People v. Cooper ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ROBERT COOPER,
Defendant and Appellant.
S273134
Second Appellate District, Division Six
B304490
Los Angeles County Superior Court
TA140718
May 25, 2023
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
PEOPLE v. COOPER
S273134
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill 333), effective January 1, 2022, amended the substantive
offense of active participation “in a criminal street gang” as well
as the sentencing enhancement available for a felony committed
“for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.” (Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 3; Pen Code, § 186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1).)1 Among
other changes, Assembly Bill 333 now requires that, in order to
demonstrate a pattern of criminal gang activity for the purpose
of establishing a criminal street gang, the prosecution must
prove that the two predicate offenses “commonly benefited a
criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses
is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)2
1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
In order to establish that a gang is in fact a criminal street
gang within the meaning of the California Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act), the prosecution
must prove that gang members “collectively engage in, or have
engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd.
(f).) We refer to the offenses that are used to establish “a pattern
of criminal gang activity” under the STEP Act as predicate
offenses. (§ 186.20 et seq.; see People v. Valencia (2021)
11 Cal.5th 818, 829.)
1
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Defendant Robert Cooper was convicted of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(e)), and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–
(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). We granted review in this case to
determine whether any of Cooper’s sentencing enhancements
must be vacated due to this recent statutory change to section
186.22.3 The parties as well as the Court of Appeal below all
agree that Cooper’s jury was instructed under the prior law, that
the new requirements in section 186.22 apply retroactively to
Cooper’s case on appeal under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, and that the prejudice from the instructional error is
assessed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18(Chapman). (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207
[the rule of Estrada applies to Assem. Bill 333’s changes to §
186.22 and any instructional error resulting from the change in
law is assessed under Chapman].) Applying the Chapman
standard, we hold that the failure to instruct that the alleged
predicate offenses must have “commonly benefited” the gang in
a “more than reputational” manner (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)) was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the record
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding
regarding whether the gang as a whole (as opposed to the
predicate offenders themselves) benefited from the offenses in a
nonreputational manner. We reverse Cooper’s gang
enhancement, as well as the firearm enhancement that is
contingent upon the gang enhancement, and remand the case to
3
Cooper’s first degree murder conviction is not at issue in
this appeal.
2
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the
superior court for any retrial of the same.
I. Background
Cooper was a member of the Lueders Park gang.4 Nicos
Mathis and Monique Peterson were members of a rival gang,
Mob Piru. On October 24, 2012, the three were all in Gonzales
Park in Compton with a large group of people. Mathis
challenged Cooper to a fight, but Cooper declined and walked
away.
About 20 minutes later, a Buick drove into the park.
Peterson recognized the two occupants of the Buick as Lueders
Park gang members and urged Mathis to leave. Mathis refused
to leave because he was waiting for a fellow gang member
nicknamed “Hit Man.” Eventually Mathis drove away looking
for Hit Man with Peterson and two other friends. Mathis pulled
over on the street where Hit Man had told him to meet. Peterson
heard gunshots, and told Mathis to drive away, but they
remained parked.
Peterson testified that she turned and saw two cars pull
up, the Buick and an Infiniti. Cooper, “Mousey,” and “Honcho”
were in the Infiniti. She saw two guns fire toward the vehicle
she was in. One of the guns was fired from the front passenger
side of the Infiniti and the other from the rear passenger side.
The Buick crashed into Mathis’s car but drove away. Mathis
was shot once in the head and four times in the body and later
died of his wounds in the hospital.
4
The brief summary of facts is drawn from the Court of
Appeal’s opinion.
3
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
An information charged Cooper with conspiracy to commit
murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)); the murder of Mathis (§ 187, subd.
(a)); and three counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd.
(a)). Each count also alleged firearm allegations (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c), (d), & (e)(1)), and that the crimes were committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The information also alleged a
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds.
(a)–(d)).
A jury initially acquitted Cooper of three counts of
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), but hung on a murder
count (§ 187, subd. (a)) and conspiracy to commit murder count
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). A retrial was held on the murder count
only, with the gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and firearm
enhancements alleged as before (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e)).
