People v. Frederickson ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
    CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    DANIEL CARL FREDERICKSON,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    S067392
    Orange County Superior Court
    96CF1713
    February 3, 2020
    Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
    Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar,
    Kruger, and Groban concurred.
    Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion.
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON
    S067392
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    A jury convicted defendant, Daniel Carl Frederickson, of
    the first degree murder of Scott Wilson.             (Pen. Code,1
    § 187, subd. (a).) It found true the special circumstance
    allegation that defendant committed the murder while engaged
    in the commission of the attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd.
    (a)(l7)(i)), and it also found true that defendant personally used
    a firearm while committing the crime (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1),
    12022.5, subd. (a)). Following a sanity trial, the jury found
    defendant was sane at the time of the crimes. After a penalty
    trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court
    imposed a judgment of death. This appeal is automatic.
    We strike an improperly imposed restitution fine and
    affirm the judgment in all other respects.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    On June 13, 1996, defendant walked into a home
    improvement store and shot the store manager once in the head,
    killing him. Defendant represented himself at trial with the
    assistance of advisory counsel.
    1
    All further undesignated statutory references are to this
    code.
    1
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    A. Guilt Phase
    1. Prosecution Case
    On June 13, 1996, 30-year-old Scott Wilson was working
    as a customer service manager at the HomeBase home
    improvement store in Santa Ana. The store was crowded due to
    a relocation sale. Around 11:30 a.m., cashier Maricela Saucedo
    asked Wilson to make change for her to give to a customer.
    Wilson walked to the store’s safe, which was located behind the
    customer service area. Saucedo turned back to her customer.
    Within seconds, she heard a gunshot. She turned and saw
    defendant waving his gun while running out of the store.
    Saucedo saw Wilson lying bleeding on the ground, holding 10
    five-dollar bills in his hand.
    Cashier Susan Bernal saw Wilson walking toward the
    customer service area and a man following him. Wilson did not
    argue with anyone and did not call out for help. Bernal saw the
    man shoot Wilson in the head at close range and then run out of
    the store.
    Loss prevention employee Christopher Rodriguez saw
    defendant run out of the store carrying what appeared to be a
    silver revolver. Rodriguez followed defendant outside to an
    alleyway. The man entered the passenger side of a white van,
    which then drove away. Rodriguez memorized the license plate
    number and provided it to the police.
    Santa Ana police officers arrived at HomeBase within a
    few minutes of the shooting. Officer Ronald Dryva was on the
    scene for two to three hours interviewing witnesses. During
    that time, defendant called and spoke to an employee.
    Defendant did not identify himself by name. The employee
    handed the phone to Dryva. Defendant, who believed he was
    2
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    still speaking with the employee, told Dryva, “I’ve never killed
    or shot anyone before. This is stupid. That is what I do for a
    living. Do you understand?” Defendant continued, “You need to
    tell your employees that money is not worth getting killed over.”
    Dryva asked defendant why he “pull[ed] the trigger.”
    Defendant replied, “Because I was flustrated [sic]. He didn’t do
    what I told him. Do you understand?” Defendant explained that
    he followed Wilson to the safe. “While I pointed the gun at him
    and told him to put the money in the bag, he just started
    counting the money. I told him not to count the fucking money.
    I told him to put the money in the box. He just closed the safe
    and started walking away. The man continued — continued to
    say [that] he didn’t believe I was serious. I got mad, flustrated
    [sic], so I shot him.” Defendant told Dryva he would “probably”
    turn himself in that night.
    The next day, June 14, 1996, police officers conducted
    surveillance outside defendant’s residence. In the driveway,
    officers observed a white van matching the description
    Rodriguez had given.        Approximately three hours after
    beginning their surveillance, officers observed the van, driven
    by defendant, pull out of the driveway. An officer ordered
    defendant to stop and exit the vehicle. Officers arrested him and
    searched his residence, a camper located on his grandparents’
    property. They found a .32-caliber revolver containing five live
    rounds and one empty round.
    Santa Ana police investigators Phillip Lozano and Mark
    Steen interviewed defendant shortly after his arrest on June 14,
    1996. Steen advised him of his Miranda rights. (Miranda v.
    Arizona (1966) 
    384 U.S. 436
    (Miranda).)               Defendant
    acknowledged he understood his rights and agreed to speak with
    3
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    the officers. The prosecution played an audiotape recording of
    the interview for the jury. Defendant admitted he had been
    committing robberies for nearly 15 years and that he walked
    into the HomeBase on June 13 with “a game plan.” Defendant
    first looked around to “get a feel for the place” and to identify
    the manager. After he identified Wilson as the manager, he
    waited until Wilson needed to retrieve change for a customer.
    He followed Wilson to the safe and said, “Excuse me?” When
    Wilson looked up, defendant said, “Can you put that money in
    this box?” Wilson ignored defendant and began counting five-
    dollar bills. Defendant showed Wilson part of his gun, and
    Wilson closed the safe door and stood up. Defendant said that
    “the next thing I knew, you know, [the gun] was at his temple.”
    He expected Wilson to hand over the money and was surprised
    and “pissed off” that Wilson refused. After firing the shot, he
    ran out of the store and into his van.
    Defendant explained that he called the HomeBase store
    approximately one hour later and asked to speak with a
    manager. Crying, he told the officers, “I just laid into him. I
    told him, ‘You son of a bitch. That fucker didn’t need to die.’ . . .
    I just told him man. He ought to make his fucking life mission
    to instruct all of his employees of the proper procedures. Just
    giving the money up, and that fucker died protecting [the
    money].” He said he was “just tired of . . . being broke all the
    time” and “just got frustrated with life and shit, and said, well,
    fuck it man, if I get caught, you know, I’ll go back in for about
    two or three years and, you know, . . . get out and try it again
    later.”
    The following day, newspaper reporter Marla Jo Fisher
    interviewed defendant in jail. Defendant admitted that he was
    attempting to rob the store and shot Wilson during the attempt.
    4
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    He explained that Wilson did not hand over the money, and after
    Wilson shut the safe door, defendant shot him. According to
    Fisher, defendant thought “Wilson was brave but stupid. He
    admired Wilson’s courage but thought [Wilson] was foolish for
    defying him and that he should have complied with his request
    for money.” He blamed HomeBase management for failing to
    train their managers to hand over the money if they were
    robbed.
    On July 25, 1996, defendant sent Officer Lozano a letter
    asking to speak with the investigators again. Lozano and Steen
    interviewed defendant at the jail on August 12. Defendant
    explained that he had “held back some info” regarding
    accomplices. He stated that he got the gun from his “associate”
    John McCanns. McCanns met defendant in January or
    February of 1996 and, at some point, moved into defendant’s
    camper.     McCanns and defendant discussed the robbery
    beforehand, and after the murder, McCanns took the spent shell
    casing.
    Dr. Richard Fukomoto, the pathologist who performed the
    autopsy on Wilson’s body, testified that Wilson died from a
    single gunshot wound to the head. He opined that the barrel of
    the gun was six to twelve inches from the wound when the gun
    discharged.
    2. Defense Case
    Defendant represented himself during the guilt phase. He
    called as a witness clinical psychologist Dr. Martha Rogers, who
    had evaluated defendant regarding his sanity at the time of the
    offense. Dr. Rogers met with defendant for almost 15 hours and
    reviewed defendant’s juvenile records and prior psychological
    testing records. Dr. Rogers found no neurological injury or
    5
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    impairment, and no loss of cognitive function. She found him to
    be “a pretty high functioning individual.” She noted in her
    report that defendant “most likely has not had a memory lapse
    or loss of functioning such that he did not know or understand
    his behavior was wrong or illegal as he claims.”
    The defense also called psychologist Dr. Roberto Flores de
    Apodaca. Dr. Flores interviewed defendant for approximately
    four hours and reviewed several relevant records. Dr. Flores did
    not conduct any clinical testing, although he reviewed reports
    from testing previously conducted. He opined that defendant
    suffered from a personality disorder that expressed itself with
    narcissistic and antisocial features. He concluded that no
    psychiatric condition prevented defendant from knowing the
    difference between right and wrong, and that defendant was not
    insane.
    Attorney Wayne Dapser testified that he was defendant’s
    mentor through an organization called Volunteers in Parole.
    Dapser explained that he was struck by defendant’s high degree
    of optimism, but there were also times when defendant got very
    depressed. Defendant often told Dapser that he turned down
    criminal activity, such as using stolen credit cards or getting
    involved in drugs. Dapser never felt that defendant was a
    danger to society. Dapser agreed that defendant had “fairly
    good cognitive abilities,” including the ability to plot and
    strategize.
    Defendant’s 22-year-old cousin, Nick Peres, testified that
    defendant had previously asked Peres to kill him. When Peres
    refused, defendant asked him to find an assassin to kill him. He
    also asked Peres to help him get a gun. Peres testified that
    defendant used drugs “all the time.”
    6
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    Jan Moorehead testified that she became defendant’s
    probation officer when he was 14 years old. Moorehead said that
    defendant was a “high control” parolee because of his high
    violence potential and mental instability. She tested him for
    drugs approximately twice a month. When defendant told
    Moorehead he felt depressed, she encouraged him to write down
    positive thoughts. Moorehead had referred defendant to the
    Volunteers in Parole program because she thought he was
    “worth taking a chance on.”
    B. Sanity Phase
    1. Defense Case
    Defendant’s advisory counsel conducted the sanity phase.
    Roger Wunderlich, a staff psychiatrist at Atascadero State
    Hospital, testified that he examined defendant on June 17,
    1994, to determine, in connection with a different case, whether
    defendant was a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO).2 After
    interviewing defendant for 30 minutes, Dr. Wunderlich
    concluded defendant was an MDO. As a result, defendant was
    paroled to the hospital for treatment. Dr. Wunderlich testified
    that defendant wanted treatment under the MDO law because
    he “was afraid of what he might do if paroled” to the streets. On
    2
    The Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (§ 2960 et seq.)
    “addresses the treatment and civil commitment of offenders who
    suffer from a ‘severe mental disorder.’ ” (People v. Blackburn
    (2015) 
    61 Cal. 4th 1113
    , 1127.) “The term ‘severe mental
    disorder’ means an illness or disease or condition that
    substantially impairs the person’s thought, perception of reality,
    emotional process, or judgment; or which grossly impairs
    behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an acute brain
    syndrome for which prompt remission, in the absence of
    treatment, is unlikely.” (§ 2962, subd. (a)(2).)
    7
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    cross-examination, Dr. Wunderlich said that the basis of his
    MDO determination was that defendant had “violent fantasies”
    that had, in fact, resulted in an assault. He further testified
    that defendant was a “coherent, fairly intelligent individual.”
    Dr. Wunderlich opined that defendant was able to distinguish
    between right and wrong.
    Psychiatrist Joseph Chong-Sang Wu testified that he
    performed positron emission tomography (PET) scans on
    defendant. Defendant’s scans showed an impairment in his
    frontal lobe function, which has been reported in patients with
    attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The scans also showed
    increased activity in defendant’s temporal lobes, which is found
    in people with “aggressive, explosive, [and] violent” behavior.
    Steven Clagett, a therapist and case manager for Health
    Care Agency of Orange County, testified that he evaluated
    defendant at the state hospital on May 5, 1995, about a year
    before the Wilson murder, and concluded that defendant was
    not suitable for release into the community. Clagett explained
    that defendant had not met the agency’s release criteria, which
    included 12 months of nonaggressive behavior, cooperation with
    the treatment plan, and participation in the groups, programs,
    and activities that the agency recommended. During the
    evaluation, Clagett saw no evidence of a thought disorder,
    hallucinations, or suicidal or homicidal ideation. Defendant told
    Clagett that he had “played up” psychiatric symptoms in the
    past, trying to “get out of the prison system” and “into the
    hospital.”
    Defendant testified at the sanity trial. He said he was first
    hospitalized when he was 13 years old. He had been running
    away from home, sleeping on the streets, and getting into fights
    8
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    at school.     Defendant described “thought patterns” and
    “fantasies” that led him to “act out and to destroy or to hurt
    things.” Sometime after his first hospital stay, defendant
    started taking medication that helped him control these
    thoughts. Defendant was hospitalized again two years later. At
    that time, he was diagnosed as having latent schizophrenia with
    explosive personality disorder.
    Defendant spent his juvenile and adult life in and out of
    institutions. He underwent several mental health evaluations
    while incarcerated and testified that he functioned better while
    medicated, both in and out of prison. Defendant was in prison
    in 1994, and before his scheduled release, defendant indicated
    to prison mental health professionals that he wanted to be sent
    to the state hospital as an MDO because he did not receive
    mental health treatment on the streets.           Following two
    evaluations and a parole hearing, he was committed to
    Atascadero on July 1, 1994. Defendant was released from the
    state hospital on August 22, 1995. He did not meet with the
    parolee outpatient doctor between the date of his release and the
    date of the instant offense, nearly 11 months later. He
    developed suicidal thoughts and, on June 13, 1996 (the date of
    the Wilson murder), acquired a gun with which to commit
    suicide. He drove to HomeBase later that day to buy material
    for a project he was working on with a friend. He carried the
    gun with him in case he found the opportunity to commit suicide
    while running errands. Defendant testified that he did not
    intend to rob the store.
    On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned
    defendant about several theft incidents: stealing cigarettes in
    1977; possession of a stolen moped in 1978; stealing clothing
    from a department store in 1979; possession of a stolen moped
    9
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    in 1980; stealing a car in 1981; and armed robbery of a market
    in 1982. Defendant also acknowledged that he pleaded guilty
    for stabbing a fellow inmate in September 1984, although he
    claimed he did not actually stab the individual. Regarding a
    conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in 1991, defendant
    testified that someone was attacking another person, and
    defendant tried to intervene. The family of the attacker paid
    defendant to plead guilty, and he agreed to do so because he
    “needed an excuse” to go back to prison. He denied that he
    committed the instant offense in order to go back to prison.
    The prosecutor asked defendant about his testimony on
    October 7, 1997, when he testified as a gang expert for the
    defense in an unrelated trial. The prosecutor in that case had
    asked defendant if he considered himself to be insane, and
    defendant replied, “No.” The prosecutor asked if he considered
    himself insane at the time he murdered Wilson, and defendant
    replied, “No, sir. I presented that as a defense, and it’s up to a
    jury to decide whether I was insane at the time the crime
    occurred.” Defendant also admitted testifying in the other trial
    that he had claimed to have violent fantasies so that he could
    get into Atascadero.
    2. Prosecution Case
    The prosecution recalled Drs. Flores and Rogers. Dr.
    Flores testified that he reviewed defendant’s medical records
    and spoke with defendant, and that he did not believe defendant
    met the criteria for insanity under section 1026, which governs
    insanity pleas. Dr. Flores opined that at the time of Wilson’s
    murder, defendant knew the difference between right and
    wrong, and he chose to ignore it. Dr. Flores believed defendant’s
    10
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder was
    “debatable” and irrelevant to the issue of insanity.
    Dr. Rogers reviewed defendant’s medical records and
    examined his behavior before, during, and after the Wilson
    murder. In her opinion, defendant was sane when he murdered
    Wilson.
    Phillip Kelly, a staff psychiatrist at Atascadero, testified
    that he had daily contact with defendant between July 1994 and
    September 1995. Defendant told Dr. Kelly that he had
    “manipulated the examiners” into declaring him to be an MDO.
    When Dr. Kelly told defendant that because he manipulated
    himself into the hospital, he would “have to deal with the
    problem,” defendant replied, “Well you are the experts, you
    shouldn’t have let me get away with it.” Dr. Kelly ultimately
    diagnosed defendant with antisocial personality disorder and
    substance abuse. He did not believe defendant belonged in the
    MDO program, concluding he did not have a mental illness.
    The jury found that defendant was sane at the time he
    committed the crime.
    C. Penalty Phase
    1. Prosecution Evidence
    Four witnesses testified regarding defendant’s prior
    criminal activity. Jeff Tawasha testified that he was working as
    a cashier at a market on October 25, 1981. Around 3:00 p.m.,
    defendant, wearing a stocking over his face, entered the market
    with a sawed-off shotgun and said, “This is a robbery. Give me
    the money or I’ll blow your head off.” A female customer walked
    into the store, and defendant pointed the shotgun at her and
    ordered her behind the counter. He then ordered Tawasha to
    11
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    take cash out of the cash register and put the money in his bag.
    Defendant ran out on foot and entered a waiting vehicle.
    Correctional Officer Grant Henry testified that on
    January 12, 1983, he conducted a search of defendant’s jail cell
    and found a “manufactured stabbing implement.” The weapon
    had been made by sharpening a metal rod.
    Correctional Lieutenant Richard Martinez testified that
    on March 7, 1984, he was working as a floor officer in the prison
    where defendant was housed. At approximately 8:00 p.m.,
    Martinez was talking to an inmate when defendant began
    stabbing the inmate. Defendant stabbed the inmate three to
    seven times before Martinez separated them.
    Deputy Sheriff Bradford Blakely testified that on
    November 15, 1990, he was working in a men’s jail where
    defendant was housed. While searching defendant’s cell, he
    found a five-inch stabbing instrument fabricated from a mop
    bucket.
    The prosecutor also introduced defendant’s testimony
    from an unrelated trial, in which he admitted that in 1991 he
    had stabbed a man six times.
    Four witnesses testified regarding defendant’s mental
    health.    Dr. Flores testified that defendant’s personality
    disorder had minimal to no impact on his free will. He explained
    that defendant’s “history is not indicative of someone who acts
    in an irrational manner, out of touch with reality in ways that
    don’t make sense. His history is consistent with someone who
    violates the rights of others, consistently.”        Dr. Hannah
    McGregor, a psychiatrist with the California Department of
    Corrections, testified that she certified defendant as an MDO in
    1994 after she reviewed reports from Dr. Wunderlich and
    12
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    another psychiatrist, Dr. Steven Moberg. Neurologist Dr. Helen
    Mayberg testified that she reviewed defendant’s PET scans. She
    disagreed with many of Dr. Wu’s findings and methods. She
    further opined that defendant’s frontal lobes were “relatively
    normal” and that his temporal lobes were normal. Psychologist
    Dr. Leisla Howell testified that she had evaluated defendant in
    1982 at a state prison following his armed robbery conviction.
    She testified that defendant did not take responsibility for his
    actions and blamed “everything on everybody for his
    difficulties.”
    The prosecution also recalled reporter Marla Jo Fisher,
    who testified that defendant had told her that he had committed
    the robbery because he wanted to go back to prison. He told
    Fisher that he did not like “life on the outside.” He appeared
    apologetic for shooting Wilson, but blamed HomeBase officials
    for failing to teach employees to hand over money without
    arguing.
    Officer Mark Steen testified regarding his interview of
    defendant, conducted with Officer Lozano, on June 14, 1996.
    When Steen asked defendant why he tried to commit a robbery,
    defendant replied that he was “tired of being broke all the time”
    and “want[ed] to be rich.” Defendant told the investigators that
    he was “in [his] right mind” during the attempted robbery.
    Three witnesses provided victim impact testimony.
    Maricela Saucedo, the cashier who asked Wilson for change,
    testified that Wilson had been her manager for two months,
    during which time she saw him nearly every day. She described
    Wilson as outgoing, understanding, friendly, and a hard worker.
    She felt responsible for his death, because if she had not asked
    him for change, he would not have walked to the safe and would
    13
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    not have been killed. Wilson’s aunt, Joyce Fyock, testified that
    Wilson’s father had died when he was a toddler and that she had
    helped his mother care for him. She described Wilson as
    outgoing and said he cared about people. She discussed visiting
    Wilson in the hospital before he died and having to take Wilson’s
    mother to the mortuary. Wilson’s brother Kirk testified that
    because he was 10 years older than Wilson and because their
    father had died, the brothers had a father-son relationship. He
    described walking into Wilson’s hospital room and staying in the
    room until Wilson was pronounced dead about five hours later.
    He testified that Wilson enjoyed working at HomeBase because
    he liked being around people, but he said that Wilson was also
    trying to pursue a career in sports broadcasting. Wilson had
    just become an intern at a local network and produced one sports
    promotional segment before he died.
    2. Defense Evidence
    The defense recalled Dr. Wu, who disagreed with Dr.
    Mayberg’s conclusions and interpretations of defendant’s PET
    scans.
