went to the hospital “for the avowed purpose of
    evaluating defendant for purposes of a determination
    concerning the defendant’s mental state post-incident and I
    think the District Attorney’s Office has no alternative but to
    pursue a line of that nature, certainly in a case such as this.”
    The trial court concluded that the audio recording of the
    interview was “[t]he most powerful and compelling evidence of
    the defendant’s understanding, knowledge, appreciation and
    35
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    willingness to participate in the conversation . . . .” The court
    “wish[ed]” Patterson had taken an explicit Miranda waiver from
    defendant when defendant started talking to Patterson but
    concluded that defendant knowingly waived his rights because
    he twice stated that his lawyer was going to be upset that
    defendant had talked to Patterson and because defendant
    controlled the conversation and directed the topics for
    discussion. The trial court found that defendant “knew what
    was going on. He knew what use it would be put to. He knew
    with whom he was speaking. He knew what he was speaking
    of. He discusses that he is or is not in pain, he discusses in fact
    his motivations to speak at that time before he becomes
    anesthetized or sedated, and that was important to him, that
    the facts be known at the best possible time and he tells us that
    in his statement which would be the time in closest proximity to
    the time at which these events occurred.” Acknowledging
    defendant’s medical condition, the court concluded that the
    audio of the interview nonetheless demonstrated that defendant
    had knowingly and voluntarily participated in the interview.
    The court accordingly denied the motion to suppress.
    2. Analysis
    We address below three questions: (1) whether law
    enforcement’s earlier contacts with defendant violated his
    Miranda rights; (2) whether defendant initiated the
    conversation that resulted in his confession; and (3) whether he
    did so with a knowing and voluntary waiver of his previously
    invoked Miranda rights. “The Fifth Amendment provides that
    no ‘person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
    witness    against      himself.’      In   Miranda[,    supra,]
    
    384 U.S. 436
     . . ., the [United States Supreme] Court concluded
    that ‘without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
    36
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
    inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
    individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
    would not otherwise do so freely.’ 
    Id., at 467
    . Accordingly, the
    Court formulated the now-familiar “procedural safeguards
    effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” ’
    Colorado v. Spring, 
    479 U.S. 564
    , 572 (1987) (quoting Miranda,
    
    supra,
     
    384 U.S. at 444
    ). Among these is the rule that when an
    accused has ‘expressed his desire to deal with the police only
    through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by
    the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
    unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
    exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ Edwards[, supra],
    
    451 U.S. 477
    , 484–485 . . . . .” (Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 
    481 U.S. 520
    , 525–526, fn. omitted.) “ ‘[I]nterrogation’ under Miranda
    refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
    actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know
    are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
    the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses
    primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
    intent of the police.” (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 
    446 U.S. 291
    , 301, fns. omitted (Innis).) “ ‘[N]ot all conversation between
    an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation. The police
    may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech would
    not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating
    response.’ ” (People v. Hensley (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 788
    , 810–811
    (Hensley).) The ban on further interrogation is intended to
    prevent police “ ‘ “from badgering a defendant into waiving his
    previously asserted Miranda rights.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas
    (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 908
    , 926.) “If further conversations are
    initiated by the police when there has not been a break in
    37
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    custody, the defendant’s statements are presumed involuntary
    and inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial.” (Ibid.)
    In reviewing Miranda claims, we “accept the trial court’s
    resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations
    of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.]
    However, we must independently determine from the
    undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court,
    whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.”
    (People v. Boyer (1989) 
    48 Cal.3d 247
    , 263 (Boyer); accord, People
    v. Hoyt (2020) 
    8 Cal.5th 892
    , 931.) We review Miranda claims
    under federal constitutional standards. (People v. Sims (1993)
    
    5 Cal.4th 405
    , 440 (Sims).)
    a. Earlier Law Enforcement Contacts Violated
    Mosley and Edwards
    We agree with defendant that his Miranda rights were
    violated at various points during the evening of July 17, 1996.
    As detailed in the factual background: (1) Haas and Young
    approached defendant to question him a mere 10 minutes after
    defendant had confirmed to District Attorney Bradbury that he
    did not want to speak, and within a half hour of his original
    invocation to Young. In that encounter, Haas and Young did not
    readvise defendant about his rights to remain silent and have
    the assistance of counsel. Their questioning concerned the same
    ongoing investigation and was by one of the same officers,
    Young, who had just recently attempted to interview defendant.
    (2) Less than an hour after this questioning by Haas and Young,
    Young again returned to defendant’s gurney to ask for a
    statement concerning the same investigation. Young did not
    readvise defendant of his rights, instead informing him that
    according to Bradbury, defendant had stated he might be willing
    to talk later. Defendant responded by telling Young that he
    38
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    thought he had told Bradbury that he was feeling shocked and
    confused “right now” and wanted to wait to talk to a lawyer, and
    then reasserted his Miranda rights to Young. (3) Nonetheless,
    Young again returned to defendant’s gurney about 25 minutes
    after that encounter, to berate him for murdering Aguirre. (4)
    Seventy-five minutes after that, Patterson attempted to
    interview defendant about the same ongoing investigation.
    Within this three-hour timeframe, defendant invoked his right
    to silence each time he was asked, on four occasions, and on at
    least two of those occasions also requested an attorney. In sum,
    prior to Patterson’s arrival, law enforcement officials had,
    within the previous three hours, twice contacted defendant
    about his willingness to provide a statement, impermissibly
    interviewed him, and angrily confronted him about Aguirre’s
    murder (after defendant had invoked counsel to the same
    officer). The trial court found that defendant invoked his right
    to silence when Detective Young Mirandized him in their first
    encounter, and that Young and Investigator Haas violated
    defendant’s Miranda rights by continuing to question him after
    he had given consent to search G.A.’s house. Thus, it correctly
    excluded portions of the interview conducted by Haas and
    Young.
    We also agree with defendant that the district attorney’s
    office violated Edwards by the manner in which Patterson
    requested to interview defendant after he had invoked his right
    to counsel. As the trial court found and the Attorney General
    agrees, defendant invoked his right to counsel when Detective
    Young returned to defendant’s gurney at 8:25 p.m. to request a
    statement. Resuming contact with a suspect at a later time for
    purposes of interview, where the suspect had earlier requested
    the assistance of counsel and remains in custody without
    39
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    counsel, is a clear violation of the rule that all efforts at
    interrogation must cease once the right to counsel is invoked.
    (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 485.)        In Edwards, the
    defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ended,
    but the police returned the next morning for an interview. (Id.
    at pp. 478–479.) Edwards then waived his rights and made
    statements. (Id. at p. 479.) The high court ruled the statements
    inadmissible, holding that “when an accused has invoked his
    right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a
    valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only
    that he responded to further police-initiated custodial
    interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” (Id. at
    p. 484.) Edwards explicitly stated that once a suspect invokes
    the right to counsel, law enforcement personnel may not resume
    interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect reinitiates
    contact. This is a bright-line rule: It requires all questioning
    cease after a suspect requests counsel. “ ‘In the absence of such
    a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through “badger[ing]”
    or “overreaching” — explicit or subtle, deliberate or
    unintentional — might otherwise wear down the accused and
    persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier
    request for counsel’s assistance.’ ” (People v. Henderson (2020)
    
    9 Cal.5th 1013
    , 1022 (Henderson), quoting Smith v. Illinois
    (1984) 
    469 U.S. 91
    , 98.)
    The Attorney General contends — as the trial court
    concluded below — that the district attorney’s office had a
    “legitimate ‘purpose’ ” in “enlist[ing] Dr. Patterson’s aid in
    observing appellant and gathering information relevant to his
    mental state, whether or not appellant wished to speak to him.”
    By this, the Attorney General can be understood to argue that
    because the district attorney’s office had another purpose
    40
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    (besides interrogation) in sending Patterson to visit defendant,
    which was to observe him, the office committed no constitutional
    violation. The Attorney General is correct, to an extent: Police
    officers routinely remain in the presence of suspects for
    custodial matters such as booking and transportation, even
    after the suspect has invoked his or her Miranda rights. (E.g.,
    Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 
    462 U.S. 1039
    , 1042 (Bradshaw)
    [transporting suspect to police station]; People v. Enraca (2012)
    
    53 Cal.4th 735
    , 750 (Enraca) [booking interview].) But the
    Edwards rule “renders a [suspect’s] statement invalid if the
    authorities initiate any ‘communication, exchanges, or
    conversations’ relating to the case, other than those routinely
    necessary for custodial purposes.” (Boyer, supra, 
    48 Cal.3d 247
    ,
    274, italics omitted.)
    The evidentiary hearing established the prosecution’s
    intention to send Patterson to interview defendant about his
    mental state and not merely to observe him. The district
    attorney’s office called Patterson on the evening of the homicide
    and retained him to interview defendant close in time to the
    events that day to evaluate his mental state as a homicide
    suspect. District attorney staff gave Patterson a tape recorder,
    Miranda card, and instructed him to advise defendant of his
    Miranda rights. Patterson testified he went to the hospital to
    interview defendant to evaluate his post-event mental state. He
    explained that when a district attorney’s office reaches out to
    him, “as typical when I get such a call, my question is will the
    suspect be willing to talk with me.” Patterson did not merely
    Mirandize defendant. Instead, Patterson did more, making
    clear to defendant that he was there to “talk” with him,
    explaining that “the DA’s office asked me to come and talk with
    ya” and after partially describing defendant’s Miranda rights,
    41
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    said, “So, the next thing then in knowing these things, are you
    willing to talk with me about yourself?”            Patterson’s
    communications here, violated the bright-line rule of Edwards.
    Deputy Holmes confirmed as much that Patterson was there to
    engage defendant in conversation, explaining that he told
    Patterson: “I’d like you to go in and do your usual thing, advise
    him of his rights, tell him who you are, who you work for, and
    see if he wants to talk now.” Holmes testified that had he known
    defendant had invoked his right to counsel earlier in the
    evening, he would not have permitted Patterson to speak with
    defendant. Holmes explained, “Because it’s improper. If — if
    someone has unequivocally invoked counsel, it’s improper for
    law enforcement to contact him. And I would — I would stay
    absolutely away from there.” He testified further, “[I]t’s not at
    all proper if they’ve invoked their right to counsel, and I just
    simply stay away from — if somebody invokes the right to
    counsel, I would let Dr. Patterson watch and observe and that
    would be it.”
    Thus, the record clearly shows the district attorney’s
    intention that Patterson was to interview defendant for
    evidence about his mental state as part of its criminal
    investigation. This is why Patterson arrived with a Miranda
    card and a tape recorder. Patterson did not merely observe
    defendant in order to evaluate his mental state: He contacted
    defendant, advised him of his Miranda rights, asked him if he
    was willing to talk about himself, responded to defendant’s
    request for counsel by reminding him that he had supposedly
    earlier agreed to talk to Patterson, and then telling defendant
    he (Patterson) would remain close by in case defendant changed
    his mind about asserting his Miranda rights.
    42
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    The fact that Patterson might also have intended to
    observe defendant does not eliminate the fact that Patterson
    sought to interview defendant as directed by the district
    attorney’s office. As Innis explained, we consider the situation
    primarily from the suspect’s perspective in determining whether
    there was interrogation. (Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301.) Even
    if Patterson might have permissibly gone to the hospital and sat
    silently in defendant’s room for the purpose of observing his
    behavior (a fact pattern not before us here), defendant would not
    have understood mere silent observation to be Patterson’s
    purpose from Patterson’s words and conduct: The explanation
    Patterson gave defendant for his presence was to interview
    defendant. Patterson told defendant, “the DA’s office asked me
    to come and talk with ya,” and after addressing defendant’s
    Miranda rights, asked defendant, “next thing then in knowing
    these things, are you willing to talk with me about yourself?”
    (See Innis, 
    supra, 446
     U.S. at p. 301 [“ ‘interrogation’ under
    Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
    words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
    normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
    know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
    from the suspect.”].)
    Under settled law, a psychiatric interview of a suspect is
    interrogation if the interview contains material later to be used
    in the prosecution’s case, including evidence about a suspect’s
    mental state. (See People v. San Nicolas (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 614
    ,
    640; Estelle v. Smith (1981) 
    451 U.S. 454
    , 466–469 [Miranda
    advisements were required prior to defendant’s pretrial
    examination by a court-retained psychiatrist, where the
    psychiatrist later testified for the prosecution]; People v. Ghent
    (1987) 
    43 Cal.3d 739
    , 750; People v. Polk (1965) 
    63 Cal.2d 443
    ,
    43
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    449; People v. Walker (1972) 
    29 Cal.App.3d 448
    , 451–456; People
    v. Montgomery (1965) 
    235 Cal.App.2d 582
    , 590.) In Estelle,
    