The jury then convicted Cooper of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and found true the gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and
firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e)). The trial
court accepted Cooper’s admission that he had suffered a prior
strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).)
The trial court sentenced Cooper to 75 years to life in prison,
consisting of 25 years to life for the murder, doubled by the
strike, plus a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and
(e)(1). The trial court stayed the remaining gun and gang
enhancements.
At the retrial, the jury was instructed on the gang
enhancement pursuant to the former section 186.22 with
CALCRIM No. 1401. The jury was instructed that to prove the
gang enhancement, the prosecution must prove the “defendant
committed or attempted to commit the crime for the benefit of,
4
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang;
and [¶] That the defendant intended to assist, further, or
promote criminal conduct by gang members.” The jury was
instructed that the definition of a “criminal street gang”
requires a “pattern of gang activity” and “as one or more of its
primary activities,” the commission of the predicate offenses of
robbery and the sales of narcotics. To establish a “pattern of
gang activity,” the prosecution must prove “at least one of” the
predicate robbery and the sales of narcotics offenses and that
the offenses “were committed on separate occasions or were
personally committed by two or more persons.” Pursuant to the
former law, the jury was instructed that the predicate offenses
“if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need
not be gang-related.” The jury was not instructed, as Assembly
Bill 333 now requires, that the predicate offenses, if any, must
have “commonly benefited [the] criminal street gang, and the
common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.” (§
186.22, subd. (e)(1).)
The records of conviction and gang expert testimony
establishing the predicate offenses at the retrial show that two
Lueders Park gang members committed one crime each: Ricky
Lee Vaughn committed a robbery in violation of section 211 in
2012 and Donald Wayne Mahan sold narcotics in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 in 2012.5 The gang
expert testified that both Vaughn and Mahan are Lueders Park
gang members. The gang expert had contacted Vaughn
“numerous times” and Vaughn has “identified himself as a
5
The Court of Appeal states this narcotics sale occurred in
2016, but the record of conviction and gang expert testimony
reflect it occurred in 2012.
5
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
[Lueders] Park Piru gang member.” The gang expert testified
that Mahan’s son “Doc” is “[p]robably the most senior [Lueders]
Park Piru gang member on the street right now.” He also
testified that the Lueders Park gang claims territory in
Compton and its primary activities are “theft, burglary, robbery,
vehicle theft, narcotic sales, narcotic possession, weapons sales,
weapons possession, assault to murder.” The gang expert
explained that “most gang members play that role of a gang
member and act hard. But there’s a specific group within each
specific gang that are really your most active guys.” He added:
“They’re out there going on missions, they’re doing shootings,
they’re doing robberies, they function to do gang banging things.
And that gets that gang’s name out there.” The gang expert
further testified that through the generations, Lueders Park has
had “different groups that do robberies, shootings, run girls,
[and] sell narcotics.”
In response to a hypothetical question, the gang expert
testified to how the underlying murder benefited the gang, but
did not testify as to how the alleged predicate offenses benefited
the gang. The gang expert explained that a murder like the one
in this case would benefit the gang by eliminating a rival and by
maintaining respect, but that money is the “number one” gang
function.
During the pendency of Cooper’s appeal, Assembly Bill
333 amended section 186.22’s definition of a “criminal street
gang” to require proof of additional elements. As relevant here,
in order to prove “a pattern of criminal gang activity” for the
purpose of establishing a criminal street gang, the prosecution
must now prove both that the required predicate offenses
“commonly benefited [the] criminal street gang” and that “the
common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.”
6
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; § 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) Assembly Bill
333 clarifies that “Examples of a common benefit that are more
than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial
gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual
gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or
previous witness or informant.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; §
186.22, subd. (g).)6
Based upon the evidence presented at the retrial, the
Court of Appeal found that the absence of a jury instruction on
the new requirement that the alleged predicate offenses must
have “commonly benefited” the gang in a “more than
reputational” manner (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)) was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal reasoned that
the gang expert “testified that the offenses were committed by
[Lueders] Park gang members and that robbery and sale of
narcotics are some of the gang’s primary activities. The
evidence was uncontradicted. The benefit to the gang of robbery
and sale of narcotics is more than reputational.” (People v.