    Defendant testified on his own behalf, with advisory
    counsel conducting the examination. He explained that his
    family moved frequently and that his father left when he was
    five years old. He struggled to fit in with his peers and even
    with members of his own family, because he was a “mixture of
    Scandinavian and Hispanic.” He attended school through
    seventh grade and applied for his General Educational
    Development (GED) certificate in 1982, at the age of 19, while
    incarcerated. Defendant served in the United States Navy for
    five months in 1982, receiving an honorable discharge. From
    the time he was 12 years old until trial, when he was 34 years
    14
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    old, defendant estimated that he spent 15 years in group homes,
    juvenile halls, or state institutions.
    Defendant studied religion and language while
    incarcerated, and he spent time with several different religious
    communities. In 1992, he earned vocational certificates in
    drywall installation and small engine repair. In 1995, he earned
    four computer and programming certificates.           Defendant
    explained that he felt motivated and was able to focus on his
    studies because of the “external controls” that existed in prison
    and because of the guidance provided by deputies, counselors,
    and correctional officers.
    Defendant further testified that he was “groomed” to join
    the Mexican Mafia gang beginning in 1981 and that he officially
    joined the gang in 1984. He withdrew from the gang in 1985
    after he disagreed with the gang’s decision to go to war with
    other prisoners. Shortly after, a fellow Mexican Mafia member
    stabbed defendant with a welding rod, because leaving a gang
    was punishable with death. Defendant’s subsequent prison
    sentences had to be served in protective custody.
    He said that he asked his mother several times to attend
    the penalty phase of his trial, but she did not want to testify,
    because her husband’s parents did not know about the offense,
    and she worried they would find out about it if she testified on
    behalf of her son.
    Defendant asked the jury to return a verdict of death. He
    explained that he had wanted to be put to death since the day of
    his arrest. The death penalty would be a “fitting end to a ruined
    life.” He also said that he would “like to apologize” and that he
    had never denied his guilt. He said that he had tried to plead
    guilty and “acknowledge full responsibility to all of the charges,
    15
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    including the special circumstances, even though I don’t believe
    in my mind that they’re true.”
    The defense recalled Volunteers in Parole mentor Wayne
    Dapser. Dapser testified that he knew defendant “probably
    better than anyone in this courtroom.” He believed defendant
    was one of the most intelligent men he knew. He stated that
    defendant “had a childhood from hell” and “a history that very
    few of us can even comprehend.” Dapser did not believe
    defendant deserved the death penalty.
    II. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
    A. Self-Representation and Desire to Plead Guilty
    Defendant raises several arguments in relation to his
    decision to represent himself and his desire to plead guilty in
    the municipal court prior to his preliminary hearing. Before
    addressing the specific arguments, a detailed description of the
    relevant procedural history is necessary.
    1. Procedural Background
    On June 18, 1996, defendant appeared for arraignment
    before a municipal court magistrate. (Former §§ 859, 859b,
    860.) At defendant’s request, the court appointed the public
    defender to represent him, and the arraignment was continued
    to a later date. On July 16, 1996, defendant filed a handwritten
    motion seeking to proceed in propria persona (in pro. per.). At a
    hearing in the municipal court on August 22, 1996, the court
    asked defendant, “You are willing to roll the dice all by yourself
    without any skills of an experienced attorney to assist you?”
    Defendant replied that he did not trust the public defender’s
    office. The court warned defendant that, as a self-represented
    defendant, he would not have special privileges, that his
    “opposition will be a skilled and talented attorney,” that if
    16
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    convicted he could not later complain he did not have effective
    assistance of counsel, and that he would be unable to change his
    mind during the trial. Defendant’s counsel then asked the court
    to defer ruling on the motion, and the court continued the matter
    to the date of the scheduled arraignment.
    At the arraignment on October 30, 1996, defendant
    informed the municipal court that he did not then want to
    represent himself, but he reserved the right to represent himself
    at some later point. Additionally, defendant requested a
    hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 
    2 Cal. 3d 118
    (Marsden), asking the judge to replace one or both of his
    attorneys. The court conducted a Marsden hearing in chambers.
    Defendant explained that he had “zero confidence” in his two
    attorneys and that he did not want “that vigorous of a defense.”
    He continued, “I want them to let me — allow me to steer them
    away from certain witnesses that I don’t want called onto the
    stand because of — you know, I just — I just don’t want certain
    information coming out.” Defendant clarified that he was
    concerned about information coming out in the penalty phase of
    the case, not the guilt phase. The court explained, “Well, you’re
    here now facing just a preliminary hearing, where the People
    put on some of their evidence and the defense puts on nothing.
    So you’re talking about way down the line at trial and then
    sentencing rights.” Defendant replied that he wanted to waive
    the preliminary hearing and plead guilty. He acknowledged
    that his attorneys were not ineffective and that he was not yet
    ready to represent himself, but he wanted counsel who would
    not work as hard. The court explained that it could not remove
    counsel for working too hard and denied the Marsden motion.
    After holding the Marsden hearing, the municipal court
    arraigned defendant. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of
    17
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    a copy of the complaint, waived reading and advisement, and
    entered a plea of not guilty. Defendant then said, “Over my
    objection.” Defense counsel clarified, “What he means is he
    would like to have the complaint read.” Defendant did not offer
    any further clarification, and the court noted his objection on the
    record.
    One week later, on November 7, 1996, defendant made an
    oral motion in the municipal court to proceed in propria persona.
    Defendant said that he had a GED certificate, was aware he
    faced the death penalty, and had previously represented himself
    in superior court proceedings. Defendant’s only concern was
    whether, as a self-represented defendant, he would still have the
    ability to request funding for an investigator, and the court
    assured him he would. The court stated that it found defendant
    to be “a very bright person, mentally alert,” and it granted the
    motion to proceed in propria persona. Defendant then accepted
    the court’s offer to appoint advisory counsel, and the court
    appointed Edgar Freeman. The court went through defendant’s
    list of requested jail privileges related to his status as a self-
    represented defendant, and it granted much of what defendant
    sought.
    At an in camera hearing on December 5, 1996, defendant
    asked the municipal court to award funds for a guilt phase
    investigator and a penalty phase investigator. The court
    explained that the district attorney had not yet declared an
    intent to pursue the death penalty and therefore the case was
    not yet a capital case. Defendant responded that the prosecutor
    had stated in open court that it was a capital case. Defendant
    also informed the court that he had submitted a letter to the
    prosecution offering “to stipulate to the murder in the first
    degree and admit all special circumstances and waive all
    18
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    appellate rights in order for a sentence of life without the
    possibility of parole.” Defendant said, “The district attorney has
    refused that. It’s a death penalty case, your honor. I wish it
    wasn’t.” The court then explained that it only needed to provide
    sufficient investigation funding to allow defendant to have a fair
    preliminary hearing; after that, assuming defendant was held
    to answer in the superior court, the superior court would be
    responsible for disbursing investigation funds. The court then
    appointed an investigator and explained that the investigator
    could submit bills to the court for the court’s discretionary
    consideration.
    On December 17, 1996, the municipal court called
    defendant back for another in camera hearing, revoking all prior
    orders concerning jail privileges and substituting a new order
    that, among other things, granted no more than $3,000 in
    investigative funds. When the court denied defendant’s request
    for an additional $3,000 for office supplies, defendant
    complained that the county provided the public defender’s office
    with money for office supplies, and he accused the court of not
    taking his case seriously. The court replied that “this is a very
    serious case. I want you to appreciate your life is on the line and
    that you’re not, despite what you think, you are not, I don’t
    believe, capable of adequately representing yourself, that is,
    doing a legally competent job. . . . I want you to know that my
    offer to appoint counsel for you remains outstanding.”
    Defendant replied, “I’ll accept if you are going to appoint
    secondary counsel on the case under [section] 987, subsection
    (d), which grants a second attorney to a capital defendant.” The
    court asked whether defendant intended to continue to act as
    his own lead counsel, and defendant responded in the
    affirmative, indicating that his request was for appointment of
    19
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    cocounsel in place of advisory counsel. The court denied the
    request without prejudice.
    On December 20, 1996, the municipal court called
    defendant back once again, this time to make clarifications
    regarding its prior orders. Defendant expressed frustration
    with some of his self-representation jail privileges, mentioning
    in particular his inability to reach his investigator via collect
    calls. The court then acknowledged its previous denial of
    defendant’s request for secondary counsel, and it offered
    defendant the opportunity to show a need for such counsel.
    Defendant argued that, given the limitations of his jail
    privileges, it would help him to have second counsel to prepare
    briefs and motions, and to make appearances on minor matters.
    He told the court that writing motions was “a little bit above”
    him but added, “I am stubborn enough that if the court does not
    grant me a second chair, I will continue to fight the case as best
    I can.” The court granted defendant’s request and appointed
    Edgar Freeman as “second counsel,” vacating Freeman’s
    appointment as advisory counsel. The significance of that
    change was apparently that Freeman could make appearances
    on behalf of defendant.
    As of December 24, 1996, the case was being formally
    treated as a capital case, and a superior court judge, sitting in
    camera, was handling disbursements of investigative funds
    under section 987.9. (See Anderson v. Justice Court (1979) 
    99 Cal. App. 3d 398
    , 402 [“[T]he superior court is the only court with
    jurisdiction to entertain an application for funds under section
    987.9. . . . A magistrate has only such powers as are statutorily
    granted and it cannot be said that section 987.9 clearly grants
    this power to the magistrate.”].) For purposes of the preliminary
    20
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    hearing, however, the case was still before a municipal court
    magistrate. (See former § 860.)
    On January 23, 1997, a superior court judge held an in
    camera hearing to discuss defendant’s request to replace his
    investigator. The court stated at the outset of the hearing that
    it had received notice that an officer had discovered a file folder
    containing nude photographs in defendant’s jail cell. This
    discovery indicated a violation of defendant’s self-representation
    jail privileges, because the photographs were being stored in
    plastic sheet protectors that defendant had requested from the
    court for purposes of preparing his defense. When the superior
    court judge raised the issue, defendant stated, “Well, if the court
    would please hear my first motion, this matter could become
    moot very fast.”
    Defendant then informed the superior court that he
    wanted to “go public” — as opposed to in camera — and plead
    guilty. He requested the court schedule the penalty phase for
    February 5, 1997, and reappoint the public defender’s office to
    represent him. He stated that he had already spoken with his
    previous attorneys and that they had agreed to take the case for
    the penalty phase after he pleaded guilty. The superior court
    judge asked defendant if he had spoken to cocounsel Freeman
    and received advice about pleading guilty. Defendant replied
    that he had spoken to Freeman but “this is not on the advice of
    anyone, sir. This is a decision that I have made based on the
    fact that there is absolutely zero potential for me receiving any
    type of justice whatsoever.” He expressed frustration over his
    inability to get a working computer in jail and his difficulty
    placing unmonitored telephone calls. He continued, “I do not
    care to allow the State of California, the government, to run over
    me. I just want to go ahead, plead guilty, go and put my life in
    21
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    front of a jury, and let the jury decide whether or not I should
    get this death penalty, or whether I should get life
    imprisonment. But as to the matter of death, I don’t even want
    to play these games anymore. I want to just go ahead, I want to
    enter a plea of guilty. I have a right to do so, and I wish to do so
    at this time. [¶] I’ve spoken with counsel. And like I said, I
    would drop my pro. per. status and accept the public defender’s
    office to represent me as far as the penalty phase is concerned.
    And if the court would take my waiver, I’m making a knowing
    and . . . intelligent waiver.”
    As noted, this request to plead guilty arose while the
    superior court was holding an in camera hearing solely to
    address the disbursement of investigative funds under section
    987.9. The case was not otherwise in the superior court, since
    the preliminary hearing had not occurred and defendant had not
    been held to answer. The superior court therefore explained to
    defendant that “the issue as to whether or not you’re going to
    plead guilty or waive a preliminary hearing is really not before
    me today.” Defendant replied, “I would like it to be before you
    because it would handle a lot of these other matters.”
    Defendant explained that he had received money from the
    court for investigation services but had not received an
    investigative report, and he had to “keep coming to this court
    and begging for phone calls, begging for materials, begging for
    this, while a criminal investigation needs to proceed.” The court
    then stated that it would hold a hearing the following week on
    the allegations surrounding defendant’s jail violation, and it
    temporarily suspended his self-representation jail privileges.
    The court continued, “But I would be frank with you and say this
    is one of the things I tried to talk to you [about] out front when
    I kind of bottom-lined it [on] one of the first days you were in
    22
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    court. I sincerely hope you’re sincere in wanting these privileges
    to defend yourself.” Defendant replied that he did not believe
    the court had ever been sincere in its efforts to assist him. He
    added that he would “still like to make the matter moot” by
    waiving the preliminary hearing, pleading guilty, and accepting
    the appointment of the public defender’s office for the penalty
    phase.
    The court then agreed to help defendant. It said, “With
    your permission and request, I’ll contact — or have my clerk
    contact — the judicial officer in Division [311 (where the
    preliminary hearing was scheduled to be held)] and request your
    matter be calendared as soon as possible because you
    want [¶] . . . [¶] . . . to consider a change of plea or waiver of
    preliminary hearing . . . .” Later, defendant said, “I’m pleading
    guilty and that’s that.” The court responded, “Well, you haven’t
    done that yet,” and defendant said, “Well, I’m attempting to
    very, very, very hard.” When asked whether he had discussed
    the matter with cocounsel Freeman, defendant answered that
    he had done so. Defendant discussed the difficulties he was
    having with his investigator, and he repeated that the problem
    would be moot if the court would allow him to plead guilty. The
    court then told defendant, “That part of the matter’s not before
    me. [¶] . . . [¶] Okay. Those matters are pending in [Division]
    311 [of the municipal court] [¶] . . . [¶] We’re going to make
    arrangements to have you brought over to [Division] 311, and
    you can discuss your desires there.”
    After more discussion concerning defendant’s request to
    replace his investigator, the court denied that request. The
    court then made clear that it intended to assist defendant in his
    effort to waive the preliminary examination and plead guilty.
    The court said, “[We]’ll do our best to get you calendared in
    23
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    [Division] 311 [of the municipal court] as soon as possible. I
    can’t guarantee when that will be. As soon as we’re in recess,
    I’m sure my clerk will call over there. If I have to call over there
    personally, I would do it.” The hearing then came to an end.
    The minute order for the hearing reflected the court’s effort to
    help defendant achieve his aim of pleading guilty. It states:
    “Defendant’s oral request that preliminary hearing in Div. 311
    be advanced and waived, that defendant be allowed to change
    his plea to a guilty plea and that the Public Defender be
    appointed to represent defendant. Court orders that Div. 311 be
    contacted by the Court clerk and that defendant’s requests be
    expedited in Div. 311.”
    A few days later, on January 27, 1997, the superior court
    held another in camera hearing, this time to address defendant’s
    violation of his self-representation jail privileges. The court
    stated, “It appears to me in this short time that I have been
    involved in this case that Mr. Frederickson at least has a dual
    focus in what he is doing. Part of it he is trying to defend
    himself, and part of it he is trying to use his pro. per. privileges
    to do other things that common sense would indicate just aren’t
    appropriate and are a violation of the implicit terms of the pro.
    per. privilege. [¶] . . . He was in court the other day on the 23rd.
    He indicated that, well, judge, you don’t have to worry about it.
    I am going to waive the preliminary hearing. I am going to plead
    guilty. . . . [¶] He wanted me to contact the judge at [Division]
    311 to see if he could be brought over there to waive [the]
    preliminary hearing or whatever he was talking about doing.”
    Cocounsel Freeman then represented to the court that
    defendant was dedicated and committed but had, in his opinion,
    a low tolerance for frustration. Freeman stated that after a
    “series of frustrations,” including a poorly functioning computer,
    24
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    defendant told him that he wanted to “ ‘go in and plead guilty in
    muni[cipal] court and get this over with and get it on the road
    and let the public defender handle [the] penalty phase.’ ”
    Freeman continued, “I told him, ‘Well, Daniel, that is your
    decision. That is up to you. I will not participate in entering
    into a plea with you in your case.’ I have told him that.”
    Lieutenant Danny Jarvis, a facility master at the intake
    center that housed defendant, then testified about defendant’s
    violation of his self-representation jail privileges. Jarvis
    explained that defendant was “very, very inconvenient to care
    for,” because he was in protective custody due to his self-
    representation. He continued, “What I see that he is doing
    within the jail environment, he is using his pro. per. status to
    manipulate his status within the areas that he is housed to try
    to bring more credence on him so he can have some sort of status
    and role within the jail population, which makes it doubly
    difficult.” After more discussion among the court, defendant,
    and cocounsel Freeman, the court revoked defendant’s self-
    representation jail privileges. It closed the hearing by again
    offering to help defendant to waive his preliminary hearing and
    plead guilty, if that was what defendant still wanted: “We will
    call [the municipal court judge assigned to your case] and see if
    she can work it in sometime late this morning, or sometime this
    afternoon.”
    That afternoon, defendant appeared in the department of
    the municipal court assigned to his case. He explained to the
    court, “[T]he guilt of my crime has been weighing heavily on me
    with a remorseful heart. I would like to offer a change of plea
    and enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and admit
    the special circumstances and waive all appellate rights at this
    time.” The prosecutor then requested to speak with both
    25
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    defendant and Freeman off the record.             Following that
    conversation, the prosecutor informed the municipal court that
    he had explained to defendant that “by law he cannot plead
    guilty to a special circumstances allegation case.”          The
    prosecutor continued, “I told him no judge can accept your
    plea. [¶] Furthermore, I told him that it was my opinion Mr.
    Freeman would offer him the best possible representation and
    suggested that he follow Mr. Freeman’s advice on the
    matter. [¶] It’s my understanding Mr. Frederickson — despite
    Mr. Freeman’s conversations with him and my own
    conversations with him in Mr. Freeman’s presence — Mr.
    Frederickson still wants to plead guilty, although I think he
    realizes that he cannot.” The prosecutor added, “I think it’s his
    desire to actually waive the preliminary hearing which is still
    scheduled for February 5th. My last suggestion to him was not
    to do anything today. That we just come on February 5th and
    have more of a chance to think about it. To talk to Mr. Freeman,
    or talk to his investigator, and then he can decide what he wants
    to do on the 5th.”
    The court reminded the parties that the People also have
    a right to a preliminary hearing, and even if defendant waived
    his right, the People could choose not to do so. The prosecutor
    stated that the People were not prepared to waive the
    preliminary hearing at that time, although the People might be
    willing to do so on the scheduled date of the hearing. The court
    then explained to defendant, “If the People are unwilling at this
    time, or at any time, to waive the preliminary hearing, it doesn’t
    really matter [that you want to do so], because they have the
    right to have a preliminary hearing in your case. . . . [¶] So [the
    prosecutor] is telling me that he is not prepared today to make
    that decision even if you are. So to have further discussions and
    26
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    undertake further proceedings today would be — for lack of a
    better word — a waste of time, and I am going to suggest that
    we terminate these proceedings today and that you come back
    on February 5th. [¶] . . . You will have had another nine days
    to think about this and decide whether or not you truly want to
    waive [the] preliminary hearing or not.”3 Defendant agreed
    with that solution.
    On the scheduled date of the preliminary hearing,
    February 5, 1997, defendant never requested to waive the
    hearing, and the hearing proceeded. At the end of the hearing,
    defendant was held to answer the allegations of the complaint
    in the superior court.
    By information filed in the superior court on February 18,
    1997, the People formally charged defendant with one count of
    first degree murder, an enhancement allegation of personal use
    of a firearm, and a robbery-murder special circumstance
    allegation. On February 24, 1997, defendant appeared in
    superior court with cocounsel Freeman and entered pleas of not
    3
    The magistrate’s statement implied that defendant could
    waive the preliminary hearing despite his self-represented
    status. The text of former section 860 and relevant case law
    suggest otherwise. (See former § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2,
    p. 2670 [“. . . a defendant represented by counsel may . . . waive
    his right to an examination . . . ,” italics added]; People v. White
    (1963) 
    213 Cal. App. 2d 171
    , 174 [“Unless represented by counsel
    a felony defendant who appears before a committing magistrate
    may not . . . waive a preliminary examination (Pen. Code, §
    860).”].) Defendant did, however, have the assistance of Edgar
    Freeman who, per the magistrate’s order, was serving as
    “second counsel.” We need not decide whether, with Freeman
    serving in that role, defendant could waive the preliminary
    hearing, because, as noted in the main text, the People were not
    prepared to join such a waiver.
