Untitled California Attorney General Opinion ( 2019 )


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  •                  TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    State of California
    XAVIER BECERRA
    Attorney General
    _________________________
    :
    OPINION                    :                No. 18-202
    :
    of                     :              April 19, 2019
    :
    XAVIER BECERRA                  :
    Attorney General               :
    :
    LAWRENCE M. DANIELS                 :
    Deputy Attorney General            :
    :
    ________________________________________________________________________
    Proposed relators EULALIO GOMEZ, THOMAS TRESTER, MONICA DIAZ,
    and JERI NOWAK have requested leave to sue proposed defendants RILEY TALFORD,
    JOHN ROBINSON, and JOHN ADAMS in quo warranto to remove them as trustees of
    the Board of Retirement of the Fresno County Employee Retirement Association on the
    ground that their elections resulted from violations of election procedures.
    CONCLUSION
    Leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED to determine whether the elections of
    proposed defendants RILEY TALFORD and JOHN ROBINSON as trustees of the Board
    of Retirement of the Fresno County Employee Retirement Association resulted from
    violations of election procedures. Leave to sue in quo warranto is DENIED as to proposed
    defendant JOHN ADAMS because his challenged term of office has expired.
    1
    18-202
    ANALYSIS
    Retirement boards for public employees have plenary authority and the fiduciary
    responsibility to administer the employees’ retirement systems.1 Pursuant to the California
    Constitution, retirement board trustees must “administer the system in a manner that will
    assure prompt delivery of benefits and related services to the participants and their
    beneficiaries.”2 The County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 permits a county to
    establish and operate a retirement plan, and to provide disability retirements, for the
    county’s employees.3
    Under this law, the County of Fresno has established the Fresno County Employees’
    Retirement Association, governed by a Board of Retirement (Board).4 The Board’s duties
    “consist primarily of protecting the assets of the retirement system through investment
    decisions and through actuarial valuations and adjustments; calculating benefits; delivering
    benefits and services to members and their beneficiaries; and deciding individual members’
    claims for benefits.”5 The Board consists of nine members: the county treasurer, four
    appointed members, two elected general members, one elected safety member, and one
    elected retired member.6 Safety members are classified as “those employees who are in
    positions in which the principal duties consist of either active law enforcement or active
    fire suppression.”7 General members are “all employees not classified as Safety
    1
    Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17; Flethez v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement
    Assn. (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 630
    , 635 (Flethez).
    2
    Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17, subd. (a).
    Gov. Code, § 31450 et seq.; Flethez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 635; Marin Assn. of Public
    3
    Employees v. Marin County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2016) 
    2 Cal.App.5th 674
    , 680.
    4
    Gov. Code, §§ 31520, 31520.1, 31595; Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Assn.
    Bd. of Retirement Charter (as amended Oct. 7, 2015) (“FCERA Charter”), available at
    https://www2.co.fresno.ca.us/9200/Attachments/policies/20151007-6B-BoardCharters-
    1dRaCharter.pdf.
    5
    89 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 152, 156 (2006), fn. omitted; see Gov. Code, §§ 31451, 31453,
    31453.5, 31530-31536, 31580-31619; FCERA Charter, supra, pt. 1, § 1.
    6
    Gov. Code, § 31520.1, subd. (a).
    7
    Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Assoc. Handbook (2017) (“FCERA
    Handbook”), p. 8, available at http://www2.co.fresno.ca.us/9200/attachments/handbook/a
    ctivehandbook.pdf; see Gov. Code, § 31469.3.
    2
    18-202
    members.”8
    The two Board trustee positions representing general members (trustee positions 2
    and 3) and the one Board trustee position representing safety members (trustee position 7)
    were up for election on November 16, 2017. In this election, the three proposed defendants
    (Defendants Riley Talford, John Adams, and John Robinson) prevailed over the four
    proposed relators (Relators Eulalio Gomez, Thomas Trester, Monica Diaz, and Jeri
    Nowak). For trustee position 2, Defendant Talford received 322 votes, Robert Bash (not a
    party in this matter) received 287 votes, Relator Nowak received 230 votes, and Bobby
    Bloyed (not a party in this matter) received 108. For trustee position 3, Defendant Adams
    received 348 votes, Relator Trester received 347 votes, and Relator Diaz received 243. For
    trustee position 7, Defendant Robinson received 180 votes and Relator Gomez received
    177. The county clerk certified these results.
    On December 19, 2017, after the election, Relators brought an election contest in
    Fresno County Superior Court challenging the election results.9 On February 2, 2018, the
    court dismissed the case on the basis that the statute authorizing election contests did not
    encompass elections for county retirement boards.10 On April 3, 2018, Relators appealed
    this dismissal to the Fifth Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal. On January
    11, 2019, upon Relators’ request, the court dismissed the appeal.