Cooper (Jan. 14, 2022, B304490) [nonpub. opn.].) We granted
review.
II. Discussion
Cooper argues that the Court of Appeal erred in finding
that the lack of jury instruction on Assembly Bill 333’s new
elements was harmless. Here, the jury was never instructed
6
Assembly Bill 333 also made several other changes to
section 186.22 that are not at issue in this appeal. These
changes included narrowing the definition of “criminal street
gang” to “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or
more persons,” whose members “collectively,” rather than just
individually, “engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of
criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)
7
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
that, as Assembly Bill 333 now requires, the predicate offenses
must have “commonly benefited [the] criminal street gang, and
the common benefit from the offenses is more than
reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) We agree with Cooper
and find that the absence of jury instruction on this new
requirement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman holds “that before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman,
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) The jury instruction here implicates
Cooper’s due process rights by lessening the prosecution’s
burden to prove elements of the crime. (See People v. Harris
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 438 [“jury instructions in a state criminal
trial omitting the requirement of proof of every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt are erroneous under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”].) The due
process “requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are
interrelated.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278.)
Chapman applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of
an offense. (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 4.) When
a jury instruction has omitted an element of an offense, our task
“is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that
could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the
omitted element.’ ” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417
(Mil), quoting Neder, at p. 19.)7
7
The Attorney General incorrectly characterizes the
Chapman inquiry before us as asking whether the jury could
draw a reasonable inference that the alleged predicate offenses
8
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Since Assembly Bill 333’s new elements did not exist at
the time of Cooper’s trial, the prosecution made no attempt to
prove that the alleged predicate offenses provided a more than
reputational common benefit to the gang and Cooper made no
such concession. Instead, the records of conviction and gang
expert testimony establishing the predicate offenses at the
retrial merely show that two Lueders Park gang members
committed one crime each: Ricky Vaughn committed a robbery
in 2012 and Donald Mahan sold narcotics in 2012. The gang
expert also testified that Lueders Park’s primary activities are
“theft, burglary, robbery, vehicle theft, narcotic sales, narcotic
possession, weapons sales, weapons possession, assault to
murder.” The Attorney General suggests, and the Court of
Appeal appears to have concluded, that crimes that have an
inherent financial benefit and that are identified as the gang’s
primary activities qualify as a common benefit to the gang that
is “more than reputational” under Assembly Bill 333. (See
People v. Cooper, supra, B304490 [“The benefit to the gang of
robbery and sale of narcotics is more than reputational”].)
However, the record does not disclose the circumstances
surrounding the predicate offenses and the prosecution never
introduced any evidence about how the gang commonly
benefited from them. While robbery and the sale of narcotics
typically provide a financial benefit to the offender, the record
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding
regarding whether the fruits of the offenses were intended to or
commonly benefited the gang. This, however, is not the proper
standard. As noted above, our task “is to determine ‘whether
the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a
contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.’ ” (Mil,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 417.)
9
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
did benefit the gang as a whole. As the Attorney General
concedes, robbery and narcotics sales “may of course be
committed by gang members only for personal gain (which,
relatedly, may benefit the gang only reputationally).” Indeed,
“[n]ot every crime committed by gang members is related to a
gang.” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) In this way,
the question of whether an offense is within the gang’s primary
activities is distinct from the question of whether a particular
offense has “commonly benefited a criminal street gang.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) A jury determination regarding the
gang’s primary activities merely constitutes a conclusion about
the types of activities in which a gang typically engages,
whereas the question about a common benefit asks about how
the specific predicate offense actually benefited the gang. (See
People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 473, 478–480 (E.H.)