    27
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant said
    nothing about a desire to plead guilty. At an appearance the
    following day, defendant confirmed that despite the revocation
    of his self-representation jail privileges, he still intended to
    represent himself. Then, during an in camera hearing on
    February 28, 1997, the court granted defendant’s request to
    appoint a second investigator, tasked solely with interviewing
    his family. The court also reinstated defendant’s jail privileges.
    On March 14, 1997, the assigned trial judge began
    presiding over defendant’s case. On the same date, the
    prosecutor requested the court take a second waiver of
    defendant’s right to counsel (see Faretta v. California (1975) 
    422 U.S. 806
    (Faretta)), because the first waiver occurred before the
    People had formally declared an intent to seek the death
    penalty. Defendant stated he understood his rights and the
    maximum sentence he faced, and he signed a written Faretta
    waiver.
    At a pretrial hearing on July 25, 1997, defendant told the
    court, “I’m contemplating withdrawing my right to . . . plead in
    propria persona and ask for counsel to start representing me.”
    Later in the hearing, defendant explained, “[O]ne of the reasons
    why I would even be considering giving up my pro. per. status
    would be [that] I feel, if counsel represents me, the court will
    give counsel the funds to do it, whereas they won’t give it to me.”
    The judge presiding over the trial of a capital case does not
    oversee disbursement of investigative funds (§ 987.9, subd. (a)),
    and therefore the court responded, “It’s an issue I’m not involved
    in, so I really can’t comment.”
    On August 1, 1997, the trial court held a Marsden hearing
    at defendant’s request, despite the circumstance that defendant
    28
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    was representing himself. Defendant explained, “I wanted to let
    the court know, if the court was not aware, that I’m in pro. per.
    I’m lead counsel; he is second chair. . . . This hearing was not
    about [cocounsel] Freeman or whether or not he was effectively
    representing me. It’s about whether I’m effectively representing
    myself as a pro. per. defendant. It sounds funny, a pro. per.
    defendant stating that he’s complaining of ineffective
    representation, but through all the information that I’ve been
    filing, the court has doggedly refused to give me funds for my
    investigation. . . . And if that continues, your honor, then
    obviously I’m going to lose. And I feel if I continue to represent
    myself, it would be a danger to my life, and therefore, if the court
    steadfastly refuse[s] to acknowledge that the defendant needs
    [section] 987.9 funds for an investigation, then the defendant
    would request that the court appoint counsel, [so] that the court
    will give money to defend me, which is wrong. I shouldn’t have
    to waive my right for defending myself just so I can have money
    to effectively represent myself, that’s what I’m complaining of.”
    The court reminded defendant that by representing
    himself, he could not claim incompetence of counsel. Defendant
    replied, “I’m complaining actually of incompetence of judiciary
    in this case.” The court then informed defendant that an
    appointed attorney would not be given unlimited investigative
    funds, and it asked, “So I just need to know if you want to
    represent yourself, or do you want [the] court to appoint counsel
    for you?” Defendant said that he was withdrawing his Marsden
    motion and would continue to represent himself.
    The same issue came up again on September 25, 1997.
    During an in camera hearing, the court read aloud a note it had
    received from defendant: “ ‘Sir, I am requesting an ex parte, in
    camera hearing with you to discuss the very possible mechanics
    29
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    of turning my case over to appointed counsel. My reasons are
    legion, but the biggest is the fact that the court will not give me
    investigative funds to fully investigate my cause. I know that it
    is only due to my persistence of wanting pro. per. that this is the
    case. [¶] So the issues to be discussed by us in camera and ex
    parte are: 1. Appointment of new lead counsel; 2. Appointment
    of new second chair; 3. Hear any argument by defendant and
    counsel for the purpose of retaining some of the pro. per.
    privileges now enjoyed to assist in the speedy transition of case
    information.’ ” The note continued: “ ‘Sir, I know that a lot of
    men go pro. per. just to confound the court’s process. I assure
    you my intention was honorable. It is still my desire to defend
    myself, but I cannot present a case to [the] jury without a full
    and proper investigation. The court will be open to new
    counsel’s requests, where they were closed to mine. I know that
    this will also probably make me waive more time, a thing the
    court knows I do not want to do, but if we could just sit down
    and work out a good plan of action immediately, I am sure the
    end of justice will be served. Thank you, sir.’ ”
    After a lengthy discussion, the court explained: “I’ve
    always been prepared to work with you, sir, the problem, sir, I
    can’t hold you to a lower standard than I hold everybody else.
    Someone who represents himself or herself basically steps into
    the shoes of someone that is represented by counsel, and so there
    aren’t any special privileges. Your pro. per. privileges I don’t
    think are special privileges; we basically afford you . . . the
    privileges so you can basically be able to do the same things that
    a lawyer can do if the lawyer were representing you.” Defendant
    then asked to speak with cocounsel Freeman off the record. On
    return, the court asked defendant to state his “desire with
    respect to representation.” Defendant asked to discuss funding
    30
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    first, “because that’s the primary motivation of whether or not I
    will continue in pro. per. or give the case over to counsel, but I
    mean it seems dangerous . . . for me to set precedent for the rest
    of the pro. per. [litigant]s if all the court has to do is set a few
    harsh standards, and then the pro. per. [litigant] can lay down,
    and counsel can step in and automatically start getting funds
    available to do the case. It would be dangerous to future pro.
    per. [litigant]s of the United States of America.” The court then
    reminded defendant that there was no guarantee that an
    attorney would receive investigative funds that defendant had
    not received, and the court asked defendant if he wished to
    continue to represent himself. Defendant said, “I intend to
    proceed in pro. per.”
    On October 20, 1997, during a pretrial conference, the
    court initiated a discussion on cocounsel Freeman’s role during
    trial. The court opined that “advisory counsel is just that, an
    advisory counsel. There is no such thing as a pro. per.
    cocounsel.” Defendant explained that Freeman had been
    relieved as advisory counsel and appointed as cocounsel under
    section 987, subdivision (d). Defendant further related that he
    planned to present the opening statement and closing
    argument, and to conduct the examination of witnesses during
    the guilt phase, while Freeman would conduct the sanity phase.
    Defendant and Freeman planned to share responsibilities
    during the penalty phase, with defendant conducting the
    opening statement and the examination of witnesses, Freeman
    conducting the direct and redirect examination of defendant,
    and both of them conducting the closing argument.
    The court responded, “I’m somewhat puzzled at [the
    municipal court’s] order, because the research that I’ve done
    indicates that there is no such thing as cocounsel when the
    31
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    defendant is pro. per.” The court continued, “The reason I need
    to sort that out is because in my opinion, if you are going to be
    representing yourself, you need to represent yourself in all
    processes — all stages of the trial.” After defendant requested
    that Freeman be permitted to object on his behalf throughout
    trial, the court said, “No. You either represent yourself or you
    don’t. He can certainly advise you. . . . But in terms of him
    acting as your attorney, either he is your attorney or he’s
    advisory counsel, which means it’s up to you.” After more
    discussion, the court concluded that the previous appointment
    of Freeman as second chair was inappropriate. It said: “So I’m
    going to be conducting this trial as if you are representing
    yourself in pro. per., and Mr. Freeman is your advisory counsel.”
    Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asked the court to order
    defendant not to mention any discussion of a proposed plea deal
    in front of the jury. Defendant replied by bringing up his earlier
    attempt to plead guilty: “In Division 311 and on several
    occasions the defendant has attempted to plead guilty, and the
    prosecution has refused to accept that. Counsel at that time
    refused to join, and the court refused to accept that or
    acknowledge my plea of guilty, but it was placed on the record.”
    The prosecutor acknowledged that “[i]t was placed on the
    record” but pointed out that “the Penal Code specifically
    disallows a guilty plea while he’s in pro. per., and no counsel has
    ever agreed to join in his plea, so technically it’s an illegal,
    unacceptable plea and still should not be mentioned to this
    jury.” The court agreed that defendant’s attempts to plead
    guilty were not relevant for the guilt phase, but the question was
    “open to argument” for the sanity and penalty phases.
    On October 27, 1997, defendant again asked the court to
    allow him to introduce evidence of his attempts to plead guilty.
    32
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    He said, “Your honor, a clear and distinct part of my testimony
    and evidence is the fact of my remorse and confession. It would
    appear to a trier of fact that I am playing a game by pleading
    not guilty yet introducing evidence of my confessions of guilt.
    Just because my attorneys have refused to join my plea
    pursuant to [section] 1018 does not alter the truth. The truth is
    that I have attempted to plead guilty and accept responsibility
    for the [violation of section] 187. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The jury is going
    to feel like, well, if he’s confessing and now coming in front of us
    and saying he’s not guilty, he’s pulling the wool over our eyes.
    My veracity is at stake here, your honor.” Defendant then asked
    the court to introduce evidence that defendant had “accepted
    responsibility and guilt for [his] crime and [had] attempted to
    plead guilty.”       The court reminded defendant that such
    information was relevant at the penalty phase but not at the
    guilt phase. Defendant nonetheless asked the court to “instruct
    the jury on [section] 1018.” He asked that the court explain to
    the jury “that the defendant has attempted to plead guilty” but
    that, by law, he could not do so. The court again ruled that the
    information was relevant only at the penalty phase, not at the
    guilt phase.
    2. Right to Plead Guilty
    Defendant contends that he was denied his personal and
    fundamental right to control his defense when the trial court,
    acting under compulsion of section 1018, refused to permit him
    to plead guilty without the consent of counsel. We conclude his
    claim is forfeited because he never moved to plead guilty in the
    superior court, thereby causing that court to invoke section
    1018.
    33
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    a. Legal Background
    Section 1018 provides in relevant part: “No plea of guilty
    of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be received
    from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor
    shall that plea be received without the consent of the
    defendant’s counsel.” This portion of section 1018 was added in
    1973 as part of an extensive revision to the death penalty laws.
    (Stats.1973, ch. 719, § 11, p. 1301.) “The fact that the
    requirement of counsel’s consent to guilty pleas in capital cases
    was enacted as part of [an extensive revision of the state’s death
    penalty laws in response to Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
    408 U.S. 238
    ] demonstrates that the Legislature intended it to serve as a
    further independent safeguard against erroneous imposition of
    a death sentence.” (People v. Chadd (1981) 
    28 Cal. 3d 739
    , 750
    (Chadd).)
    Two years after the 1973 amendment to section 1018, the
    high court recognized a defendant’s constitutional right to self-
    representation in 
    Faretta, supra
    , 
    422 U.S. 806
    . In 
    Chadd, supra
    , 
    28 Cal. 3d 739
    , we reconciled the right of self-
    representation with section 1018’s requirement that counsel
    consent to a guilty plea in a capital offense. Defense counsel in
    Chadd informed the trial court that the defendant wanted to
    plead guilty against counsel’s advice, and counsel explained that
    he would not consent to his client entering such a plea, because
    the defendant’s desire was to commit suicide. (Id. at p.
    744.) The defendant admitted to the court that he had
    attempted suicide, and if he did not receive the death penalty,
    he would “just have to do it myself.” (Id. at p. 745.) Defense
    counsel reminded the court that a guilty plea by his client was
    without his consent, and the prosecutor agreed that section 1018
    34
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    prohibited the court from accepting such a plea. (Chadd, at p.
    745.)
    The trial court ruled that if it found the defendant
    competent to act as his own attorney under Faretta, it could
    accept his guilty plea despite section 1018. (
    Chadd, supra
    , 28
    Cal.3d at p. 745.) The court questioned the defendant, found
    him competent under Faretta, and then, without actually
    dismissing defense counsel, allowed the defendant to plead
    guilty to the information. (Chadd, at p. 745.) On appeal, the
    Attorney General argued that section 1018 could be construed
    to permit a capital defendant to discharge his attorney,
    represent himself, and plead guilty. (Chadd, at p. 746.) We
    rejected this contention, however, stating that the language of
    section 1018 plainly required the consent of counsel to plead
    guilty. (Chadd, at p. 746.) Construing the statute “to permit a
    capital defendant to discharge his attorney and plead guilty if
    he knowingly, voluntarily, and openly waives his right to
    counsel” “would make a major portion of the statute redundant,”
    we reasoned, because “that is precisely what the third sentence
    of section 1018 expressly authorizes noncapital defendants to
    do.” (Chadd, at p. 747.)
    We noted the larger public interest at stake in guilty pleas
    in capital offenses, as well as the Legislature’s “increasing
    concern to insure that no defendant enter a guilty plea in our
    courts without fully understanding the nature and
    consequences of his act.” (
    Chadd, supra
    , 28 Cal.3d at pp. 748–
    749.)
    We read Faretta as not affecting the Legislature’s
    authority to condition guilty pleas on counsel’s consent. (
    Chadd, supra
    , 28 Cal.3d at p. 750.) “Nothing in Faretta, either
    35
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the right to conclude
    that the danger of erroneously imposing a death sentence
    outweighs the minor infringement of the right of self-
    representation resulting when defendant’s right to plead guilty
    in capital cases is subjected to the requirement of his counsel’s
    consent.” (Chadd, at p. 751.) We further concluded that Faretta
    did not grant a capital defendant the right to discharge counsel
    and waive his automatic appeal, explaining that the state, too,
    had an indisputable interest in correct judgments in capital
    cases. (Chadd, at p. 752.)
    We again held section 1018 to be constitutional more than
    25 years later in People v. Alfaro (2007) 
    41 Cal. 4th 1277
    (Alfaro).
    In Alfaro, the defendant accepted complete responsibility for the
    offenses in a videotaped confession on the day of her arrest. (Id.
    at p. 1295.) Eleven days before jury selection began, defense
    counsel informed the trial court that the defendant wanted to
    plead guilty to the special circumstances against counsel’s
    advice and asked the court whether it believed he should
    withdraw from the case. (Ibid.) The defendant explained to the
    court that she wanted to plead guilty because she feared for her
    safety and that of her family should she implicate her
    accomplice in the crime. (Id. at p. 1296.) The court responded
    that under section 1018 she could not plead guilty against her
    attorney’s advice. The court also declined to remove defense
    counsel from the case, concluding that the disagreement
    between counsel and the defendant involved trial tactics and
    therefore did not require counsel’s removal. (Alfaro, at p. 1296.)
    The prosecutor then argued during the penalty phase that the
    defendant had not accepted responsibility and lacked remorse,
    and the jury did not hear evidence that the defendant had
    attempted to enter a guilty plea. (Id. at pp. 1296–1297.)
    36
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    We acknowledged the defendant’s argument that “a
    defendant has the ultimate, fundamental right to control his or
    her own defense,” but concluded that section 1018 was “one of
    several exceptions to the general rule.” 
    (Alfaro, supra
    , 41
    Cal.4th at p. 1298.) We noted that “[t]he statute constitutes a
    legislative recognition of the severe consequences of a guilty plea
    in a capital case, and provides protection against an ill-advised
    guilty plea and the erroneous imposition of a death sentence.”
    (Id. at p. 1300.) We rejected the defendant’s assertion that the
    trial court improperly failed to inquire into her reasons for
    desiring to plead guilty and that had it done so, it would have
    discovered her intent to demonstrate remorse. We noted that
    nothing in the record supported the defendant’s assertion on
    appeal that her desire to plead guilty was motivated by a desire
    to establish a defense of remorse or to establish that she
    accepted responsibility for the murder. (Id. at p. 1302.)
    “Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded that the
    dispute between defendant and her counsel did not implicate a
    constitutionally protected fundamental interest that might
    override the plain terms of section 1018.” (Alfaro, at p. 1302.)
    We left undecided whether a defendant might be able to make a
    successful as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of
    section 1018 in a case in which the evidence of guilt was very
    strong and the defendant’s express reason for wanting to plead
    guilty was to lay the foundation for a remorse argument at the
    penalty phase.
    Most recently, in McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) __ U.S. __
    [
    138 S. Ct. 1500
    ] (McCoy), the United States Supreme Court held
    that “it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on
    the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining
    mercy at the sentencing stage [of a capital case], or to maintain
    37
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1505], italics
    added.) In McCoy, the defendant’s retained counsel determined
    that the best strategy for avoiding a death sentence was to
    concede guilt as to the three murders during the guilt phase and
    plead for mercy during the penalty phase. (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct.
    at p. 1506].) The defendant was “ ‘furious’ ” with counsel’s
    strategy and wanted to pursue acquittal instead. (Ibid.) The
    trial court denied the defendant’s request to remove his counsel,
    as well as defense counsel’s request to be relieved if the
    defendant secured other counsel. (Ibid.) The court told counsel
    that it was his decision whether to concede guilt or put on a
    defense case. (Ibid.) Defense counsel then acknowledged during
    his opening statement to the jury that the evidence
    unambiguously showed that the defendant had committed the
    murders. Nonetheless, the defendant testified he was innocent.
    (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].) The jury found the defendant
    guilty and then returned three death verdicts. (Ibid.)
    The    defendant,      represented    by    new     counsel,
    unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that the
    court had violated his constitutional rights by allowing counsel
    to concede his guilt over his objection. 
    (McCoy, supra
    , __ U.S. at
    p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].) The Louisiana Supreme Court
    affirmed the trial court’s ruling, concluding that the concession
    was permissible because defense counsel reasonably believed
    that admitting guilt offered the defendant the best chance to
    avoid a death sentence. (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].)
    The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
    
    (McCoy, supra
    , __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1512].) It
    explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant
    the right to make a defense; it “ ‘speaks of the “assistance” of
    38
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.’ ”
    (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].) While some decisions, such
    as trial management, are best left to counsel, “[s]ome
    decisions . . . are reserved for the client — notably, whether to
    plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own
    behalf, and forgo an appeal.” (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508],
    italics added.) The high court held that a defendant who
    “insist[s] on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a
    capital trial” cannot be forced by counsel to concede guilt.
    Defense counsel can make strategic choices regarding how best
    to achieve a defendant’s objectives, but the defendant chooses
    those objectives. (Ibid.)
    b. Analysis
    If defendant wanted to challenge the constitutionality of
    section 1018, whether on the ground that it precluded him from
    using a guilty plea to lay the foundation for a penalty phase
    remorse argument or on some other ground, he needed to
    request to plead guilty in the superior court and ask that court
    to make a ruling based on section 1018, thus preserving the
    issue on appeal. He never did so. The claim is therefore
    forfeited.
    Before 1992, there were clear jurisdictional lines
    separating misdemeanor cases from felony cases:               The
    municipal court had no jurisdiction in felony cases, and the
    superior court had no jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases.
    Therefore, in a felony case, the municipal court could not convict
    a defendant on a plea of guilty, because it was not authorized to
    39
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    render a felony judgment. (See, e.g., former § 1462,4 Stats. 1976,
    ch. 1288, § 21, p. 5765; People v. Callahan (1997) 
    54 Cal. App. 4th 1419
    , 1424–1425 [magistrate had no authority under the pre-
    1992 amendment to section 1462 to impose judgment in
    noncapital felony cases]; People v. Miskiewicz (1984) 
    158 Cal. App. 3d 820
    , 824–825; People v. Denton (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d
    Supp. 1, Supp. 4–Supp. 6.) A municipal court judge, sitting as a
    magistrate (not as a judge), could arraign a defendant in a
    noncapital felony case, and if the defendant pleaded guilty (or
    nolo contendere), the magistrate could accept the plea and
    certify the case to the superior court for entry of judgment.
    (Former § 859a,5 Stats. 1980, ch. 540, § 1, pp. 1495–1496; People
    4
    Before 1992, former section 1462 provided:              “Each
    municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in all
    criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor, where the offense
    charged was committed within the county in which such
    municipal or justice court is established except those of which
    the juvenile court is given jurisdiction and those of which other
    courts are given exclusive jurisdiction. Each municipal and
    justice court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
    involving the violation of ordinances of cities or towns situated
    within the district in which such court is established.”
    5
    Before 1992, former section 859a provided in relevant
    part: “(a) If the public offense charged is a felony not punishable
    with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon the
    appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint to
    the defendant and ask him whether he pleads guilty or not
    guilty to the offense charged therein . . . ; thereupon, or at any
    time thereafter, while the charge remains pending before the
    magistrate and when his counsel is present, the defendant may
    plead guilty to the offense charged . . . . [¶] (b) . . . [T]he
    magistrate shall, upon the receipt of a plea of guilty . . . ,
    immediately appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in the
    superior court . . . .” (Italics added.)