    supra,
     at pages 456–457, the trial court ordered a psychiatric
    examination of a defendant to determine his competency to
    stand trial.    (Id. at pp. 456–457.)     But the examining
    psychiatrist later testified for the prosecution about defendant’s
    mental status. (Id. at pp. 459–460, 464.) The high court held
    “the Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore, [was] directly
    involved here because the State used as evidence against
    respondent the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial
    psychiatric examination.” (Id. at pp. 464–465.) The court
    explained, “The considerations calling for the accused to be
    warned prior to custodial interrogation apply with no less force
    to the pretrial psychiatric examination at issue here.
    Respondent was in custody at the Dallas County Jail when the
    examination was ordered and when it was conducted. . . . When
    Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on the
    issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the
    penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent’s future
    dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like
    that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements
    made in a postarrest custodial setting. During the psychiatric
    evaluation, respondent assuredly was ‘faced with a phase of the
    adversary system’ and was ‘not in the presence of [a] perso[n]
    acting solely in his interest.’ ” (Id. at p. 467.)
    In the immediate wake of the senseless murder of a
    beloved colleague, the police and district attorney were
    understandably zealous in their effort to question the apparent
    perpetrator.   But we find concerning the multiple clear
    violations of Miranda that occurred in this case through the
    repeated efforts of investigating officials to solicit defendant’s
    44
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    waiver of his rights to silence and counsel, after he had
    expressed his unwillingness to talk. That defendant invoked his
    right to remain silent does not mean police could never again
    approach him and inquire whether he was still unwilling to talk.
    (See Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 
    423 U.S. 96
    , 100–104.) But it is
    one thing to reapproach a suspect about his willingness to talk
    after a “significant period of time” (id. at p. 106); it is another
    thing to reapproach the suspect to confront him or to inquire
    about his willingness to talk no less than five times in a roughly
    three-hour span.       These violations not only infringed
    defendant’s established constitutional rights, they also
    jeopardized the efforts of the prosecution, court, and jurors to
    have a jury weigh the charges against defendant and render a
    sentence. We emphasize the substantial costs to the justice
    system and the lives affected when law enforcement officials,
    however well-intentioned, do not conform their own conduct to
    the law.
    b. Defendant Initiated the Conversation with
    Patterson
    Concluding that there were Miranda violations does not,
    however, resolve the question whether those violations require
    that defendant’s later statements to Patterson be suppressed.
    Like the trial court concluded below, the Attorney General
    contends defendant initiated the conversation with Patterson.
    After listening to the interview tapes admitted at trial and
    reviewing the transcripts, we agree that defendant initiated the
    later discussion that produced the statements admitted at trial.
    As noted, interrogation must cease once a suspect requests
    counsel.     (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485.)
    “ ‘However, if the defendant thereafter initiates a statement to
    police,   “nothing     in    the    Fifth    and     Fourteenth
    45
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Amendments . . . prohibit[s] the police from merely listening to
    his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against
    him at the trial.” ’ ” (Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 810.)
    “ ‘After a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police officers
    may nonetheless resume their interrogation if “the suspect ‘(a)
    initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly
    and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.’ ” ’ ” (Enraca,
    supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 752.) “ ‘An accused “initiates” ’ further
    communication, when his words or conduct ‘can be “fairly said
    to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more generalized
    discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” ’ ”
    (People v. Molano (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 620
    , 656 (Molano).) This
    exception to the Edwards rule requires that the suspect initiate
    “ ‘further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
    police’ ” but not necessarily “the encounter at which he does so.”
    (People v. Waidla (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 690
    , 732 (Waidla); see also
    People v. Mickey (1991) 
    54 Cal.3d 612
    , 652 (Mickey).) Defendant
    spoke to Patterson and, as a factual matter, began the
    conversation that led to his various inculpatory statements.
    Patterson remained in defendant’s presence after their initial
    exchange but did not speak to him. Around 20 minutes later,
    after X-rays and a brief conversation with his doctor, defendant
    asked Patterson, “Still here, huh?” He engaged Patterson in a
    conversation about psychiatrists who had treated him and then,
    after some pauses, reconfirmed his desire to speak, asking, “You
    wanna talk about it?” Suspects in custody have initiated further
    questioning by asking, “ ‘Well, what is going to happen to me
    now?’ ” (Bradshaw, 
    supra, 462
     U.S. at pp. 1045–1046), or
    “ ‘What can I do for you[?],’ ‘What do you want from me?,’ and
    ‘What can I do to help you[?],’ ” (Waidla, at p. 731). Defendant’s
    question to Patterson, “Still here, huh?,” followed by defendant’s
    46
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    question to Patterson if he wanted to “talk about it,” squarely
    falls within the kinds of statements we have found to constitute
    an initiation of further communication by the accused. As the
    trial court found after an eight-day evidentiary hearing,
    defendant “initiated the conversation, controlled the
    conversation, directed the conversation and took it to the places
    he wished to go.”
    We must next resolve whether defendant’s renewed
    contact with Patterson should be deemed effective or instead the
    tainted product of the earlier Miranda violations, considering
    all the relevant surrounding circumstances. “[W]e have never
    found that an initial failure to honor a defendant’s invocation —
    whether of the [right] to remain silent or the right to have
    counsel present — poses a categorical bar to the admission of
    any subsequent statement regardless of the circumstances.
    Instead, in case after case, we have held that despite the initial
    failure to honor a Miranda invocation, a voluntary confession
    obtained during a subsequent interrogation is admissible.”
    (People v. Krebs (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 265
    , 314, italics omitted
    (Krebs).) However, as a general rule, “where law enforcement
    officers have disregarded a suspect’s previously-invoked rights
    by continuing to interrogate him, a renewal of contact by the
    defendant will be considered an ‘initiation’ only if the decision to
    renew contact was not a ‘response to’ or ‘product of’ the prior
    unlawful interrogation.” (Mack v. State (Ga. 2014) 
    765 S.E.2d 896
    , 903 (Mack).) Indeed, to be valid, a defendant’s initiation
    cannot be the product of the authorities’ coercion. (E.g., Boyer,
    supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 275 [holding that defendant had not
    initiated the communication by calling back the officer after he
    had turned to leave in light of the officer’s comments and earlier
    unlawful interrogation]; People v. Neal (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 63
    , 78
    47
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    (Neal) [holding that defendant did not voluntarily initiate an
    interview in light of earlier impermissible interrogation and
    defendant’s youth, isolation, and “low intelligence”]; People v.
    Bradford (1997) 
    14 Cal.4th 1005
    , 1046 (Bradford) [rejecting
    claim that “statement was the tainted product of earlier illegal
    interrogations”].) Likewise, “a defendant’s decision to talk with
    police cannot be a product of police interrogation, ‘badgering,’ or
    ‘overreaching,’ whether ‘explicit or subtle, deliberate or
    unintentional.’ ” (People v. Davis (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 539
    , 596
    (Davis).) While as a matter of historical fact, a suspect may have
    started the contact with authorities, the totality of the
    circumstances might demonstrate that doing so was the product
    of earlier badgering in violation of Miranda. (Mack, at p. 905;
    Blake v. State (Md. 2004) 
    849 A.2d 410
    , 413–414, 422.) In Mack,
    police disregarded the suspect’s invocation of his right to stay
    silent by badgering and cajoling him to come clean for more than
    90 minutes, after similarly having ignored his invocation of
    rights on the previous day. (Mack, at pp. 904–905 & fn. 8.)
    Approximately 10 minutes later, the suspect relented and asked
    to speak with police. (Ibid.) In Blake, after the suspect invoked
    his right to counsel, a detective gave the suspect a charging
    document for first degree murder stating the penalty was
    “DEATH,” even though the suspect was not eligible for the death
    penalty due to his youth. (Blake, at p. 413.) The Maryland high
    court concluded that the suspect’s subsequent question about
    the detective’s comment (“I bet you want to talk now, huh!”) was
    a response to interrogation rather than initiation.        (Id. at
    pp. 413–414, 422.)
    Because of the prior Miranda and Edwards violations
    described above, the defendant’s contention, echoed by the
    dissent, that defendant did not initiate the communication with
    48
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Patterson is not without force. And although Patterson asked
    no more questions, his action of remaining with defendant for
    the stated purpose of seeing if defendant would change his mind
    about asserting his Miranda rights could have added more
    pressure to make a statement. Patterson remained just a few
    feet from where defendant was handcuffed to a gurney, twice
    reminded him he had earlier agreed to speak with a
    psychiatrist, and advised him that Patterson would “just stay
    around here with [defendant] and . . . see if [defendant] still
    feel[s]” that he wanted to assert his Miranda rights. In addition,
    defendant contends that Young’s angry speech accusing
    defendant of murder could have added further pressure to
    confess. Defendant also argues that his compromised physical
    state and related pain, shock, and confusion, would have
    compromised his ability to withstand the pressure of repeated
    attempts to obtain a statement. (People v. Caro (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 463
    , 493 (Caro) [“While a defendant’s ‘compromised physical
    and psychological condition’ alone will not render her
    statements involuntary [citation], that condition is relevant to
    the inquiry and presents an opportunity for abuse”].)
    Though these facts and circumstances make this a close
    case, the record, particularly the audio recording of defendant’s
    conversation with Patterson, reflects defendant’s “clear
    willingness and intention to talk” to Patterson. (People v.
    Gamache (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 347
    , 386 (Gamache).) As a result,
    we cannot find that defendant’s conversation with Patterson
    was caused by or the product of earlier violations. (See, e.g.,
    Bradford, 
    supra, 14
     Cal.4th at pp. 1045–1046.)
    First, the record does not reveal the sort of berating
    evident in other cases that might readily wear down a suspect
    (e.g., Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 80–83; Boyer, supra,
    49
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274), but instead a handful of one- to two-
    minute conversations over a period of a few hours. The trial
    court, after an extensive hearing, including sworn testimony
    from Patterson and at least 16 other witnesses, found that the
    tape-recorded discussion was a “low-key, very, very calm,
    rational — perhaps unnervingly so — discussion of what
    transpired.” At the hearing, Patterson testified “at no point did
    I attempt to insert any strong injunction for him to talk to me
    about the crime” and that defendant “was completely alert and
    very cognizant of what he was talking to me about and without
    evidence of mental confusion or disorientation.” We agree with
    the trial court that defendant revealed no “outward sign of
    stress, [offering] just a straight account of what happened,” and
    his statements were “un[e]xcited, unforced and voluntary . . . .”
    Examining the record as a whole, we conclude the relatively
    brief prior interrogations that occurred — even when considered
    cumulatively — did not add up to “ ‘ ‘badger[ing]” ’ ” that
    effectively wore down defendant’s will to remain silent.
    (Henderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1022.)
    Second, although Patterson should not have contacted
    defendant to request an interview, he did not ask further
    questions after defendant invoked his right to counsel. Edwards
    does not bar further contact with a suspect, only further
    interrogation. (See Waidla, 
    supra, 22
     Cal.4th at pp. 728–732
    [although officer went to jail and met Waidla for express purpose
    of interrogating him, Waidla initiated the interrogation when he
    repeatedly interrupted the officer with offers of assistance
    before the officer had a chance to address and advise him of his
    Miranda rights]; Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 652 [rejecting
    argument that Edwards requires a suspect to initiate the
    meeting at which he initiates the interrogation, where the
    50
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    defendant had requested an interview while officers were
    transporting him].) Patterson immediately stopped asking
    questions when defendant invoked his right to counsel.
    Patterson soon stepped out into the hallway where Holmes
    directed Patterson “to follow the defendant wherever he went
    and just observe him.”
    Third, the recorded interview clearly shows that
    defendant was engaging Patterson — defendant initiated the
    conversation and Patterson only responded. (See Mickey, 
    supra, 54
     Cal.3d at p. 648 [an initiation occurs when a suspect’s “words
    or . . . conduct” can be “ ‘fairly said to represent a desire . . . to
    open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or
    indirectly to the investigation’ ”].) As noted above, after
    defendant requested counsel, Patterson asked no more
    questions and there was no discussion for about 20 minutes.
    Defendant then asked, “Still here, huh?” Patterson responded,
    “Yeah, just, just in case you’re — I can, I can, whatever.”
    Defendant then remarked, “Yeah, you seem like you have a kind
    face.” Patterson responded, “Um, thank you.” Defendant then
    asked, “The last psychiatrist I talked to, made me very angry,
    you know.” Patterson responded, “You know who it was?” And
    the two discussed briefly whether Patterson knew the
    psychiatrists defendant had seen. Defendant then stated,
    “Anyway, so two years ago I went through the county mental
    health system.” Patterson responded, “Here in Ventura?”
    Defendant responded, “Yeah, the east end, thinking that I had
    some type of mental disorder.” Patterson responded, “Hum.”
    Defendant volunteered, “And I saw a counselor. I saw a
    psychologist and eventually I saw a psychiatrist. Took about six
    months.” Patterson verified, “To get to the psychiatrist.”
    Defendant responded, “Yeah.” After a brief interruption to
    51
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    perform a medical procedure, defendant asked Patterson, “You
    wanna talk about it?”          Patterson responded, “Sure.
    (unintelligible) Cause you, you don’t mind, and we could just
    talk about what has happened or something.” Defendant
    continued the conversation, stating, “So anyway I was talking
    about the psychiatrist that I saw.” Defendant turned the
    discussion toward his relationship with G.A. and the events
    under investigation with the comment: “But I think this
    emotional relationship that I’ve been in for the last
    year . . . [s]tirred things up.”   Soon thereafter defendant
    continued to direct the conversation toward the events under
    investigation by saying, “[Y]ou know I, about this afternoon, I’m
    aware of everything that happened . . . .” And from there, the
    conversation ensued, defendant talking about his mental health
    history and past diagnoses, Patterson mostly listening and
    asking occasional questions. Contrary to defendant’s assertion,
    it was not Patterson’s question — “you know who [your last
    psychiatrist] was?” — that turned the conversation to the
    instant crime and began the discussion about the criminal
    investigation. Rather, as the above description makes clear, it
    was defendant who turned the discussion toward his
    relationship with G.A. and the events under investigation. Over
    the course of the next hour, defendant continued to largely direct
    the conversation and select the topics. As the trial court
    properly found, defendant “picked the topic; he started the
    conversation.”
    Fourth, and most importantly, the record indicates that
    defendant was aware he was providing information that might
    be used against him, yet he viewed the tradeoff a worthwhile
    one. Upon meeting defendant, Patterson Mirandized defendant
    and then asked him, “So, the next thing then in knowing these
    52
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    things, are you willing to talk with me about yourself?”
    Defendant declined to talk, explaining, “I don’t think so. I’m
    facing very serious charges and I think I’d rather talk to a
    lawyer first.” He stated further, “That be okay? I think right
    now I’m in a state of shock and kind of confused and I don’t know
    that the information I’d give you would be that accurate.” Early
    on in his discussion with Patterson, defendant said: “I think I’d
    be better off talking to you about emotional states than about
    actual specific facts” and “I’m sure my lawyer wouldn’t
    appreciate it, you know?” Later on in the discussion, defendant
    elaborated: “I don’t know why they, why they say don’t say
    nothing, because if you did something and people know you did
    it, there’s people . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . you know, they saw me,
    right. How are you gonna say you didn’t? I mean that, what are
    you accomplishing, you know, I think the situ — I think it’s best
    to be honest, that way you get to the root of it. [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
    after I’d talked to you a little bit I though[t] well, it’s probably
    more beneficial to me to give him as much information as I can
    while I’m uh — [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I, I’m not under the influence of
    any chemicals or drugs yet, they’re gonna sedate me pretty soon.
    And it’s fairly close to the time of the incident.” Thus, as the
    trial court noted, defendant “discuss[ed] in fact his motivations
    to speak at that time before he [became] anesthetized or
    sedated, and that was important to him, that the facts be known
    at the best possible time and he tells us that in his statement
    which would be the time in closest proximity to the time at
    which these events occurred.” The dissent posits that defendant
    may have doubted whether he was actually free to remain silent
    or to consult a lawyer before speaking with Patterson. (Dis.
    opn., post, at pp. 11–12.) But we need not speculate about
    defendant’s thought-process as to why he chose to speak with
    53
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Patterson: defendant expressly detailed why he chose to speak
    to Patterson in the taped recording of the discussion.
    Defendant’s statements showed he was making a deliberate
    decision to speak with Patterson because he determined that it
    was “best to be honest.” Defendant’s statements also show a
    clear and deliberate recognition that he wanted to speak before
    sedatives impacted his thinking. And, his statement that “I’m
    sure my lawyer wouldn’t appreciate” him talking with Patterson
    about “specific facts,” coupled with his statement (detailed
    below) that “I understand my lawyer’s really going to be
    pissed . . . .” demonstrate that he understood he had the right to
    remain silent or consult a lawyer before talking to Patterson.
    The dissent also contends that the protection of Edwards
    is not limited to cases where the suspect was berated or where
    law enforcement employed “overt” coercion. (Dis. opn., post, at
    pp. 2, 19.) We agree. As the dissent states, the question we
    must answer is whether defendant’s decision to speak with
    Patterson was in “ ‘ “response to” or “product of” the prior
    unlawful interrogation.’ ” (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 9, 20, quoting
    Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903; see also Boyer, supra,
    48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274.) Our case law makes clear that the
    question of whether law enforcement officials repeatedly
    berated or badgered the suspect will naturally be relevant in
    determining whether the suspect spoke in response to the
    officials’ conduct. (See Davis, 
    supra, 46
     Cal.4th at p. 596 [“a
    defendant’s decision to talk with police cannot be a product of
    police interrogation, ‘badgering,’ or ‘overreaching,’ whether
    ‘explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional’ ”]; see also Boyer,
    supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274.) As the dissent acknowledges:
    “Of course, where a suspect is berated, it is more likely his
    initiation was tainted by law enforcement misconduct.” (Dis.
    54
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    opn., post, at p. 20.) We again agree. But surely the converse is
    also true: where a suspect is not berated, though that fact is not
    dispositive, it makes it less likely his initiation was tainted by
    law enforcement misconduct.
    The dissent also argues that Patterson’s “understated
    manner” “presented [defendant] with a deliberate contrast to
    the impatient and even angry officers who had sought to
    question him earlier.” (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 10–11.) The
    dissent argues that this fact is relevant in assessing “ ‘the entire
    sequence of events’ that night.” (Id. at p. 10, quoting Mack,
    supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904.) We disagree. As the dissent
    acknowledges, the question we must answer is whether
    defendant’s decision to talk was the “ ‘ “product of” the prior
    unlawful interrogation.’ ” (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 9, 20, quoting
    Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903, italics added; see also Boyer,
    supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274.) Though the dissent suggests
    that Patterson’s “tactics” were “unethical” (dis. opn., post, at
    pp. 5–6, 11), it appears to recognize, as it must, that Patterson’s
    conduct was lawful. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 
    496 U.S. 292
     296–
    300.) Patterson’s lawful conduct simply does not answer the
    question we must resolve here, i.e., whether defendant spoke to
    Patterson because the police had previously acted unlawfully.
    And if defendant ultimately decided to talk because of the
    efficacy of Patterson’s “understated manner” (dis. opn., post, at
    pp. 10–11) and because he determined that he and Patterson
    “ ‘share[d] a common interest, that their relationship is a
    [mutual] rather than an adversarial one’ ” (id. at p. 5), then
    surely defendant did not speak because of the prior unlawful
    conduct of police interrogation.
    55
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Finally, the dissent asserts that the majority’s holding
    abrogates the “ ‘bright-line rule’ ” in Edwards “that all
    questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel.”
    (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98.) We disagree. “[W]e
    have never found that an initial failure to honor a defendant’s
    invocation — whether of the [right] to remain silent or the right
    to have counsel present — poses a categorical bar to the
    admission of any subsequent statement regardless of the
    circumstances. Instead, in case after case, we have held that
    despite the initial failure to honor a Miranda invocation, a
    voluntary confession obtained during a subsequent
    interrogation is admissible.” (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 314,
    italics omitted.)
    In fact, the majority and dissent do not disagree on the
    applicable legal standard. We agree that Edwards establishes
    a bright-line rule. We agree that the question we must
    ultimately decide is whether defendant’s decision to speak with
    Patterson was the “ ‘product of’ the prior unlawful
    interrogation.” (Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903.) Where we
    disagree is in the application of this standard. The dissent relies
    heavily on its interpretation of a single sentence Patterson
    uttered in which Patterson reminded defendant that defendant
    had previously promised to speak to him and that he would wait
    around to see if defendant changed his mind. From this, the
    dissent surmises that defendant would have felt that he had to
    speak with Patterson or he would be “going back on his word”
    and that defendant would have felt that Patterson “was not
    satisfied with Johnson’s refusal.” (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 7–8.)
    This, coupled with Patterson’s decision to remain present for 20
    minutes without a break and without a change in location or
    personnel, indicates to the dissent that defendant’s decision to
    56
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    talk was the product of prior unlawful conduct.3 (Id. at pp. 9–
    14.) But, once again, we need not rely on surmise. We have a
    full tape of the interview itself.
    Ultimately, the operative question is whether, when
    defendant began talking to Patterson at 10:20 p.m., he did so
    freely, or he did so because of undue coercion. As the trial court
    explained, the record itself — and most notably listening to the
    tape of defendant’s and Patterson’s conversation — establishes
    that defendant, fully aware that his statements could later be
    used against him, chose to speak with Patterson because “if you
    did something and people know you did it . . . it’s best to be
    honest.” Our review of the audio recording demonstrates
    defendant was speaking easily and comfortably and was
    3
    The dissent also relies on the fact that Patterson spent
    about an hour simply observing defendant before introducing
    himself and yet defendant did not attempt to engage Patterson
    in conversation during this time. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 14.)
    However, the record further indicates that Patterson was in
    plainclothes with nothing about his appearance that would show
    he was associated with law enforcement or the district
    attorney’s office. Defendant was on a gurney and, based upon
    defendant’s condition, Patterson was waiting for “medically . . .
    the proper time for me to talk with him about why I was there.”
    Patterson was “not trying to establish eye contact.” Medical
    professionals were in and out and Patterson did not identify
    himself to them. The fact that defendant did not begin a
    dialogue with a silent stranger under these circumstances does
    not inform whether he wanted to initiate further communication
    with Patterson once Patterson identified himself and stated that
    “the DA’s office asked me to come and talk with ya.” Only after
    defendant learned that the district attorney’s office sent
    Patterson, did defendant eventually decide to speak with him,
    explaining that “after I’d talked to you a little bit I though[t]
    well, it’s probably more beneficial to me to give him as much
    information . . . .”
    57
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    generally directing the conversation while Patterson mostly
    listened. As the trial court concluded, that defendant “knew
    what was going on. He knew what use it would be put to. He
    knew with whom he was speaking. He knew what he was
    speaking of. He discusses that he is or is not in pain, he
    discusses in fact his motivations to speak at that time before he
    becomes anesthetized or sedated, and that was important to
    him, that the facts be known at the best possible time and he
    tells us that in his statement which would be the time in closest
    proximity to the time at which these events occurred.” We
    therefore need not speculate about why defendant did not speak
    to Patterson before Patterson identified himself (dis. opn., post,
    at p. 14), or whether defendant felt that he was not free to
    remain silent (id. at pp. 11–12), or whether Patterson’s
    statements made defendant feel that he would be going back on
    his word if he did not speak with Patterson (id. at p. 7), or
    whether Patterson’s “understated manner” encouraged
    defendant to speak to him (id. at pp. 10–11). We agree with the
    trial court’s conclusion that the audio recording of the interview
    was “[t]he most powerful and compelling evidence of the
    defendant’s understanding, knowledge, appreciation and
    willingness to participate in the conversation . . . .” On this
    record, considering the entire circumstances of the interview, we
    are persuaded that defendant freely initiated the conversation
    with Dr. Patterson.
    c. Defendant Knowingly and Voluntarily Waived
    His Miranda Rights
    Apart from whether there was a legally valid initiation,
    there remains the question whether defendant voluntarily and
    knowingly waived his Miranda rights. We conclude he did.
    58
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    As noted above, a suspect initiates “further
    communication, when his words or conduct ‘can be “fairly said
    to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more generalized
    discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” ’ ”
    (Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 656.) “The initiation of further
    dialogue by the accused . . . does not in itself justify
    reinterrogation” (Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 440); “ ‘the burden
    remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events
    indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel
    present during the interrogation’ ” (ibid.). “The state must
    demonstrate that the suspect knowingly and intelligently
    waived his right to counsel ‘under the totality of the
    circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused,
    not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’ ”
    (Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 810.) “ ‘The waiver must be
    “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
    deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
    deception” [citation], and knowing in the sense that it was
    “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
    abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
    it.” ’ ” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 1063
    , 1086
    (McCurdy).) “ ‘[A]n express waiver is not required where a
    defendant’s actions make clear that a waiver is intended.’ ”
    (People v. Frederickson (2020) 
    8 Cal.5th 963
    , 1010.) Although a
    suspect’s responses to further interrogation may not be used to
    cast doubt on the clarity of his or her initial request for counsel,
    “[s]uch subsequent statements are relevant only to the distinct
    question of waiver.” (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at
    p. 100.)
    A prior Edwards violation is not by itself dispositive of
    whether a suspect knowingly and voluntary waived his or her
    59
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    rights. As we have said before, “[W]e cannot conclude that an
    Edwards violation, ‘unaccompanied by any actual coercion or
    other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s
    ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory
    process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is
    ineffective for some indeterminate period.’ (Oregon v. Elstad
    (1985) 470 U.S.[, 298,] p. 309.) Rather, if the statement made
    after an Edwards violation is voluntary, ‘the admissibility of any
    subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely
    on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.’ ” (Bradford,
    supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) “Only if the ‘totality of the
    circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an
    uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may
    a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been
    waived.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 
    475 U.S. 412
    , 421 (Burbine).)
    Thus, our case law makes clear that earlier attempts to
    interrogate a defendant after an invocation of rights can violate
    Edwards, but a subsequent decision to speak with law
    enforcement can still be voluntary. That is the case here.
    Regarding the requirement that the waiver be voluntary,
    we conclude that for the same reasons discussed in part
    II.A.2.b., ante, the record shows that defendant’s initiation was
    voluntary and uncoerced by law enforcement’s earlier conduct.
    Notably, there is no indication that Patterson “ ‘threatened,
    tricked, or cajoled’ ” defendant into a waiver. (People v.
    Honeycutt (1977) 
    20 Cal.3d 150
    , 160.)
    Defendant relies on Neal, 
    supra,
     
    31 Cal.4th 63
     to argue he
    did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights when he spoke
    with Patterson, asserting that law enforcement authorities
    repeatedly disregarded defendant’s efforts to remain silent and
    invoke his right to counsel during the three-and-a-half-hour
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    time frame, despite defendant’s physical condition and
    expressed shock and confusion, and that Young berated
    defendant for murdering Aguirre.
    In Neal, however, the defendant invoked his right to
    counsel nine times, and the officer intentionally violated the
    defendant’s Miranda rights, applying an aggressive method of
    interrogation that he knew was improper. “[T]he officer . . . not
    only continued the questioning improperly but badgered
    defendant, accusing him of lying, and informing defendant that
    ‘this is your one chance’ to help [yourself] and that ‘if you don’t
    try and cooperate . . . , the system is going to stick it to you as
    hard as they can.’ Despite this badgering, defendant did not
    admit his guilt at that session. After the session ended,
    however, defendant was placed in custody and kept in jail
    overnight without access to counsel or other noncustodial
    personnel and without food or drink or toilet facilities. The
    following morning, defendant asked to speak to the officer, who
    thereafter met with him, resumed questioning, and ultimately
    obtained two confessions from him.” (Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at
    p. 68; see id. at pp. 73–75.) Neal was an 18-year-old high school
    dropout with limited intelligence and little experience of the
    criminal justice system. (Id. at p. 84.)
    Here, defendant not only initiated the conversation with
    Patterson, he led it. Patterson asked few questions and
    frequently gave only one-word responses, encouraging
    defendant to continue speaking. For example, after a brief
    interruption during which the surgery resident entered the
    room to conduct a medical procedure, defendant started a new
    topic, stating, “you know I, about this afternoon, I’m aware of
    everything that happened (unintelligible).” After they discussed
    defendant’s attendance at AA meetings, defendant switched to
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    a new topic, stating, “But this episode with me, just today
    (unintelligible).” The overall picture is not of a browbeaten
    suspect whose will was overborne by a coercive interrogator, but
    of a suspect eager to tell his story to a sympathetic listener, even
    though there might be consequences for doing so. Near the end
    of their conversation, defendant urged Patterson to “write [his]
    report as quickly as possible” and remarked, “[Y]ou had a kind
    face. . . . I think that’s [an] asset in your business.” Thus, the
    discussion between Patterson and defendant paints a different
    picture than in Neal. Of significance here and in contrast to
    Neal, the record before us (including defendant’s statement that
    his lawyer was “really going to be pissed”) suggests that the
    actions of law enforcement personnel did not cause defendant to
    misunderstand the nature of his rights such to undermine the
    validity of his waiver. (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 485.)
    Regarding the requirement that the waiver be knowing
    and intelligent, the record establishes that defendant made a
    conscious choice to talk to Dr. Patterson despite knowing he was
    entitled to counsel and also knowing that, by talking to
    Patterson, he was acting against his legal interest. First,
    defendant had been read his full Miranda rights by Detective
    Young at the start of the evening and had invoked those rights
    by refusing to talk to the police and the district attorney and
    asking for an attorney. Second, Patterson clearly informed
    defendant at the start of the encounter that his statements could
    be used against him. Defendant asserted his Miranda rights to
    Patterson, as he had earlier in the evening, which showed his
    understanding that he had the right to assert his rights to
    Patterson. Defendant clearly understood that his statements
    could be used against him, telling Patterson that he was “facing
    very serious charges and I think I’d rather talk to a lawyer first.”
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Patterson agreed, stating, “that’s your decision” and “it’s up to
    you, you can still refuse it . . . .” Third, Patterson testified at the
    hearing on the Miranda motion that defendant appeared alert
    and cognizant during the interview, and his participation in the
    interview was unimpaired by his physical condition. Fourth,
    and most critically, defendant’s own contemporaneous
    statements demonstrated a knowing waiver by defendant of his
    Miranda rights. Early on in his discussion with Patterson,
    defendant said: “I think I’d be better off talking to you about
    emotional states than about actual specific facts” and “I’m sure
    my lawyer wouldn’t appreciate it, you know?” (see p. 31, ante.)
    Toward, the end of the discussion with Patterson, defendant
    again reiterated this understanding, stating:
    “DEFENDANT: I started out by just not wanting to tell
    you exactly what happened —
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: — but it ended up that way.
    “PATTERSON: Well, we went sort of round and round —
    “DEFENDANT: At this point I don’t have anything to
    lose by being honest and saying what happened.
    “PATTERSON: Yeah.
    “DEFENDANT: And I understand my lawyer’s really
    going to be pissed and so forth.
    “PATTERSON: Um-hum.
    “DEFENDANT: So then (unintelligible).
    “PATTERSON: You can certainly talk, and he’ll get what
    we’re talking about.
    “DEFENDANT: I’m sure he will, yeah.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    “PATTERSON: And uh —
    “DEFENDANT: And I don’t know why they, why they say
    don’t say nothing, because if you did something and people
    know you did it, there’s people (unintelligible) —
    “PATTERSON: They saw you.
    “DEFENDANT: — you know, they saw me, right. How
    are you gonna say you didn’t? I mean that, what are you
    accomplishing, you know, I think the situ- I think it’s best
    to be honest, that way you get to the root of it.”
    These responses demonstrated defendant’s awareness of
    his rights to silence and counsel and that his statements would
    be used against him and his conscious choice to speak to
    Patterson anyway. Specifically, defendant’s comment that his
    attorney would be angry “demonstrated his awareness of the
    consequences of talking with Dr. Patterson,” as the Attorney
    General argues, and that defendant’s agreement with
    Patterson’s statement that defendant’s attorney would “get
    what we’re talking about” demonstrated that defendant “was
    aware of his right to speak without counsel and that the
    statements would be used against him, yet he voluntarily chose
    to do so anyway.” Defendant’s statement that “I understand my
    lawyer’s really going to be pissed and so forth” demonstrates an
    understanding that he would have a lawyer in the future and is
    a direct acknowledgment by defendant that what he was doing
    contradicted what that future lawyer would advise him to do.
    Defendant’s statement that he “started out . . . not wanting to
    tell [Patterson] exactly what happened” but concluding, “[a]t
    this point [he did not] have anything to lose by being honest and
    saying what happened” further illustrates his awareness that
    he did not have to speak and that he was waiving this right, as
    64
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    did his comment, “I don’t know why they . . . say don’t say
    nothing, because if you did something and people know you did
    it.”
    Defendant even knew Patterson would prepare a report at
    the conclusion of the interview: When Patterson said he was
    going to leave defendant to rest before surgery, defendant
    replied, “Yeah, it’s probably better if you write your report as
    quickly as possible . . . .” Thus, he acknowledged that Patterson
    would be writing a report on what had been said, but he spoke
    with Patterson anyway. As the trial court observed, defendant’s
    statements make it clear defendant understood he could have a
    lawyer and that his statements could be used against him in
    legal proceedings.
    Relying upon Bradshaw, supra, 
    462 U.S. 1039
     and
    Waidla, 
    supra,
     