[finding that though the predicate offenses included crimes that
could, in theory, provide a monetary benefit to the gang, the
evidence did not show that these predicate offenses actually
benefited the gang].) Furthermore, the jury here was
specifically instructed that the predicate offenses “that establish
a pattern of criminal gang activity[] need not be gang-related,”
in accordance with the former law as set forth in People v.
Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621–622, disapproved of on
other grounds by People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686,
fn. 13. This instruction directly contradicts Assembly Bill 333’s
new requirement that the predicate offenses “commonly
benefited [the] criminal street gang, and the common benefit
from the offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd.
(e)(1).) Based upon the record, a jury could have reasonably
concluded that the predicate offenses at issue were committed
for personal gain alone.
10
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Moreover, the Attorney General’s interpretation would
render superfluous much of the new amendment that requires
both that predicate offenses “commonly benefited” the gang and
that the common benefit is “more than reputational.” (§ 186.22,
subd. (e)(1).) Section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) lists numerous
predicate offenses that typically involve a financial benefit to the
offender.8 Prior to the amendments, section 186.22,
subdivisions (e)(1) and (f), which define “pattern of criminal
gang activity” and “a criminal street gang,” have long required
that the gang must have “as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more of” the enumerated predicate
offenses. (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) The Legislature then decided to
amend section 186.22 to require a heightened showing both that
the predicate offenses “commonly benefited a criminal street
gang” and that the common benefit is “more than reputational.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) If all that were required to prove a
predicate offense is that the prosecution show that the gang
member committed as one of the gang’s primary activities any
one of the enumerated predicate offenses that typically involve
a financial benefit, then the additional requirement that the
predicate offenses also “commonly benefited a criminal street
gang” in a “more than reputational” manner would be mere
surplusage. Finally, such an interpretation is inconsistent with
the legislative history indicating the Legislature was concerned
8
Specifically, the list of predicate offenses in section 186.22,
subdivision (e)(1) includes: robbery (§ 211 et seq.), sale or
possession for sale of a controlled substances (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11007), grand theft (§ 487), grand theft of a firearm or
vehicle (§ 487, subd. (d)), burglary (§ 459), money laundering
(§ 186.10), felony extortion (§§ 518, 520), carjacking (§ 215), sale
of a firearm (§ 27500 et seq.), and vehicle theft (Veh. Code,
§ 10851).
11
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
with “lax” interpretations of the prior law that allowed for overly
expansive application of gang enhancements (Stats. 2021, ch.
699, § 2) and therefore sought to amend the law by “making the
standards for applying a gang enhancement more rigorous.”
(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 333, as
amended May 28, 2021, p. 6.)9
The Attorney General tries to save his argument by
claiming that because Mahan was a “ ‘senior’ ” member of the
gang and Vaughn was “a well-known” member, a reasonable
inference is that Mahan and Vaughn were among the “most
active” gang members committing the gang’s primary activities,
making it in turn reasonable to infer that they committed the
predicate offenses for the common benefit of the gang. However,
even assuming arguendo that senior or well-known gang
membership could possibly be evidence that predicate offenses
commonly benefited the gang, the record does not support the
Attorney General’s characterization of Mahan and Vaughn as
senior or well-known members of the gang. Rather, the gang
expert testified, when asked if he was familiar with Mahan, that
“I know Doc, his son. Doc’s a [Lueders] Park Piru gang member.
9
At oral argument, defense counsel acknowledged that one
interpretation of Assembly Bill 333 is that, though the evidence
presented here does not suffice, it is permissible, as a general
matter, to use circumstantial evidence to prove a common
benefit that is more than reputational. It is also worth noting
that a financial gain is not the only way that the prosecution can
prove a more than reputational common benefit to the gang.