    40
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    v. Miskiewicz, at pp. 824–825 [upon entry of felony plea,
    magistrate must immediately certify case to superior court].)
    And, conversely, if the defendant pleaded not guilty, a municipal
    court judge, again sitting as a magistrate, could preside at the
    preliminary hearing and hold the defendant to answer. (Former
    § 859b, Stats. 1989, ch. 897, § 26.5, p. 3066–3067; former § 860,
    Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670.) But, as stated, the municipal
    court lacked jurisdiction to render a felony judgment. Moreover,
    under former section 859a, its judges, sitting as magistrates,
    also lacked authority to accept a guilty plea to a felony
    punishable by death.
    These jurisdictional lines began to blur in 1992. Former
    section 1462 was amended, effective that year, to allow the
    municipal courts to accept guilty pleas in “noncapital” felony
    cases and to pronounce judgment in such cases, thus reducing
    the burden on the superior courts. (Former § 1462,6 Stats. 1991,
    6
    As a result of this change, former section 1462 provided:
    “(a) Each municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in
    all criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor, where the offense
    charged was committed within the county in which the
    municipal or justice court is established except those of which
    the juvenile court is given jurisdiction and those of which other
    courts are given exclusive jurisdiction. Each municipal and
    justice court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
    involving the violation of ordinances of cities or towns situated
    within the district in which the court is established. [¶] (b)
    Each municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in all
    noncapital criminal cases to receive a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere, appoint a time for pronouncing judgment
    under Section 859a, pronounce judgment, and refer the case to
    the probation officer if eligible for probation. [¶] (c) The
    superior courts shall have jurisdiction in all misdemeanor
    criminal cases to receive a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
    41
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    ch. 613, § 8, p. 2886; see former § 859a,7 Stats. 1991, ch. 613, §
    6, pp. 2884–2885.) The same amendment allowed superior
    courts to take guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases, thus giving
    superior courts flexibility to accept misdemeanor plea bargains
    as a way of resolving felony charges. (Stats. 1991, ch. 613, § 8,
    p. 2886.) But the law remained unchanged for capital cases —
    that is, the law continued to be that the municipal court lacked
    jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in such cases, and its judges,
    sitting as magistrates, lacked statutory authority to accept
    guilty pleas in such cases. Former section 1462 was again
    amended in 1998 in ways that are not relevant here. (Stats.
    1998, ch. 931, § 417, p. 6633.) Finally, in 2002, due to unification
    of the municipal and superior courts, former section 1462 was
    repealed. (Stats. 2002, ch. 784, § 554.1.)
    Therefore, when defendant was in the municipal court in
    1996, the judicial officers before whom he appeared were not
    acting as judges; rather, they were sitting as magistrates. (See
    former §§ 859, 859b, 860.) Moreover, because the offense
    appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, and pronounce
    judgment.” (Italics added.)
    7
    As a result of this change, former section 859a provided in
    relevant part: “(a) If the public offense charged is a felony not
    punishable with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon
    the appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint
    to the defendant and ask him or her whether he or she pleads
    guilty or not guilty to the offense charged therein . . . . While
    the charge remains pending before the magistrate and when the
    defendant’s counsel is present, the defendant may plead guilty
    to the offense charged . . . . [¶] (b) . . . [T]he magistrate shall,
    upon the receipt of a plea of guilty . . . , immediately appoint a
    time for pronouncing judgment in the superior court, municipal
    court, or justice court . . . .” (Italics added.)
    42
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    charged was a felony “punishable with death” (former § 859a,
    subd. (a), Stats. 1992, ch. 78, § 1, pp. 274–275), the municipal
    court judge (sitting as a magistrate) was, at most, empowered to
    deliver to defendant a copy of the complaint (former § 859,
    amended by initiative, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990), commonly
    known as Prop. 115), inform defendant that, if needed, counsel
    would be provided for him at the public’s expense (ibid.), set a
    time for the preliminary hearing (former § 859b, Stats. 1989, ch.
    897, § 26.5, pp. 3066–3067), and, at that appointed time,
    “proceed to examine the case,” unless such examination was
    waived (former § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670). The
    magistrate was simply not authorized to accept a plea of guilty
    and pronounce judgment, because former section 859a — which
    authorized that procedure — only applied “[i]f the public offense
    charged is a felony not punishable with death.” (Former
    § 859a.)8
    Hence, if defendant wanted to plead guilty before his
    preliminary hearing, when his case was before a magistrate, his
    only option was (1) to waive the preliminary hearing, and then
    (2) enter his guilty plea in superior court to the information filed
    in that court. (Former § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670.)
    Defendant was required to follow that two-step process. (See,
    e.g., In re Van Brunt (1966) 
    242 Cal. App. 2d 96
    , 101–102.)
    Moreover, the People could insist on a preliminary hearing
    8
    In a letter brief filed after oral argument, defendant
    concedes this point, saying, “As it appears that the municipal
    court could not accept his guilty plea under former section 1462,
    the municipal court should have certified or transferred the case
    to the superior court for acceptance of the plea.”
    43
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    notwithstanding defendant’s willingness to waive it. (Former
    § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670 [“nothing contained
    herein shall prevent the district attorney . . . from requiring that
    [a preliminary] examination be held as provided in this
    chapter”].)9
    Here, defendant’s attempts to plead guilty, all of which
    occurred before the preliminary hearing, were all rejected for
    procedural reasons unrelated to section 1018. Defendant first
    mentioned wanting to plead guilty on October 30, 1996, during
    a Marsden hearing. He complained that his attorneys were
    working too hard and that he did not want “certain information
    getting out” during the penalty phase. When the court
    explained that the penalty phase was a long time away,
    defendant stated that he wanted to waive the preliminary
    hearing and plead guilty. He acknowledged that his counsel
    were not ineffective, but he did not want attorneys who would
    work so hard. The court denied the Marsden motion and
    arraigned defendant that same day. Defense counsel waived
    reading of the complaint and entered a plea of not guilty.
    Defendant objected, but counsel explained that defendant’s
    objection meant that he wanted the complaint read. Defendant
    did not further clarify his reason for objecting. The case was one
    in which the punishment might be death, and the municipal
    court had no power to accept a guilty plea. At no point did the
    municipal court rule that, based on section 1018, it would not
    accept defendant’s guilty plea.
    9
    As noted in footnote 3 on page 27, ante, defendant may also
    have been precluded from waiving the preliminary hearing
    because of his self-represented status.
    44
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    On January 23, 1997, defendant was before a superior
    court judge for an in camera hearing regarding investigative
    funds under section 987.9, but the preliminary hearing had not
    occurred and the case was still before the municipal court.
    Defendant told the superior court judge that he wanted to “go
    public” and plead guilty. He expressed frustration, saying, “I
    don’t even want to play these games anymore. I want to just go
    ahead, I want to enter a plea of guilty. I have a right to do so,
    and I wish to do so at this time.” Because defendant was only
    before a superior court judge on a section 987.9 hearing, the
    superior court explained that “the issue as to whether or not
    you’re going to plead guilty or waive a preliminary hearing is
    really not before me today.” Defendant was insistent, and the
    court agreed to help defendant to achieve his aim. As noted,
    pleading guilty required a two-step process: (1) waiver of the
    preliminary hearing; and (2) entry of a guilty plea in superior
    court.10 Therefore, the superior court judge said, “With your
    permission and request, I’ll contact — or have my clerk contact
    — the judicial officer in Division [311 of the municipal court] and
    request your matter be calendared as soon as possible because
    you want [¶] . . . [¶] . . . to consider a change of plea or waiver of
    preliminary hearing . . . .” Defendant continued to insist. At
    one point he said, “I’m pleading guilty and that’s that.” The
    superior court judge responded, “Well, you haven’t done that
    yet.” And defendant said, “Well, I’m attempting to very, very,
    10
    Significantly, several times when defendant expressed his
    desire to plead guilty, he also said he wanted to waive the
    preliminary hearing. It seems, therefore, that defendant had
    been informed of the two-step process requiring him first to
    proceed through (or waive) the preliminary hearing before he
    could enter a guilty plea in superior court.
    45
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    very hard.” The court told defendant, “That part of the matter’s
    not before me. [¶] . . . [¶] Okay. Those matters are pending in
    [Division] 311 [of the municipal court] [¶] . . . [¶] We’re going to
    make arrangements to have you brought over to [Division] 311,
    and you can discuss your desires there.” The court added,
    “[We]’ll do our best to get you calendared in [Division] 311 [of
    the municipal court] as soon as possible. I can’t guarantee when
    that will be. As soon as we’re in recess, I’m sure my clerk will
    call over there. If I have to call over there personally, I would
    do it.” Thus, the superior court judge made a considerable effort
    to help defendant achieve his aim of pleading guilty.
    Defendant argues that these efforts were misleading. He
    contends that the superior court could have accepted his guilty
    plea and instead it misleadingly sent defendant to municipal
    court, a court that lacked authority to accept the guilty plea.
    Because defendant was proceeding in propria persona,
    defendant argues, the superior court’s instructions were unfair
    to him. Defendant points out that although a self-represented
    defendant is held to the same standard as counsel, the court is
    not permitted to mislead a self-represented defendant.
    But the superior court did not mislead defendant. The
    superior court was only involved because the case was a capital
    case that required disbursement of investigative funds under
    section 987.9, and a municipal court judge was not empowered
    to disburse such funds. (See Anderson v. Justice 
    Court, supra
    ,
    99 Cal.App.3d at p. 402.) The case was not otherwise pending
    in the superior court, and the superior court therefore could not
    have accepted defendant’s guilty plea. Rather, the law required
    a magistrate to hold a preliminary hearing (or accept a waiver
    of such a hearing), and only then could defendant be held to
    answer in superior court and plead guilty. Defendant cites no
    46
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    authority for the proposition that in 1996, when municipal court
    judges sitting as magistrates conducted preliminary hearings in
    felony cases, a defendant in a case in which the punishment
    might be death could enter a guilty plea in superior court
    without first having completed proceedings in the municipal
    court. Here, the superior court judge who was holding the
    section 987.9 hearing while defendant’s case was otherwise in
    the municipal court could not accept defendant’s guilty plea.
    Hence, the superior court judge did not mislead defendant;
    rather, he sent defendant on the only path that would have
    allowed defendant to achieve his stated aim.
    A few days later, on January 27, 1997, the superior court
    held another in camera hearing and defendant’s request to plead
    guilty was discussed. The superior court again offered to help
    defendant waive his preliminary hearing and plead guilty, if
    that was what defendant still wanted: “We will call [the
    municipal court magistrate assigned to your case] and see if she
    can work it in sometime late this morning, or sometime this
    afternoon.”
    That afternoon, defendant appeared in the department of
    the municipal court assigned to his case. He explained to the
    court, “[T]he guilt of my crime has been weighing heavily on me
    with a remorseful heart. I would like to offer a change of plea
    and enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and admit
    the special circumstances and waive all appellate rights at this
    time.” The prosecutor then told defendant, off the record
    (although later described on the record), that “by law he cannot
    plead guilty to a special circumstances allegation case” and “no
    judge can accept your plea.” The court then reminded the
    parties that the People also have a right to a preliminary
    hearing, and even if defendant waived his right, the People
    47
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    could choose not to do so. The prosecutor stated that the People
    were not prepared to waive the preliminary hearing, and so the
    municipal court explained to defendant that there was no choice
    but to proceed with that hearing. The court said: “So to have
    further discussions and undertake further proceedings today
    would be — for lack of a better word — a waste of time, and I
    am going to suggest that we terminate these proceedings today
    and that you come back on February 5th. [¶] . . . You will have
    had another nine days to think about this and decide whether
    or not you truly want to waive [the] preliminary hearing or not.”
    Defendant agreed with that solution.
    Then, on the scheduled date of the preliminary hearing in
    municipal court, February 5, 1997, defendant never requested
    to waive the hearing, and the hearing proceeded. At the end of
    the hearing, defendant was held to answer in superior court.
    Defendant was then charged in the superior court by
    information filed on February 18, 1997. On February 24, 1997,
    defendant appeared in superior court and entered pleas of not
    guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant said
    nothing about a desire to plead guilty.
    As noted, if defendant wanted to challenge the
    constitutionality of section 1018, he needed to ask to plead guilty
    in superior court and ask the court to make a ruling based on
    section 1018, thus preserving the issue on appeal. He never did
    so. He did ask to plead guilty while his case was in the
    municipal court, and both the superior court judge hearing his
    section 987.9 motion and the municipal court magistrate
    assigned to his preliminary hearing attempted to assist him.
    But after the preliminary hearing, when defendant was held to
    answer in superior court, he never renewed his request to plead
    48
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    guilty. On the contrary, he entered pleas of not guilty and not
    guilty by reason of insanity.
    It is true that defendant was apparently persuaded that
    he could not plead guilty. The prosecutor had told him that “no
    judge can accept your plea.” Moreover, at the hearings on
    October 20 and 27, 1997, he told the court that he had wanted
    to plead guilty but could not do so, due to section 1018, and he
    asked the court to allow him to inform the jury of that fact.11
    11
    Defendant may have been under the impression that his
    previous requests to plead guilty, made when his case was in the
    municipal court, were denied pursuant to section 1018, but that
    possibility does not change the fact that, under former section
    859a, the municipal court lacked statutory authority to accept
    defendant’s guilty plea.
    The concurring opinion argues that the municipal court
    relied on section 1018 in rejecting defendant’s request to plead
    guilty. It focuses on the prosecutor’s statement to the municipal
    court that “by law [defendant] cannot plead guilty to a special
    circumstances allegation case.” The concurrence describes that
    statement as “an evident reference to section 1018.” (Conc. opn.
    of Liu, J., p. 4, post.) But the prosecutor could equally well have
    been referring to the municipal court’s lack of authority under
    former section 859a. That would explain why the prosecutor
    added, “I think it’s [defendant’s] desire to actually waive the
    preliminary hearing,” meaning that defendant wanted to get his
    case out of the municipal court. To be sure, the prosecutor also
    said that “no judge” could accept defendant’s plea, but the
    prosecutor may only have meant that no judge could do so at
    that time, before defendant was charged in the superior court.
    Significantly, in arguing to the municipal court that defendant
    was barred from pleading guilty, the prosecutor never made any
    reference to defendant’s unrepresented status, and the
    prosecutor’s comments nine months later in the superior court
    could not have influenced the municipal court, which clearly
    relied on the People’s right to a preliminary hearing, not section
    1018, in rebuffing defendant’s request to plead guilty.
    49
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    But, be that as it may, defendant never requested to plead guilty
    before the superior court, and he never asked that court to make
    a ruling based on section 1018, which would have preserved on
    appeal the issue of that statute’s constitutionality. He may have
    been acting based on the advice that no judge could accept his
    plea, but he still needed to obtain a ruling and thus preserve the
    issue. Self-represented defendants are “held to the same
    standard of knowledge of law and procedure as is an attorney,”
    and that point remains valid even in capital cases. (People v.
    Clark (1990) 
    50 Cal. 3d 583
    , 625; see People v. Espinoza (2016) 1
    Cal.5th 61, 75; People v. Blair (2005) 
    36 Cal. 4th 686
    , 734; People
    v. Mendoza (2000) 
    24 Cal. 4th 130
    , 157; 
    Faretta, supra
    , 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 834–835, fn. 46.) “We have . . . rejected claims that the fact
    or likelihood that an unskilled, self-represented defendant will
    perform poorly in conducting his or her own defense must defeat
    the Faretta right. [¶] . . . Instead, we have accepted that the
    cost of recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to self-
    representation may result ‘ “in detriment to the defendant, if not
    outright unfairness.” ’ [Citations.] But that is a cost that we
    allow defendants the choice of paying, if they can do so
    knowingly and voluntarily.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th
    181, 206; see People v. Taylor (2009) 
    47 Cal. 4th 850
    , 866.)
    In summary, pleading guilty before the preliminary
    hearing was simply not an option for defendant, because the
    municipal court magistrate had no power to accept a guilty plea
    in a capital case. The municipal court never made a section 1018
    ruling prohibiting defendant from pleading guilty, because the
    issue of a guilty plea was not before it and, for jurisdictional
    reasons, could not be before it. The most the municipal court
    could do for defendant was accept a stipulated waiver of the
    preliminary hearing and then send the case to the superior
    50
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    court. But the People did not agree to waive the preliminary
    hearing, and when the day of the preliminary hearing arrived,
    defendant did not renew his request to plead guilty. Nor did he
    renew it in the superior court after he was held to answer. Only
    the superior court could have made a ruling based on section
    1018, and once the case got to the superior court, defendant
    never asked to plead guilty, so such a ruling never became
    necessary.    We therefore reject defendant’s constitutional
    challenge to section 1018 on the ground that the trial court
    never made a ruling under section 1018, and his claim is
    therefore forfeited.
    3. Validity of Waiver of Right to Counsel
    Defendant challenges the validity of his waiver of his right
    to counsel, making several arguments. None of his arguments
    has merit.
    a. Municipal Court’s Asserted Error in Denying
    Defendant’s Marsden Motion without Sufficient
    Inquiry
    Defendant first contends his waiver of the right to counsel
    was induced by the municipal court’s errors during his first
    Marsden hearing on October 30, 1996, when he said that he did
    not want that vigorous of a defense and added that he wanted
    to plead guilty. He asserts that the court made no inquiry into
    his intent to plead guilty or his conflict with counsel, and it then
    permitted counsel to enter a not guilty plea despite defendant’s
    stated desire to plead guilty. He argues that the court’s actions
    placed him in an unconstitutional dilemma of either (1)
    defending himself with counsel who would not “accede to his
    fundamental and personal right to control his defense by
    pleading guilty and pursuing a case for life at penalty,” or (2)
    defending himself without counsel. In these circumstances, he
    51
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    argues, there was no valid waiver of the right to counsel. He
    asserts that the unaddressed and unresolved conflict he had
    with his counsel negated the required showing that his waiver
    was voluntary and intelligent.
    Defendant is wrong. After defendant made an oral
    Marsden motion, the municipal court held a Marsden hearing in
    chambers. The court started the hearing by asking defendant
    to describe why he believed one or both of his attorneys were not
    rendering competent or reasonable representation. Defendant
    explained that he did not agree with “their idea of what they
    want to do tactical-wise” and that he did not want them to call
    witnesses over his objection. Defendant’s complaints regarding
    trial preparation and strategy were tactical disagreements, as
    defendant conceded in the hearing, which do not by themselves
    constitute an irreconcilable conflict. (People v. Cole (2004) 
    33 Cal. 4th 1158
    , 1192 (Cole); see People v. Bolin (1998) 
    18 Cal. 4th 297
    , 334 [whether to call certain witnesses is a matter of trial
    tactics].) Although the McCoy court acknowledged a defendant’s
    fundamental right to choose the objective of his or her defense,
    the court also acknowledged that it is defense counsel’s job to
    determine how best to achieve a client’s objectives. 
    (McCoy, supra
    , __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)
    Defendant did not indicate to the municipal court that the
    conflict he had with counsel was so serious that he would
    consider representing himself just to terminate his relationship
    with his current public defenders, nor did defendant say that his
    conflict with counsel concerned whether or not to enter a guilty
    plea. On the contrary, defendant’s main concern was about
    whether certain witnesses would be called at the penalty phase.
    When the municipal court said that the penalty phase was still
    a long way off, defendant responded that it was not a long way
    52
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    off, because he planned to waive the preliminary hearing and
    plead guilty, which meant the penalty phase would occur
    relatively soon. He added that his dispute with counsel
    concerned how to conduct the penalty phase. His counsel
    wanted “to check all avenues,” and defendant didn’t want that.
    He also said that he didn’t want to represent himself and allow
    the prosecutor “to just walk all over me.” He continued, “I’m
    going to keep these counsel. I’m not saying they are ineffective.”