    22 Cal.4th 690
    , defendant argues that an
    additional round of Miranda warnings were necessary here
    after any initiation in order to ensure that his statement to
    Patterson was voluntary. While initiation and waiver are
    indeed separate inquires that should not be “meld[ed]” together
    (Bradshaw, at p. 1045), these cases do not require a new
    Miranda advisement after a suspect initiates dialogue. As the
    trial court acknowledged, an express Miranda waiver would
    certainly make this an easier case. However, it is well settled
    that a suspect initiates “further communication, when his words
    or conduct ‘can be “fairly said to represent a desire” on his part
    “to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or
    indirectly to the investigation.” ’ ” (Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
    p. 656.) “ ‘In the event he does in fact “initiate” ’ such further
    communication, exchanges, or conversations, ‘the police may
    commence interrogation if he validly waives his [Miranda]
    rights.’ ” (Waidla, at pp. 727–728; see also Bradshaw, at p. 1044
    65
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    [“if a conversation taking place after the accused has ‘expressed
    his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,’ is
    initiated by the accused, where reinterrogation follows, the
    burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent
    events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have
    counsel present during the interrogation”].) For the reasons
    stated above, the waiver here was valid.
    Nonetheless, we acknowledge that certain aspects of the
    interaction between Patterson and defendant make this
    question close. First, defendant never expressly revoked his
    invocations. Instead, the waiver here was more subtle: When
    defendant asked Patterson if he wanted to talk, Patterson
    responded, “[I]f you don’t mind and we could just talk about
    what has happened or something,” and then a conversation
    ensued. Defendant later explained that he had not wanted to
    discuss what had happened that day but that “it ended up that
    way” and that “at this point,” which was after he had confessed,
    he had nothing to lose. As the trial court explained, “The only
    thing lacking — and I think [defense counsel] argued this point
    and I think well argued it — was if Dr. Patterson had stopped
    and stated the Miranda, we probably wouldn’t be having this
    conversation.”
    Second, defendant’s medical condition — he had been
    shot, he was in pain, and had been given a “pretty heavy dose”
    of perhaps “local anesthesia” prior to his confession — raises
    concern about whether he would have been alert and cognizant
    during his encounters with Patterson.
    Third, there is the possibility that law enforcement’s prior
    violations of defendant’s right to counsel may have put pressure
    on defendant and made him feel like he had to talk to law
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    enforcement or Patterson despite his prior invocations of his
    right to silence and to counsel.
    Last, there is the possibility that defendant was unclear
    as to whether Dr. Patterson was there to interrogate defendant
    or treat him. Defendant may not have fully appreciated this
    distinction. Defendant spoke to Patterson only after expressing
    potential willingness to Haas to speak with a psychiatrist in the
    context of a discussion in which defendant had described his
    earlier efforts to see mental health specialists. In talking with
    Patterson, defendant seemed interested in getting answers
    about his schizophrenia. He explained his efforts to get
    treatment and described his delusions and what seemed to
    worsen them. He told Patterson, “I think you, you probably deal
    with emotional states rather than facts anyway, but
    (unintelligible) if you’re giving some type of a diagnosis.”
    Nonetheless, despite these countervailing concerns, the
    record overall establishes that defendant made a conscious
    choice to talk to Patterson despite knowing he was entitled to
    counsel and also knowing that, by talking to Patterson, he was
    acting against his legal interest. Defendant had been read his
    full Miranda rights by Detective Young at the start of the
    evening and Patterson had clearly informed defendant at the
    start of the encounter that his statements could be used against
    him. Defendant asserted his Miranda rights to Patterson, as he
    had earlier in the evening, which showed his understanding that
    he had the right to assert his rights to Patterson. Most crucially,
    we have the unique benefit of being able to listen to the audio of
    the interview, which corroborates Patterson’s testimony that
    defendant appeared alert and unconfused, and convinces us, as
    it did the trial court, of “defendant’s understanding, knowledge,
    appreciation and willingness to participate in the
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    conversation . . . .” (See Burbine, 
    supra, 475
     U.S. at pp. 422–
    423 [“Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely
    on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could
    stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the
    State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction,
    the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of
    law”]; accord, People v. Mattson (1990) 
    50 Cal.3d 826
    , 867.) We
    agree with the trial court’s conclusion, described above, that
    defendant “knew what was going on. He knew what use it would
    be put to. He knew with whom he was speaking. He knew what
    he was speaking of.” We further agree the conversation was
    “un[e]xcited, unforced and voluntary . . . .” In sum, our review
    of the audio recording reveals a defendant who is speaking
    freely, easily, and comfortably and not as the result of
    “ ‘ “intimidation, coercion, or deception . . . .” ’ ” (McCurdy,
    supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1086.)
    Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the suppression
    motion. Defendant’s ultimate decision to speak with Patterson
    was not the product of the earlier efforts to question him but of
    his own free will and intelligent choice, knowing he was entitled
    to, and had the option to wait for, an attorney. Only because of
    an unusual record affording insight into defendant’s thinking
    can we conclude defendant’s willingness to talk was
    uninfluenced by the earlier Miranda violations. To be clear, we
    do not hold that, after invocation, law enforcement can return
    shortly thereafter and request to interrogate the suspect. That
    violates Edwards’s bright line rule. Similarly, we do not hold
    that law enforcement has carte blanche permission to remain
    present after an invocation in the hope of inducing a suspect to
    talk. Depending on the facts, such conduct could make a
    subsequent initiation and waiver involuntary. For example, we
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    could imagine a case where the subsequent statements by law
    enforcement to the suspect are more directive (e.g. “we’ll just
    stay here or follow you around until you change your mind”),
    where the duration of the officer’s presence is longer, where the
    manner in which the officer stays is more menacing or
    intimidating, or where the defendant’s ultimate decision to talk
    seems coerced based upon the defendant’s responses. But that
    is not this case. Every Miranda inquiry is highly fact specific,
    and here we have unique facts. Here, Patterson explained after
    defendant invoked that “it’s up to you” and did not ask further
    questions; Patterson was present with defendant for only a
    limited time period before defendant started the conversation
    with Patterson; defendant, and not Patterson, started the
    conversation at issue; the recorded interview clearly shows that
    defendant was calm and was engaging Patterson, with
    defendant largely directing the conversation and selecting the
    topics; the record indicates that defendant was aware he was
    providing information that might be used against him, yet he
    viewed the trade-off as worthwhile; and the trial court’s
    numerous factual findings are supported by an audio recording
    that we can listen to and assess for ourselves. On this unique
    record, we affirm.4
    4
    The dissent expresses concern that this holding will
    encourage law enforcement to “ ‘simply disregard the suspect’s
    requests for counsel’ ” and continue to interrogate the suspect
    with shifting and ever subtler tactics. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 21,
    quoting People v. Storm (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 1007
    , 1046 (dis. opn.
    of Chin, J.).) We disagree. First, it is worth noting that we here
    hold that the trial court properly excluded portions of
    defendant’s prior interviews conducted by Haas and Young.
    Moreover, we acknowledge above that this is a close case and,
    69
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    B. Exclusion of Portions of Patterson’s Interview
    of Defendant
    After the trial court denied defendant’s suppression
    motion, the parties litigated what portions of the Patterson
    interview were admissible, with defendant arguing for
    admission of the entire interview but the court generally ruling
    with the prosecution in admitting only limited portions.
    Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling, contending that
    excluding a majority of the interview violated Evidence Code
    section 356 and his federal constitutional right to due process.
    The Attorney General argues the excluded portions were
    irrelevant to the question of defendant’s mental state and that
    regardless, any error was harmless. We conclude the trial court
    acted within its discretion in redacting the statements as it did.
    1. Version of Interview Presented to Jury
    The redacted interview submitted to the jury described in
    the statement of facts ante is recounted in more detail here. In
    the redacted interview, defendant explained that he would
    become overwhelmed by “intense emotions” and that he had
    recently been in a monthlong “very intense emotional
    relationship” with G.A. that had “[s]tirred things up.” He
    on different facts, suppression of defendant’s statements to
    Patterson could have been required. This fact alone, involving
    the possibility — litigated over several decades — of
    suppressing statements used at the trial of a defendant
    convicted of the senseless murder of a law enforcement officer,
    serves as a stark warning. No one should take from this opinion
    the lesson that violations of constitutional rights carry no
    consequences. Every violation jeopardizes the ability to place
    before a jury anything a suspect might say, and jeopardizes any
    conviction that might be obtained if matters that should have
    been excluded are erroneously admitted.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    explained he had married G.A. some years before as a favor so
    she could obtain a green card and that they had had no contact
    nor began dating until recently. The week before the shooting,
    he had accused G.A. of cheating on him and she had denied it.
    He explained to Patterson that he had become intensely jealous
    of G.A. and determined to never be physically separated from
    her again. He then confessed to kidnapping G.A. at gunpoint.
    The portion submitted to the jury also included Patterson
    and defendant’s discussion of the events surrounding the
    shooting of Aguirre. Defendant recalled observing the police
    pull G.A. out of the house and realizing then that her family
    must have called the police. He saw Aguirre enter the residence
    and heard Aguirre tell him to put his hands up. Defendant
    explained that he “was kinda looking out” from behind a wall
    and “just jumped out and shot [Aguirre],” explaining that that
    was how he “reacted” to the situation.
    The submitted portions of the interview also included
    some explanation of defendant’s experience of the events that
    day. He told Patterson that on the day of the shooting, he felt
    as if he “was in a movie.” He recounted earlier conversations
    with G.A. in which she had urged him to write a movie because
    defendant had “done some writing” in school. That afternoon
    when they were driving in the car after leaving G.A.’s employer’s
    residence, G.A. had reminded defendant about writing a movie
    and he had explained to her that he was writing the movie at
    that moment and that they were in the movie “acting it out.” He
    told Patterson, “[W]hen you have guns, then that’s how you
    write a movie . . . ” and that he kept telling G.A., “[Y]ou’re in [the
    movie] right now, isn’t it exciting?” But he explained to
    Patterson that he was “aware of everything that happened” and
    “know what I did . . . .” He explained that he was “getting what
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    [he] wanted” and that the “movie was going the way [he] wanted
    it to.” He explained that his actions against the police that day
    had been a “passive suicide attempt.”
    2. Portions of Interview not Presented to Jury
    In the portions of the interview excluded from the jury,
    defendant and Patterson discussed defendant’s experiences
    with paranoid delusions, efforts to seek mental health
    treatment, self-diagnosis of schizophrenia, recognition that
    close emotional relationships would intensify his delusions, and
    description of prior criminal activity and incarceration as it
    related to his delusions. Defendant stated, “I think you, you
    probably deal with emotional states rather than facts anyway,
    but (unintelligible) if you’re giving some type of a diagnosis.”
    Defendant told Patterson he had paranoid delusions. He
    explained that about two years before Patterson’s interview of
    defendant, defendant had contacted the county mental health
    department because he thought he had a mental disorder. He
    saw psychologist Lisa Kus (who testified in defendant’s penalty
    defense) at the county’s mental health department, and she
    diagnosed him with organic delusional disorder. Kus referred
    defendant to a psychiatrist who prescribed Haldol. Defendant
    stopped taking the medication after three days because it caused
    “a lot of hallucinations” that were “real frightening.” Patterson
    told defendant that sometimes Haldol worsens hallucinations.
    When defendant went back to the county’s mental health
    department, he was seen by another psychiatrist who did not
    schedule defendant for another appointment because he did not
    think defendant “was going to be a mental health patient.”
    Defendant told Patterson he also attended “12-step
    meetings and recovery programs” for drug addiction and
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    alcoholism and enrolled in a drug and alcohol counselor’s
    certificate program at Oxnard Community College. He told
    Patterson about his job working as a resident manager at the
    facility for residents with dual diagnosis of mental disorder and
    chemical dependency. Through information gained in these
    experiences, defendant determined he had schizophrenia.
    Defendant provided some descriptions of his delusions. He
    explained that when he saw Kus, he had been living with his
    parents and had formed the belief they were “Nazi
    agents . . . trying to reprogram [defendant] through chemicals”
    by poisoning his food. Defendant said he had a “paranoid
    episode” for three months after that. Defendant responded
    affirmatively to Patterson’s question whether defendant still
    believed his father was poisoning his food.
    He described experiencing an “intense” paranoid delusion
    about three to six months before the interview with Patterson,
    in which defendant formed the belief that his father had
    molested defendant’s son when his son was approximately 7
    years old. Defendant felt “intense” anger and avoided his father,
    thinking he would have to kill him, until he realized he was
    having a delusion.
    Regarding defendant’s accusation to G.A. a few days
    before the shooting, that she was cheating on him, defendant
    told Patterson that G.A. responded, “You’re sick, Mike, you’re
    sick in the head, you need treatment, you should go [see] the
    doctor.”
    Defendant explained he had “another violent episode”
    about 10 years earlier, in which he committed armed robbery of
    a McDonald’s restaurant while he was under the influence of
    drugs. Patterson asked if the armed robbery was “a fall off with
    73
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    the paranoid delusional thing.” Defendant responded, “Well you
    know the armed robbery thing was, and I, this is all in my files
    over at Hillmont, but I had the delusion — I sorta had that
    delusion today too, but uh, I was doing a religious thing. It was
    a religious battle. (unintelligible). Ever heard of Krishna? The
    Indian God, Krishna?” Defendant explained he was Hindu and
    robbed the McDonald’s restaurant because, “I thought they were
    the demons of this world selling billions and billions of
    hamburgers. I wanted to harm them, so I was gonna rob
    ’em. . . . I wanted to scare all the people in the restaurant.”
    Patterson and defendant discussed his incarceration
    following the robbery. Defendant told Patterson that when he
    was pending release from incarceration, he told a staff
    psychiatrist that he thought he would be harmful to himself and
    society and should not be released. Defendant told prison staff
    that he was continuing to have “delusions with Krishna.”
    Defendant explained that he was not feeling “remorse
    now” and this was “normal” for him when he was “emotionally
    excited, to shut down.” He described feeling like “there’s no
    emotion” but also that there was “too much emotion. You don’t
    realize you have emotions, then you feel that controls your
    actions.”
    In addition to explaining to Patterson, in the portion
    submitted to the jury, that the intense emotions defendant
    experienced were overwhelming, defendant had also explained
    in the excluded portions of the interview that close emotional
    relationships “amplified the delusional thinking.” He explained
    that the paranoid episodes were “triggered by, by uh, people
    that . . . are real close . . . .” Defendant avoided seeing his son,
    at the time age 22, because it would be a “pretty emotional”
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    experience, and emotions would “amplif[y] the delusional
    thinking, you know.”       He experienced his emotions as
    “disorienting and confusing and . . . uncomfortable.”
    In response to Patterson’s question about whether
    defendant’s delusions had “entirely disappear[ed],” defendant
    explained that he still had “paranoid . . . episodes.”       The
    episodes would “come[] and go[].”
    3. Procedural and Legal Background
    The prosecution sought to admit portions of defendant’s
    statements “to explain the defendant’s actions” on the day of the
    shooting and argued that the remaining portions concerned
    evidence of defendant’s criminal, family, educational, and
    mental health history that was irrelevant “to what the
    defendant was thinking or doing on the day in question and do
    not shed any light on the issues in the case.” The prosecution
    specifically objected on hearsay grounds to defendant’s
    comments relaying statements made by his previous treating
    clinicians.
    The defense contended that admission of the entire
    interview was necessary under his federal constitutional due
    process and confrontation rights because it was defendant’s
    explanation of why the shooting occurred. The defense argued
    that defendant’s statements in the interview — his descriptions
    of his symptoms and earlier episodes of delusions, recounting of
    diagnosis by former mental health clinicians, and explanation
    that his paranoid delusions were amplified by intense emotional
    relationships and had resulted in earlier criminal activity —
    were in response to Patterson’s questions and an explanation
    that his paranoid delusions were present in the days leading to,
    and had resulted in, the shooting and thus were evidence of his
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    mental state. Defendant also argued that the remaining
    portions of the interview were connected to the portions offered
    by the prosecution to show defendant’s thoughts and actions
    that day, including the admitted portion in which defendant
    stated that he “just reacted” to the situation, and that the
    statements added corroboration and credibility to the admitted
    statements.     The defense argued that exclusion of the
    statements, and in particular the detailed parsing of the
    statements, would create a misleading impression that
    defendant confessed to shooting Aguirre absent any mental
    illness and that the admitted portions were all that defendant
    had told Patterson, a psychiatrist, about why he shot Aguirre.
    In sum, the defense argued that excluding all references to
    defendant’s mental illness would create a misleading impression
    of defendant’s state of mind and deprive the jury of a complete
    evaluation of defendant’s explanation of his mental state.
    The prosecution objected to admission of the entire
    statement as containing multiple layers of hearsay and that the
    defense was not calling a mental state expert in the guilt phase
    or declaring an intent to present a defense based on a mental
    disease.
    The trial court denied the defense motion to include the
    entire interview, admitting the portions requested by the
    prosecution, some additional passages the court determined to
    admit, and two specific portions requested by the defense in
    response to the court’s ruling. Specifically, on its own, the court
    admitted portions of the discussion between Patterson and
    defendant in which defendant described feeling “these intense
    emotions that were kind of overwhelming,” that his relationship
    with G.A. had “[s]tirred things up,” that defendant had felt like
    he was “in a movie” that day but that he was “aware of
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    everything that happened,” and that his conduct that day was
    his “reaction to the situation” and had possibly been a “passive
    suicide attempt,” and that defendant was “getting what [he]
    wanted, the movie was going the way [he] wanted it to.” In
    response to defense requests, the court admitted portions in
    which defendant said he had accused G.A. of cheating on him
    the week before, which she denied, but it declined to admit the
    additional portion in which G.A. further told defendant, “You’re
    sick, Mike, you’re sick in the head, you need treatment, go to the
    doctor.”
    The court reasoned that the portions it was admitting
    were relevant to the prosecution’s offer to show defendant’s
    “state of mind” and actions that day but that defendant’s
    “subjective evaluation of his own psychological state as it
    reflects back upon what he thought he was doing in the context
    of the psychoanalysis and other treatment he had received
    throughout, other therapists” (sic) was inadmissible. The court
    ruled that the defense could otherwise contest the state’s case
    on state of mind, malice, and premeditation such as through
    expert testimony, but could not present expert opinion through
    defendant’s statements. The defense could also inquire into the
    circumstances of the interview, such as defendant’s condition
    and the representations made by Patterson. In response to the
    court’s ruling, the defense reiterated its contention that
    admission of the entire interview was required and argued that
    nonetheless, the inclusion of 15 additional lines from the
    interview was at least admissible under the trial court’s own
    theory of admissibility. As noted above, the trial court admitted
    some of the requested lines.
    During its opening statement, the prosecution quoted
    from defendant’s statements to Patterson that he felt like he
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    was in a movie on the day of the shooting. The prosecution
    stated this “wasn’t a hallucination” and quoted defendant’s
    further comments from the interview in which defendant stated
    that he had told G.A. that he was writing a movie. The defense
    renewed its motion under Evidence Code section 356 to have the
    entire audiotape played during cross-examination, arguing in
    response to the prosecution’s comment that defendant had not
    been hallucinating, that the excised portions of the interview
    supported the defense theory that defendant was experiencing
    delusions that day, noting specifically that defendant had
    explained that he had earlier had a delusion that he was in a
    Hindu religious battle and that he had told Patterson that he
    “ ‘sort of had that delusion today too.’ ” The trial court denied
    the motion, explaining:
    “It is one thing for a person to express subjectively, ‘This
    is my state of mind at the time,’ that is, this is what I know, this
    is what I said, this is what I did, which is what the present offer
    is, what is before the jury. It’s a wholly different thing for them
    to have him engage in psychoanalytic theory on why he did what
    he did.
    “And, in substance, what the defense would have the
    Court do is have Mr. Johnson become his own expert. Not on
    his state of mind at the time, which is — you know, one is
    allowed to give one’s impressions about one’s own physical
    condition under oath. But this is really ramblings of someone
    about former events, former states of mind, former matters
    which are wholly outside of, in my estimation, what is before the
    Court.
    “Now, let me be clear. I think this has all really been
    rather thoroughly explored. I am comfortable with the idea and
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    the reason I allowed his expression of his then existing state of
    mind in because I think you have a right to argue whether a
    person who sees himself in a movie is a person who has actually
    formed malice. I think ultimately I’m going to hear that
    argument from you.
    “And inasmuch as he was recounting the events and his
    then existing state of mind, that is all that is before the jury.
    However, to then allow a foray into Mr. Johnson’s subjective
    psychoanalytic theory concerning what moves him in times past
    and how that may have some nexus with times present is not
    356. It’s just — it’s not part of the same package. It’s a wholly
    different issue.
    “As to his cognitive functions at the time, you know, the
    evidence will be whatever the evidence is. And Dr. Patterson’s
    examination at this point has been markedly circumspect. It’s
    been: I was there, there was the person, this is what he said.
    And it was redacted to confine itself to the very narrow issues
    before the Court.
    “I could go on and give you some self-serving comments
    about how I’m comfortable with this ruling, but I’m more
    comfortable than I was before with it. I think it’s a very clear,
    almost bright line distinction between his evaluative thinking
    reflectively and his declarative thinking about what in fact
    occurred.
    “So, the objection — the motion to offer the greater portion
    of evidence is denied, and the Court stands on its earlier ruling.”
    Evidence Code section 356 provides that “[w]here part of
    an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence
    by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired
    into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or
    writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
    conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it
    understood may also be given in evidence .” “ ‘ “The purpose of
    this section is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a
    conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a
    misleading impression on the subjects addressed.” ’ ” (People v.
    Hardy (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 56
    , 104.) “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts do not draw
    narrow lines around the exact subject of inquiry. “In the event
    a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of a
    conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have
    placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the
    declarant in the course of such conversation or correspondence,
    provided the other statements have some bearing upon, or
    connection with,           the admission or declaration in
    evidence. . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Clark (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
    , 600
    (Clark).) This includes admission of portions “of the same
    interview or conversation, even if they are self-serving” so long
    as they “ ‘have some bearing upon, or connection with, the
    admission . . . in evidence.’ ” (People v. Arias (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 92
    , 156.) “Evidence Code section 356 ‘ “is founded on the
    equitable notion that a party who elects to introduce a part of a
    conversation is precluded from objecting on confrontation clause
    grounds to introduction by the opposing party of other parts of
    the conversation which are necessary to make the entirety of the
    conversation understood.” ’ ”    (People v. Melendez (2016)
    