Assembly Bill 333 provides several other examples of a more
than reputational common benefit, including, but not limited to,
“retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or
intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous
witness or informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
12
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Probably the most senior [Lueders] Park Piru gang member on
the street right now. Been a long time in prison. I think he’s
been out maybe three or four years now. But just saw him a
couple weeks ago. Probably there today. He sets up on
Saunders and Bradfield and goes to sell his narcotics.” The most
plausible read of this testimony is that the gang expert testified
that Mahan’s son (and not Mahan himself) was “the most senior”
Lueders Park gang member. At a minimum, this testimony does
not allow us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
gang expert was referring to Mahan himself. Moreover, to the
extent the Attorney General is suggesting that we can
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mahan was a senior
gang member simply because a family member was a senior
gang member, we reject that argument out of hand. As for Ricky
Vaughn, though the Attorney General contends that the gang
expert characterized him as a “well-known” gang member, the
gang expert actually testified that “I’ve contacted Ricky
numerous times. I’ve spoken to Ricky. He identified himself as
a [Lueders] Park Piru gang member. I’ve taken photographs of
him throwing up the [Lueders] Park Piru Hand sign. [¶] I’ve
recently assisted on another case where Ricky Lee Vaughn has
identified himself as a [Lueders] Park Piru gang member again.”
Again, even assuming arguendo that senior or well-known gang
membership could possibly be evidence that predicate offenses
commonly benefited the gang, this testimony does not support
the Attorney General’s characterization. The gang expert
testified not that Vaughn was a well-known or senior gang
member, but simply that Vaughn was known to the gang expert
through several prior contacts with him.
In sum, the grand total of evidence relied on by the Attorney
General for proving that the alleged predicate offenses provided
13
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
a common benefit that is more than reputational to the gang is
that there was a robbery and a sale of narcotics by gang
members and that a primary activity of the gang is to commit
robberies and the sale of narcotics. Under these circumstances,
we cannot conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)10
III. Disposition
For the above reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s
affirmance of Cooper’s gang enhancement.11 Since the firearm
10
As Cooper argues, the Court of Appeal’s holding is an
anomaly among opinions considering Assembly Bill 333 and
which have reversed gang enhancements. (E.g., E.H., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 476–480; People v. Lopez (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 327, 343–346 (Lopez); People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 664–670; People v. Rodriguez (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 816, 822–823; People v. Vasquez (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1032–1033.) In each case, the predicate
offenses and the evidence supporting them are different and, as
the Attorney General maintains, these decisions have
distinguishing features. Nevertheless, though we do not here
decide the unique facts of those cases, Cooper is correct that in
each case the Court of Appeal reversed a gang enhancement
after the enactment of Assembly Bill 333 for a trial that occurred
without Assembly Bill 333’s guidance. Indeed, the decision
below is the only Court of Appeal opinion cited in the parties’
briefing affirming a gang enhancement after the enactment of
Assembly Bill 333 for a trial that occurred before Assembly Bill
333 was enacted.
11
As noted above, Assembly Bill 333 also requires that gang
members “collectively” engage in a pattern of criminal gang
activity under section 186.22, subdivision (f). Cooper requests
that if we do not reverse the gang enhancement based upon the
new requirement that the predicate offenses commonly benefit
14
PEOPLE v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
enhancement alleged under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1),
is contingent on a true finding on the gang enhancement under
section 186.22, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of
that firearm enhancement as well, and remand the case to the
Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the
superior court for any retrial of the same. (See Lopez, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 346–348; E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 480 [“The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof —
where newly required elements were ‘never tried’ to the jury —
is to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the
affected charges”].)
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
the gang in a more than reputational way, that we instead
remand the case to the Court of Appeal so that the failure to
instruct on the element of collective action by the gang can be
briefed there. Cooper has also filed a motion for eventual
remand or, alternatively, to expand the issues on review based
upon similar reasons. Since we are reversing Cooper’s gang
enhancement on the issue that we granted review upon,
Cooper’s requests that we remand or expand the issues based
upon another theory is rendered moot.
15
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Cooper
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 1/14/22 – 2d Dist.,
Div. 6
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S273134
Date Filed: May 25, 2023
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Allen Joseph Webster, Jr.
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Michael C. Keller, Idan Ivri and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Elizabeth K. Horowitz
Law Office of Elizabeth K. Horowitz, Inc.
5272 South Lewis Avenue, Suite 256
Tulsa, OK 74105
(424) 543-4710
Charles S. Lee
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 269-6068