    Defendant’s comments contradict his assertion that his waiver
    of the right to counsel was due to a conflict over whether he
    should plead guilty. On the contrary, what he told the court was
    that the conflict was over how the penalty phase should be
    conducted, and the court acted within its discretion in finding
    no irreconcilable conflict requiring counsel’s replacement.
    b. Failure to Advise that Defendant Could Not
    Plead Guilty
    Defendant next contends his waiver was invalid because
    the municipal court failed to advise him that even if he waived
    his right to counsel, he still could not plead guilty. He notes that
    his request to waive counsel “came one week after counsel was
    allowed to thwart [his] stated intent to plead guilty,” suggesting
    that the court should therefore have known that his reason for
    waiving counsel was his desire to plead guilty. He points out
    that section 1018 prohibits a capital defendant from pleading
    guilty without consent of counsel, and he argues that court
    failed to ensure he was aware of the rule.
    “The requirements for a valid waiver of the right to
    counsel are (1) a determination that the accused is competent to
    waive the right, i.e., he or she has the mental capacity to
    understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him
    or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing and
    53
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance and
    consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion.”
    (People v. Koontz (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 1041
    , 1069-1070.) “On
    appeal, we examine de novo the whole record—not merely the
    transcript of the hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to
    determine the validity of the defendant’s waiver of the right to
    counsel.” (Id. at p. 1070.)
    Defendant here asserts, in effect, that the court did not
    ensure he was aware of all of the disadvantages of self-
    representation; namely, that he would not be able to plead guilty
    because such a plea requires the consent of counsel under
    section 1018. Defendant argues that the timing of his Faretta
    request, made only one week after he attempted to plead guilty,
    demonstrated that his request stemmed from a mistaken belief
    that a guilty plea would be accepted after counsel was
    discharged.
    Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that when
    a defendant waives the right to counsel, the trial court must
    inform the defendant of every possible specific disadvantage
    that might later flow from the waiver. Countless disadvantages
    might result from a waiver of the right to counsel, and a trial
    court could not possibly predict each of those disadvantages in
    advance. Therefore, the trial court need only inform the
    defendant in general terms of the most common disadvantages.
    (See People v. Riggs (2008) 
    44 Cal. 4th 248
    , 277–278 (Riggs);
    People v. Lopez (1977) 
    71 Cal. App. 3d 568
    , 572–573.)
    Nor on this record was the municipal court made aware of
    the need to inform defendant that he could not plead guilty if he
    represented himself. On November 7, 1996, when defendant
    made his oral motion to proceed in propria persona, he did not
    54
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    say anything about an intent to plead guilty. Quite the opposite:
    Defendant’s only concern about representing himself was
    whether he would have the ability to obtain funding for an
    investigator to assist him. It is true that defendant had told the
    court one week earlier, during the Marsden hearing, that it was
    his plan to waive the preliminary hearing and plead guilty.
    However, when the court arraigned defendant after the hearing,
    counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Defendant then said, “Over
    my objection,” but counsel clarified that defendant’s objection
    related to the reading of the complaint, and defendant did not
    dispute that point. Those facts do not support defendant’s
    assertion that on the day of the Marsden hearing “counsel was
    allowed to thwart [his] stated intent to plead guilty.”
    A week later when defendant waived his right to counsel,
    defendant’s actions were too ambiguous for the court to have
    reasonably known that the reason he sought to represent
    himself was that he wanted to plead guilty. Furthermore, when
    defendant later learned that he would be unable to plead guilty
    as a self-represented defendant, he reaffirmed his desire to
    continue without counsel.
    We conclude that the record “ ‘as a whole demonstrates
    that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-
    representation, including the risks and complexities of the
    particular case’ ” 
    (Riggs, supra
    , 44 Cal.4th at p. 276), and that
    because defendant did not make his intent clear, the municipal
    court was not obligated to specifically inform defendant that he
    would not be able to plead guilty if he waived his right to
    counsel.
    55
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    c. Sufficiency of the Court’s Inquiry
    Defendant further contends that the municipal court’s
    Faretta inquiry was insufficient to support a valid waiver of the
    right to counsel in a capital case. He asserts the court did not
    specifically inquire into his understanding of capital case
    proceedings and did not make him aware of the specific dangers
    and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel in capital
    proceedings or of the fundamental legal rights that would be
    affected by proceeding without counsel. He also notes that his
    Faretta form did not advise him of such disadvantages. We
    conclude the court’s inquiry was sufficient.
    As noted, the trial court could not possibly predict every
    disadvantage that might flow from a waiver of the right to
    counsel, and therefore it need only inform the defendant in
    general terms of the most common disadvantages. We have
    upheld warnings similar to those that defendant here received.
    
    (Riggs, supra
    , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 277–278 [advisements were
    adequate where record showed the defendant was aware that
    defending himself against capital charges was a complex process
    involving extremely high stakes and that his ability to defend
    himself might be hampered by his incarceration and lack of
    training]; People v. Blair (2005) 
    36 Cal. 4th 686
    , 709–710
    [advisements were adequate where record reflects that the
    defendant understood the nature of the charged offense, the
    nature of a capital proceeding and penalty phase, and was
    advised by the court to receive help from a lawyer].)
    On August 22, 1996, the municipal court discussed at
    length with defendant his desire to plead guilty. Defendant
    explained that he had been involved in several cases in the
    criminal justice system and had previously represented himself
    56
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    against three felony charges, none of which went to jury trial.
    He understood that he would be treated the same as an attorney
    and would receive no special privileges. He affirmed that he
    could read and understand English “very well” and that he had
    a “healthy, clear mind.” On November 7, 1996, defendant
    executed a written waiver of his right to counsel. The waiver
    form emphasized that it was “almost always unwise to represent
    yourself” and reminded defendant that he would be facing a
    skilled and experienced prosecutor. During the oral colloquy,
    defendant affirmed his awareness that he faced “murder with
    special circumstances and [that] the maximum term is the death
    penalty.”
    The record here reflects that defendant was aware of the
    charges against him, that he knew he faced both a guilt phase
    and, if found guilty, a penalty phase, that he could expect to
    have access to only limited resources due to his incarceration,
    and that the assistance of an attorney was highly recommended.
    The court’s inquiry was sufficient.
    d. Requests to Reappoint Counsel
    Defendant next asserts the trial court erred by failing to
    address and grant his requests on January 23 and 27, 1997, for
    reappointment of counsel.
    The hearing on January 23 was an in camera hearing
    before a superior court judge who was overseeing disbursement
    of investigative funds under section 987.9. At the start of the
    hearing, the court explained that it had received notice that
    defendant had violated the terms of the order granting him jail
    privileges. Defendant replied that he wished to plead guilty. He
    expressed frustration with his lack of a working computer and
    difficulty placing unmonitored phone calls. He explained that
    57
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    he did not want the government to “run over” him and did not
    “want to play these games anymore.” He told the court that he
    preferred to plead guilty and have the public defender’s office
    reappointed to represent him during the penalty phase.
    Defendant complained that he had to “keep coming to this court
    and begging” for phone calls, materials, and investigation
    reports and did not believe the court was sincere in its efforts to
    assist him. Defendant asked insistently to “go public” and allow
    him to change his plea. The court, which was addressing only
    the disbursement of investigative funds under section 987.9,
    said, “That part of the matter’s not before me.” As noted, the
    court told defendant he would need to discuss his desire to
    change his plea in the proper department, and the court offered
    to help him do so. (See ante, p. __.)
    Defendant returned to the superior court on January 27,
    1997, for an in camera hearing on his alleged jail violation and
    to further discuss his displeasure with his assigned investigator.
    The court revoked defendant’s self-representation jail privileges
    and closed the hearing by again offering to help defendant waive
    his preliminary hearing and plead guilty, if that was what
    defendant still wanted: “We will call [the municipal court judge
    assigned to your case] and see if she can work it in sometime
    late this morning, or sometime this afternoon.”
    That afternoon, defendant appeared in the department of
    the municipal court assigned to his case and asked to plead
    guilty. As already discussed, the municipal court had no
    authority to accept a guilty plea in a capital case. Instead, if
    defendant insisted on pleading guilty, the court would need to
    proceed with the preliminary examination, hold defendant to
    answer, and then defendant would have to plead guilty in the
    superior court. The prosecutor told defendant that the law
    58
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    prevented him from pleading guilty. The municipal court then
    explained that the People were not prepared to waive the
    preliminary hearing, and therefore there was no choice but to
    proceed with that hearing. The court said, “I am going to
    suggest that we terminate these proceedings today,” adding that
    defendant should return on the day scheduled for the
    preliminary hearing, having considered the matter further.
    Defendant agreed with that solution.
    A motion to abandon self-representation and have counsel
    reappointed must be unequivocal. (People v. Lawrence (2009) 
    46 Cal. 4th 186
    , 193 (Lawrence); see People v. Lewis and Oliver
    (2006) 
    39 Cal. 4th 970
    , 1002 (Lewis and Oliver).)
    “Equivocation . . . may occur where the defendant tries to
    manipulate the proceedings by switching between requests for
    counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions are
    the product of whim or frustration.” (Lewis and 
    Oliver, supra
    ,
    39 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) A trial court’s denial of a Faretta
    revocation request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    (Lawrence, at p. 192.)
    At the hearing on January 23, 1997, defendant did not
    simply request to have counsel reappointed. Instead, he
    expressed an intent first to plead guilty, and only then to have
    counsel reappointed to handle the penalty phase. As already
    discussed, however, in order to plead guilty, defendant needed
    to proceed through the preliminary hearing (or waive it), be held
    to answer in superior court, and then enter his guilty plea in
    that court. The superior court, which was handling only
    disbursement of investigative funds under section 987.9, did not
    fail to address defendant’s request. The court appropriately
    informed defendant that the matter of his pleading guilty was
    not before it and that he needed to raise that issue in the proper
    59
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    department. It then arranged a hearing in the division of the
    municipal court that was assigned to defendant’s preliminary
    hearing.    Because defendant’s request to have counsel
    reappointed was expressly conditioned on his pleading guilty,
    and because he could not plead guilty without proceeding
    through the preliminary hearing (or waiving it), the court
    properly directed defendant to the division of the municipal
    court where he could begin that process.
    On January 27, 1997, when defendant was before the
    municipal court division that was handling his preliminary
    hearing, defendant again requested to plead guilty, but he did
    not repeat his request to have counsel reappointed. Because the
    People were not willing to waive the preliminary hearing, the
    court had no choice but to proceed with that hearing as
    scheduled.
    Contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court did not fail
    to address his request to plead guilty and have counsel
    reappointed. Instead, it did what was within its power to assist
    defendant. We conclude there was no error.
    e. Waiver of Right to Counsel after Defendant Was
    Held to Answer in Superior Court
    Lastly, defendant asserts he did not validly waive counsel
    on March 14, 1997, when the superior court took a second
    Faretta waiver. The prosecutor requested this second waiver of
    defendant’s right to counsel, because defendant’s previous
    waiver was before the prosecution had formally declared its
    intent to pursue the death penalty.
    At the hearing on March 14, 1997, the superior court
    advised defendant that he had the right to a speedy and public
    trial, and the right to a trial by jury. The court also advised
    60
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    defendant that he had the right to use the court to subpoena
    witnesses or records he might need and the right to confront in
    open court all witnesses called to testify against him. The court
    then noted that, according to a minute order dated February 28,
    another judge had gone “through all this” with defendant.
    Defendant clarified that “those were in camera hearings.” The
    court asked, “Were all these rights explained to you at that
    time?” In response, defendant said, “Yeah, I’m fully aware of my
    rights. I’m making a knowing and intelligent waiver of my
    rights. I understand that this is a death penalty case and that
    the minimum term, mandatory minimum is life without the
    possibility of parole. I am also aware that by pleading not guilty
    and not guilty by reason of insanity, I could spend the rest of my
    life in a mental institution if a jury so finds, but I’m willing to
    fill out your petition here.” The court stated, “As long as this
    has all been gone over with you by [the other judge], I’m
    satisfied.” Defendant then signed the Faretta waiver for the
    court.
    Defendant contends the trial court’s failure to readvise
    him of his rights violated section 987, subdivision (b), which
    provides that if a capital defendant appears for arraignment
    without counsel, the court shall inform him that he shall be
    represented by counsel at all stages of the preliminary and trial
    proceedings.
    In People v. Crayton (2002) 
    28 Cal. 4th 346
    , a noncapital
    defendant waived his right to counsel in municipal court. After
    the defendant was held to answer, the superior court did not
    readvise him of his right at his subsequent arraignment, as is
    required by section 987, subdivision (a). We held that when “a
    defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel
    at all stages of the proceedings (including trial), and voluntarily
    61
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    and knowingly has invoked the right to represent himself or
    herself throughout all the proceedings, the trial court’s failure
    to provide a new advisement and obtain a renewed waiver at the
    arraignment (as required by section 987) does not operate to
    terminate or revoke the defendant’s validly invoked
    constitutional right to represent himself or herself at trial.”
    (People v. Crayton, at p. 365.) We further held that a trial court’s
    error in failing to comply with section 987 was susceptible to a
    harmless error analysis. (People v. Crayton, at p. 365.) We
    noted that a review of the record will reveal whether, despite the
    absence of an explicit advisement by the superior court at
    arraignment, the defendant was aware that he or she had the
    right to appointed counsel at subsequent proceedings and
    whether an explicit advisement at the arraignment would have
    been likely to lead the defendant to reconsider the decision to
    represent himself or herself. (Ibid.)
    The same rule applies to capital defendants under section
    987, subdivision (b). Where, as here, the record reveals that the
    defendant was aware that he had the right to appointed counsel
    at subsequent proceedings and an explicit advisement at
    arraignment would not have been likely to lead to the
    defendant’s reconsidering his decision to represent himself, the
    court’s failure to readvise the defendant is harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Defendant was well aware that he had the
    right to appointed counsel at all stages. When the municipal
    court took his Faretta waiver on November 7, 1996, the court
    expressly stated that defendant’s motion “is to represent
    yourself throughout the proceedings, prelim, pretrial, trial,
    everything?” Defendant replied, “Yes, sir.” Defendant also
    repeatedly reminded the court during in camera hearings that
    he wanted to represent himself, that he was lead counsel on his
    62
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    case, and that he did not want the court to handle matters
    through his advisory counsel. He also signed a second written
    waiver of his Faretta rights. And when the court attempted to
    readvise defendant of his rights, he told the court that he was
    “fully aware” of his rights and was making a “knowing and
    intelligent” waiver of those rights. We conclude that any
    possible error was harmless under any standard.
    B. Failure to Suppress Statements
    Investigators first interviewed defendant shortly after his
    arrest on June 14, 1996. Officer Mark Steen advised defendant
    of his right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used
    against him in court, of his right to have an attorney present
    before or during any questioning, and that if he could not afford
    an      attorney,    one      would    be     appointed     before
    questioning. Following each advisement, Steen asked
    defendant if he understood. To each question, defendant
    replied, “Yes, sir.” Steen then proceeded to question defendant
    about his involvement in the crime.
    Early in the questioning, defendant said, “Hey, when am I
    going to get a chance to call my lawyer. It’s getting late, and
    he’s probably going to go to bed pretty soon.” Steen replied,
    “Your lawyer? Well you can call your lawyer after we’re done in
    our facility.” Defendant said, “Oh, okay. So what do we got to
    do in our facility here?” Steen explained, “Well, we’re
    conducting this interview.” When defendant asked if they could
    finish the interview the following day, Steen replied, “Um, we
    can continue talking tomorrow; however, we’re not going to
    continue the interview.” Steen then continued asking defendant
    about the murder.
    63
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    Eleven days later, on July 25, 1996, defendant sent
    Officers Steen and Lozano a letter requesting to meet. The
    investigators spoke with defendant at the jail on August 12,
    1996. Lozano advised defendant that he was represented by the
    public defender, who had invoked defendant’s right to remain
    silent. Lozano asked if defendant would like to waive his right
    to have an attorney present. Defendant replied, “I waive that,
    and I have since fired him.”12 Lozano advised defendant of his
    Miranda rights, and defendant signed a waiver. Lozano then
    interviewed defendant.
    On June 23, 1997, defendant filed a pretrial motion to
    suppress his statements from the June 14 interview. He also
    moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that his
    confession was obtained in violation of Miranda, and without
    the confession, there was insufficient evidence to hold him to
    answer on the murder charge. On September 8, 1997, defendant
    filed a motion to suppress both the June 14 confession and his
    statements from the August 12 interview. He argued the
    August statements “still carried the taint” of the June 14
    interview at which the investigators engaged in misconduct by
    failing to notify his counsel when he requested to speak with
    them. Defendant further argued that his “known history of
    mental illness and current treatment with psycho[tropic]
    medications are factors to consider.”
    At a hearing on September 26, 1997, the trial court denied
    the motions. The court found that defendant’s statements
    12
    Actually, defendant had submitted, on July 16, 1996, a
    handwritten motion requesting to proceed in propria persona.
    Defendant later withdrew that request, but he then made a new
    request, which the court granted on November 7, 1996.
    64
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    during the June 14 interview did not constitute a clear request
    for an attorney. Rather, his inquiry into when he could call his
    attorney indicated that he was “desirous of speeding up the
    interview so he [could] call his lawyer when the interview was
    over. There is certainly nothing close to a clear request for an
    attorney.” The court found that because defendant initiated
    contact before the August interview and signed written waivers
    of the presence of counsel and of his Miranda rights, “defendant
    can hardly complain that his statements were coerced,
    involuntary, or in violation of his right to counsel.” The court
    further found that defendant presented no evidence of any
    mental defect that would preclude him from understanding and
    waiving his rights.
    Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to
    suppress his statements from the June 14 interview because he
    did not validly waive his right to counsel. He further asserts the
    trial court erred in failing to suppress statements from the
    August 12 interview because there was no break in the causal
    chain from the erroneous first interrogation. Lastly, defendant
    asserts that the state violated his Sixth Amendment rights “by
    approaching appellant [on August 12] without first contacting
    his attorney,” and he further asserts that his mental illness
    affected his ability to waive his rights. We disagree.
    In 
    Miranda, supra
    , 
    384 U.S. 436
    , the United States
    Supreme Court set forth prophylactic measures to protect an
    individual’s right against self-incrimination from curtailment
    under the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial
    interrogation. (Id. at p. 467.) A suspect “must be warned prior
    to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
    anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
    he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
    65
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
    any questioning if he so desires.” (Id. at p. 479.) After a suspect
    has heard and understood these rights, he or she may waive
    them. (People v. Tate (2010) 
    49 Cal. 4th 635
    , 683.) The
    prosecution, however, bears the burden of showing that the
    waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the
    totality of circumstances. (People v. Linton (2013) 
    56 Cal. 4th 1146
    , 1171; see Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 
    559 U.S. 98
    , 104.)
    On appeal, we view the evidence in a light most favorable
    to the order denying the motion to suppress. (People v. Tully
    (2012) 
    54 Cal. 4th 952
    , 979.) “Moreover, the reviewing court
    ‘must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and its
    assessment of credibility.’ ” (Ibid.)
    In People v. Whitson (1998) 
    17 Cal. 4th 229
    , a police officer
    interviewed the defendant on three separate occasions. At the
    beginning of each interview, the officer advised the defendant of
    his rights under Miranda and asked whether he understood
    them. Each time, the defendant responded that he did. The
    officer then proceeded to question the defendant. (Id. at
    pp. 237–239.) We concluded the defendant’s statements were
    voluntary, noting that the record was devoid of any suggestion
    that the police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to
    elicit them. (Id. at pp. 248–249.) We concluded the defendant
    was aware of the rights he was waiving and the consequences of
    his decision to do so, observing that there was no evidence that
    during any interview his judgment was clouded or otherwise
    impaired. (Id. at p. 249.) We further concluded that the
    defendant’s waiver was intelligent, noting that there was no
    evidence that he lacked sufficient intelligence to understand his
    rights or the consequences of waiving them. (Id. at p. 250.) We
    held:      “Although the police officers did not obtain
    66
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    an express waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights, decisions of
    the United States Supreme Court and of this court have held
    that such an express waiver is not required where a defendant’s
    actions make clear that a waiver is intended.” (Ibid.; see North
    Carolina v. Butler (1979) 
    441 U.S. 369
    , 374–375.)
    As in Whitson, ample evidence supports a finding here
    that defendant’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and
    intelligent. Officers Steen and Lozano explained each Miranda
    right to defendant, after which he indicated that he understood.
    Following a complete admonition, defendant began to discuss
    his role in the murder. His actions made clear that a waiver was
    intended.