    Meanwhile, between the superior court and Court of Appeal dismissals of the
    election contest case, Relators applied to the Attorney General to sue Defendants, on the
    same factual grounds, via a quo warranto legal theory. These grounds are that (1) 56 votes
    were counted from 28 voters who returned envelopes containing both a general member
    ballot and a safety ballot; (2) some completed ballots were delivered in bulk, rather than
    individually; and (3) Defendants unlawfully used county resources for political
    campaigning.
    For the reasons that follow, we now find that Relators’ well-supported grounds for
    relief warrant granting them leave to sue in quo warranto against Defendants Talford and
    Robinson, whose challenged terms will expire on December 31, 2020. We will deny
    Relators leave to sue against Defendant Adams, however, because the electoral term they
    challenge as to him expired on December 31, 2018.
    8
    FCERA Handbook, supra, at p. 8; see Gov. Code, § 31499.11, subd. (a).
    9
    See Elec. Code, § 16000 et seq. (election contests). Defendants began serving their
    terms as trustees on January 1, 2018.
    10
    See Elec. Code, § 16100.
    3
    18-202
    Applicable Law on Quo Warranto
    Quo warranto is a means of challenging whether a person unlawfully holds a public
    11
    office. Before initiating a quo warranto proceeding in superior court, a person must
    obtain leave to sue from the Attorney General against a person “who usurps, intrudes into,
    or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office . . . within this state.”12 In order to grant
    a quo warranto application, we must find that (1) quo warranto is the proper remedy to
    resolve an issue presented, (2) the application presents a substantial issue of law or fact
    appropriate for judicial resolution, and (3) granting the application would serve the overall
    public interest.13 We address these three requirements in turn.
    1.     Is Quo Warranto a Proper Remedy?
    For quo warranto to be an available remedy, Defendants must be holding public
    offices, and Relators must be challenging Defendants’ titles to these public offices.14 A
    public office is a governmental position that is created or authorized by law with a
    continuing and permanent tenure in which the incumbent performs a public function and
    exercises some sovereign powers of government.15
    An application of this test convinces us that the position of trustee of a county
    retirement board is a public office. First, the position is governmental because the county
    and its subsidiary governing bodies are part of our state’s governmental system, and
    because the Board uses taxpayer funds to perform its obligations.16 Second, the position is
    created or authorized by law because the state Constitution has authorized, and the
    Legislature has specifically created, this position.17 Third, the position has a continuing
    and permanent tenure because the Board’s life is perpetual and its elected members serve
    Code Civ. Proc., § 803; Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001) 
    91 Cal.App.4th 1221
    ,
    11
    1225; 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 157, 165 (1993).
    12
    Code Civ. Proc., § 803; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 1.
    13
    96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 40 (2013); 95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 50, 54 (2012).
    14
    See 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 41-45; 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 197, 200-201
    (1990).
    Moore v. Panish (1982) 
    32 Cal.3d 535
    , 545; People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey (1940)
    15
    
    16 Cal.2d 636
    , 639-640; 100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 29, 30 (2017).
    16
    Gov. Code, §§ 23000-23005, 31451, 31580-31590.
    17
    Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17; Gov. Code, §§ 31520, 31520.1, subd. (a).
    4
    18-202
    regular (three-year) terms of office.18 Fourth, the Board performs a public function, the
    Fresno County Board of Supervisors having transferred to it the duty to provide for the
    county employees’ retirement.19 By this delegation of power, the Board must “administer
    the [county retirement] system in a manner that will assure prompt delivery of benefits and
    related services to the [county] participants and their beneficiaries.”20
    Lastly, the Board, through its trustees, exercises some sovereign powers of
    government using its constitutionally-provided “plenary authority” over the system.21 It
    possesses broad discretionary authority regarding investments of monies, and has the
    power to adjust benefits, correct errors or omissions in benefits, and audit a county or
    district to determine the accuracy of benefits.22 The Board further exercises “quasi-judicial
    powers”23 by ruling on applications for retirement benefits and disability retirements, and
    determining factual issues, such as whether a member is permanently incapacitated and
    whether the disability is service-connected;24 by appointing referees for hearings;25 and by
    exercising subpoena powers and administering oaths to witnesses.26 The Board is also
    empowered to formulate regulations, which become effective upon approval by the Fresno
    County Board of Supervisors.27 The Board must comply with the Brown Act’s open-
    18
    Gov. Code, §§ 31520, 31520.1, 31595.
    Gov. Code, § 31500; Bd. of Retirement v. Santa Barbara County Grand Jury (1997)
    19
    
    58 Cal.App.4th 1185
    , 1191.