    2 Cal.5th 1
    , 26.) “The section permits introduction only of
    statements ‘on the same subject’ or which are necessary for
    understanding of the statements already introduced. The ‘other
    conversation’ referred to in Evidence Code section 356 must
    have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    declaration in evidence.” (People v. Breaux (1991) 
    1 Cal.4th 281
    ,
    302.) Evidence Code section 356 “applies only to statements
    that have some bearing upon, or connection with, the portion of
    the conversation originally introduced. [Citation.] Statements
    pertaining to other matters may be excluded.” (People v.
    Samuels (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 96
    , 130; accord, People v. Chism
    (2014) 
    58 Cal.4th 1266
    , 1324.) “Section 356 is indisputably
    ‘ “subject to the qualification that the court may exclude those
    portions of the conversation not relevant to the items thereof
    which have been introduced.” ’ [Citations.] ‘The rule is not
    applied mechanically to permit the whole of a transaction to
    come in without regard to its competency or relevancy . . . .’
    (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 320, p. 283.)” (People v.
    Williams (1975) 
    13 Cal.3d 559
    , 565.)
    Further, under section 352, “a trial court has broad
    discretion to exclude evidence it deems irrelevant, cumulative,
    or unduly prejudicial or time-consuming.” (People v. Pride
    (1992) 
    3 Cal.4th 195
    , 235; see People v. Zapien (1993) 
    4 Cal.4th 929
    , 960 [affirming trial court’s ruling to admit portions of
    earlier testimony sought by the prosecution for context under
    Evid. Code § 356 where the court also considered and rejected
    the defense’s challenge to admission of the statement under §
    352].)
    A trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 356 is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Farley (2009)
    
    46 Cal.4th 1053
    , 1103.) “ ‘ “[T]he scope of discretion always
    resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal
    principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . .’ Action that
    transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is
    outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’
    of discretion.” ’ ” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 81
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    531, 540.) “To establish an abuse of discretion, defendants must
    demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was so erroneous that
    it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ [Citations.] A merely
    debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion.
    [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be ‘established by “a
    showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
    capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
    manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and
    Wheeler (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 335
    , 390 .)
    4. Analysis
    Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in
    excluding a majority of his statement to Patterson because the
    redacted statement gave the jury an incomplete, prejudicial
    view of his mental state on the day of the crime as well as during
    the interview with Patterson.
    In the interview, defendant had explained his belief that
    he had been plagued by paranoid delusions throughout his life
    and that they had resulted in criminal activity similar to the
    events that day. He explained that his perceptions of reality
    would be incorrect due to his mental illness.        Defendant
    observed that his delusions were worsened by close
    relationships, such as his parents and his son, and had
    previously resulted in homicidal thoughts. He explained that
    as the delusions were happening, he would believe they were
    real, such as that his parents were Nazi agents trying to poison
    his food or that his father had molested defendant’s son.
    Defendant argues these explanations were part of his
    explanation in the admitted portions about becoming
    overwhelmed with feelings for G.A.; he highlights that he had
    told Patterson that his intense feelings for G.A. had amplified
    82
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    his delusional thinking. Defendant had told Patterson that he
    had considered going to see a psychiatrist a week before the
    shooting because when he accused G.A. of cheating on him, she
    had said he was mentally ill and needed to see a doctor. Thus,
    defendant argues, his complete statement gave meaning to his
    behavior and mental state at the time of the kidnapping, sexual
    assault, and murder. He argues exclusion of the statements
    was prejudicial because it created a misleading impression that
    he shot Deputy Aguirre absent any mental illness and because
    it allowed the prosecution to argue defendant committed cold-
    blooded first degree special-circumstances murder by urging the
    jury to “listen to that tape to hear the cold and to hear the ice”
    in defendant’ statements without the benefit of hearing the rest
    of the interview, which he argues would have given the jury
    context to evaluate the prosecution’s characterization of
    defendant’s demeanor and intent.
    We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion to
    redact the statements as it did. First, the court admitted
    defendant’s statements that described his mental state on the
    day of the shooting. Defendant described that he “felt these
    intense emotions that were kinda overwhelming.” He described
    that “what happened this afternoon was like I was in a movie.”
    He described, “it was going on and I was living life and that was
    a movie.” The court reasonably decided that defendant’s self-
    diagnosis regarding prior events was unrelated to the current
    events and his description of what he was experiencing that day.
    The trial court chose to distinguish between statements
    reflecting past unrelated events versus the events on the day of
    the shooting and defendant’s analytic statements as to his mind
    versus declarative statements of what he was experiencing.
    Thus, it excluded the portions of the interview that covered
    83
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    defendant’s criminal, educational, psychiatric, and family
    history. As the Attorney General argues, these portions were
    irrelevant to what defendant was thinking on the day of the
    shooting. Second, the trial court informed the defense that the
    whole interview was not admissible and that the defense needed
    to be more specific about which parts it sought to admit, and
    then it considered further the specific portions the defense
    identified as admissible. The court explained that because the
    defense had sought to admit the entire interview, “I had to do it
    essentially on my own, I felt. I felt somewhat at sea on that. [¶]
    I’ve made the ruling. Are there things specifically you feel
    should come in that I’m not allowing in? Having said, ‘I want it
    all,’ can you be more precise?” The record shows the trial court
    acted carefully in seeking to narrowly admit the portions related
    to the portions sought by the prosecution. Third, the trial court
    informed the defense that it could present an expert to testify
    about defendant’s mental condition on the day of the shooting.
    Counsel apparently chose not to do so. The record shows that
    the trial court carefully reviewed the interview transcript and
    discussed its reasoning with the parties and provided the
    defense an additional opportunity to argue for the inclusion of
    specific statements, before it reasonably concluded it had
    included all statements that related to defendant’s statement of
    mind on the day of the shooting. The trial court’s decision to
    include statements that related to the defendant’s mental state
    on the day of the shooting but to exclude statements regarding
    his mental state prior to the shooting (in some cases ten years
    or more prior to the shooting) was not an abuse of discretion.
    Because the court acted within its discretion under
    Evidence Code section 356 in excluding portions of the
    statements, defendant’s related claim that the trial court
    84
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    violated his due process rights by excluding relevant evidence
    also fails. “ ‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence
    do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present
    a defense. Courts retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic
    power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence
    in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of
    prejudice.’ ” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 
    45 Cal.3d 660
    , 683; accord,
    People v. Frye (1998) 
    18 Cal.4th 894
    , 948.) While the court
    excluded the portions of the interview it found unrelated to
    defendant’s statements about the events on the day of the
    shooting, it informed the defense it could otherwise contest the
    state’s case on state of mind, malice, and premeditation such as
    through presentation of expert testimony. Thus, the defense
    was not precluded from presenting a defense about his state of
    mind.
    C. Admission of Defendant’s Prior Serious Felony
    Convictions as Evidence of Motive
    Defendant contends the trial court’s admission in the guilt
    phase of evidence of his prior crimes to demonstrate his “Three
    Strikes” status as proof of motive violated Evidence Code
    sections 1101 and 352, depriving him of his rights to a fair trial
    and due process of law, and rendering the penalty determination
    unreliable in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
    Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He
    also raises related prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of
    discretion claims. Without resolving the substantive claims, we
    conclude any error was harmless. 5
    5
    As he argued below, defendant also argues that the other
    crimes evidence was inadmissible to show intent, as distinct
    85
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    1. Factual and Legal Background
    To support its theory of premeditated murder, the
    prosecution moved to admit evidence that defendant had
    suffered two prior convictions in 1987 that qualified as serious
    felonies, and that he had signed a parole form in 1991 stating
    that possession of a firearm would constitute a felony. (Evid.
    Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) The prosecutor reasoned that if
    defendant knew he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence for
    possessing firearms, then his awareness of his status supported
    an inference that he quickly shot Deputy Aguirre and attempted
    to kill Deputy Fryhoff to avoid arrest and a potential life
    sentence.
    The defense argued that such inference was speculative
    because there was no evidence defendant understood and was
    motivated by the possibility that he faced a Three Strikes
    sentence. Defense counsel further argued that defendant may
    not have understood that his concurrent convictions in 1987
    were separate strikes since he had committed the offenses “on
    the same occasion.”
    Acknowledging that defendant’s knowledge of his status
    was “to some degree speculative,” the trial court nonetheless
    from motive, because his prior offenses were insufficiently
    similar to his current charges to support an inference that he
    was acting with the same intent in the current charges as he
    was in the previous offenses. However, the prosecution did not
    argue that defendant killed Deputy Aguirre because he was
    motivated by the same intent he harbored when he committed
    the past offenses. The prosecution only used the prior offenses
    to argue motive, i.e., defendant killed Aguirre to escape a life
    sentence because the existence of his prior convictions exposed
    him to a potential life sentence, and the jury was accordingly
    instructed only on this theory.
    86
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    granted the prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence of
    defendant’s prior offenses and the parole advisement,
    concluding defendant’s criminal history was “significant
    circumstantial evidence” of motive, the absence of which would
    “misrepresent the picture of the facts” and render the killing of
    Deputy Aguirre apparently senseless. The court explained, “the
    point is that in the space of but moments, the defendant, it is
    alleged, shot and killed a police officer with premeditation and
    deliberation. [¶] Operating in a vacuum, it is arguable that
    makes little, if any, sense. The district attorney’s correct. The
    Court is also mindful that if it admits evidence concerning the
    defendant’s criminal history, it’s terribly prejudicial. [¶] The
    role — the status of the defendant as a person who just happens
    to be taking a shower when police arrive and sees them, arms
    himself and shoots and kills a police officer — on its face makes
    little, if any, sense in and of itself. [¶] There is a total package
    here that the jury is entitled to consider. The Court has to weigh
    how you put that together, understanding that the People’s
    theory is this is a motive-driven killing, if I understand [the
    prosecutor’s] position. [¶] The Court therefore is of the opinion
    that to deny the People the opportunity to show something about
    the defendant’s history would be to disable the People from
    arguing significant circumstantial evidence that runs to motive,
    which would otherwise be completely absent, and that would be
    a mis[re]presentation of the picture of the facts as they existed
    at the time. [¶] The Court therefore is of the opinion that the
    People will be permitted to show that the defendant had suffered
    unspecified convictions.”
    The court concluded defendant’s experience with the
    criminal justice system supported a reasonable inference that
    he understood the consequences of possessing a firearm. Due to
    87
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    the prejudicial nature of the criminal history, the court decided
    to sanitize the convictions as “unspecified priors” and give the
    jury a limiting instruction.
    In response to the ruling, the defense asked the court not
    to sanitize the two convictions, which were for assault with a
    firearm and robbery with a firearm, withdrew its request to
    bifurcate the trial of the prior conviction sentencing allegations
    and request to stipulate to defendant’s status as a convicted
    felon (which was an element of the charge of felon in possession
    of a firearm), and requested that the parties avoid the phrase
    “Three Strikes.” Granting the requests, the court instructed the
    jury that defendant had been convicted of the offenses and
    would be subject to a 25-year-to-life sentence if he were
    convicted of possessing a firearm or committing any felony.
    The court also instructed the jury three times during the
    trial to consider the priors not as propensity or character
    evidence, but only as evidence of motive for murder and for proof
    of the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. This first
    occurred after the prosecution presented evidence about
    defendant’s criminal record to show that defendant faced a
    potential life sentence when he armed himself on the day of the
    shooting and that his former parole officer would have advised
    defendant that possessing a firearm was a felony. The trial
    court instructed the jury not to use the evidence to conclude
    defendant had a disposition to commit the crimes, and gave a
    similar caution before deliberations. Second and third, the court
    also instructed the jury in the guilt and penalty phases that
    statements made by the attorneys during the trial were not
    evidence.
    88
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    “ ‘Subdivision (a) of [Evidence Code] section 1101 prohibits
    admission of evidence of a person’s character, including evidence
    of character in the form of specific instances of uncharged
    misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a specified
    occasion. Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however, that
    this rule does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged
    misconduct when such evidence is relevant to establish some
    fact other than the person’s character or disposition.’ (People v.
    Ewoldt (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 380
    , 393.) ‘Evidence that a defendant
    committed crimes other than those for which he is on trial is
    admissible when it is logically, naturally, and by reasonable
    inference relevant to prove some fact at issue, such as motive,
    intent, preparation or identity. [Citations.] The trial court
    judge has the discretion to admit such evidence after weighing
    the probative value against the prejudicial effect.’ ” (People v.
    Fuiava (2012) 
    53 Cal.4th 622
    , 667 (Fuiava).) When reviewing
    the admission of other crimes evidence to show motive, “ ‘a court
    must consider: (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or
    disproved, (2) the probative value of the other crime evidence to
    prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any rule or
    policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant.’ ”
    (Ibid.)
    “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
    that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
    time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
    confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code,
    § 352.) “ ‘ “[E]vidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial
    when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury,
    motivating them to use the information, not to logically evaluate
    the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one
    89
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such a
    circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the
    substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate
    purpose.” ’ ” (People v. Powell (2018) 
    6 Cal.5th 136
    , 162–163
    (Powell).)
    “ ‘ “We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings
    on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under
    Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.” ’ ” (Fuiava, supra,
    53 Cal.4th at pp. 667–668.) As noted above, “[t]he court’s ruling
    will not be disturbed unless made ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or
    patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
    of justice.’ ” (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 162.)
    2. Analysis
    Assuming without deciding that the admission of the prior
    crimes evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision
    (b) in the guilt and penalty phases was error, any error was
    harmless. Considering the evidence’s impact in the guilt phase
    first, we review state law errors for prejudice under People v.
    Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
     (Watson). (People v. Harris (2013)
    
    57 Cal.4th 804
    , 842; People v. Malone (1988) 
    47 Cal.3d 1
    , 22.)
    This requires us to examine whether it was “reasonably
    probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
    would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson,
    at p. 836.)
    Our review of the record shows it was not “reasonably
    probable” defendant would have received a more favorable
    result had his prior convictions been excluded. To prove
    defendant premeditated Deputy Aguirre’s murder, the
    prosecution sought to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior
    Three Strikes offenses to show defendant was motivated to shoot
    90
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    at the officers in order to escape and avoid a life sentence. But
    the evidence was strong that defendant killed Deputy Aguirre
    under all three theories of first degree murder. Defendant had
    confessed to the details of shooting Deputy Aguirre and
    kidnapping G.A., and acknowledged his awareness that Aguirre
    was a police officer. He had explained seeing the police officers
    pulling G.A. out of the house and understanding then that her
    daughter had called the police. Defendant’s confession was
    corroborated by G.A.’s testimony about the kidnapping and by
    defendant’s further actions as witnessed by Deputy Fryhoff that
    defendant fired several rounds at Fryhoff as defendant ran out
    of the house. Further, expert testimony on gunshot wounds and
    blood splatter established that Deputy Aguirre was shot in the
    head at very close range, likely while he was on or near the
    ground. Given all of this evidence, the jury likely would have
    concluded defendant fired at the officers while he was running
    out of the house in order to escape and avoid arrest, and
    regardless, that he premeditated the ambush murder of Deputy
    Aguirre while kidnapping G.A. Thus, the evidence was strong
    that he premeditated the killing of Deputy Aguirre, as well as
    killed him in the course of kidnaping G.A. (felony murder
    theory), as well as jumped out from behind a wall and ambushed
    the deputy (lying-in-wait theory).
    The prior crimes evidence was not a significant part of the
    prosecution’s case; rather, the prosecutor largely focused on
    defendant’s confession as proof of his mental state and conduct.
    Defendant’s confession was a focal point of the prosecutor’s case
    on premeditation (as well as the other theories of murder). The
    prosecutor discussed defendant’s admissions in his opening
    statements at the start of trial, played the statements for the
    jury during the trial, used them in cross-examining defense
    91
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    witnesses, and emphasized how the statements supported the
    prosecution’s case during closing and rebuttal arguments. In
    the opening statement, for example, the prosecutor highlighted
    that the jury was “going to hear in [defendant’s] own words the
    cold, matter-of-fact way in which he describes this murder of
    Peter Aguirre.”     The prosecutor then quoted defendant’s
    statements extensively, about kidnapping G.A. from work at
    gunpoint, going to her house and ordering her 15-year-old
    daughter to leave, observing the arrival of the police when he
    and G.A. were in the shower, observing the police pull G.A. out
    the front door, and hearing Aguirre telling him to put his hands
    up. During the trial itself, the prosecutor played the entire
    audiotape of the redacted interview for the jury to hear. In the
    portions played by the prosecutor, the jury heard defendant
    confess that he kidnapped G.A. from her workplace, stating, “I
    would say actually I, I kidnapped her, you know?” The jury also
    heard defendant describe looking out from behind a wall, seeing
    the police pull G.A. out of the front door of the home, and hearing
    Deputy Aguirre tell him to put his hands up in response to which
    defendant “just jumped out and shot” him. In the portion the
    prosecutor played for the jury, it also heard defendant explain
    that he shot Deputy Aguirre because he “just reacted” to the
    situation and that he believed he had attempted a “passive
    suicide” by his actions that day. These direct admissions by
    defendant regarding his culpable state of mind were far more
    consequential than reference to the fact that defendant might
    have faced a life sentence for committing the crimes.
    Defendant argues admission of the evidence at the guilt
    phase was prejudicial because it permitted the jury to use
    defendant’s prior convictions as propensity evidence, increasing
    the likelihood defendant was convicted for his status as a prior
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    offender. However, the jury was twice instructed at the guilt
    phase not to treat the evidence as propensity evidence. “We
    must assume, contrary to defendant’s theory of prejudice, that
    the jury obeyed the express language of the instruction not to
    use the other-crimes evidence to establish defendant’s character
    or his disposition to commit crimes.” (People v. Hayes (1990)
    