    Defendant also did not unequivocally invoke his right to
    counsel when he subsequently asked, “Hey, when am I going to
    get a chance to call my lawyer? It’s getting late, and he’s
    probably going to go to bed pretty soon.” When a defendant has
    waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police, any
    subsequent invocation of the right to counsel must be
    unequivocal and unambiguous. (Davis v. United States (1994)
    
    512 U.S. 452
    , 461–462.) “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary
    waiver, interrogation may proceed ‘until and unless the suspect
    clearly requests an attorney.’ ” (People v. Williams (2010) 
    49 Cal. 4th 405
    , 427 (Williams).) Defendant’s statement that it was
    getting late and his question about when he would get to call his
    lawyer did not amount to an unequivocal and unambiguous
    request for counsel. A reasonable officer in Steen and Lozano’s
    position would have concluded that defendant’s remark
    expressed concern over the length of the interview and a desire
    to contact counsel when the interview was over. Defendant
    never said that he wanted to stop the interview immediately and
    consult counsel.
    67
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    We conclude that defendant’s statements from the June 14
    interview were properly obtained. It follows that his subsequent
    statements at the August 12 interview did not carry any taint
    from the previous interview. Furthermore, the investigators
    readvised defendant of his Miranda rights before beginning the
    August 12 interview, and defendant signed a waiver.
    Defendant’s contention that the August 12 interview
    violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel also fails. Officer
    Lozano reminded defendant that the investigators were present
    for the interview because defendant had initiated contact
    through a letter indicating a desire to speak with them. While
    advising defendant of his Miranda rights, Lozano said, “You are
    being represented, at this point, that we know of, by a public
    defender, okay, . . . who has invoked your right to remain silent
    with the court. He’s filed papers to that effect, . . . that you are
    just . . . [to] remain silent, okay? You have the right to have your
    attorney . . . present while we talk to you, okay? Uh, . . . do you
    wish to have him here at this time, or do you waive that right to
    have that attorney . . . here at this time?” Defendant replied, “I
    waive that, and I have since fired him.”13
    “The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least
    after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel
    as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” (Maine v. Moulton
    (1985) 
    474 U.S. 159
    , 176.) A suspect has the right, however, to
    knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel,
    especially if the accused himself initiates such communication.
    (Patterson v. Illinois (1988) 
    487 U.S. 285
    , 291.) Defendant
    13
    As noted, defendant had filed a motion to proceed in
    propria persona, but the court had not ruled on it. Defendant
    later withdrew the motion.
    68
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    initiated contact with the investigators when he sent them a
    letter requesting to meet. He was then thoroughly advised of
    his right to have counsel present during the interview, and he
    unequivocally waived that right. Moreover, his waiver was not
    invalidated by his asserted mental illness. Defendant relies on
    a declaration he submitted to the trial court with his motion to
    suppress, in which a psychologist declared that defendant was
    “mentally ill” and that his letter requesting a meeting with the
    investigators “was a product of this deteriorated mental state.”
    On review of this declaration, the trial court expressed concern
    over the lack of cross-examination by the People and found that
    the psychologist’s statement was “a legal conclusion that would
    not be admissible, as it is without foundation.” In its written
    order, the trial court stated that defendant failed to present
    evidence of any mental defect that would prohibit him from
    waiving his rights.
    The record does not demonstrate that defendant failed to
    understand or validly waive his rights. We conclude that
    substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
    C. Failure to Suppress Evidence
    Santa Ana Police Corporal Richard Reese testified at trial
    that he arrested defendant on the evening of June 14, 1996.
    After the arrest, Reese and other law enforcement personnel
    conducted a parole search of defendant’s camper. They located
    a .32-caliber revolver in its holster, hidden under a blanket.
    Reese testified that they found five live rounds in the revolver.
    Defendant objected and asked the trial court to strike
    Reese’s testimony. Outside the jury’s presence, defendant
    explained the basis of his objection: “No probable cause for the
    search. The evidence that he’s attempting to introduce is the
    69
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    object of an illegal search and seizure. I believe that Officer —
    Corporal Reese testified that the defendant was already in
    custody [and hence no longer on parole], and . . . I believe that
    there was no exigent circumstances for them to conduct a search
    without a search warrant. They could have obtained a search
    warrant, so on and so forth.” The prosecutor replied that if
    defendant wanted to suppress the evidence of the search, “he
    had ample time before the proceedings” to do so. He argued the
    search was actually conducted by parole agent Jan Moorehead
    pursuant to a parole condition. The prosecutor explained that
    he “did not want to raise the specter of a parole search” before
    the jury, and he had only vaguely questioned Reese as to
    whether other investigators were present, so as not to reveal to
    the jury that defendant was on parole. Defendant replied that
    he was in custody at the time of the search and no longer on
    parole.
    The court stated that the objection was “extremely tardy”
    and asked defendant why he waited until mid-trial to raise the
    issue. Defendant explained that he was under the assumption
    that the officers had conducted the search pursuant to a
    warrant, but he realized after Reese’s testimony that they did
    not have a warrant. The prosecutor responded that an evidence
    list from the parole search had listed a revolver, holster, and
    bullets, thus informing defendant that the gun was found during
    the parole search, not during a later search of the same camper,
    done pursuant to a warrant.
    The court denied defendant’s motion, stating: “If there’s
    nothing in any of the discovery to indicate that the weapon was
    taken during a search pursuant to a warrant, I’m somewhat
    confused as to how you would not be aware that it was taken by
    Corporal Reese during his search of the camper.” Defendant
    70
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    explained that the documents confused him and that he did not
    purposefully wait to make the argument. The court replied,
    “The problem presented here is that if I were to allow this
    motion to be heard at this time, it would be granting favoritism
    to an individual who decided to represent himself. I don’t
    believe that it’s fair to the process of justice to do that. The
    defendant, having chosen to represent himself, is bound to know
    the rules and procedures. I frankly can’t see any justification
    for waiting mid-trial to make a motion to suppress.”
    Section 1538.5, subdivision (a), provides that a defendant
    may move to suppress as evidence any tangible thing obtained
    as a result of an illegal search or seizure. A defendant is not
    permitted to raise a search and seizure issue for the first time
    during trial, however, unless the opportunity for the motion did
    not previously exist or the defendant was not aware, prior to
    trial, of the grounds for the motion. (§ 1538.5, subd. (h); People
    v. Brooks (1980) 
    26 Cal. 3d 471
    , 476.)
    We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the trial
    court’s finding that defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence
    was untimely. The discovery provided to defendant clearly
    indicated that the gun was located during Reese’s post-arrest
    search of the camper, not during the subsequent execution of the
    search warrant. Defendant said the paperwork confused him;
    he did not claim, however, that he had been provided erroneous
    or incomplete pretrial discovery and therefore was incapable of
    discovering the grounds for his motion. Defendant’s failure to
    bring his motion to suppress prior to trial therefore does not fall
    within the exceptions recognized in section 1538, subdivision
    (h).
    71
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    D. Disclosure of Reporter’s Unpublished Notes
    Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to
    obtain evidence when it refused to require a reporter to disclose
    her notes from her jailhouse interview with him. He asserts
    application of the newsperson’s shield law (Cal. Const., art. I,
    § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070) limited his ability to challenge
    testimony from Marla Jo Fisher, a reporter with the Orange
    County Register (the Register).
    On June 15, 1996, the day after defendant’s arrest, Fisher
    visited the jail to conduct an interview. After Fisher identified
    herself to defendant and explained the purpose of her visit, he
    agreed to speak with her. He admitted that he was attempting
    to rob the HomeBase store and that he shot Wilson. The
    following day, the Register published an article containing
    several statements and admissions from defendant.
    The prosecution subpoenaed Fisher to testify at trial.
    Defendant in turn subpoenaed the Register for any notes and
    materials it had regarding Fisher’s interview. The Register
    provided a copy of the published article. After defendant argued
    that the Register wanted to “quash the unpublished” notes, the
    trial court issued an order to show cause why the Register
    should not produce the requested documents. In response, the
    Register, on its own behalf and on behalf of Fisher, moved for a
    protective order limiting the scope of subpoenas to information
    not protected under the California reporter’s shield law and also
    the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that statements he
    made during the interview would establish mitigating
    circumstances relative to the penalty determination, might
    establish that the murder was not in furtherance of a robbery,
    72
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    and might be relevant for the sanity phase. He further argued
    that Fisher published his statements out of context, and he
    needed the ability to impeach her credibility and to show that
    she was acting as a government agent.
    At a hearing on the matter, the court concluded that
    defendant could cross-examine Fisher regarding the
    circumstances surrounding the interview, including statements
    he may have made that were not published. The court also
    concluded, however, that it would not order Fisher to turn over
    her notes at that time, stating that making such an order would
    depend on her testimony and whether she relied on those notes
    in refreshing her recollection while testifying.
    The trial court then conducted another hearing before
    Fisher testified to determine whether she would be using any
    unpublished notes to refresh her recollection. Attorney Alec
    Barinholtz appeared on behalf of Fisher and the Register’s
    parent company. Fisher did not testify regarding whether she
    had taken notes during her interview with defendant. Rather,
    she said that prior to coming to court, she had refreshed her
    recollection by reviewing the published newspaper article and
    watching a videotape of a televised interview. The court ruled
    that because Fisher did not rely on any notes to refresh her
    recollection, any notes she may have taken were shielded by law.
    The court concluded that defendant could “inquire about
    matters that were discussed during his interview with her. . . .
    Well, anything that he recalls that he wants to talk to her about
    that occurred during the course of the interview is subject to be
    examined upon.”
    Article I, section 2, subdivision (b) of the California
    Constitution provides, as relevant to this case, that a
    73
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    “reporter . . . shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial,
    legislative, or administrative body . . . for refusing to disclose
    any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering,
    receiving or processing of information for communication to the
    public.” The constitutional provision is codified in section 1070
    of the Evidence Code. This law, known as the “shield law,”
    “protects a newsperson from being adjudged in contempt for
    refusing to disclose either: (1) unpublished information, or (2)
    the source of information, whether published or unpublished.”
    (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 
    50 Cal. 3d 785
    , 797 (Delaney).)
    A newsperson’s immunity, however, must yield to a criminal
    defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 805;
    People v. Charles (2015) 
    61 Cal. 4th 308
    , 325 (Charles).) “ ‘In
    order to compel disclosure of information covered by
    the shield law, the defendant must make a threshold showing of
    a reasonable possibility that the information will materially
    assist his defense. The showing need not be detailed or specific,
    but it must rest on more than mere speculation.’ ” (People v.
    Ramos (2004) 
    34 Cal. 4th 494
    , 526 (Ramos).)
    We have previously “set forth a number of factors to guide
    the trial court in balancing the interests of a criminal defendant
    seeking      to   overcome     the     immunity      granted    by
    the shield law with the newsperson’s interests. Those factors
    are: (a) ‘whether the unpublished information is confidential or
    sensitive’; (b) whether ‘the interests sought to be protected’ by
    the law would be thwarted by disclosure; (c) ‘the importance of
    the information to the criminal defendant’; and (d) ‘[w]hether
    there is an alternative source for the unpublished information.’ ”
    
    (Charles, supra
    , 61 Cal.4th at p. 325; see 
    Delaney, supra
    , 50
    Cal.3d at pp. 810–811.)
    74
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    Defendant asserts that the shield law should not apply
    because he was both the source of the unpublished information
    and the person seeking its disclosure. In 
    Delaney, supra
    , 
    50 Cal. 3d 785
    , we acknowledged that when “the criminal defendant
    seeking disclosure is himself the source of the information, it
    cannot be seriously argued that the source (the defendant) will
    feel that his confidence has been breached. The reporter’s news-
    gathering ability will not be prejudiced.” (Id. at pp. 810–811.)
    Before the court may weigh the interests sought to be
    protected by the shield law, however, the defendant must first
    make the threshold showing that there is a reasonable
    possibility that the information will materially assist his
    defense. In 
    Ramos, supra
    , 
    34 Cal. 4th 494
    , a newspaper reporter
    interviewed the defendant about the charges pending against
    him. The newspaper published the interview. When the
    prosecution subpoenaed the reporter, he filed a motion to quash
    on the ground that the information the prosecution sought was
    protected by the shield law. (Id. at p. 523.) Following an in
    camera hearing, the trial court decided the defense could cross-
    examine the reporter on his observations of the defendant’s
    mental status and demeanor, but it did not require the reporter
    to produce his notes of the interview. (Id. at p. 524.)
    We concluded that the defendant’s assertion that the
    reporter’s notes were material to his defense was mere
    speculation. (
    Ramos, supra
    , 34 Cal.4th at p. 527.) The
    defendant had not established that the notes contained
    anything different from the reporter’s testimony, and the record
    did not suggest the notes contained anything of substance that
    the jury had not already heard. (Ibid.) Because the defendant
    failed to meet the threshold showing, we did not balance the
    Delaney factors to determine whether disclosure was required,
    75
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    and we found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using
    the shield law to protect the reporter’s notes. (Ibid.)
    Here, defendant has likewise failed to make a threshold
    showing that there was a reasonable possibility, beyond mere
    speculation, that the information contained in Fisher’s notes
    would have materially assisted his defense. Indeed, he has not
    established that such notes even existed. Although he asserted
    in his motion that he had been misquoted in various passages of
    the article, the statements attributed to him in the article were
    consistent with his statements to the investigators. Defendant’s
    vague assertion that he needed the notes to “test her credibility”
    does not show a reasonable possibility that the notes would have
    materially assisted his defense. He has not made an adequate
    showing that any notes made by Fisher contained anything
    different from her testimony or from what the jury had already
    heard.
    Further, the trial court permitted defendant to cross-
    examine Fisher on “all of the circumstances” surrounding the
    interview, including statements defendant may have made that
    were not published. As the court told defendant during the
    hearing, “Considering the interview was of you, I think there is
    significant areas of testing the credibility available to you.”
    The trial court likewise did not err when it denied
    defendant’s motion to strike Fisher’s testimony. For the reasons
    discussed above, defendant was not, as he asserts, unable to
    effectively cross-examine Fisher without her notes.
    E. Instructional Error
    1. Instruction on First Degree Murder
    Defendant contends that the instructions permitting him
    to be convicted of first degree murder on a theory of either
    76
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    premeditated murder or felony murder violated his rights under
    the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
    Constitution because he was not charged with first degree
    murder. He asserts that because he was charged only with
    second degree murder under section 187, he cannot be found
    guilty of first degree murder. He further asserts that the trial
    court committed reversible error by failing to require the jury to
    unanimously agree on the theory of first degree murder. We
    have repeatedly rejected substantially similar claims and do so
    again here. (People v. Geier (2007) 
    41 Cal. 4th 555
    , 592; 
    Cole, supra
    , 33 Cal.4th at p. 1221; People v. Hughes (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 287
    , 369; People v. Kipp (2001) 
    26 Cal. 4th 1100
    , 1132; People v.
    Silva (2001) 
    25 Cal. 4th 345
    , 367; People v. Carpenter (1997) 
    15 Cal. 4th 312
    , 394–395.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason
    to revisit these holdings.
    2. Attempted Robbery–Murder Instruction
    Defendant contends the trial court erred when it
    instructed the jury on attempted robbery–murder. He asserts
    the instruction was “tantamount to a directed verdict on the
    issue of whether the killing occurred during the commission of
    attempted robbery, because the undisputed evidence showed
    that [he] fatally shot the victim long before he had reached a
    place of ‘temporary safety.’ ”
    The court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC
    Nos. 8.21: “The unlawful killing by a defendant of a human
    being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which
    occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the
    crime of robbery is murder of the first degree when the
    perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime.” It also
    instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.21.1: “For
    77
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    the purposes of determining whether an unlawful killing has
    occurred during the commission or attempted commission of a
    robbery, the commission of the crime of robbery is not confined
    to a fixed place or a limited period of time. An attempted
    robbery is still in progress after the attempted taking of the
    property while the perpetrator is fleeing in an attempt to escape.
    Likewise it is still in progress so long as immediate pursuers are
    attempting to capture the perpetrator. An attempted robbery is
    complete when the perpetrator has eluded any pursuers and has
    reached a place of temporary safety.”
    Defendant asserts that the evidence showed the
    attempted robbery and murder were two distinct crimes, not one
    continuous transaction, and that the instruction erroneously
    removed a factual issue from the jury’s consideration by
    directing the jury to conclude that the attempted robbery was
    still in progress when he shot the victim. He relies on People v.
    Sakarias (2000) 
    22 Cal. 4th 596
    (Sakarias). In that case, the jury
    asked the court for clarification regarding when a burglary
    begins and ends. The court responded, “ ‘Although it is alleged
    that the killing in the present case occurred sometime after it is
    alleged the defendant entered the house, if the jury finds that
    the defendant committed burglary by entering the house with
    the intent to steal, the homicide and the burglary are parts of
    one continuous transaction.’ ” (Id. at p. 623.) In Sakarias, we
    concluded that the trial court’s response relieved the jury of its
    obligation to determine whether all the elements of first degree
    murder and the burglary-murder special circumstance had been
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but we further concluded
    that the error was harmless. (Id. at pp. 624–625.)
    Subsequent to our decision in Sakarias, we have held
    CALJIC No. 8.21.1 to be a correct statement of the law. (People
    78
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    v. Debose (2014) 
    59 Cal. 4th 177
    , 204–205.) Defendant concedes
    that CALJIC No. 8.21.1 “may be a proper instruction under
    appropriate circumstances,” but he asserts that the instruction
    was erroneous in this situation. He is mistaken. In Sakarias,
    the trial court’s written response to the jury’s question was
    erroneous because it did not instruct the jury that it must decide
    for itself whether the homicide and burglary were part of a
    single continuous transaction. 
    (Sakarias, supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at
    p. 626.) The CALJIC No. 8.21.1 instruction given here did not
    suffer from the same flaw. The jury was left to decide whether
    the attempted robbery was complete before the murder took
    place.
    3. Special Circumstance Instruction
    Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed
    the jury on the special circumstance allegation of attempted
    robbery–murder. He contends that the instruction, combined
    with CALJIC No. 8.21.1, permitted the jury to find the special
    circumstance true without finding that he killed the victim
    while engaged in an attempted robbery. We reject the claim.
    Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the
    jury using a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.8.17 as follows,
    with the modified portion in italics: “To find that the special
    circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the
    commission of attempted robbery, is true, it must be proved:
    1. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged
    in the attempted commission of a robbery, or the murder was
    committed during the immediate flight after the attempted
    commission of a robbery by the defendant and 2. The murder
    was committed in the course of the commission of the crime of
    attempted robbery or to facilitate the escape therefore or to
    79
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance
    referred to in these instructions is not established if the
    attempted robbery was merely incidental to the commission of
    the murder.”
    The standard jury instruction at the time of trial read,
    “The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the
    commission of the crime . . . .” (Italics added.) Defendant
    asserts that the evidence supported instructing the jury with the
    standard “carry out or advance” language, because the jury
    could have reasonably concluded that any intent to steal no
    longer existed when he shot the victim. We have previously
    held, however, that there “is nothing magical about the phrase
    ‘to carry out or advance’ the felony. Indeed, we ourselves have
    stated the requirement without using that phrase.” (People v.
    Horning (2004) 
    34 Cal. 4th 871
    , 908.) We reiterated in Horning
    that if the felony was merely incidental to the murder, no
    separate felony-based special circumstance exists, and the
    instruction’s explanation that the robbery must not be “ ‘merely
    incidental to the commission of the murder’ ” adequately
    conveys this requirement. (Ibid.) Because the court properly
    instructed the jury that it could not find the special
    circumstance true if it found the robbery to be merely incidental
    to the commission of the murder, there was no error.
    4. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
    Defendant contends the instructions on circumstantial
    evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, 8.83.1) diluted the proof-
    beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard because they “informed
    the jurors that if [he] reasonably appeared to be guilty, they
    could find him guilty even if they entertained a reasonable doubt
    as to guilt.” We have previously rejected similar challenges to
    80
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    these instructions. (People v. Brasure (2008) 
    42 Cal. 4th 1037
    ,
    1058.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to revisit
    our precedent.
    5. Flight Instruction
    Defendant raises three challenges to the trial court’s
    instruction on flight, CALJIC No. 2.52.