    20
    Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17, subd. (a).
    21
    Ibid.
    22
    Gov. Code, §§ 31537, 31538, 31539, 31541, 31595; FCERA Charter, supra, pts. I,
    II.
    Rau v. Sacramento County Retirement Bd. (1966) 
    247 Cal.App.2d 234
    , 236 (a county
    23
    “retirement board is a local administrative body vested with quasi-judicial powers”); see
    also Le Strange v. City of Berkeley (1962) 
    210 Cal.App.2d 313
    , 323 (a fire pension board
    of a city is quasi-judicial because of its “fact finding power and the concomitant
    requirement to make a determination or adjudication of fact in connection with matters
    properly submitted to it after a hearing”).
    24
    Gov. Code, §§ 32725, 32725.7, 31725.8; Flethez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 636.
    25
    Gov. Code, § 31533.
    26
    Gov. Code, § 31535.
    27
    Gov. Code, § 31525.
    5
    18-202
    meeting rules because a county retirement board is a “local agency” for this purpose.28 And
    significantly, the Legislature in 2012 evidenced its belief retirement board trustees hold
    public offices (in the first instance) when it specifically exempted them from the legal
    prohibition against holding incompatible public offices.29 We find that Defendants hold
    public offices for quo warranto purposes as well.
    Next, we turn to whether Relators are challenging Defendants’ titles to these public
    offices. On this point, it is well established that a party may challenge an election by means
    of an election contest or a quo warranto complaint.30 Under a quo warranto theory, if the
    28
    Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 821
    , 824; see generally Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq. (the Ralph M. Brown Act); see
    also Bd. of Retirement of Kern County Employees’ Retirement Assn. v. Bellino (2005) 
    126 Cal.App.4th 781
    , 790-792 (a county retirement association is a “local agency” for purposes
    of Government Code section 53227’s prohibition against employees of a local agency
    serving on its board); Bd. of Retirement v. Santa Barbara County Grand Jury, supra, 58
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 (a county retirement association is a “local government agency” for
    purposes of the grand jury’s exercise of investigative and subpoena powers under Penal
    Code sections 925, 933, and 939.2); and see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18700.3, subd. (b)(2)
    (within the meaning of the financial-disclosure provisions of the Political Reform Act of
    1974, “public officials who manage public investments” under Government Code section
    87200 include members of retirement boards); Lexin v. Super. Ct. (2010) 
    47 Cal.4th 1050
    ,
    1084 (city employees of the City of San Diego acted “[i]n their official capacities” within
    the meaning of Government Code section 1090 in contracting with the city as members of
    its retirement board).
    29
    Stats. 2002, ch. 289, § 1 (Sen. Bill No. 1746) (the Legislature intends that “appropriate
    legal counsel . . . would cure any potential clash between the two offices as implied by the
    doctrine of incompatibility of public offices”); see generally Gov. Code, § 1099 (describing
    the rule against simultaneously holding incompatible public offices). In a similar vein, we
    have found that the incompatible-offices rule did not prevent a county treasurer from also
    serving on the county retirement board, because the Legislature required the county
    treasurer to serve in this dual capacity. (89 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 152, 158; see
    also Gov. Code, § 31520.1, subd. (a) [referring to the three-year “terms of office of the
    elected, appointed, and alternate seventh members” of the county retirement board and
    stating that the “eighth and ninth members shall take office as soon as practicable,” italics
    added]; 4 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 234, 234 (1944) [referring to a board of retirement member
    as serving a “term of office”].)
    30
    People ex rel. Budd v. Holden (1865) 
    28 Cal. 123
    , 129; Salazar v. City of Montebello
    (1987) 
    190 Cal.App.3d 953
    , 957; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 82, 84, fn. 1 (2003); 74
    6
    18-202
    election was unlawful, a court may find that the elected official has no legal right to occupy
    the office.31
    Defendants Talford and Adams argue that even were quo warranto otherwise
    appropriate, this same matter was already litigated and dismissed with prejudice. But it
    was an election contest, not a quo warranto action, that the superior court dismissed with
    prejudice. The issues and claims presented in the election contest were not resolved on the
    merits; instead, the court determined that an election contest was not a statutorily
    authorized action to overturn an election of a trustee of a county retirement board.32 As a
    result, the re-litigation doctrines of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) and res judicata
    (claim preclusion) do not apply.33
    2.     Is a Substantial Question of Law or Fact Presented?
    Having found that quo warranto is a proper remedy in these circumstances, we turn
    to the question whether Relators have raised a substantial question of fact or law warranting
    judicial resolution. In this inquiry, it is not our role to resolve the merits of the controversy,
    Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 31, 32 (1991); see, e.g., Bradley v. Perrodin (2003) 
    106 Cal.App.4th 1153
    , 1173; People ex rel. Kerr v. County of Orange (2003) 
    106 Cal.App.4th 914
    , 919-
    920, 932-934.