    52 Cal.3d 577
    , 625.)
    Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed
    misconduct by repeatedly arguing falsely in the guilt and
    penalty phases that defendant signed a parole form that advised
    him that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence on possession of a
    firearm. It is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue facts that
    are not in the evidence. (People v. Linton (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 1146
    , 1207 (Linton); People v. Mendoza (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 856
    ,
    906.) Regardless, without deciding whether the comments were
    misconduct, for the reasons described above, these comments
    would have been harmless because the prosecution largely
    focused on defendant’s confessions and generally argued
    defendant would have shot at the police officers to facilitate his
    escape. Moreover, even assuming the prosecutor improperly
    conveyed to the jury that the parole form stated that defendant
    faced a 25-year-to-life sentence for possessing a firearm, it was
    undisputed that defendant was advised that possessing a
    firearm was a felony, which would have potentially subjected
    defendant to further sentencing. In this way, even without the
    assumed error, the jury still would have heard uncontradicted
    evidence that defendant had been advised that possessing a
    firearm was a felony. Thus, defendant would have been aware
    that he could be convicted of a felony if he, a convicted felon,
    93
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    were ever apprehended with a firearm. Thus, any error was
    harmless.6
    Defendant also argues admission of the Three Strikes
    evidence was prejudicial at the penalty phase. Specifically, he
    argues that his “defense in the penalty phase was that [he] was
    suffering from the debilitation of paranoid schizophrenia. The
    improper admission and use of the evidence — in light of the
    prosecution's concealment that appellant was in fact suffering
    from paranoid schizophrenia, while also denigrating the defense
    expert on this subject and arguing to the jury that appellant was
    not suffering from paranoid schizophrenia — utterly destroyed
    the defense.” Defendant appears to be arguing that the claimed
    error in admitting the Three Strikes evidence into the trial, and
    the claimed error in denigrating his expert psychologist during
    the penalty phase, had the cumulative prejudicial effect of
    persuading the jury to conclude at the penalty phase that
    defendant killed Deputy Aguirre because he wanted to avoid
    arrest and prison and to reject the defense’s expert testimony
    that defendant killed Deputy Aguirre because he was
    experiencing schizophrenia.
    For state law errors, we review whether there was a
    “reasonable possibility” the error affected the penalty verdict.
    (People v. Brown (1988) 
    46 Cal.3d 432
    , 447; People v. Ashmus
    (1991) 
    54 Cal.3d 932
    , 965.) As discussed in part II.G.4., we
    conclude the prosecutor’s efforts to denigrate the defense expert
    would have been harmless. The jury, moreover, learned about
    defendant’s prior violent offenses (that were the basis for the
    6
    For the same reasons, defendant’s related claim that he
    was prevented from responding to the prosecutor’s argument,
    even if it has merit, was also harmless error.
    94
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    Three Strikes convictions) as part of the prosecution’s
    presentation of Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) and factor (c)
    evidence on defendant’s prior criminal activity. Thus, the jury
    would have heard about the prior convictions that were the basis
    for the Three Strikes allegations as routine penalty phase
    evidence regardless of whether they were admissible under the
    guilt phase theory that defendant shot Deputy Aguirre because
    he knew he faced a life sentence and thus sought to avoid
    arrest.7 We therefore conclude there was no reasonable
    possibility that any error in admitting defendant’s Three Strikes
    convictions prejudicially affected the penalty phase verdict.
    D. Deputy District Attorney’s Testimony About
    Defendant’s Criminal Record
    Defendant contends his state and federal rights to due
    process and a fair trial were violated by Deputy District
    Attorney Terence Kilbride’s testimony about defendant’s
    criminal record.    Specifically, he contends the testimony
    usurped the jury’s role in determining defendant’s prior
    convictions. He also contends the testimony usurped the court’s
    role in instructing the jury. We conclude there was no
    prejudicial error.
    As part of the prosecution’s evidence that defendant faced
    a potential life sentence when he armed himself on the day of
    the shooting, Kilbride testified, as an expert on sentencing, that
    defendant had served a prison term and had convictions for five
    7
    In determining the penalty, factor (b) of Penal Code,
    section 190.3 permits the jury to consider evidence of “criminal
    activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted
    use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use
    force or violence.” Factor (c) permits the jury to consider
    evidence of defendant’s prior felony convictions. (Id., subd. (c).)
    95
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    felonies. Kilbride had worked as a deputy prosecutor for 23
    years and was trained and experienced in California sentencing
    law. He explained that Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12
    were sentencing schemes under which “a serious felony
    conviction [has] substantial effects on the amount of sentence a
    person would serve.” He explained that “serious felonies” were
    “certain statutory felonies” identified in the Penal Code.
    Kilbride testified that in reviewing defendant’s conviction
    records, he “determine[d]” that defendant was convicted of
    several felonies. He reviewed several of defendant’s conviction
    records in the jury’s presence, explaining what information each
    document showed and explaining that two of defendant’s
    convictions, for robbery with a firearm and for assault with a
    firearm, qualified as serious felonies under the “statutory
    definition.” He then explained that under Penal Code sections
    667 and 1170.12, a person with two prior serious felonies faced
    a sentence of 25 years to life upon conviction of a new felony. In
    addition to admitting defendant’s conviction records and
    Kilbride’s testimony to show that defendant was motivated to
    kill Deputy Aguirre to avoid a life sentence, the prosecution
    offered the evidence to show defendant’s status as a convicted
    felon to support the charge of felon in possession of a firearm,
    and as proof of prior convictions for the sentencing
    enhancements. 8
    8
    As explained above, after the trial court ruled against
    defendant on whether to admit defendant’s prior convictions to
    show motive, defendant withdrew his motion to bifurcate the
    trial of his prior convictions allegations, which were the basis of
    the sentencing enhancement allegations, and withdrew his
    similar request for a stipulation that defendant was a convicted
    96
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    At the conclusion of Kilbride’s testimony, the trial court
    instructed the jury that it was to determine (1) “whether in fact
    the defendant did suffer the felony convictions,” (2) whether the
    convictions established a motive for Deputy Aguire’s murder,
    and (3) “whether such felony convictions, if true, establish[ed]”
    that defendant was a convicted felon for purpose of the charge
    of felon in possession of a firearm. During closing argument, the
    prosecutor informed the jury about its role in completing the
    verdict forms. The prosecutor explained “there is a step-by-step
    process intellectually that you will need to go through to reach
    the various verdicts that the law instructs you [that] you should
    in this case.” The prosecutor stated the jury would have to make
    several findings on the verdict form with respect to the several
    charges including a “number of findings” regarding the prior
    conviction allegations and that “all the appropriate findings are
    laid out very, very well” in Kilbride’s uncontested testimony.
    The prosecutor also told the jury, “You must find he was
    convicted, served a prison term, that they were serious felonies.
    And again, I submit to you that an examination of Mr. Kilbride's
    uncontested testimony in this will serve you well.”
    First, defendant argues Kilbride’s opinion — that
    defendant had five felony convictions including for two serious
    felonies, and that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence upon
    conviction of another felony — violated his federal
    constitutional right to have a jury find beyond a reasonable
    doubt every element of the charged offenses.
    “All criminal defendants have the right to ‘a jury
    determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of
    felon, which was an element of the charge of felon in possession
    of a firearm.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’
    (United States v. Gaudin (1995) 
    515 U.S. 506
    , 510 (Gaudin);
    accord, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 477.)”
    (People v. Merritt (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 819
    , 824.) Though “a witness
    may not express an opinion on a defendant’s guilt,” the Evidence
    Code makes clear that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion
    that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
    embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
    (Evid. Code, § 805.)
    While Kilbride’s testimony aided the jury in
    understanding defendant’s criminal records, it was the records
    themselves that established the facts of defendant’s convictions
    for several felonies. Kilbride reviewed the records in the jury’s
    presence to aid the jury in its understanding of the records. His
    testimony did not take away the jury’s function of itself
    determining from the evidence whether defendant was in fact a
    convicted felon of the several prior offenses. The fact that
    Kilbride’s testimony — that he had determined that defendant’s
    criminal records showed that defendant had committed the
    prior convictions and that some qualified as Three Strike
    offenses — might have “embrace[d] the ultimate issue,”
    Evidence Code section 805, of whether defendant was guilty of
    those convictions, did not make the testimony inadmissible. As
    the jury was instructed by the trial court and informed by the
    prosecutor to do so, it determined whether defendant had
    suffered the prior convictions. “Testimony in the form of an
    opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because
    it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
    (Ibid.)
    Defendant’s cited authorities fail to support his claim that
    he was denied his right to a jury determination of every element
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    of the charges.    The cited authorities generally address
    questions regarding a defendant’s right to a jury trial, which
    defendant was provided. (Gaudin, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 507
    [whether defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by
    omission from the jury’s consideration of an element of an
    offense]; Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 
    391 U.S. 145
    , 146 [whether
    the defendant had a right to a jury trial on an offense subjecting
    him to punishment of up to two years]; Sandstrom v. Montana
    (1979) 
    442 U.S. 510
    , 512 [whether a jury instruction took away
    an element of an offense from the jury’s consideration by
    creating a conclusive presumption on the element].) In keeping
    with the cited authorities, defendant was given a jury trial on
    all of the charges; the court instructed the jury on all of the
    elements of the charges and that it was to determine “what facts
    have been proved from the evidence received in the trial” and
    whether the offenses had been proved beyond a reasonable
    doubt; and the jury entered verdicts on each count. As such,
    defendant’s convictions as to these offenses “rest[ed] upon a jury
    determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of
    the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    (Gaudin, 
    supra, at p. 510
    .)
    Second, defendant contends Kilbride’s expert opinion
    testimony — that defendant had two felonies that qualified as
    serious felonies and so he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence upon
    conviction of another felony — was an impermissible opinion on
    the law and thus usurped the trial court’s role to instruct the
    jury on the law. Defendant did not preserve this claim. He
    contends he preserved it through his Evidence Code section
    1101 challenge to the other crimes evidence addressed in part
    II.C., ante. However, when defendant argued below at the
    hearings and in his briefing, that the evidence of his prior
    99
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    convictions was inadmissible as motive evidence under Evidence
    Code section 1101, defendant did not specifically raise this
    distinct and unrelated legal challenge — that Kilbride’s opinion
    testimony usurped the trial court’s role in instructing the jury.
    (People v. Lindberg (2008) 
    45 Cal.4th 1
    , 48 [defendant forfeited
    his claim on appeal when, even though he “objected to the
    admission of the expert’s testimony as a whole, he failed to
    object specifically on the ground he now advances and thereby
    deprived the trial court of an opportunity to make a fully
    informed ruling on the issue”].)
    Regardless, defendant’s claim that Kilbride’s expert
    testimony usurped the trial court’s role to instruct the jury
    about the law, even were we to conclude the claim has merit, is
    harmless for the reasons we discussed in part II.C, ante. (People
    v. Prieto (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 226
    , 247, quoting Watson, supra,
    46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [inadmissible expert testimony warrants
    reversal only if “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more
    favorable to the appealing party would have been reached’ ”
    absent the error].) As we said in part II.C., ante, it was not
    reasonably probable defendant would have received a more
    favorable result had his prior convictions evidence been
    excluded because even without the evidence, the prosecution
    was able to present strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.
    E. Jury Selection Issues
    1. Denial of For Cause Challenges
    Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial
    error in denying 10 for-cause challenges to prospective jurors.
    We disagree.
    Defendant used peremptory challenges to remove nine of
    the ten jurors at issue, asked for and was denied an additional
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    peremptory challenge to use against seated juror (Juror No.
    3121, and expressed dissatisfaction with the jury, explaining
    that he would have used his peremptory challenges to remove
    her and other jurors on the panel had he not been forced to use
    the peremptory challenges to remove the other jurors he had
    challenged for cause. Defendant has thus preserved his
    challenge for review. (People v. Rices (2017) 
    4 Cal.5th 49
    , 75
    (Rices) [to preserve a claim of wrongful denial of a challenge for
    cause, “the defendant must (1) exercise a peremptory challenge
    to remove that prospective juror, (2) exhaust all peremptory
    challenges or somehow justify the failure to do so, and (3)
    express dissatisfaction with the jury that is ultimately
    selected”].)
    On appeal, defendant contends he was prejudiced by the
    trial court’s rulings on his for-cause motions that resulted in the
    seating of Juror No. 3121. “A criminal defendant is entitled to
    an impartial jury.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 
    2 Cal.5th 181
    , 215
    (Mickel).) As discussed below, the trial court’s ruling was
    supported by substantial evidence.
    “A prospective juror’s opinions on the death penalty may
    support an excusal for cause if those opinions would ‘ “prevent
    or substantially impair the performance” ’ of the prospective
    juror’s duties. ([Wainwright v.] Witt [(1985)] 469 U.S. [412,]
    424.) A prospective juror who is incapable of ‘ “ ‘conscientiously
    consider[ing]’ ” ’ the full range of sentencing options, including
    the death penalty, should be excluded from service. [Citation.]
    An inability to carefully and sincerely consider all sentencing
    options is distinct, however, from merely holding views about
    the death penalty, including personal opposition to capital
    punishment. [Citation.] Rather, so long as a prospective juror
    is willing to ‘ “temporarily set aside [his or her] own beliefs” ’ and
    101
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    fairly consider the sentencing alternatives presented under the
    law, the prospective juror may properly serve on a capital jury.”
    (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 215.)
    “On appeal, we review the trial court’s ‘for cause’ juror
    excusals deferentially. If the juror’s voir dire responses conflict
    or are equivocal, we accept the trial court’s findings if supported
    by substantial evidence.” (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 481.)
    “Where a trial court conducts in-person voir dire, we generally
    defer to the trial court’s determination as to a prospective juror’s
    true state of mind. [Citations.] Unlike the reviewing court, the
    trial court that has conducted voir dire has the unique benefit of
    observing a prospective juror’s credibility, tone, attitude, and
    demeanor — factors we have described as of ‘ “ ‘critical
    importance’ ” ’ in determining whether a prospective juror is
    capable of performing his or her duties as a juror.” (Mickel,
    supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 215.)
    Juror No. 3121 stated in her questionnaire that the death
    penalty was used too seldomly and that she would be unwilling
    to consider defendant’s background in determining the
    appropriate penalty. She circled 10 on the scale of being
    strongly in favor of capital punishment. However, during voir
    dire she explained that while her “philosophical opinion” would
    be that the death penalty was automatically appropriate in the
    case of a police officer killing, that she would not automatically
    vote for that sentence because “Judge Perren says that we need
    to listen to the mitigating circumstances.” Juror No. 3121
    explained that that she could honestly consider the mitigating
    evidence:     She explained that she earlier would have
    automatically thought the death penalty was appropriate for the
    murder of a police officer based on the publicity she had read
    about the case, but she would not automatically apply the death
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    penalty now after hearing the trial court’s explanation to the
    potential jurors that “we need to listen to the mitigating
    circumstances.” When asked if she could “honestly tell us as you
    sit here now today” that she “could disregard what [she] heard
    before,” Juror No. 3121 responded she could if she “heard and
    saw everything presented, yes.” When pressed further, she
    explained that prior to entering the courtroom, she had had a
    “preconceived notion that the death penalty was appropriate,”
    but upon seeing defendant, she recognized the “human
    element,” and realized she was not the “hanging judge” that she
    thought she was. Juror No. 3121 said she could weigh the
    aggravating and mitigating factors before reaching a decision.
    Juror No. 3121 reiterated this response, that she could set aside
    her philosophical view and consider the evidence and give
    defendant a fair trial, the two more times she was asked about
    this.
    During voir dire, defendant challenged Juror No. 3121’s
    qualification to serve as a juror “based upon her comment that
    in a case of a first degree murder with special circumstances the
    death penalty is automatically appropriate.” The trial court
    denied the motion. It explained, “I think there are actually two
    moments of lucidity. One was when she finally understood what
    the process was. And she made one of the more profound
    statements I think we’re ever going to hear. I had a real strong
    opinion until I actually had to look at a human being. Then I
    had to question actually how strong I felt. Right on the money.”
    We conclude the claim fails because substantial evidence
    supports the trial court’s ruling. While Juror No. 3121 stated in
    her questionnaire that the death penalty was not applied
    enough, that she would be unwilling to consider defendant’s
    background in determining the appropriate penalty, and that
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    she was strongly in favor of capital punishment, her voir dire
    responses amply demonstrated her ability to set aside her views
    on capital punishment and consider both sentencing options.
    She explained that while her philosophical view was that the
    death penalty was automatically appropriate in the case of a
    police officer killing, she would not automatically vote for that
    sentence and would consider the mitigating evidence. When
    pressed further, she explained that she reconsidered her views
    upon seeing defendant in the courtroom, and that she would
    weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence before reaching
    a decision. As described above, Juror No. 3121 gave similar
    responses when asked again about this. Juror No. 3121’s
    comments at voir dire showed that she understood that she
    needed to consider the evidence presented at trial and not
    automatically vote for a death sentence based on her views
    about the death penalty. Juror No. 3121’s comments thus
    demonstrated that she was willing to “ ‘ “temporarily set
    aside” ’ ” her beliefs and “fairly consider the sentencing
    alternatives presented under the law . . . .” (Mickel, supra,
    2 Cal.5th at p. 215.) Thus, substantial evidence supports the
    trial court’s ruling and defendant’s claim fails. (Caro, supra,
    7 Cal.5th at p. 481.)
    2. Denial of Additional Peremptory Challenges
    In a variation of the preceding claim, defendant contends
    the trial court erred in denying his request for additional
    peremptory challenges in violation of his constitutional right to
    a fair trial before an impartial jury.
    “[T]o establish the constitutional entitlement to additional
    peremptory challenges argued for here, a criminal defendant
    must show at the very least that in the absence of such
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    additional challenges he is reasonably likely to receive an unfair
    trial before a partial jury.” (People v. Bonin (1988) 
    46 Cal.3d 659
    , 679; accord, People v. DePriest (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 1
    , 23.)
    Defendant bases this claim on the contention that Juror No.
    3121 was a partial juror, which is belied by the record as shown
    above. Defendant’s claim thus fails for the same reason, that he
    fails to show that a partial juror sat on his jury.
    3. Asserted Witt Error
    Defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the
    prosecution’s for-cause challenge to Prospective Juror Ann I.
    because the record fails to support the court’s conclusion that
    Ann I.’s capital punishment views impaired her ability to serve
    as a juror. Defendant also argues that reversal of the guilt
    phase is required because exclusion of Ann I. in conjunction with
    the inclusion of Juror No. 3121 resulted in an unfair jury. We
    need not reach that issue because, as shown above, the court’s
    ruling on the challenge to Juror No. 3121 is supported by the
    record.
    As for Prospective Juror Ann I., the test for Witt error is
    the same whether it involves “ ‘erroneous juror exclusion or
    inclusion.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 564.) As outlined
    above, a prospective juror must be excused for holding views on
    capital punishment that would “ ‘ “substantially impair” ’ ” the
    juror’s ability to serve. (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 215.) “A
    ruling on a cause challenge will be upheld if it is fairly supported
    by the record.” (People v. Leon (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 569
    , 590
    (Leon).) “[W]here the trial court has had an opportunity to
    observe the juror’s demeanor, we uphold the court’s decision to
    excuse the juror so long as it is supported by substantial
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    evidence.”    (People v. Spencer (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 642
    , 659
    (Spencer).)
    The prosecution challenged Prospective Juror Ann I.
    based on her religious view that the death penalty should be
    limited to extreme cases such as multiple murders, which, as
    she explained, was “about the only time I think I could vote for
    it.” The trial court granted the challenge, concluding that while
    Ann I. had stated her willingness to “make every effort” to
    perform her duties as a juror, each such statement was followed
    by expressions of doubt about whether she could do so.
    The record fairly supports the trial court’s determination
    that Prospective Juror Ann I.’s views on the death penalty would
    substantially impair her ability to consider both sentencing
    options. In her questionnaire, Ann I. wrote that the death
    penalty should be a “last resort,” expressed doubt about whether
    she could “personally recommend the death sentence for another
    human being,” and felt that a life sentence was her “punishment
    of choice for all but the most extreme cases.” During voir dire,
    she explained that she did not believe the murder of a police
    officer was the type of “extreme case” that warranted the death
    penalty. While Ann I. stated that she would “listen to the
    evidence first,” and “hear everything” before voting, she felt that
    her belief system would make it difficult to keep an open mind
    toward the death penalty in a case involving only one murder.
    For example, she stated, “I feel that the death penalty should be
    reserved for somebody who is a habitual criminal in a serious
    way, such as someone who has murdered many times, who is a
    danger not only to one person but to many people. And that's
    about the only time I think I could vote for it.” She also said she
    “could not guarantee” that her “conscience [would] allow [her] to
    have an open mind, to weigh the circumstances of this one
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    particular murder and make a decision fairly to both sides here.”
    When asked by the court whether she could place the “principles
    of law” above her “religious scruples,” Ann I. responded that she
    felt her religious beliefs would be “foremost.” When asked if she
    could follow the rules of law and apply them to the facts and give
    both sides an equal hearing in the penalty phase, Ann I.
    responded, “I think so. It’s very, very difficult because I don’t
    really believe in the death penalty as — as a good penalty.” She
    said further, “I really don’t know whether I could do it or not. I
    have a feeling it would be something that would weigh on me
    terrible.” “[A]nd if I made that decision, having to live with that
    decision for the rest of my life. I think it would be very difficult.”
    She could not see herself in a case involving one murder voting
    for death.
    Prospective Juror Ann I.’s comments support the trial
    court’s conclusion that her religious views would make it
    difficult for her to fairly consider the death penalty as a
    sentencing option in a case such as this one that involved only
    one murder. While Ann I. said she would try to follow the rules
    and consider both options, she expressed serious doubt about
    her ability to do so. “Time and again, [Ann I.] expressed
    uncertainty as to whether [she] could set aside [her] personal
    antipathy to the death penalty and follow the law as instructed.”
    (Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 659.) Ann I.’s views on the death
    penalty appeared sufficiently fixed that she could not set them
    aside and fairly consider both sentencing options as they
    pertained to the particular facts of this case. Critically, she
    stated that her “religious scruples,” rather than “principles of
    law,” would be “foremost,” and when asked if she could follow
    the law, she responded: “I really don’t know whether I could do
    it or not. I have a feeling it would be something that would
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    weigh on me terrible.” Therefore, the trial court’s ruling is
    “fairly supported” by the record. (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
    p. 590.)
    F. Prosecution’s Use of Defense Expert in a
    Demonstration
    Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion
    and violated his state and federal due process and fair trial
    rights by allowing the prosecutor, over a defense objection, to
    ask the defense wound ballistics expert to demonstrate with a
    mannequin representing Aguirre, the possible position and
    location of the gun during the firing of the two shots to Aguirre’s
    forehead. The claim lacks merit.
    Dr. Martin Fackler had testified for the defense that based
    on his review of the evidence — the autopsy report, crime scene
    diagram,     photographs,    police   reports,   and     witness
    statements — it was impossible to determine the sequence of the
    two shots fired to Aguirre’s forehead, the position of his head
    and whether he was in motion on impact of the bullets, and
    whether the bullet found in the floor had caused the entry into
    Aguirre’s left forehead. He opined that the evidence supported
    two or more scenarios — that the shots were fired in a deliberate
    manner while Aguirre’s head was near the floor or fired when
    Aguirre was in motion and defendant was running past him.
    The distance and angles from which the shots were fired did not
    permit Fackler to form an opinion as to whether the parties were
    still or in motion. In examining Fackler, the defense asked him
    to make various assumptions based on the evidence, about
    which bullet to the forehead was fired last and about the
    rapidity of the gunfire.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    In turn, the prosecution had Fackler participate in a
    hypothetical demonstration using the murder weapon and a
    mannequin representing Aguirre lying on the ground. The
    prosecutor asked Fackler to make assumptions, based on bullet
    ejection and trajectory patterns evidence that was provided in
    prosecution expert testimony.
    During the testimony, the defendant objected several
    times for lack of foundation and Fackler’s lack of expertise on
    the prosecutor’s area of inquiry. The prosecutor explained that
    it was asking Fackler to assume facts based on the earlier
    testimony of the prosecution ballistics expert and then to answer
    the questions posed based on the assumed facts. The trial court
    ultimately allowed Fackler to answer the questions.            It
    instructed the jury that the prosecution was presenting Fackler
    with a hypothetical based on the earlier prosecution ballistics
    expert’s testimony and to respond to the questions about the
    hypothetical based on his own expertise.
    On redirect examination, Fackler reiterated that it was
    difficult to conclude from the facts whether defendant fired the
    gun while standing over Aguirre or whether when he was
    running by Aguirre. He explained that he was not an expert in
    ejection patterns.
    “ ‘ “Experimental evidence has long been permitted in
    California trial courts . . . .” ’ (People v. Bonin[, supra,]
    