    He first asserts the instruction was unnecessary because
    it was duplicative of the general jury instructions regarding
    circumstantial evidence, citing CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.01, and
    2.02. We have previously rejected this claim, concluding:
    “ ‘CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.01, and 2.02 instruct[] the jury on the
    definition of circumstantial evidence and its sufficiency in
    establishing facts to establish guilt. On the other hand, CALJIC
    No. 2.52 [is] a cautionary instruction that benefit[s] the defense
    by “admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence
    that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory.”
    [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Leon (2015) 
    61 Cal. 4th 569
    , 608.)
    Defendant next contends the instruction was
    impermissibly argumentative in light of People v. Mincey (1992)
    
    2 Cal. 4th 408
    , which he contends rejected, as argumentative, an
    instruction structurally similar to CALJIC No. 2.52. We have
    described the instruction in Mincey, like that in CALJIC No.
    2.52, as having an if/then structure: “ ‘If [certain facts] are
    shown, then you may [draw particular conclusions].’ ” (People v.
    Bonilla (2007) 
    41 Cal. 4th 313
    , 330.) We explained in Bonilla,
    however, that the structure of the instruction given in Mincey
    was not problematic. Rather, the Mincey instruction was flawed
    because it contained argumentative language that focused on
    the defendant’s version of the facts, not his legal theory of the
    81
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    case. (Bonilla, at p. 330.) In Bonilla, we also rejected the
    defendant’s argument that CALJIC No. 2.03, another
    consciousness of guilt instruction, was argumentative simply
    because it, too, contained the if/then structure. (Bonilla, at p.
    330.) For the same reason, we reject defendant’s argument here.
    Lastly, defendant asserts that the instruction permitted
    the jury to draw an impermissible inference concerning his guilt.
    We have previously rejected this contention (People v. Bryant,
    Smith and Wheeler (2014) 
    60 Cal. 4th 335
    , 438; People v. Rundle
    (2006) 
    43 Cal. 4th 76
    , 153–154), and defendant presents no
    compelling reason to reconsider these decisions.
    6. Motive Instruction
    Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the
    jury with CALJIC No. 2.51, regarding motive, because it
    improperly allowed the jury to determine guilt based upon the
    presence of an alleged motive and thus shifted the burden of
    proof to the defense. We have repeatedly rejected substantially
    similar contentions, and we do so again here. (People v. Nelson
    (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 552–553; People v. Capistrano (2014) 
    59 Cal. 4th 830
    , 876–877.)
    III. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
    A. Refusal of Defendant’s Requested Jury
    Instructions
    1. Instructions on Aggravating Factors
    Defendant contends the trial court erred when it refused
    his proposed instruction that would have informed the jurors
    that they could not double-count the facts underlying the special
    circumstance. The proposed instruction read: “You must not
    consider as an aggravating factor the existence of any special
    circumstances if you have already considered the facts of the
    82
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    special circumstance as a circumstance of the crime for which
    the defendant has been convicted. [¶] In other words, do not
    consider the same facts more than once in determining the
    presence of aggravating factors.” The trial court rejected the
    proposed instruction, concluding that defendant’s concern was
    addressed in CALJIC No. 8.88.
    Defendant cites People v. Monterroso (2004) 
    34 Cal. 4th 743
    , in which we held the trial court committed harmless error
    when it denied the defendant’s request to instruct the jury
    against double-counting the special circumstances. (Id. at
    p. 789.) The court had instructed the jury with CALJIC
    No. 8.85, “which instructed the jury to consider, take into
    account, and be guided by, inter alia, ‘the circumstances of the
    crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present
    proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found
    to be true.’ ” (People v. Monterroso, at p. 789.) We noted that,
    even without the clarifying instruction the defendant had
    requested, the possibility that a jury would believe it could
    weigh each special circumstance twice was remote, and thus, in
    the absence of any misleading argument by the prosecutor or
    some other event substantiating the claimed double-counting,
    reversal was not required. (Id. at pp. 789–790.)
    In the present case, the trial court also instructed the jury
    in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85. Defendant does not allege
    that the prosecutor argued the issue in a misleading manner,
    nor does he point to anything in the record giving rise to a
    substantial likelihood of double-counting. Even assuming error,
    it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it
    refused his proposed instruction that read: “In deciding whether
    83
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    you should sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without
    the possibility of parole, or to death, you cannot consider as an
    aggravating factor any fact that was used by you in finding him
    guilty of murder in the first degree unless that fact establishes
    something in addition to an element of the crime of murder in
    the first degree.” Section 190.3, factor (a), however, expressly
    permits the penalty phase jury to consider the circumstances of
    the crime in determining penalty, and on that ground, we have
    previously upheld the rejection of substantially similar proposed
    instructions. (See People v. Moon (2005) 
    37 Cal. 4th 1
    , 40.)
    2. Refusal of Additional Penalty Phase Instructions
    Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously
    refused to give several requested penalty phase instructions
    that would have clarified the standard penalty phase
    instructions and provided guidance to the jurors. We disagree.
    The first proposed instruction would have told the jury
    that certain sentencing factors could only be considered as
    mitigating. The trial court concluded the instruction was
    duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85. It did not err. As we have
    previously held, the trial court need not define which statutory
    factors could be considered aggravating and mitigating. (People
    v. Hillhouse (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 469
    , 509.)
    The second proposed instruction would have told the jury
    that its consideration of mitigating factors was not limited to the
    factors provided and that jurors could consider any other
    circumstances relating to the case or to defendant as reasons for
    not imposing the death penalty. We have previously held that
    such instructions are not necessary because “the catchall section
    190.3, factor (k) instruction ‘allows the jury to consider a
    84
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    virtually unlimited range of mitigating circumstances.’ ”
    (People v. Smithey (1999) 
    20 Cal. 4th 936
    , 1007.)
    The third proposed instruction would have told the jury it
    could not consider evidence of defendant’s lifestyle or
    background as an aggravating factor, but it could consider such
    evidence as a mitigating factor. In People v. Ochoa (2001) 
    26 Cal. 4th 398
    , 457, we concluded that the court’s refusal to give a
    substantially similar instruction was not erroneous because, as
    in this case, the court properly instructed the jury on
    aggravating and mitigating factors.
    Defendant also proposed instructing the jury that it could
    consider as a mitigating circumstance whether defendant was
    under the influence of any mental or emotional disturbance at
    the time of the offense and whether his capacity to appreciate
    the criminality of his conduct was a result of mental disease,
    mental defect, or intoxication. The court rejected these
    instructions, concluding they were cumulative. Defendant now
    asserts the proposed instructions were not cumulative because,
    unlike CALJIC No. 8.85, they did not contain the term
    “extreme.” (See, e.g., CALJIC No. 8.85 [permitting the jury to
    consider “[w]hether or not the offense was committed while the
    defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
    emotional disturbance” (italics added)].)      He asserts this
    distinction is important because jurors “must be allowed to
    consider a defendant’s entire personal history and
    characteristics, not just those that may be seen as ‘extreme.’ ”
    We have previously held, however, that the “use of restrictive
    adjectives — i.e., ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ — in the list of
    mitigating     factors     in section  190.3 does    not     act
    unconstitutionally as a barrier to the consideration of
    mitigation.” (People v. Harris (2005) 
    37 Cal. 4th 310
    , 365.) We
    85
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    have also held that the instruction allows a jury to consider a
    defendant’s mental condition as mitigation even if not
    “ ‘extreme.’ ” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 
    45 Cal. 3d 660
    , 720–721.)
    In addition, defendant requested that the court instruct
    the jury that defendant bore no burden to prove the existence of
    mitigating factors, that a mitigating factor need not be proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury need not
    unanimously agree on any fact or circumstance offered in
    mitigation. We again conclude that the trial court did not err in
    refusing these instructions. (Kansas v. Carr (2016) 577 U.S. __,
    __ [
    136 S. Ct. 633
    , 642] [“our case law does not require capital
    sentencing courts ‘to affirmatively inform the jury that
    mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt’ ”]; 
    Riggs, supra
    , 44 Cal.4th at p. 328 [the court
    was not required to instruct the jury on burden of proof]; People
    v. Breaux (1991) 
    1 Cal. 4th 281
    , 314–315 (Breaux) [the court is
    not required to instruct the jury that unanimity on mitigating
    factors was not required].)
    Defendant also proposed three instructions regarding the
    jurors’ consideration of aggravating factors. The first proposed
    instruction would have told the jury it could consider rebuttal
    evidence offered by the prosecution only as it relates to the
    existence or weight of a mitigating factor; it could not consider
    it as an aggravating factor. Because the prosecutor did not
    present rebuttal evidence during the penalty phase, the court
    did not err in refusing to give this proposed instruction.
    Defendant asserts that the prosecutor nonetheless presented
    rebuttal evidence during its case in chief (namely, evidence of
    his background and character) and that such evidence should
    have instead been presented as rebuttal evidence. Therefore,
    defendant argues, the court should have provided the proposed
    86
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    instruction. Because defendant does not actually challenge the
    admissibility of this evidence during the prosecutor’s case in
    chief, we decline to decide whether or not it was improper. As
    the Attorney General notes, even if the evidence was improperly
    introduced during the case in chief and should have been
    introduced as rebuttal evidence, defendant’s proposed
    instruction would have confused the jury, as the jury would not
    have understood what evidence the instruction referred to.
    The second proposed instruction would have told the jury
    that it must find an aggravating factor has been proven beyond
    a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly held that, except for
    evidence of other crimes and prior convictions under section
    190.3, factors (b) and (c), the jury need not find the aggravating
    factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
    Rangel (2016) 
    62 Cal. 4th 1192
    , 1235; 
    Williams, supra
    , 49
    Cal.4th at pp. 458-459.) We have no cause to reconsider those
    holdings here.
    The third proposed instruction would have instructed the
    jurors that they could not allow sympathy for the victim or the
    victim’s family to divert their attention from their sentencing
    role, and they could not impose a penalty of death as a purely
    emotional response to the evidence. The court did not err when
    it found this proposed instruction cumulative. The court
    instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which in relevant
    part provides, “You must neither be influenced by bias nor
    prejudice against the defendant, nor swayed by public opinion
    or public feelings.” We presume the jurors understood and
    followed the court’s instruction. (People v. Homick (2012)
    
    55 Cal. 4th 816
    , 873.)
    87
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    Lastly, defendant requested instructions regarding the
    jurors’ weighing of factors and their consideration of mercy and
    sympathy. The first proposed instruction would have told the
    jury that it could decide to impose life without the possibility of
    parole even if it found no mitigating factors present. We have
    previously held that the trial court is not required to so instruct
    the jury. (People v. Perry (2006) 
    38 Cal. 4th 302
    , 320; People v.
    Johnson (1993) 
    6 Cal. 4th 1
    , 52.)
    The second proposed instruction would have told the jury
    that the presence of a single mitigating factor is sufficient to
    support a vote against imposing the death penalty. We have
    previously held a trial court does not err in refusing such an
    instruction. (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 
    28 Cal. 4th 1083
    , 1160–
    1161.)
    The third proposed instruction provided: “The law of
    California does not require that you ever vote to impose the
    penalty of death. After considering all of the evidence in the
    case and instructions given to you by the court, it is entirely up
    to you to determine whether you are convinced that the death
    penalty is the appropriate punishment under all of the
    circumstances of the case.” We have previously held that such
    instruction is misleading and argumentative if it does not also
    inform the jury that the law has no preference for the
    punishment of life without the possibility of parole. (People v.
    Earp (1999) 
    20 Cal. 4th 826
    , 903.) Rather, a correct statement
    of California law is that “our law ‘expresses no preference as to
    the appropriate punishment.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court properly
    rejected defendant’s proposed instruction.
    Defendant also requested that the jury be instructed that,
    on the basis of mercy, it could decide not to impose the death
    88
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    penalty, regardless of whether or not defendant deserved their
    sympathy, and that if any of the evidence aroused sympathy to
    such an extent that they believed death was not an appropriate
    punishment, the jury could act on that sympathy by imposing
    life in prison without the possibility of parole. In rejecting these
    proposed instructions, the trial court concluded they were
    duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), which informed the
    jury that it could consider “any sympathetic or other aspect of
    the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as
    a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to
    the offense for which he is on trial.” (Ibid., internal brackets
    omitted.) “As we have previously explained, CALJIC No. 8.85
    adequately instructs the jury concerning the circumstances that
    may be considered in mitigation, including sympathy and
    mercy. [Citation.] We therefore ‘must assume the jury already
    understood it could consider mercy and compassion.’ ” (People
    v. Ervine (2009) 
    47 Cal. 4th 745
    , 801.)
    B. Instruction on Applicable Sentencing Factors
    Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
    delivering its oral instructions to the jury.
    While reading the penalty phase instructions to the jury,
    the court read CALJIC No. 8.85 as follows: “In determining
    which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall
    consider all of the evidence which has been received during any
    part of the trial of this case except as you may hereafter be
    instructed. You may consider, take into account and be guided
    by the following factors, if applicable . . . .” (Italics added.) The
    court erroneously said “may consider” instead of “shall
    consider,” but the written version of CALJIC No. 8.85 correctly
    instructed the jury that it shall consider the enumerated factors.
    89
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88,
    which read in part: “After having heard all of the evidence, and
    after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you
    shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable
    factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which
    you have been instructed.” (Italics added.) The court also
    instructed the jurors, “You are to be governed only by the
    instruction in its final wording.”
    We presume the jury understands and follows the trial
    court’s instructions, including the written instructions. (People
    v. Wilson (2008) 
    44 Cal. 4th 758
    , 803.) Moreover, “[t]o the extent
    a discrepancy exists between the written and oral versions of
    jury instructions, the written instructions provided to the jury
    will control.” (Ibid.) Defendant cites to nothing in the record to
    rebut the presumption that the jurors followed the written
    instructions that were provided.
    IV. OTHER ISSUES
    A. Challenges to the Death Penalty
    Defendant presents a number of challenges to California’s
    death penalty law that our prior decisions have considered and
    rejected. He provides no persuasive reason for us to reexamine
    the following conclusions:
    “California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the
    class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not
    violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citation.] Section 190.2,
    which sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death
    may be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the
    Eighth Amendment.” (People v. Williams (2013) 
    58 Cal. 4th 197
    ,
    294.)
    90
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    “Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the
    crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the
    death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” (People v.
    Kennedy (2005) 
    36 Cal. 4th 595
    , 641.)
    “Nor is the death penalty statute unconstitutional for not
    requiring ‘findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an
    aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor
    (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors
    outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the
    appropriate sentence.’ ” (People v. Erskine (2019) 7 Cal.5th 279,
    304.)
    CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly broad. 
    (Breaux, supra
    , 1 Cal.4th at p. 316, fn. 14.)
    The death verdict need not be based on unanimous jury
    findings. “While all the jurors must agree death is the
    appropriate penalty, the guided discretion through which jurors
    reach their penalty decision must permit each juror individually
    to assess such potentially aggravating factors as the
    circumstances of the capital crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), prior
    felony convictions (id., factor (c)), and other violent criminal
    activity (id., factor (b)), and decide for him- or herself ‘what
    weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty.’ ”
    (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 
    39 Cal. 4th 1
    , 41 (Demetrulias).)
    The trial court need not instruct the jury that it must
    return a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if it
    finds that mitigation outweighs aggravation. (People v. Duncan
    (1991) 
    53 Cal. 3d 955
    , 978.)
    Instructions on the meaning of a sentence of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole and on the
    91
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    “ ‘presumption of life’ ” are not constitutionally required.
    
    (Demetrulias, supra
    , 39 Cal.4th at p. 43.)
    “The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC
    No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor must it identify
    which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating.”
    (People v. Cook (2006) 
    39 Cal. 4th 566
    , 618.)
    “Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial
    or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.” (People v.
    Snow (2003) 
    30 Cal. 4th 43
    , 126.)
    “The capital sentencing scheme does not violate equal
    protection by denying to capital defendants procedural
    safeguards that are available to noncapital defendants.” (People
    v. Thomas (2012) 
    53 Cal. 4th 771
    , 836 (Thomas).)
    California’s death penalty does not violate international
    law or international norms of decency. 
    (Thomas, supra
    , 53
    Cal.4th at p. 837.)
    B. Restitution Fine
    The abstract of judgment indicates that the trial court
    imposed a $10,000 restitution fine. However, the court did not
    actually impose the fine at the sentencing hearing; it was merely
    added to the abstract of judgment later. Defendant contends
    that because the court never imposed the fine in open court in
    his presence, it should be stricken from the abstract of
    judgment. (See § 1202.4; People v. Tillman (2000) 
    22 Cal. 4th 300
    , 303.) The Attorney General properly concedes the error.
    We order the restitution fine stricken from the record and the
    minutes, and the abstract of judgment modified accordingly.
    92
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
    C. Cumulative Error
    Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the
    asserted errors requires reversal of the judgment. We have
    identified one error, the imposition of the restitution fine, and
    assumed other errors but found no prejudice. Nor is this error
    and any assumed error cumulatively prejudicial.
    V. CONCLUSION
    The restitution fine is ordered stricken from the abstract
    of judgment. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
    CHIN, J.
    We Concur:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    GROBAN, J.
    93
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON
    S067392
    Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu
    I agree with the judgment and with today’s opinion, except
    that I would reach the merits of whether Penal Code section
    1018 is constitutional after McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S.
    __ [
    138 S. Ct. 1500
    ] (McCoy) and hold that it is.
    Penal Code section 1018 says that no guilty plea to an
    offense punishable by death or life without the possibility of
    parole “shall be received from a defendant who does not appear
    with counsel, nor shall that plea be received without the consent
    of the defendant’s counsel.” (All statutory references are to the
    Penal Code.) Frederickson’s primary argument in his automatic
    appeal is that the trial court denied his repeated requests to
    plead guilty based on section 1018 and that section 1018 violates
    his right to control his defense under the Sixth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution. The court dismisses this
    argument exclusively on the basis that he failed to secure a
    ruling from the superior court rejecting his plea on section 1018
    grounds. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 50–51.) But the record is too
    muddled to support that conclusion, and in any event, this court
    has often excused forfeitures raising pure questions of law. On
    the merits, I would reject Frederickson’s claim that section 1018
    is unconstitutional after McCoy. McCoy does not upend our long
    and unbroken precedent holding that section 1018 constitutes a
    valid balance between society’s interest in ensuring the
    1
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    reliability of judgments in capital cases and a criminal
    defendant’s right to conduct his own defense.
    I.
    I am skeptical of dismissing Frederickson’s section 1018
    challenge on the ground that he failed to secure a ruling from
    the superior court that section 1018 barred him from pleading
    guilty as a self-represented capital defendant. The record is at
    least ambiguous as to whether the municipal court on January
    27, 1997 implied such a ruling and therefore indicated to
    Frederickson that any attempt to plead guilty at his preliminary
    hearing would be futile because of section 1018.
    As today’s opinion recounts (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17–27),
    Frederickson diligently pursued his desire to plead guilty before
    trial until the prosecution informed him that he could not
    lawfully do so, and the municipal court appeared to endorse that
    view. Frederickson expressed a desire to waive his preliminary
    hearing and plead guilty on December 24, 1996 at an in camera
    hearing in the superior court to address the disbursement of
    investigative funds. At this point, he was representing himself
    with the aid of advisory counsel. Because only the disbursement
    issue was before it, the superior court explained that “the issue
    as to whether or not you’re going to plead guilty or waive a
    preliminary hearing is really not before me today.”
    Frederickson repeated his wishes by saying, “I’m pleading guilty
    and that’s that.” The court responded, “Well, you haven’t done
    that yet.” Frederickson said, “Well, I’m attempting to very, very,
    very hard.” The superior court said it would contact the
    municipal court, where the rest of Frederickson’s case was
    pending, and ask it to calendar his preliminary hearing as soon
    as possible.
    2
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    On January 27, 1997, the superior court held another in
    camera hearing, this time to address Frederickson’s violation of
    his self-representation jail privileges. Frederickson’s advisory
    counsel reiterated Frederickson’s desire to waive the
    preliminary hearing and plead guilty, and the superior court
    again offered to contact the municipal court.
    That afternoon, Frederickson and his advisory counsel
    appeared in municipal court. Frederickson stated to the court,
    “[T]he guilt of my crime has been weighing heavily on me with
    a remorseful heart. I would like to offer a change of plea and
    enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and admit the
    special circumstances and waive all appellate rights at this
    time.” Before the municipal court could rule on his request, the
    prosecutor asked to speak with Frederickson and his advisory
    counsel off the record. Following that conversation, the
    prosecutor summarized the conversation for the court: “What I
    did your honor, for the record I had a brief conversation with Mr.
    Frederickson in the presence of Mr. Freeman [advisory counsel]
    and I had suggested to Mr. Frederickson that he seriously
    reconsider his thoughts about what he was planning on
    doing. He wants to plead guilty to the charges. I told him by
    law he cannot plead guilty to a special circumstances allegation
    case. He understands that, but I told him no judge can accept
    your plea. Furthermore, I told him that it was my opinion Mr.
    Freeman would offer him the best possible representation and
    suggested that he follow Mr. Freeman’s advice on the
    matter. It’s my understanding Mr. Frederickson despite Mr.
    Freeman’s conversations with him and my own conversations
    with him in Mr. Freeman’s presence Mr. Frederickson still
    wants to plead guilty, although I think he realizes that he
    cannot. I think it’s his desire to actually waive the preliminary
    3
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    hearing which is still scheduled for February 5th. My last
    suggestion to him was not to do anything today. That we just
    come on February 5th and have more of a chance to think about
    it, to talk to Mr. Freeman, or talk to his investigator and then
    he can decide what he wants to do on the 5th.” (Italics added.)
    The court responded: “Well, that is all true, but Mr.
    Tanizaki [the prosecutor], the People also have a right to a
    preliminary examination. So even if Mr. Frederickson does
    want to waive preliminary hearing, the People may choose not
    to.” The court went on to explain to Frederickson that the
    prosecution was not prepared to waive the preliminary hearing
    at that time and suggested that Frederickson reassert his
    request if he wished to do so on February 5 at his preliminary
    hearing. At the preliminary hearing, Frederickson did not
    request to waive the hearing or to plead guilty.
    The prosecutor’s summary of his January 27, 1997
    conversation with Frederickson and advisory counsel suggests
    that he told Frederickson that section 1018 prevented him from
    pleading guilty to a capital crime. The prosecutor specifically
    stated that Frederickson “by law . . . cannot plead guilty to a
    special circumstances allegation case,” an evident reference to
    section 1018. The prosecutor reinforced this by saying that “no
    judge can accept your plea.” He did not say that Frederickson
    could not plead guilty at this hearing or that he could not plead
    guilty before a municipal court; instead, he suggested that the
    legal bar to pleading guilty was unconditional for Frederickson,
    who proceeded pro per. This categorical statement did not
    suggest that “the prosecutor may only have meant that no judge
    could [accept his plea] at that time.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 49,
    fn. 11). Indeed, at a hearing on October 21, 1997, the prosecutor
    asked the court to bar Frederickson from mentioning that he
    4
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    had previously attempted to plead guilty because “the Penal
    Code specifically disallows a guilty plea while he’s in pro per.”
    The municipal court then endorsed the entirety of the
    prosecutor’s remarks to Frederickson, stating, “Well, that is all
    true.” The court did not expressly deny Frederickson’s attempt
    to plead guilty based on section 1018, and according to today’s
    opinion, it appears that the municipal court had no jurisdiction
    to accept such a plea. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 42–44.) But the
    municipal court’s endorsement of the prosecutor’s admonition
    that “no judge can accept [Frederickson’s] plea” informed
    Frederickson that section 1018 barred him from pleading guilty
    regardless of which court he was in.
    Today’s opinion relies heavily on the fact that the
    municipal court on January 27, 1997 did not have jurisdiction to
    accept Frederickson’s guilty plea and that Frederickson should
    have pressed for a ruling on his request to plead guilty at his
    February 5, 1997 preliminary hearing. (Maj. opn., ante, at
    pp. 47–50.) But Frederickson had no reason to press for a ruling
    on his guilty plea request at the preliminary hearing; in light of
    the municipal court’s endorsement of the prosecutor’s statement
    that “no judge can accept [his] plea,” Frederickson had good
    reason to believe any further effort to plead guilty would have
    been futile. Indeed, based on the prosecutor’s remarks at the
    hearing on October 27, 1997, it appears that both parties
    operated on the assumption that a court had in fact rejected
    Frederickson’s plea on the ground that it was precluded by
    section 1018. Given Frederickson’s diligent efforts to plead
    guilty until the municipal court endorsed the prosecutor’s
    statement that “by law he cannot plead guilty to a special
    circumstances allegation case,” I would not reject Frederickson’s
    section 1018 challenge on forfeiture grounds.
    5
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    In any event, we regularly excuse forfeiture where the
    defendant has asserted the deprivation of a fundamental
    constitutional right (People v. Vera (1997) 
    15 Cal. 4th 269
    , 276
    [“A defendant is not precluded from raising for the first time on
    appeal a claim asserting the deprivation of certain fundamental,
    constitutional rights.”]), and we have recognized, approvingly,
    that the Courts of Appeal have excused forfeiture “when a
    forfeited claim involves an important issue of constitutional law
    or a substantial right” or “when applicability of the forfeiture
    rule is uncertain or the defendant did not have a meaningful
    opportunity to object at trial” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 
    40 Cal. 4th 875
    , 887–888, fn. 7 [collecting cases]). Frederickson’s claim
    implicates his Sixth Amendment rights, and ample precedent
    supports excusal of any forfeiture here.
    II.
    On the merits, I would hold that section 1018 is
    constitutional notwithstanding the high court’s decision in
    McCoy. I addressed this issue in People v. Miracle (2018) 6
    Cal.5th 318, 360–361 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.), and reprise the main
    points here. I note that the Attorney General in this case,
    contrary to his position in Miracle, contends that section 1018 is
    constitutional and assured this court at oral argument that
    going forward he will no longer take the position that section
    1018 is unconstitutional.
    At the core of the question is whether the Eighth
    Amendment requirement of “reliability in the determination
    that death is the appropriate punishment” (Woodson v. North
    Carolina (1976) 
    428 U.S. 280
    , 305 (Woodson)), when balanced
    against a capital defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to control
    his own defense, allows the Legislature to limit that defendant’s
    6
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    ability to plead guilty without consent of counsel. A long and
    unbroken line of precedent has upheld section 1018 as striking
    an appropriate balance between these interests, and McCoy
    does not disturb that precedent.
    A.
    The Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally
    the right to make his defense.” (Faretta v. California (1975) 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 819 (Faretta).)       This right, grounded in the
    “fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed
    to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own
    liberty” (Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. __, __ [
    137 S. Ct. 1899
    , 1908]), guarantees to the accused the “ultimate
    authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the
    case” (Jones v. Barnes (1983) 
    463 U.S. 745
    , 751 (Barnes)).
    However, “the right to self-representation is not absolute,”
    particularly in capital cases where there are competing
    constitutional concerns. (Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
    Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 
    528 U.S. 152
    , 161 (Martinez).) The
    Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
    punishment imposes a “high requirement of reliability [in] the
    determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a
    particular case.” (People v. Bloom (1989) 
    48 Cal. 3d 1194
    , 1228
    (Bloom).) The high court has long recognized that the Eighth
    Amendment requires “a greater degree of reliability when the
    death sentence is imposed” because of the “qualitative difference
    between death and other penalties.” (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 
    438 U.S. 586
    , 604 (plur. opn.); see also Beck v. Alabama (1980) 
    447 U.S. 625
    , 637 (Beck); cf. People v. Horton (1995) 
    11 Cal. 4th 1068
    ,
    1134.) This heightened requirement reflects “the fundamental
    respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment”
    7
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    
    (Woodson, supra
    , 428 U.S. at p. 304) and the “ ‘vital importance
    to the defendant and to the community that any decision to
    impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
    rather than caprice or emotion’ ” (Beck, at pp. 637–638). As a
    result, certain procedural safeguards may be warranted in a
    capital case because they mitigate “risk [that] cannot be
    tolerated in a case in which the defendant’s life is at stake.” (Id.
    at p. 637; see 
    id. at pp.
    637–638 & fn. 14 [requiring lesser
    included offense instruction in a capital case but “not decid[ing]
    whether the Due Process Clause would require the giving of
    such instructions in a noncapital case”].)
    This court has recognized that the “rights and decisions
    that are normally personal to a criminal defendant may be
    limited or overruled in the service of death penalty reliability.”
    (People v. Mai (2013) 
    57 Cal. 4th 986
    , 1055 (Mai); see 
    Martinez, supra
    , 528 U.S. at p. 162 [“[T]he government’s interest in
    ensuring the integrity . . . of the trial at times outweighs the
    defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”].) In
    particular, we have long recognized that section 1018, which
    reflects the legislative judgment that heightened requirements
    for guilty pleas to capital crimes are necessary to mitigate the
    risk of unreliability in California’s death penalty scheme, strikes
    a constitutionally valid balance between competing Sixth
    Amendment and Eighth Amendment considerations.
    In People v. Chadd (1981) 
    28 Cal. 3d 739
    (Chadd), we
    upheld section 1018 against a constitutional challenge that the
    statute “denies [the defendant] his ‘fundamental right’ to control
    the ultimate course of the prosecution.” (Chadd, at p. 747.) We
    explained that the Legislature amended section 1018 to require
    capital defendants to appear with counsel and obtain counsel’s
    consent before pleading guilty “to serve as a further independent
    8
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    safeguard against erroneous imposition of a death sentence.”
    (Chadd, at p. 750.) We noted that the amendments to section
    1018 were part of a comprehensive revision of California’s death
    penalty statutes in response to the Eighth Amendment concerns
    raised in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
    408 U.S. 238
    , which held
    that the operation of the death penalty was arbitrary at the
    time. (Chadd, at p. 750 [chronicling legislative history of section
    1018].)
    Moreover, we rejected the Attorney General’s argument
    that section 1018 as we construed it “is unconstitutional because
    it allows counsel to ‘veto’ a capital defendant’s decision to plead
    guilty.” (
    Chadd, supra
    , 28 Cal.3d at p. 747.) We specifically
    recognized that section 1018 was a constitutionally permissible
    balance between the constitutional concerns of reliability and
    defendant autonomy: “[The Attorney General] fails to recognize
    the larger public interest at stake in pleas of guilty to capital
    offenses. It is true that in our system of justice the decision as
    to how to plead to a criminal charge is personal to the defendant:
    because the life, liberty or property at stake is his, so also is the
    choice of plea. [Citation.] But it is no less true that the
    Legislature has the power to regulate, in the public interest, the
    manner in which that choice is exercised.” (Chadd, at pp. 747–
    748.) We continued, “The Attorney General in effect stands
    Faretta on its head: from the defendant’s conceded right to
    ‘make a defense’ in ‘an adversary criminal trial,’ the Attorney
    General attempts to infer a defendant’s right to make no such
    defense and to have no such trial, even when his life is at stake.
    But in capital cases, as noted above, the state has a strong
    interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments. Nothing in
    Faretta, either expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the
    right to conclude that the danger of erroneously imposing a
    9
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    death sentence outweighs the minor infringement of the right of
    self-representation resulting when defendant’s right to plead
    guilty in capital cases is subjected to the requirement of his
    counsel’s consent.” (Id. at p. 751.)
    This holding — that section 1018 strikes a permissible
    balance between Eighth Amendment reliability concerns and
    the defendant’s Sixth Amendment interest in control over an
    aspect of the defense — has been a consistent through-line in
    our capital jurisprudence.        In 2007, we reaffirmed this
    understanding of section 1018 in People v. Alfaro (2007) 
    41 Cal. 4th 1277
    (Alfaro). Relying extensively on Chadd, we
    concluded that defense counsel’s refusal to consent to a guilty
    plea was reasonable where a capital defendant sought to plead
    guilty in order “to prevent the presentation of evidence
    regarding an accomplice.” (Alfaro, at p. 1301.) We rejected the
    defendant’s argument that her desire to plead guilty “concerned
    a fundamental aspect of her defense that . . . must remain within
    defendant’s control.” (Id. at p. 1302.) Our unanimous opinion
    reaffirmed that “[t]he consent requirement of section 1018 has
    its roots in the state’s strong interest in reducing the risk of
    mistaken judgments in capital cases and thereby maintaining
    the accuracy and fairness of its criminal proceedings. [Citation.]
    The statute constitutes legislative recognition of the severe
    consequences of a guilty plea in a capital case, and provides
    protection against an ill-advised guilty plea and the erroneous
    imposition of a death sentence.” (Id. at p. 1300.)
    We have never suggested that autonomy interests
    implicated by a capital defendant’s desire to plead guilty take
    precedence over heightened reliability interests. Rather, the
    baseline requirement that the prosecution “discharge[] its
    burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases” has been the
    10
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    fundamental point of departure for our evaluation of capital
    defendants’ autonomy rights. 
    (Bloom, supra
    , 48 Cal.3d at
    p. 1228.) In such cases, we have reiterated that “a defendant
    may not discharge his lawyer [in a capital case] in order to enter
    . . . a [guilty] plea over counsel’s objection.” 
    (Mai, supra
    , 57
    Cal.4th at p. 1055; see People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961,
    983, fn. 1 (Daniels).)
    Reliability concerns are particularly significant at the plea
    phase, since the plea substitutes for the prosecution’s discharge
    of the burden of proof, a bedrock component of the adversarial
    process ensuring that outcomes are reliable. (See Boykin v.
    Alabama (1969) 
    395 U.S. 238
    , 242 [describing the plea as “itself
    a conviction”].) Thus “a trial, even one where a defense is
    voluntarily forgone, is fundamentally different from a guilty
    plea” because in a trial, “the state [i]s put to its burden of proof.”
    
    (Daniels, supra
    , 3 Cal.5th at p. 983.) At the same time, the
    defendant does not have the “absolute right under the
    Constitution to have [a] guilty plea accepted by [a] court.”
    (North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 38, fn. 11; see
    Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 
    566 U.S. 156
    , 168 [“It is, of course, true
    that defendants have ‘no right to be offered a plea . . . nor a
    federal right that the judge accept it.’ ”].)
    Finally, we have found similar legislative judgments
    limiting a defendant’s prerogative to direct his representation to
    be permissible because they further society’s interests in the
    reliability of criminal judgments. For example, a capital
    defendant cannot waive automatic appeal of a judgment of death
    (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, subd. (b)) because
    “the state . . . has an indisputable interest in it which [a capital
    defendant] cannot extinguish.” (People v. Stanworth (1969) 
    71 Cal. 2d 820
    , 834.) We have likewise recognized the requirement
    11
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    that defendants be represented by counsel in competency
    proceedings as a constitutionally valid legislative choice insofar
    as it limits defendants’ right of self-representation in service of
    reliability. (People v. Lightsey (2012) 
    54 Cal. 4th 668
    , 696–697
    [noting     special   concern     with     the   possibility    for
    “breakdown . . . in the process of meaningful adversarial testing
    central to our system of justice”].) Section 1018 represents a
    similarly valid legislative judgment in light of competing
    constitutional considerations.
    B.
    The high court’s recent decision in McCoy does not upend
    our longstanding precedent. In McCoy, the high court reversed
    the conviction of a capital defendant whose counsel had
    conceded his client’s guilt at trial over defendant’s objections.
    
    (McCoy, supra
    , 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1512].) Before
    trial, McCoy’s attorney had determined that the best strategy
    for avoiding a death sentence was to admit to the three murder
    charges during the guilt phase and plead for mercy during the
    penalty phase. (Id. at p. 1506.) McCoy disagreed and was
    “ ‘furious’ ” with his attorney’s strategy. (Ibid.) He insisted that
    his attorney pursue acquittal instead. The trial court denied
    McCoy’s request to remove his counsel and defense counsel’s
    request to be relieved if McCoy secured other counsel. It
    instructed counsel to decide how to proceed. At trial, McCoy’s
    counsel acknowledged during his opening statement that the
    evidence unambiguously showed McCoy committed the
    murders, while McCoy testified he was innocent. (Id. at
    p. 1507.) The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty and
    returned three death verdicts. (Ibid.)
    12
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    The high court reasoned that by availing himself of the
    Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, McCoy did not
    “surrender control entirely to counsel.” 
    (McCoy, supra
    , 584 U.S.
    at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].) While “[t]rial management is the
    lawyer’s province,” the court explained, “[s]ome decisions . . . are
    reserved for the client — notably, whether to plead guilty, waive
    the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an
    appeal.” (Ibid; see also 
    id. at p.
    1505 [“[I]t is the defendant’s
    prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his
    defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the
    sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the
    State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”].) The high
    court concluded that because McCoy’s decision to assert
    innocence was a choice about the objectives of his case, his
    counsel could not override that decision over his objections. (Id.
    at pp. 1508–1509.)
    Although McCoy explained that the choice of “whether to
    plead guilty” 
    (McCoy, supra
    , 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at
    p. 1508]) or “to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the
    sentencing stage” is “the defendant’s prerogative” (
    id. at p.
    1505), the high court was not announcing any new legal
    principle in doing so. Rather, it was restating established Sixth
    Amendment principles, as evidenced by its citation to Jones v.
    
    Barnes, supra
    , 
    463 U.S. 745
    , which in turn relied on earlier
    authority to explain that “the accused has the ultimate
    authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the
    case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or
    her own behalf, or take an appeal, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 
    433 U.S. 72
    , 93 n. 1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); ABA
    Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2, 21-2.2 (2d ed. 1980).”
    (Barnes, at p. 751; see McCoy, at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)
    13
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    This dicta adds nothing to the legal landscape that already
    existed when we decided Chadd and Alfaro.
    More importantly, the Eighth Amendment concerns
    reflected in section 1018 were not at issue in McCoy. Rather
    than insist upon pleading guilty, the defendant in McCoy sought
    to maintain his innocence and subject his case to the rigors of
    the adversarial process. He did not seek to avoid that process
    and its accompanying safeguards. As a result, the high court
    had no occasion to address, and did not address, the heightened
    Eighth Amendment reliability interests where a capital
    defendant seeks to forgo trial on the issue of his guilt. McCoy
    did not weigh a defendant’s autonomy interests against
    countervailing reliability interests because there was no conflict
    between the defendant’s objectives and the reliability interests
    of the Eighth Amendment; it did not address whether a capital
    defendant may enter a guilty plea against the advice of counsel
    in the face of a state statute requiring counsel’s consent as a
    measure to lessen the risk of a mistaken judgment. (See People
    v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 285 [“ ‘[A] decision is not
    authority for propositions not considered.’ ”].) By contrast, we
    expressly addressed the interplay between the heightened need
    for reliability in capital cases and a defendant’s right to control
    his own defense in Chadd, and our reasoning and holding
    remain controlling.
    It is no light matter to find a statute unconstitutional,
    particularly one that we have upheld on numerous occasions.
    That is especially true here, given the ramifications of a guilty
    plea in a capital case. (
    Chadd, supra
    , 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.)
    Against the backdrop of all that we have said about the
    constitutionality and importance of section 1018’s requirement
    of counsel’s consent, McCoy’s broad dicta is not a sufficient basis
    14
    PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON,
    Liu, J., concurring
    for jettisoning decades of precedent. This is not to suggest that
    any restriction on a capital defendant’s right to his own defense
    in the name of reliability is constitutionally valid. That right is
    foundational and rooted in “ ‘respect for the individual which is
    the lifeblood of the law.’ ” (
    Faretta, supra
    , 422 U.S. at p. 834.)
    The balance to be struck is a delicate one, and with respect to
    section 1018, it is a balance we struck decades ago.
    I would hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to
    allow Frederickson to plead guilty without counsel’s consent. In
    all other respects, I join the opinion of the court.
    LIU, J.
    15
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Frederickson
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal XXX
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S067392
    Date Filed: February 3, 2020
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Orange
    Judge: William R. Froeberg
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, and Douglas Ward, Deputy State Public Defender,
    Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Lance
    E. Winters and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Ronald Matthias and
    Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorneys General, Holly D. Wilkens, Theodore M. Cropley, Annie Featherman
    Fraser, Ronald A. Jakob and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Douglas Ward
    Attorney at Law
    350 Bay Street, P.M.B. #199
    San Francisco, California 94133
    (415) 494-9252
    Tami Falkenstein Hennick
    Deputy Attorney General
    600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
    San Diego, CA 92101
    (619) 738-9223