    47 Cal.3d 808
    , 847.) ‘ “Admissibility of experimental evidence
    depends upon proof of the following foundational items: (1) The
    experiment must be relevant [citations]; (2) the experiment
    must have been conducted under substantially similar
    conditions as those of the actual occurrence [citation]; and (3)
    the evidence of the experiment will not consume undue time,
    109
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    confuse the issues or mislead the jury [citation].” ’ (Ibid.) The
    proponent of the experimental evidence has the burden to
    show that the conditions were substantially similar but need not
    show that they were absolutely identical.” (People v. Jackson
    (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 269
    , 342.) “Admissibility also depends on proof,
    ‘with some particularity,’ of ‘the qualifications of [the]
    individual[] testifying concerning [the] experimentation . . . .’ ”
    (People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 847 (Bonin).) “We review
    the trial court’s decision to admit experimental evidence for
    abuse of discretion.” (Jackson, supra, at p. 342.)
    The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the
    testimony because the record supports a conclusion that the
    experimental evidence was relevant, substantially similar to the
    actual conditions, and was not confusing or unduly time
    consuming.     First, the prosecution’s cross-examination of
    Fackler to demonstrate the position and location of the gun in
    relation to the mannequin, the ejection pattern, and the bullet
    trajectory into the floor, related to and rebutted Fackler’s
    testimony on direct examination, that it was impossible to
    determine the sequence of the forehead shots and whether the
    parties were in motion. The evidence was thus relevant and met
    the first criterion for experimental evidence. Second, Fackler
    had maintained this opinion on the basis of various assumptions
    the defense posed to him about the rapidity and sequence of the
    shots. Seemingly in an effort to support its theory that
    defendant fired the final shot execution-style while Aguirre lay
    incapacitated on the ground, the prosecution likewise asked
    Fackler to make certain assumptions about the ejection pattern
    and trajectory of the bullets based on the testimony of the
    prosecution ballistics expert and asked him to demonstrate the
    position and location of the gun consistent with these
    110
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    assumptions. As such, the trial court would have acted within
    its broad discretion to conclude that the testimony met the
    second criterion for experimental evidence because it was based
    on the evidence of what took place during the shooting as
    provided by the testimony of the prosecution ballistics expert.
    The testimony was brief and Fackler clarified that he was not
    an expert in ejection patterns or firearms and that the position
    he was demonstrating was just one position but that there could
    be several that were consistent with the evidence about the
    trajectory and ejection patterns. Therefore, the evidence met
    the third criterion for experimental evidence because it did not
    unduly consume time and would not have misled or confused the
    jury, given Fackler’s qualifications.       Fackler limited his
    testimony to his own knowledge and the assumptions he was
    given, clarifying where he lacked expertise. His testimony as to
    the position of the gun did not contradict the Bonin requirement
    that the testifying individual have sufficient qualification
    concerning the experimental evidence.
    G. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct Throughout
    the Trial
    Defendant contends the prosecutor committed multiple
    acts of prejudicial misconduct throughout the trial in violation
    of his state and federal constitutional rights.       Defendant’s
    claims fall into three general categories: Attacking the integrity
    of defense counsel, intimidating the trial court as well as county
    staff, and attacking the integrity of defense witnesses. At the
    hearing on defendant’s new trial motion, the trial court found
    that several of the prosecutor’s actions were improper but
    concluded that because almost all of the conduct took place
    outside the jury’s presence, there was no prejudice. We agree.
    The allegations solely concern the lead prosecutor. While we
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    agree with the trial court that the prosecutor’s conduct was at
    times “out of bounds,” most of the conduct took place outside the
    jury’s presence or otherwise was not prejudicial or not
    misconduct.
    Defendant also presents additional misconduct claims
    that we discuss in parts II.C., II.H.1., and II.H.2.
    1. Attacking the Integrity of Defense Counsel
    Defendant identifies several instances in which the
    prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense counsel, which
    attacks he contends were cumulatively prejudicial because they
    created “a toxic trial atmosphere.” The prosecutor, for example,
    accused trial counsel of having no basis in “any honest
    argument,” taking “some pretty cheap shots” at prosecution
    witnesses, and making “pretty nasty attacks” on an earlier
    judge. As defendant acknowledges, all of the comments at issue
    took place outside the jury’s presence.
    “ ‘ “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks
    the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense
    counsel.” [Citations.] “In evaluating a claim of such misconduct,
    we determine whether the prosecutor’s comments were a fair
    response to defense counsel’s remarks” [citation], and whether
    there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks
    in an objectionable fashion [citation]. ’ ” (People v. Seumanu
    (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 1293
    , 1336–1337.)
    At the new trial hearing, the trial court concluded that
    while the prosecutor’s conduct during the trial, “was out of
    bounds in a variety of areas in this case,” it was not prejudicial
    because almost all instances took place outside the jury’s
    presence. (The prosecutor’s conduct that took place in front of
    the jury concerned his cross-examination of defense experts,
    112
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    discussed in pt. II.G.4., post.) This case is thus different than
    People v. Hill (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 800
    , 845 (Hill), on which
    defendant relies and in which the prosecutor committed several
    acts of misconduct by disparaging defense counsel in front of the
    jury. “ ‘An attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously
    prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself . . . .’ ” (Id. at
    p. 832.)   Although the court here heard the prosecutor’s
    disparaging remarks toward defense counsel, the record
    demonstrates that the court was unaffected by the prosecutor’s
    comments: In responding to defense counsel’s argument below
    that the lead prosecutor’s conduct toward trial counsel would
    have caused the trial court to “view counsel whose reputation
    [was] being slandered with a jaundiced eye,” the trial court
    responded that he observed that both defense counsel conducted
    themselves with “high ethics” throughout the trial and “I never
    sensed for a moment any of them shrunk or balked at their task
    because of [the prosecutor] who did not, retrospectively, conduct
    himself as he ought to have done. [¶] . . . [I]f you think I will
    gild the [lily] about [the prosecutor], it ain’t gonna happen. [The
    prosecutor’s] conduct was not acceptable. Ultimately, I told him
    to sit down at one point when he exploded. Ultimately, in your
    presence . . . I told him to knock it off, his conduct was
    unprofessional.” Thus, no prejudice is apparent because the
    record makes clear that the trial court was uninfluenced by the
    prosecutor’s comments towards defense counsel, and the jury
    did not hear the comments because they were made outside its
    presence.
    2. Intimidating the Trial Court
    Defendant contends the lead prosecutor attempted to
    intimidate the trial court on two occasions. “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s
    misconduct . . . violates California law if it involves ‘the use of
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to
    persuade . . . the court . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
    p. 172.)   First, defendant asserts the prosecutor tried to
    persuade the court to deny defendant’s Miranda motion by
    arguing that suppressing defendant’s statements would
    “operate a — fraud upon the jury.” Second, he asserts the
    prosecutor sought to intimidate the court into denying a motion
    to limit the number of uniformed officers as well as visible signs
    of mourning in the courtroom. The prosecutor urged the court
    to find the officers’ presence necessary “to make sure that the
    atmosphere in this courtroom is . . . conducive to the
    ascertainment of justice,” arguing, “we have to make sure that
    the law enforcement community trusts that what happens here
    isn’t going to exist in an atmosphere of prejudice . . . and that
    the 12 people chosen from this community to decide what
    happens to the killer of Peter Aguirre really got a fair shake at
    what they had a right to hear . . . . I don’t know what authority
    you’d have to enforce it anyway.”
    Defendant’s claim lacks merit. Though the prosecutor’s
    statements were perhaps hyperbolic, there is nothing directly
    threatening in the prosecutor’s remarks. The trial court
    considered the prosecutor’s comment that suppressing
    defendant’s statements to Patterson would “operate a — fraud
    upon the jury” as an attack on the defense rather than the court.
    The trial court explained that “defense counsel’s motion is fully
    within the ambit of the law and is properly brought before the
    Court. [¶] And I perceive no improper motive by either the
    government or the defense at this point litigating what are
    customarily motions brought before the Court routinely. And so
    I don’t perceive this to be a fraud.” With respect to the motion
    to limit officer presence, the court responded pointedly to the
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    prosecutor that it would not allow anything in the courtroom
    that “might influence the jury in its decision.” At a later hearing
    on the defense motion for a new trial in which the defense raised
    these events as a basis for its claim that the prosecutor had
    attempted to intimidate the trial court into ruling in the
    prosecutor’s favor, the trial court responded that it had
    “attributed nothing” to the prosecutor’s comments. Although
    defendant refers to several purportedly erroneous trial court
    rulings addressed elsewhere in his brief, which he claims are
    evidence of the prosecutor’s success in intimidating the court,
    these assertions are generally without merit and none of the
    trial court’s rulings appear to be the product of intimidation.
    (See pts. II.C., II.G.4., II.H.1.)
    3. Intimidating County Counsel and a Witness
    Defendant next asserts the prosecutor attempted to
    intimidate county counsel and, indirectly, defense witness Lisa
    Kus, a county psychologist represented by county counsel, by his
    comments to counsel and the court in the midst of a protracted
    legal battle regarding whether the prosecution had a right to
    access defendant’s mental health records.         According to
    Assistant County Counsel Patricia McCourt, who represented
    the Ventura County Mental Health Department, the prosecutor
    approached McCourt while seated in the courtroom prior to a
    hearing and “leaned over me in a very angry way, sort of leering
    down at me, and said, ‘Well, is it your intention to bring in
    perjured testimony like you always do?’ ” For the next several
    minutes, McCourt testified, the prosecutor repeatedly
    approached her and accused her of being “sleazy” and
    “unethical” and conspiring with Kus to “make up lies about the
    case” and hide information. According to McCourt, while the
    prosecutor’s behavior did not influence her, his “physical
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    presence was at all times angry, intimidating, imposing . . . .”
    The courtroom bailiff interceded on McCourt’s behalf until the
    judge arrived for the hearing on defendant’s mental health
    records. At the hearing, the prosecutor then accused the county
    of obstruction of justice, asserting that Kus, who had previously
    interviewed defendant and would testify as a defense penalty
    phase witness, had purportedly removed some “raw data” from
    defendant’s file and wrote a report “covering her butt” in
    response to prosecution efforts to obtain defendant’s files. The
    trial court, upon learning of the prehearing encounter between
    the prosecutor and McCourt, advised counsel for both parties
    that intimidation would not be permitted in his courtroom. The
    prosecutor responded that “this case may get very ugly before
    it’s over.”
    Defendant contends that the prosecutor intimidated Kus,
    citing as proof her testimony that she did not diagnose
    defendant with schizophrenia. “ ‘Governmental interference
    violative of a defendant’s compulsory-process right includes, of
    course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution.
    [Citations.] [¶] The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct
    may take are many and varied. They include, for example,
    statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be
    prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of
    their testimony. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Threatening a defense
    witness with a perjury prosecution also constitutes
    prosecutorial misconduct that violates a defendant’s
    constitutional rights.” (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835.)
    Nonetheless, defendant’s claim fails for lack of prejudice.
    As defendant acknowledges, McCourt testified that the
    prosecutor’s behavior did not influence her, and, as defendant
    concedes, “no evidence has yet been adduced that the
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    prosecution’s threat of an investigation affected” Kus’s
    testimony.      There is no evidence that Kus omitted a
    schizophrenia diagnosis because she was intimidated by the
    lead prosecutor’s comments. To the contrary, Kus testified she
    had not diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia because she
    did not have enough information to make such a diagnosis. In
    addition, she testified to defendant’s benefit that defendant did
    suffer from a delusional disorder. It does not appear that the
    prosecutor’s behavior, while reprehensible, prevented Kus from
    evaluating defendant and testifying about her findings.
    Because Kus testified for defendant and her testimony was
    unaltered, no prejudice flowed from the individual act of
    misconduct. (See, e.g., Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835.)
    4. Attacking the Integrity of Three Defense Experts
    Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed
    misconduct by impermissibly impugning the integrity of three
    defense experts. First, the prosecutor allegedly committed
    misconduct by asserting facts not in evidence when he cross-
    examined Roger Clark, the defense expert on police practices,
    about purported findings of nepotism and other irregularities in
    his department, and then again in arguing to the jury that the
    expert had falsified records.
    Clark’s testimony had addressed whether Aguirre acted
    within the course and scope of his duties as an officer of the law
    when he entered G.A.’s home prior to being shot. During his
    cross-examination of Clark, the prosecutor asked him whether
    an “audit” of a unit he had formerly supervised had revealed “a
    number of irregularities” about the unit including
    “improprieties in keeping time cards.” He asked Clark if the
    audit report had specifically found Clark “guilty of nepotism.”
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    He asked Clark whether each of the allegations in the audit
    report were false and whether he believed himself to be a victim
    of false allegations. He asked Clark if he did not feel bitter
    toward the Sheriff’s office. The trial court responded to defense
    counsel’s several objections to the prosecutor’s cross-
    examination by instructing the prosecutor to frame questions in
    terms of whether Clark had heard or read about the audit claims
    rather than whether the audit contained those claims. During
    the defense’s redirect examination, Clark testified that the audit
    of his department that took place after he had left the
    department did not cause him to feel “disgruntled” toward the
    Los Angeles Police Department and that he kept in touch with
    his colleagues and peers, and that his fellow administrators had
    also provided several “very favorable reviews” of his
    performance.
    During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
    there was “an audit of [Clark’s] department [that] found things
    like nepotism and irregularities in overtime cards” and
    discredited Clark’s testimony regarding whether Aguirre was
    acting in the course of his duties by commenting that Clark was
    “too busy falsifying records.” The defense objection to the
    argument for misstating the evidence was overruled. The trial
    court later acknowledged this was an erroneous ruling because
    the prosecutor had in fact argued facts outside the evidence. In
    its own closing argument, the defense argued there was no
    evidence that the expert was guilty of the audit claims and
    reminded the jury of the court’s earlier instruction not to
    consider the allegations for the truth but only whether they
    affected the expert’s state of mind.
    “ ‘ “[S]tatements of facts not in evidence [that are asserted]
    by the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    constitute misconduct.” ’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 306
    , 335 (Rivera).) As to the prosecutor’s argument, “They did
    an audit of [Clark’s] department and found things like nepotism
    and irregularities in overtime cards,” Clark acknowledged that
    he read or heard the audit made these findings, but testified
    they were false allegations. Even though it appears the
    prosecutor improperly referred to facts not in the record by
    asserting that the defense expert had falsified records, this error
    was harmless. The expert’s testimony concerned a weak part of
    the defense case — the contention that Aguirre was not acting
    within the course of his duties as a police officer when he entered
    the house in response to a highly volatile and dangerous 911
    domestic disturbance call. Further, the expert was still able to
    testify at length for defendant on this topic and the defense
    questioned him on redirect about his lack of ill feelings towards
    the police department as a result of the audit. Moreover,
    defense counsel was allowed to address the impeachment in
    closing argument where he argued there was no evidence of the
    audit claims and reminded the jury of the court’s instructions to
    only consider the audit allegations for how they would have
    affected the expert and not for their truth.
    Defendant second contends the prosecutor “made
    unsubstantiated accusations against” the defense’s prison
    expert, James Park, to the trial court during a hearing out of the
    jury’s presence, and during cross-examination, and that the
    prosecutor’s behavior infected the trial with unfairness. Prior
    to the start of Park’s testimony, the prosecutor alleged out of the
    jury’s presence that Park, when previously employed at San
    Quentin State Prison, had allowed an attorney to smuggle a gun
    to an inmate, who then murdered several security guards. The
    trial court denied the prosecutor’s request to inquire into that
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    specific area of alleged misconduct, directing him to limit his
    inquiry generally to the expert’s career, promotions, and
    demotions. In the cross-examination that defendant points us
    to, the prosecutor questioned Park about whether he had taken
    a stress retirement and whether he was transferred and had
    stopped working in prisons. Defendant also points us to cross-
    examination in which the prosecutor addressed prison
    photographs Park had brought to court and asked him about
    prison rules prohibiting photographs of prison facilities because
    such photographs would render the facilities less secure. This
    questioning was in response to Park’s testimony during direct
    examination, during which he had displayed photographs he
    brought with him of various prison structures, to demonstrate
    the security features at facilities where prisoners sentenced to
    life without the possibility of parole are housed. Park explained
    in response to the prosecutor’s cross-examination that he took
    the photographs with the warden’s consent. The trial court later
    commented that the prosecutor’s behavior toward the expert
    was “vitriolic, unnecessary and pointless.”
    “ ‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her
    conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render
    the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves
    deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the
    trier of fact.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 195
    , 306.) However, “ ‘harsh and colorful attacks on the
    credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible. [Citations.]
    Thus, counsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness
    may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the
    evidence, that a witness’s testimony is unbelievable, unsound,
    or even a patent “lie.” ’ ” (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 334–
    335.) Defendant fails to explain how the prosecutor’s effort to
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    discredit Park by questioning his employment history and by
    attempting to discredit Park’s testimony regarding the security
    features of prisons by asking whether he had permission to take
    the prison photos qualifies as misconduct. While, as the trial
    court’s comments suggest, the prosecutor’s questioning may well
    have been “vitriolic, unnecessary and pointless,” he did not
    question Park about topics prohibited by the trial court. Thus,
    his cross-examination did not result in “ ‘such unfairness as to
    render the . . . denial of due process, or involve[] deceptive or
    reprehensible methods . . . .’ ” (Silveria, supra, at p. 306.)
    Defendant’s last contention is that the prosecutor
    gestured disparagingly at defense psychology expert Charles
    Hinkin, who testified during the penalty phase that defendant
    was a paranoid schizophrenic. As part of its motion for a new
    trial, the defense included declarations from two jurors, who
    stated that the prosecutor made “eye contact with some of the
    jurors in the jury box and he was smirking and rolling his eyes
    at the testimony of Dr. Hinkin.” In his opposition to the motion
    for new trial, the prosecutor wrote that the expert’s “effeminate
    mannerisms and weak testimony, limited as it was by his failure
    to ask basic questions of the defendant during his interview of
    him, caused understandable reaction from the prosecution.”
    The trial court concluded the prosecutor’s conduct was “wrong-
    headed and unacceptable.”
    The prosecutor’s attack of Hinkin based on, as he sees it,
    the expert’s “effeminate mannerisms,” was wholly improper and
    clearly falls outside the boundaries of permissible attack
    “ ‘focused on the evidentiary reasons why [an expert’s opinions]
    could not be trusted.’ ” (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 335.) This
    statement is, by any measure, offensive and inappropriate.
    Such language has no place in pleadings, in courtrooms, or
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    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    anywhere else. Nonetheless, for purposes of our analysis here,
    i.e., potential prejudice, the statement was not made in front of
    the jury and therefore could not prejudice defendant.
    As for the prosecutor’s smirking and eye-rolling in the
    presence of the jury, the Attorney General acknowledges that
    this is “unsuitable” conduct by counsel. We agree. This conduct
    is unacceptable. (People v. Williams (2006) 
    40 Cal.4th 287
    , 322–
    323 [prosecutor’s action of slamming a writing pad and rolling
    eyes was misconduct]; Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 834 [audibly
    laughing during defense examination of several witnesses was
    misconduct].) Such tactics distract the jury and risk prejudice
    to the defense. (Hill, supra, at p. 834.)
    “If we do find misconduct occurred during the penalty
    phase, ‘we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is
    a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the jury would have
    rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not
    occurred.’ ” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 250
    , 289
    (Ghobrial).) We conclude there is no reasonable possibility that
    the prosecutor’s attempt to discredit this witness by smirking
    and rolling his eyes at the jurors would have influenced the jury
    in deciding its penalty verdict. The prosecutor’s conduct in
    smirking and rolling his eyes, while inappropriate, does not rise
    to the level of a case like Hill, in which the prosecutor subjected
    the jury to an “onslaught of . . . misconduct,” embarking on a
    campaign of misleading the jury and denigrating defense
    counsel. (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 845.) This momentary
    facial gesture by the prosecutor, though inappropriate, simply is
    not significant enough to compel us to conclude that, because of
    it, there was a “reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the
    jury would have rendered a different verdict.” (Ghobrial, supra,
    at p. 289.)
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    H. Additional Penalty Phase Claims
    1. Deputy Fryhoff’s Testimony About Failing to Kill
    Defendant
    Defendant contends the following penalty phase
    testimony by Deputy Fryhoff was irrelevant, inflammatory, and
    an impermissible opinion as to the appropriate sentence, and
    thus violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
    rights and corresponding state constitutional rights:
    “Q. [Prosecutor]: Describe your emotions for us regarding
    that part of the incident, the fact that you shot Michael
    Johnson.
    “A. Um, I’m very upset with myself that I didn’t kill him.
    “Q. Is that something that you think about often?
    “A. That’s something I have to live with every day.
    “Q. Does it make you feel that somehow you were a failure
    as an officer?
    “A. Yeah. It makes me very hostile that I wasn’t able to
    do it.”
    Prior to this testimony, defendant had objected and asked
    for a sidebar after the prosecution asked Fryhoff how he felt
    about not having killed defendant. The trial court clarified the
    permitted area of inquiry, that Fryhoff could testify about the
    event’s impact on him, and that the court would instruct the jury
    on how it was to consider the evidence.
    At the penalty phase, “evidence may be presented by both
    the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to
    aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited
    to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense . . . .”
    (Pen. Code, § 190.3.) “A State may legitimately conclude that
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder
    on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to
    whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.” (Payne v.
    Tennessee (1991) 
    501 U.S. 808
    , 827.) “Although victim impact
    testimony is admissible, the victim’s view as to the proper
    punishment is not.” (People v. Smith (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 581
    , 622
    (Smith).) “ ‘The views of a crime victim . . . regarding the proper
    punishment has no bearing on the defendant’s character or
    record or any circumstance of the offense.’ ”               (People
    v. Sattiewhite (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 446
    , 487.) “We review a trial
    court's decision to admit victim impact evidence for abuse of
    discretion.” (Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
    Fryhoff’s testimony was not about the appropriate penalty
    verdict but rather about his own remorse and perceived failure
    concerning the shootout with defendant.         The testimony
    constituted relevant victim impact evidence because it
    demonstrated how Fryhoff felt helpless and guilty following the
    loss of his friend. The testimony showed Fryhoff’s reasonable
    response to feeling grief and regret and the jury would have
    reasonably understood his testimony to be nothing more than
    an expression of that. Fryhoff was not making an “impassioned
    entreaty to the jury to end his suffering and kill appellant,
    because he had passed up the chance to do so himself,” as
    defendant argues.
    The trial court further instructed the jury at the close of
    Fryhoff’s testimony that it was not to consider the testimony as
    opinion evidence on the verdict but rather as victim impact
    testimony and that the jury alone was charged with the decision
    of verdict that it was to determine after considering the factors
    in aggravation and mitigation. The court similarly instructed
    during the penalty phase instructions. We presume jurors
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    follow a court’s instructions. (People v. Dalton (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 166
    , 238.) We therefore conclude the trial court acted within its
    discretion in admitting Fryhoff’s testimony.
    Defendant’s related claim of prosecutorial misconduct is
    also without merit.    Defendant contends the prosecutor
    committed misconduct by (1) asking Fryhoff how he felt about
    not having killed defendant, and (2) according to defendant,
    bullying the trial court into allowing Fryhoff to testify he felt
    upset and guilty for not killing defendant, and (3) arguing to the
    jury that Fryhoff would feel guilty for the rest of his life for not
    having killed the person that killed his fellow officer.
    With respect to the first misconduct contention, as
    discussed above, the prosecutor permissibly asked Fryhoff how
    he felt about not killing defendant within the parameters set by
    the trial court.
    On the second contention — that the prosecutor bullied
    the court — the prosecutor commented, at a sidebar preceding
    Fryhoff’s testimony, about the experience of officers involved in
    shootings that result in the death of fellow officers, stating,
    “Every cop that ever gets involved in a shooting carries with him
    a guilt, and this deputy carries with him a guilt, over the fact
    that he didn’t kill Michael Johnson and that is a guilt that
    haunts him every day of the rest of his life.” He acknowledged
    that Fryhoff could not offer an opinion as to the appropriate
    sentence. The defense then objected that the prosecutor had
    committed misconduct by inquiring into Fryhoff’s feelings about
    not killing defendant. The prosecutor took the defense’s
    misconduct allegation as a “personal attack” and said he would
    not be “threatened.” The prosecutor’s comments at the sidebar
    do not qualify as “bullying,” and the court did not take them as
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    such, as evidenced by its neutral explanation of the type of
    testimony that would be permitted: “The impact upon [Fryhoff]
    will be permitted and in that context you may say to him, ‘What
    are your emotions that have resulted from the events of that
    day?’ not leading him to it and what responses he gives.” After
    further discussion, the trial court explained that Fryhoff could
    testify that he wished he had killed defendant: “This witness is
    going to be allowed to say that in the context of what his
    emotions are, and this is a very dramatic piece of business if
    that’s in fact his feeling, but the statement to him, ‘Do you wish
    you’d killed him?’ I won’t let that in. [¶] On the other hand,
    what emotions he has, why he’s feeling what he’s feeling, he’ll
    be allowed to say that . . . .”
    Regarding defendant’s last contention, he alleges without
    explanation that the prosecutor’s comment during closing
    argument that Fryhoff would “go to his grave feeling guilty
    because he didn’t kill the man who killed his brother officer,” to
    which defense counsel objected, was misconduct. However, the
    comment merely reiterated Fryhoff’s own permissible
    testimony. The prosecutor was making an appropriate comment
    on the evidence — in this case victim impact evidence
    concerning the trauma felt by Fryhoff following Aguirre’s death.
    (People v. Leonard (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 1370
    , 1419 [“evidence that
    close friends and relatives of the victims suffered emotional
    trauma as a result of their deaths was permissible victim impact
    testimony, and the prosecutor appropriately commented on it in
    his closing argument”].) Accordingly, we conclude there was no
    prosecutorial misconduct concerning Fryhoff’s testimony.
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
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    2. Exclusion of Defendant’s Mother’s Testimony
    Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding his
    mother’s testimony that she did not want him sentenced to
    death, and further erred in its manner of admonishing the jury
    regarding the testimony, and that the prosecutor erred in his
    manner of objecting to the testimony.        We find no prejudicial
    error.
    After testifying that she loved her son “very much,”
    defendant’s mother responded negatively to the question
    whether she wanted him to receive the death penalty. The
    prosecution objected in an explosive manner. The trial court
    cleared the courtroom and sustained the prosecutor’s objection,
    finding the testimony impermissible opinion testimony by a
    family member on the question of penalty. It then strongly
    admonished the jury to disregard the question and response,
    stating, “You are specifically and in the strongest possible terms
    admonished to disregard the question last asked by defense
    counsel of this witness and the reply she made to it. [¶] The
    law of this state is clear: The expressed feelings of family of the
    defendant are not to be considered by you on the issue of penalty
    or punishment. The family of Deputy Aguirre did not and could
    not express its desires and respected that rule of law. You can
    do no less.”
    Defendant argues in reliance on Smith, supra, 
    30 Cal.4th 581
    , that the testimony was admissible mitigating evidence in
    the form of character testimony by a close family member.
    “Citing [Penal Code] section 190.3 and the United States
    Constitution, we have held that testimony from somebody ‘with
    whom defendant assertedly had a significant relationship, that
    defendant deserves to live, is proper mitigating evidence as
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    “indirect evidence of the defendant’s character.” ’ [Citations.]
    This evidence is admitted, not because the person’s opinion is
    itself significant, but because it provides insights into the
    defendant’s character.” (Smith, at pp. 622–623.)
    Defense counsel, however, made no offer of proof as to the
    admissibility of the excluded testimony on this ground, instead
    submitting that it was admissible as “reverse victim impact”
    evidence (but that that was “unclear”). (By “reverse victim
    impact” evidence, counsel appeared to be referring to the impact
    defendant’s death would have on his family.) The specific claim
    raised on appeal is thus forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a);
    People v. Lightsey (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 668
    , 727 [concluding that
    trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining a prosecution
    objection “when defendant made no offer of proof at trial
    explaining why the witness should have been permitted to
    answer the question”].)
    Defense counsel was incorrect, moreover, about the
    admissibility of the testimony as “reverse victim impact”
    evidence. “ ‘[W]hat is ultimately relevant is a defendant’s
    background and character — not the distress of his or her
    family. A defendant may offer evidence that he or she is loved
    by family members or others, and that these individuals want
    him or her to live. But this evidence is relevant because it
    constitutes indirect evidence of the defendant’s character. The
    jury must decide whether the defendant deserves to die, not
    whether the defendant’s family deserves to suffer the pain of
    having a family member executed.’ [Citation.] ‘In summary, we
    [reiterate] that sympathy for a defendant’s family is not a
    matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation, but that
    family members may offer testimony of the impact of an
    execution on them if by so doing they illuminate some positive
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    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    quality of the defendant’s background or character.’ ” (Rices,
    supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 88.) With the exception of the struck
    testimony about whether defendant’s mother wanted defendant
    to receive the death penalty, she was largely permitted to testify
    about her positive regard and love for her son, consistent with
    Smith and Rices.
    Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed
    prejudicial misconduct in his explosive manner of objecting, and
    that defendant was further prejudiced by the trial court’s
    clearing of the courtroom following the objection, and its
    strongly worded admonishment to the jury and comment that
    Aguirre’s family had respected the rule.
    As defendant notes, the trial court concluded the
    prosecutor’s manner of objecting was “intemperate.” Putting
    aside the questions whether the prosecutor’s actions constituted
    misconduct and the trial court’s initial jury admonishment was
    error, we conclude any error was harmless because there was no
    “ ‘reasonable . . . possibility’ ” the jury would have rendered a
    life verdict (Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 289) in the absence
    of the prosecutor’s reaction and had the trial court omitted its
    initial comment that the Aguirre family had respected the rule
    prohibiting opinions on the penalty verdict. There was no
    reasonable possibility the jury would have sentenced defendant
    to death simply because the prosecutor objected in an
    intemperate manner or because the trial court admonished
    defendant’s mother for saying she did not want her son to be
    sentenced to death.
    The court, moreover, did repeat the instruction, this time
    more generally, explaining that the jury was not to consider the
    opinion testimony of any witness including the families of either
    129
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    party: “At the time Mrs. Johnson testified, you were instructed
    to disregard her opinion on the question of penalty or
    punishment. I wish to clarify that point. The question of
    penalty or punishment is yours to decide based upon the factors
    in aggravation and mitigation upon which you are now being
    instructed. Not included is any perception you may have of the
    feelings or desires of any witness on that question, including the
    family of Deputy Aguirre and the family of Mr. Johnson or of
    any other witness. [¶] To the extent that you heard evidence of
    the impact of defendant’s conduct upon others it was not offered
    and cannot be considered by you as indicating the desires of the
    witnesses as to the proper punishment. Such evidence was
    received as a component of the ‘circumstances of the crime’
    relative to the harm caused by the crime and the
    blameworthiness of defendant. You are expressly instructed
    that you are not to in any way consider what you may believe or
    suspect to be a witness’ desire for punishment.” The jury was
    also instructed that it could consider “[a]ny other circumstance
    which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not
    a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect
    of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers
    as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related
    to the offense for which he is on trial.” We generally presume
    the jury would have understood, as the court instructed, that it
    was simply not to consider any witness’s opinion regarding
    punishment, and it was reasonably likely the jury would have
    understood that it was otherwise permitted to consider in its
    decision defendant’s mother’s unobjected-to testimony
    describing her love and positive regard for her son. (People v.
    Johnson (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 734
    , 770 [“We presume the jurors
    understood and followed the instructions”].)
    130
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    3. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law
    Defendant raises numerous challenges to California’s
    death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected and his
    proffered reasons for reconsideration of our holdings are
    unpersuasive:
    “ ‘Neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires
    that the penalty phase jury make unanimous findings
    concerning the particular aggravating circumstances, find all
    aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or find beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the
    mitigating factors.’ ” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1215; see
    also People v. Rangel (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 1192
    , 1235 [Nor is the
    death penalty statute unconstitutional for not requiring
    “findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating
    circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c)
    evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors
    outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the
    appropriate sentence”].) “ ‘The United States Supreme Court’s
    recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial
    guarantee [citations] do not alter these conclusions.’ ” (Linton,
    supra, at p. 1215; see also People v. McDaniel (2021) 
    12 Cal.5th 97
    , 141–155.) We have rejected constitutional challenge to the
    absence of a requirement that the jury make “explicit findings
    as to any aggravating factors.” (People v. Famalaro (2011)
    
    52 Cal.4th 1
    , 43.) “ ‘ “Intercase proportionality review is not
    required.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 214
    , 257.)
    “ ‘The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-
    eligible defendants.’ ” (Id. at p. 255.) “ ‘ “The sentencing factor
    of ‘circumstances of the crime’ ([Pen. Code, ]§ 190.3, factor (a)) is
    not unconstitutionally vague and does not result in the arbitrary
    and capricious imposition of the death penalty.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
    131
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    “ ‘ “The California death penalty scheme does not violate equal
    protection by treating capital and noncapital defendants
    differently.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 257.)
    I. Cumulative Error
    Defendant contends that any guilt and penalty phase
    error, if not individually prejudicial, is cumulatively so. We
    have found or assumed several errors: (1) the admission of the
    prior crimes evidence; (2) the related prosecutorial misconduct
    claim concerning argument to the jury that defendant signed a
    parole form advising him that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence
    on possession of a firearm; (3) the related claim that the defense
    was prevented from responding to this argument; (4) the related
    claim that a deputy district attorney’s expert testimony usurped
    the trial court’s role to instruct the jury about the law; (5) the
    prosecutorial misconduct claim concerning efforts to denigrate
    defense counsel; (6) the prosecutorial misconduct claim
    concerning efforts to intimidate county counsel and a witness;
    (7) the prosecutorial misconduct claims concerning efforts to
    denigrate defense experts; and (8) the prosecutorial misconduct
    claim concerning objecting in an explosive manner and the trial
    court’s initial jury admonishment. We found any assumed or
    actual error in each of these claims individually harmless.
    Many of the misconduct claims occurred outside the presence of
    the jury or would have minimal prejudicial effect. Reversal is
    not warranted in light of any of these errors individually, nor is
    there any cumulation of error that merits reversal.
    132
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment.
    GROBAN, J.
    We Concur:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    JENKINS, J.
    133
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    S070250
    Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu
    Defendant Michael Raymond Johnson was convicted of
    kidnapping and raping his wife, then shooting and killing one of
    the officers who responded to the scene, 26-year-old Ventura
    County Deputy Sheriff Peter Aguirre. The evidence established
    that Johnson killed Aguirre, but the degree of his culpability —
    in particular, his state of mind when he shot Aguirre — was a
    contested issue at trial.
    In the immediate aftermath of this tragedy, law
    enforcement officials mishandled the investigation. After the
    shooting, Johnson was arrested and transported to the hospital
    to receive treatment for a gunshot wound to the chest. He was
    hooked up to an IV, with a urinary catheter inserted. Both his
    hands were handcuffed to a hospital gurney, and he was naked
    except for a cloth on his lower body. With Johnson in this
    condition, the police and prosecution repeatedly sought to
    question him in violation of his constitutional rights. (Maj. opn.,
    ante, at pp. 38–45.) At various points, Johnson clearly invoked
    his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney. (Edwards
    v. Arizona (1981) 
    451 U.S. 477
     (Edwards); Miranda v. Arizona
    (1966) 
    384 U.S. 436
     (Miranda).) Yet, for three hours, the
    interrogating officers refused to honor these invocations and
    continued their attempts to obtain a statement from Johnson.
    Ultimately, they succeeded:       Johnson made a series of
    incriminating statements to Dr. Donald S. Patterson, a
    psychiatrist sent by the district attorney’s office to interview
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    Johnson. All members of this court agree that Patterson’s
    attempt to question Johnson clearly violated “his right to have
    counsel present during custodial interrogation.” (Edwards, at
    p. 484; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)
    Despite the raft of constitutional violations that occurred,
    today’s decision finds no error in the admission of Johnson’s
    statements because Johnson, after first declining to speak with
    Patterson, then “initiated” the conversation that led to his
    confession. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 45.) But when a suspect
    initiates conversation as a result of prior Edwards violations,
    his statements are no more admissible than if they were
    obtained through direct questioning in violation of Edwards.
    Here, Johnson’s initiation was the product of the multiple
    constitutional violations earlier that night, including two
    violations by Patterson himself. Indeed, Patterson’s presence
    and conduct at the hospital were the culmination of a continuous
    series of unconstitutional law enforcement tactics intended to
    get Johnson to talk.
    The court says Johnson’s initiation was not tainted by any
    prior violation of his rights because he was not badgered or
    berated and made the decision to speak with Patterson “freely.”
    (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 57–58.) Yet neither this court’s nor the
    United States Supreme Court’s case law has ever suggested that
    the protection of Edwards — which “set forth a ‘bright-line rule’
    that all questioning must cease after an accused requests
    counsel” (Smith v. Illinois (1984) 
    469 U.S. 91
    , 98 (per curiam)
    (Smith)) — is limited to cases of overt coercion by law
    enforcement. Indeed, once a suspect has invoked the right to
    counsel, the authorities may not make any attempt to coax him
    into speaking, be it “explicit or subtle, deliberate or
    unintentional.” (Ibid.) Were it otherwise, law enforcement
    2
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    could use psychological manipulation, repeated rounds of
    questioning, or other tactics to “persuade [a suspect] to
    incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for
    counsel’s assistance.” (Ibid.) As I explain, that is exactly what
    happened here.
    It is understandable that law enforcement officials, after
    the shooting of a fellow officer, were frustrated and impatient
    with Johnson’s refusal to talk. But the law accords every person
    the right to remain silent and the right to consult a lawyer
    before speaking to the police. I fear that the takeaway from
    today’s decision is that even multiple violations of these basic
    rights will not result in the exclusion of an incriminating
    statement if sufficiently clever or subtle tactics are ultimately
    used to elicit it. Because I cannot agree that Johnson’s
    statement was properly admitted, I respectfully dissent.
    I.
    “[I]f a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation,
    he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that
    he has the right to remain silent” and the “right to consult with
    counsel prior to questioning.” (Miranda, 
    supra, 384
     U.S. at
    pp. 467–468, 470.) This safeguard is necessary because “the
    process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
    accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
    which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to
    compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”
    (Id. at p. 467.)
    When an accused has “expressed his desire to deal with
    the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further
    interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
    available to him, unless [he] himself initiates further
    3
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”
    (Edwards, 
    supra, 451
     U.S. at pp. 484–485.) As noted, “Edwards
    set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning must cease after
    an accused requests counsel.” (Smith, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98.)
    Allowing “the continuation of custodial interrogation after a
    momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of
    Miranda,” since “repeated rounds of questioning [would]
    undermine the will of the person being questioned.” (Michigan
    v. Mosley (1975) 
    423 U.S. 96
    , 102.) By barring law enforcement
    from continuing to question someone who has invoked the right
    to counsel, “Edwards is ‘designed to prevent police from
    badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted
    Miranda rights.’ ” (Minnick v. Mississippi (1990) 
    498 U.S. 146
    ,
    150.)
    On the day of the shooting in this case, Johnson was first
    approached by Detective Robert Young at 7:00 p.m. He declined
    to talk, invoking his right to remain silent. Twenty minutes
    later, District Attorney Michael Bradbury approached Johnson
    to make sure he did not wish to talk. Johnson declined to give a
    statement, saying he was “in shock.” From there, as the court
    acknowledges (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 38–45), several Miranda
    and Edwards violations occurred: First, 10 minutes after the
    encounter with Bradbury, Young and investigator Richard Haas
    approached Johnson and began questioning him again. Second,
    less than an hour later, around 8:25 p.m., Young again
    approached Johnson to ask if he was willing to give a statement
    regarding what happened. Johnson remained firm in his refusal
    to speak, saying that he was “in a state of shock and . . . kinda
    confused,” and that he wanted to speak to an attorney. No
    counsel was provided. Instead, Young returned half an hour
    4
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    later to berate Johnson for killing Aguirre — the third violation
    that night. Johnson still did not give a statement.
    Undaunted, the prosecution switched gears. Johnson had
    told Haas and Young that he had a history of mental health and
    substance abuse issues, so the investigators sent a psychiatrist,
    Patterson, to see if he could get Johnson to talk. Sending in
    Patterson violated Johnson’s rights a fourth time. Once
    Johnson had invoked his right to counsel to Young, he could not
    be “subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
    counsel [was] made available to him.” (Edwards, supra, 451
    U.S. at pp. 484–485; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 39–40.) Yet
    Patterson, an agent of the district attorney’s office, went to the
    hospital and attempted to interview Johnson in direct violation
    of Edwards. (See People v. Ghent (1987) 
    43 Cal.3d 739
    , 750–751
    [finding unconstitutional a psychiatrist’s attempt to interview
    defendant after invocation of right to counsel].)
    This tactic — sending in a medical professional as an
    agent for the prosecution — is one of the oldest in the book. (See
    Leyra v. Denno (1954) 
    347 U.S. 556
    , 559 [after days of failing to
    obtain a confession, interrogators sent in a psychiatrist under
    the guise of providing medical treatment; the suspect
    confessed].) And it is one that Patterson was familiar with. (See
    People v. Walker (1972) 
    29 Cal.App.3d 448
    , 451 [finding
    defendant’s self-incriminating statement invalid and reversing
    conviction where “Dr. Donald S. Patterson of Santa Barbara, a
    psychiatrist,” violated Edwards by continuing to question him
    after he asked for an attorney]; 
    id. at pp. 452, 455
    .) To obtain a
    confession, police may attempt to convince a suspect “that he
    and the interrogator share a common interest, that their
    relationship is a [mutual] rather than an adversarial one.” (Leo,
    Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game
    5
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    (1996) 30 L. & Soc’y Rev. 259, 266.) A psychiatrist can assume
    this position more easily than a detective or uniformed officer —
    particularly where, as here, the suspect has a prior history of
    psychiatric treatment. But the practice has been condemned as
    unethical by professional psychiatric organizations. (Janofsky,
    Lies and Coercion: Why Psychiatrists Should Not Participate in
    Police and Intelligence Interrogations (2006) J. Am. Acad.
    Psychiatry & L. 472, 475–476 [ethical principles adopted by the
    American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of
    Psychiatry and the Law bar psychiatrists from evaluating
    suspects who have not consulted with legal counsel].)
    Today’s opinion acknowledges and denounces these four
    violations but stops short of finding a fifth. As noted, Patterson
    should not have questioned Johnson at all because Johnson had
    told Young that he wanted an attorney. But separate and apart
    from that violation, Patterson’s conduct after Johnson again
    invoked his right to counsel in response to Patterson’s unlawful
    attempt to question him constituted a fifth violation.
    After arriving at the hospital, Patterson observed Johnson
    for an hour before introducing himself as “a psychiatrist from
    Santa Barbara.” By this time in the night, Johnson had resisted
    multiple efforts to get him to talk. But Patterson took a
    different, more understated approach. Without disclosing that
    he was a forensic psychiatrist affiliated with the district
    attorney’s office, Patterson proceeded to give Miranda warnings
    to Johnson and asked if he wanted to talk. Johnson told
    Patterson he did not wish to give a statement and wanted to
    speak to an attorney. He said he was “in a state of shock and
    kind of confused” and was not sure he would be providing
    “accurate” information.
    6
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    At this point, Patterson was required to stop interrogating
    Johnson, but he did not. Instead, Patterson again tried to
    convince Johnson to speak to him, saying, “I’m gonna just stay
    around here with you and let you get back from X-ray and see
    how you’re getting along and see if you still feel, feel that way
    or — [¶] . . . [¶] — cause at some point you did say that you
    would be willing to talk to me and so — [¶] . . . [¶] — And it’s up
    to you, you can still refuse it, but you did say that at one time.”
    After saying this, Patterson stuck close to Johnson’s side; he
    followed Johnson when his gurney was wheeled into X-ray,
    stayed with Johnson while his X-rays were taken, then followed
    him back to his room. Eventually, Patterson’s strategy worked:
    Johnson turned to him and said, “Still here, huh?” The two
    began speaking; Johnson started telling Patterson about
    psychiatrists that had previously treated him, inquiring
    whether Patterson knew them. From there, the conversation
    expanded to include Johnson’s mental health history, his past
    experiences of delusions, and, eventually, his actions related to
    the shooting.
    Patterson’s tactics were a form of interrogation. For
    Edwards purposes, interrogation includes “not only . . . express
    questioning, but also . . . any words or actions on the part of the
    police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to
    elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (Rhode
    Island v. Innis (1980) 
    446 U.S. 291
    , 301, fn. omitted; cf. maj.
    opn., ante, at p. 37.) Patterson’s conduct was reasonably likely
    to elicit an incriminating response in two ways. First, Patterson
    reminded Johnson that he had previously promised to speak to
    Patterson. The comment suggested that by not speaking to
    Patterson, Johnson was going back on his word. This type of
    statement has been found to constitute further questioning.
    7
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    (See People v. Harris (1989) 
    211 Cal.App.3d 640
    , 648 [after
    suspect invoked right to silence, sergeant’s statement, “ ‘I
    thought you were going to come back and straighten it out,’ ”
    constituted impermissible further questioning].)
    Second, by saying he would wait around to see if Johnson
    would change his mind and then following Johnson around the
    hospital, Patterson conveyed that he was not satisfied with
    Johnson’s refusal. Patterson explicitly told Johnson that he was
    waiting until Johnson was willing to speak. In light of his
    statement that he was waiting for Johnson to talk, Patterson’s
    persistence in following Johnson around the hospital for 20
    minutes was reasonably likely to elicit a response from Johnson.
    “ ‘ “No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to
    proceed . . . on his own terms and as if the defendant had
    requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be
    induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his
    initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney
    or not at all.” ’ ” (People v. Henderson (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 1013
    ,
    1025, quoting Smith, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 99.) Yet even after
    Johnson invoked his right to counsel to Patterson — Johnson’s
    second such invocation that evening — Patterson’s behavior
    indicated that he was there to interview Johnson and wanted
    him to talk. Patterson’s conduct, which ultimately led to
    Johnson’s incriminating statements, amounted to further
    interrogation in violation of Edwards.
    II.
    The court concludes that Johnson’s confession is
    admissible because after invoking his right to counsel, Johnson
    initiated a conversation with Patterson. It is true that after
    Patterson had been standing at Johnson’s side for 20 minutes,
    8
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    Johnson turned to him and said, “Still here, huh?” But this
    statement was not a valid initiation for Edwards purposes.
    Under Edwards, an initiation occurs when a suspect’s
    “words or . . . conduct” can be “ ‘fairly said to represent a desire’
    . . . ‘to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or
    indirectly to the investigation.’ ” (People v. Mickey (1991)
    
    54 Cal.3d 612
    , 648; see Edwards, 
    supra, 451
     U.S. at pp. 484–
    485.) Where, as here, there has been a prior Edwards violation,
    “a renewal of contact by the defendant” constitutes an initiation
    “only if the decision to renew contact was not a ‘response to’ or
    ‘product of’ the prior unlawful interrogation.” (Mack v. State
    (Ga. 2014) 
    765 S.E.2d 896
    , 903 (Mack).) Prior infringements of
    a defendant’s rights, “even though unavailing at the time,”
    might have “fatally tainted the spontaneity of [a defendant’s]
    subsequent statement, making it instead the product of
    inducement, provocation or subtle coercion.” (People v. Kinnard
    (N.Y.App.Div. 1983) 
    470 N.Y.S.2d 828
    , 846; see Collazo v. Estelle
    (9th Cir. 1991) 
    940 F.2d 411
    , 423 (Collazo) [a defendant’s
    subsequent statement is “ ‘initiated’ ” by the police, not by the
    defendant, if it is the “delayed product” of unlawful police
    conduct].)
    To determine whether there is a causal connection
    between a prior unlawful interrogation and a defendant’s later
    renewal of contact, “the entire sequence of events leading up to
    the suspect’s renewal of contact must be considered.” (Mack,
    supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904.) Other state high courts and federal
    courts making this assessment have asked “whether (1) there
    was a break in the stream of events sufficient to insulate the
    statement from the effect of the prior coercion, (2) it can be
    inferred that the coercive practices had a continuing effect that
    touched the subsequent statement, (3) the passage of time, a
    9
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    change in the location of the interrogation, or a change in the
    identity of the interrogators interrupted the effect of the
    coercion, and (4) the conditions that would have precluded the
    use of a first statement had been removed.” (Collazo, supra, 940
    F.2d at p. 421; see State v. Yoh (Vt. 2006) 
    910 A.2d 853
    , 862–863
    (Yoh) [applying these factors]; Blake v. State (Md. 2004) 
    849 A.2d 410
    , 422 (Blake) [same]; Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904
    [similar factors].)
    Here, the Attorney General has not carried his burden to
    demonstrate that Johnson’s conduct was not a product of prior
    violations. (People v. Hensley (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 788
    , 810 [“The
    state must demonstrate that . . . ‘ . . . the accused, not the police,
    reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’ ”].)            Several
    circumstances support the conclusion that Johnson’s statement
    to Patterson — “Still here, huh?” — was the product of
    Patterson’s Edwards violations.
    First, Patterson’s interrogation tactics “had a continuing
    effect that touched [Johnson’s] subsequent statement.”
    (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.) Patterson explicitly told
    Johnson that he would stay and wait to see if Johnson would
    change his mind and provide a statement. By remaining in
    Johnson’s presence, and especially by following Johnson as he
    was moved around the hospital, Patterson continued to convey
    that he wanted Johnson to speak to him. This behavior was
    ongoing when Johnson purportedly initiated the conversation
    with Patterson.
    Moreover, Patterson’s conduct must be considered against
    the backdrop of “the entire sequence of events” that night.
    (Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904.) Patterson’s understated
    manner and “ ‘kind face’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 62) presented
    10
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    Johnson with a deliberate contrast to the impatient and even
    angry officers who had sought to question him earlier. The court
    says this contrast is not “relevant.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 55.)
    But this shifting approach by law enforcement — “alternat[ing]”
    between “a show of some hostility” and “ ‘kindhearted[ness]’ ” —
    is a familiar psychological “ploy.” (Miranda, 
    supra, 384
     U.S. at
    p. 452; see 
    ibid.
     [describing “the ‘friendly-unfriendly’ or the
    ‘Mutt and Jeff’ [good cop-bad cop] act”].) As Miranda observed,
    it is one of the “effective tactics” discussed in “various police
    manuals and texts” that “have had rather extensive use among
    law enforcement agencies.” (Id. at pp. 448, 449, fn. 9.) In other
    words, Patterson’s tactic was made more effective by the police
    and prosecution’s earlier unlawful attempts to question
    Johnson. Thus, Johnson’s purported initiation to Patterson was
    the “ ‘product of’ ” a series of law enforcement tactics that
    included “the prior unlawful interrogation[s].” (Mack, at p. 903.)
    Additionally, when a suspect’s rights are violated on
    multiple occasions, this gives the impression that law
    enforcement “w[ill] not honor [the] right to silence or . . . right to
    counsel until [the suspect] g[ives] . . . a confession.” (People v.
    Neal (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 63
    , 82 (Neal); see 
    id. at p. 89
     (conc. opn.
    of Kennard, J.) [repeatedly ignoring a suspect’s invocations
    “unmistakably implie[s] that [he] . . . ha[s] no right to counsel
    that [law enforcement] was bound to respect”].) Patterson was
    not the first person to refuse to accept Johnson’s invocation of
    the right to silence or right to counsel. Time and again, Johnson
    said he did not wish to give a statement or to speak without
    consulting a lawyer, but law enforcement ignored his
    invocations. In light of this official behavior, a reasonable
    person in Johnson’s position may well have doubted whether he
    was actually free to remain silent or to consult a lawyer before
    11
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    speaking, despite the warnings he had been given. None of the
    events that happened in the hospital would have dispelled that
    impression; Patterson’s conduct after Johnson again invoked
    the right to counsel only further conveyed that the authorities
    would not take no for an answer.
    Second, there was no “break in the stream of events
    sufficient to insulate the statement from the effect of the prior”
    violations. (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.) In some cases,
    questioning ends and the suspect is allowed to leave, with the
    interrogation resuming some days later. (Cf. Mack, supra, 765
    S.E.2d at pp. 901–902 [no break in the stream of events even
    though initial interview ended and suspect left, because the
    interrogation resumed the following day].) Or there may be a
    pause in the questioning during which the suspect is permitted
    to leave or make a phone call. (See, e.g., Perrine v. State (Fla.
    Ct.App. 2005) 
    919 So.2d 520
    , 523 [suspect left the police station,
    then returned 30 minutes later and gave a statement]; cf.
    Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at pp. 421–422 [no break in the stream
    of events even though suspect called his wife during a three-
    hour pause in questioning].) Here, by contrast, the violation was
    ongoing when Johnson initiated. Patterson explicitly told
    Johnson that he would stay and wait to see if Johnson would
    change his mind and speak to him. This behavior continued
    until the moment Johnson purportedly initiated. Aside from
    briefly stepping out of the room to speak to the district attorney,
    Patterson remained with Johnson until he made his statement.
    All the while, Johnson was handcuffed to a gurney with no
    choice but to remain in Patterson’s presence. No break in the
    stream of events insulated Johnson’s statement from
    Patterson’s improper interrogation.
    12
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    Third, neither “the passage of time, a change in the
    location of the interrogation, [nor] a change in the identity of the
    interrogators interrupted the effect” of Patterson’s prior
    Edwards violations. (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.) The
    location remained the same. Only 20 minutes passed between
    the improper interrogation and the supposed initiation. (See
    Blake, supra, 849 A.2d at p. 422 [delay of 28 minutes was too
    short to dispel taint from first improper interrogation].)
    Moreover, Johnson’s initial statement — “Still here, huh?” — is
    naturally understood as a response to Patterson’s statements
    and conduct indicating that he would wait to see if Johnson
    would change his mind. (See ibid. [suspect’s initiation was a
    response to statement made by interrogating officer in the prior
    improper interrogation].) Patterson’s response to Johnson —
    “Yeah, just, just in case you’re . . .” — further suggests he stayed
    nearby in order to get Johnson to talk.
    Fourth, there was no significant change in “the conditions
    that would have precluded the use of a first
    statement.” (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.) Johnson was
    in a vulnerable state from the time Patterson began
    interrogating him until the time he supposedly initiated. Only
    a few hours had passed since Johnson was involved in a violent
    shootout with police. He was nearly naked, handcuffed to a
    gurney, with a gunshot wound to the chest. The record shows
    he was in pain; in Patterson’s presence, he twice asked medical
    personnel when he could obtain pain medication. In declining
    to give a statement, Johnson consistently told authorities that
    he was “in shock” and “confused.” His weakened physical state,
    coupled with his disorientation, made him more susceptible to
    Patterson’s interrogation tactics, and those conditions remained
    unchanged at the time Johnson supposedly initiated a
    13
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    conversation. (See Blake, supra, 849 A.2d at p. 422 [suspect was
    “in a cold holding cell with little clothing”]; see also Mincey v.
    Arizona (1978) 
    437 U.S. 385
    , 396–402 [statements were
    involuntary in part because suspect was in the hospital,
    wounded and in pain, and expressed confusion during
    interrogation].)
    Finally, the record contains an additional feature
    indicating that Johnson in all likelihood would not have started
    a conversation if Patterson had not improperly asked to
    interview him. Immediately after arriving at the hospital,
    Patterson spent an hour silently observing Johnson. It was only
    after that hour elapsed that Patterson introduced himself and
    began to interrogate Johnson in violation of Edwards. The
    record does not reveal any attempt by Johnson to engage
    Patterson in conversation during that hour, much less speak to
    him about the events of that day. We need not wonder whether
    Johnson would have chosen to speak if his rights had not first
    been violated. The answer is in the record: For the entire hour
    before Patterson sought to interrogate Johnson, Johnson
    showed no inclination to speak with Patterson. Only after
    Patterson unlawfully asked to question Johnson and unlawfully
    refused to honor Johnson’s invocation of the right to counsel did
    Johnson initiate a conversation. On these facts, it is hard to see
    how Johnson’s purported initiation was anything but derivative
    of Patterson’s attempt to interrogate him in violation of
    Edwards. In sum, the trial court erred in admitting Johnson’s
    statement to Patterson.
    This error was prejudicial to Johnson’s conviction for first
    degree murder. Unsurprisingly, Johnson’s confession was a
    focal point of the prosecutor’s case: The prosecutor discussed
    various parts of the confession in his opening statement, played
    14
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    the entire audiotape of the redacted interview for the jury, used
    Johnson’s statements in cross-examining defense witnesses,
    and underscored how the statements supported the
    prosecution’s case during closing and rebuttal arguments.
    Moreover, the prosecution used Johnson’s confession to support
    each of its three theories of first degree murder: premeditation,
    lying in wait, and felony murder. To support premeditation, the
    prosecutor described the shooting of Aguirre as “a cold-blooded
    execution,” emphasizing “the cold and . . . the ice” in Johnson’s
    voice when he spoke to Patterson. The prosecutor also used
    Johnson’s statement to cross-examine defense experts regarding
    the ballistics evidence, arguing that Johnson killed Aguirre
    “execution-style” while Aguirre lay disabled on the ground.
    Second, regarding lying in wait, the prosecutor used Johnson’s
    statement to argue that he knew the police were at the door and
    deliberately ambushed Aguirre. Third, regarding the felony-
    murder theory, the prosecutor relied heavily on the fact that
    Johnson had confessed to kidnapping his wife to establish that
    the murder occurred during the course of a felony.
    Because Johnson’s own statements were highly probative
    of his conduct and state of mind, I cannot conclude “beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the
    verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    ,
    24; see Neal, 
    supra, 31
     Cal.4th at p. 86 [“ ‘[T]he improper
    admission of a confession is much more likely to affect the
    outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, and thus
    is much more likely to be prejudicial . . . .’ ”]; Arizona v.
    Fulminante (1991) 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 296 [“A confession is like no
    other evidence. Indeed, ‘the defendant’s own confession is
    probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
    admitted against him . . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant
    15
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and
    unimpeachable source of information about his past
    conduct.’ ”].) Accordingly, the murder conviction and death
    sentence cannot stand.
    III.
    Today’s opinion declines to consider these factors, instead
    focusing on the audio recording of the interview and concluding
    that “the record . . . reflects defendant’s ‘clear willingness and
    intention to talk’ to Patterson.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 49.)
    Citing Johnson’s conduct, demeanor, and various statements,
    the court says his decision to initiate a conversation with
    Patterson was made calmly and rationally, with full
    understanding of his rights. (Id. at pp. 52–54.)
    As an initial matter, I note that the standard the court
    applies today — i.e., there is an initiation “only if the decision to
    renew contact was not a ‘response to’ or ‘product of’ the prior
    unlawful interrogation” (Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903; maj.
    opn., ante, at pp. 47–48) — was set forth by the Georgia
    Supreme Court in a decision that itself evaluated causation by
    looking to the four factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
    Collazo and applied by other state high courts. (See Mack, at
    p. 904 [“In determining the causal connection between the prior
    unlawful interrogation and the suspect’s renewal of contact, the
    entire sequence of events leading up to the suspect’s renewal of
    contact must be considered, including but not limited to the
    lapse of time between the unlawful interrogation and the
    renewed contact, any change in location or in the identity of the
    officers involved from one interview to the next, and any break
    in custody between interviews. See, e.g., Collazo, 940 F.2d at
    421; Yoh, 910 A.2d at 862; Blake, 849 A.2d at 422 . . . .”].) It is
    16
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    no wonder today’s opinion ignores these factors: They uniformly
    suggest that Johnson’s decision to speak with Patterson was a
    product of prior Edwards violations. (Ante, at pp. 10–14.)
    By focusing on the interview itself and parsing Johnson’s
    and Patterson’s statements, the court misses the overall context
    in which those statements were made. If Johnson had made the
    statements after treatment for his injury, an appreciable
    passage of time, or a significant change in location or setting, I
    might agree that he made a free and rational decision to initiate
    a conversation with Patterson. Even if Johnson had initiated a
    conversation during the initial hour when Patterson silently
    observed Johnson, this might be a different case. But those are
    not the facts here. At the time he purportedly initiated a
    conversation with Patterson, Johnson was half-naked and
    handcuffed to a gurney, late at night in an emergency room, with
    a gunshot wound to the chest. His Miranda/Edwards rights had
    been violated five (or, we can agree, at least four) times over a
    three-hour period that evening, and Patterson had been a
    lingering presence, following Johnson around the hospital after
    he had again invoked his right to counsel. There was no break
    in the stream of events or change in conditions that might have
    separated    Johnson’s     purported    initiation   from   law
    enforcement’s prior unlawful attempts to question him.
    The court further observes that “the record does not reveal
    the sort of berating evident in other cases that might readily
    wear down a suspect [citations], but instead a handful of one- to
    two-minute conversations over a period of a few hours.” (Maj.
    opn., ante, at pp. 49–50.) And although Patterson did violate
    Edwards by approaching Johnson in the first place, the court
    says that “after [Johnson] requested counsel, Patterson asked
    no more questions and there was no discussion for about 20
    17
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    minutes.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 51.) In the court’s telling, “[t]he
    overall picture is not of a browbeaten suspect whose will was
    overborne by a coercive interrogator, but of a suspect eager to
    tell his story to a sympathetic listener, even though there might
    be consequences for doing so.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 62.)
    But it is inaccurate to say there was no berating in this
    case; it is undisputed that Young berated Johnson earlier that
    night. Nor is it accurate to suggest that Patterson honored
    Johnson’s refusal to speak. Patterson responded to Johnson’s
    invocation of counsel by urging him to speak, reminding him
    that he had previously said he would speak to Patterson, and
    then following him around the hospital. And Patterson — who
    unlawfully approached Johnson to get him to talk and
    eventually provided crucial testimony to convict him of first
    degree murder — was anything but “a sympathetic listener.”
    The court seems to reason that Johnson’s decision to speak
    to Patterson was untainted by the prior Edwards violations
    because the violations were, essentially, not that bad. But this
    reasoning cannot be squared with high court precedent. Again,
    “Edwards set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning must
    cease after an accused requests counsel.” (Smith, supra, 469
    U.S. at p. 98.) This bright-line rule is necessary because any
    attempt to coax a defendant into speaking, regardless of how it
    is undertaken, can sway a defendant to confess when he
    otherwise would not have done so. (Ibid.) Coercion in
    interrogation settings “can be mental as well as physical, and
    . . . the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
    unconstitutional inquisition.” (Blackburn v. Alabama (1960)
    
    361 U.S. 199
    , 206 (Blackburn).) The high court has repeatedly
    stressed that neither physical violence nor overt threats are
    required to create a coercive atmosphere. (See, e.g., Miranda,
    18
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467 [discussing the “inherently compelling
    pressures” of in-custody interrogation]; Arizona v. Mauro (1987)
    
    481 U.S. 520
    , 529–530 [same]; see also Culombe v. Connecticut
    (1961) 
    367 U.S. 568
    , 602 [a confession is involuntary when
    “compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or
    helps to propel the confession”].) Even “unintentional” behavior
    can cause a defendant to confess. (Smith, at p. 98).
    By adopting a bright-line rule, the high court sought to
    prevent increasingly “sophisticated modes of ‘persuasion’ ” from
    being used to manipulate suspects into confessing. (Blackburn,
    supra, 361 U.S. at p. 206.) Accordingly, this court has never
    suggested that the protection of Edwards is limited to cases of
    overt coercion by law enforcement. (See, e.g., People v. Davis
    (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 539
    , 596 [recognizing principle of Smith].)
    Lower courts, too, have recognized this principle. (See People v.
    Walker, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [finding Edwards
    violation where Patterson continued to question the defendant
    after he asked for an attorney, with no indication the defendant
    had been badgered or berated].)
    The fact that Johnson was not berated, to the extent it is
    true, has limited relevance. The question is whether the conduct
    of law enforcement — including conduct that may have exerted
    subtle pressure — would have made a reasonable person more
    likely to initiate further communication. As noted, other courts
    have not hinged this analysis on whether a defendant was
    badgered or berated; they have instead considered whether
    various factors, such as the passage of time or a break in the
    stream of events, “insulate[d] the [defendant’s] statement from
    the effect of the prior coercion.” (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at
    p. 421; see Yoh, supra, 910 A.2d at p. 862 [conducting initiation
    analysis without discussion of berating or lack thereof]; see also
    19
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    People v. Boyer (1989) 
    48 Cal.3d 247
    , 274 [defendant’s initiation
    was tainted by prior violations solely because it was a result of
    the police’s improper resumption of contact, even setting aside
    earlier badgering], disapproved on another ground in People v.
    Stansbury (1995) 
    9 Cal.4th 824
    , 830, fn. 1.) Of course, where a
    suspect is berated, it is more likely his initiation was tainted by
    law enforcement misconduct. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 54–55.)
    But the fact that a suspect was not berated simply eliminates
    one potential source of taint; subtle pressure can take many
    forms.    As the high court recognized in Miranda, even
    “ ‘kindness’ ” and “patience” can be deployed to induce a
    confession. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 450–451.)
    In sum, I find it hard to believe that Johnson — in a
    clearly vulnerable state, after three hours of unlawful efforts to
    question him in the face of his repeated invocations of the right
    to silence and right to counsel — somehow made a clean break
    and initiated a new conversation that “was not a ‘response to’ or
    ‘product of’ the prior unlawful interrogation.” (Mack, supra, 765
    S.E.2d at p. 903.) After today’s decision, what is to prevent law
    enforcement from ignoring a suspect’s clear invocations and
    engaging in repeated rounds of questioning, calling in a
    psychiatrist, or applying other subtle tactics to coax the suspect
    into “initiating” a conversation? That is precisely the type of
    conduct that Edwards’s bright-line rule seeks to prevent, and it
    is precisely the type of conduct that happened here.
    IV.
    This case involves not one, not two, not three, but five
    Miranda/Edwards violations, all of which took place while
    Johnson was handcuffed to a hospital bed, almost naked, with a
    gunshot wound to the chest. The court calls the law enforcement
    20
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    misconduct in this case “concerning.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 44.)
    But despite its concern, the court affirms Johnson’s murder
    conviction and death sentence.
    Today’s decision tells law enforcement officials that there
    is “nothing to lose, and a useable confession to gain, if they
    simply disregard the suspect’s requests for counsel” and
    continue to interrogate the suspect with shifting and ever
    subtler tactics. (People v. Storm (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 1007
    , 1046
    (dis. opn. of Chin, J.).) “We would be naive to assume that law
    enforcement agencies will not take advantage of the new
    evidentiary door the majority’s holding would helpfully open for
    them.” (Ibid.; see Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda (2008) 96
    Cal. L.Rev. 1519, 1522 [police “training materials demonstrate
    how the warning and waiver regime coheres with a
    sophisticated psychological approach to police interrogation”].)
    “Unfortunately, the court’s opinion today will encourage
    precisely the sort of subterfuge by some law enforcement
    investigators, with the ensuing violation of constitutional rights,
    that Miranda sought to end.” (Storm, at p. 1040 (dis. opn. of
    George, C. J.).)
    The right to remain silent and the right to consult a lawyer
    when questioned by the police are among the most basic
    constitutional rights we have. Because today’s decision makes
    these essential protections for our citizenry less secure, I
    respectfully dissent.
    21
    PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
    Liu, J., dissenting
    LIU, J.
    I Concur:
    LAVIN, J.*
    *
    Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
    District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
    to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    22
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
    argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Johnson
    __________________________________________________________
    Procedural Posture (see XX below)
    Original Appeal XX
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted (published)
    Review Granted (unpublished)
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S070250
    Date Filed: January 3, 2022
    __________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Ventura
    Judge: Richard M. Murphy*
    __________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Anthony J. Dain, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and
    Tiffany L. Salayer for Defendant and Appellant.
    Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Dane R.
    Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka,
    Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Lawrence M. Daniels and
    Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    *Retired judge of the Ventura Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
    Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
    publication with opinion):
    Anthony J. Dain
    Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch LLP
    525 B Street, Suite 2200
    San Diego, CA 92101
    (619) 515-3241
    Wyatt E. Bloomfield
    Deputy Attorney General
    300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702
    Los Angeles, CA 90013
    (213) 269-6145