    31
    See People v. City of San Buenaventura (1931) 
    213 Cal. 637
    , 638-642, overruled on
    another ground in Costa v. Superior Court (2006) 
    37 Cal.4th 986
    , 1014, fn. 20; City of
    Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 
    5 Cal.App.5th 1271
    , 1301; 96
    Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 48, 48-49 (2013); 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 39; see also 101
    Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 24, 28 (2018) (quo warranto is an appropriate means to challenge an
    appointment procedure).
    32
    See Elec. Code, § 16100 (“Any elector of a county, city, or of any political subdivision
    of either may contest any election held therein”). We take no position on the correctness
    of the court’s decision.
    33
    People v. Sims (1982) 
    32 Cal.3d 468
    , 484; Planning and Conservation League v.
    Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 
    180 Cal.App.4th 210
    , 226. In another case, a pending
    election contest caused us to decline to grant a quo warranto application contesting the
    same election. (74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 32 [declining to grant an application to
    sue in quo warranto because the challenged election already was the subject of an election
    contest and a civil complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief then pending in superior
    court].) Here, however, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the superior court’s
    election contest denial, and we are not aware of any related litigation.
    7
    18-202
    but only to decide if a substantial question is presented.34
    Relators first claim that the county clerk erroneously counted 56 ballots from 28
    persons who submitted envelopes containing two ballots each—a safety member ballot and
    a general member ballot.35 They argue that each of these 28 envelopes could properly
    contain only one ballot—a safety member ballot or a general member ballot. As
    mentioned, all members of the county retirement system are general members or safety
    members; a member may not retain both classifications at the same time.36 For retirement
    board elections, the Legislature has prescribed that general members elect the general
    member trustees, and that safety members elect the safety member trustee.37 Further, under
    Fresno County’s election regulations,38 “[i]f the Fresno County Clerk determines that
    multiple ballots have been received from any voter, none of their ballots will be opened
    and counted.”39 According to this regulation and state law, it appears the 56 votes from
    the 28 voters should have been excluded from the count, potentially deciding the three
    contests at issue, which had a margin between first and second place of 35 votes, one vote,
    and three votes.40
    Rando v. Harris (2014) 
    228 Cal.App.4th 868
    , 879; 95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at
    34
    p. 51.
    See Fresno County Clerk and Registrar of Voters, Off. Canvass of Elections, Bd. of
    35
    Retirement of the Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Assn. Election (Nov. 16, 2017)
    (“Canvass of Election”), p. 1 (where the county clerk states that these ballots were included
    in the canvass of votes), available at https://www.co.fresno.ca.us/home/showdocument?id
    =20291.
    36
    Gov. Code, §§ 31469.3, 31499.11, subd. (a), 31560; FCERA Handbook, supra, at p.
    8.
    37
    Gov. Code, § 31520.1, subd. (a).
    A county’s regulations for its retirement board must include provisions “[f]or the
    38
    election of officers . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 31526, subd. (a).)
    Fresno County Bd. of Supervisors, Res. 15-586 (Dec. 8, 2015) pp. 8-9; see also id. at
    39
    p. 8 (“multiple voted ballots that are in one official return envelope shall be rejected,”
    comma omitted).
    Cf. Elec. Code, § 16100, subd. (f) (a ground for an election contest is “[t]hat the
    40
    precinct board in conducting the election or in canvassing the returns, made errors
    sufficient to change the result of the election as to any person who has been declared
    elected”). We do not find it dispositive that Relators Nowak and Diaz, who ended in third
    place in their elections, finished behind the winners by 92 and 105 votes, respectively. To
    sue in quo warranto, there is no requirement that the defendant’s allegedly invalid title
    8
    18-202
    Secondly, Relators contend that Defendants Talford and Adams organized county
    employees to act as “ballot captains” by collecting and delivering ballots and reporting
    these completed ballots to their campaigns. In support of this contention, Relators offer
    detailed documentary evidence, including declarations, office e-mails, and footage from
    security cameras. This evidence allegedly shows people collecting other members’ ballots,
    one individual delivering “at least five handfuls of ballots in bulk,” and others delivering
    multiple ballots to the ballot drop-box at the clerk’s office.
    Relators further allege as part of their second claim that on October 17, 2017, before
    the election, “supervising Fresno County representatives” directed Defendant Talford not
    to use any county time or systems to conduct retirement-association business but that
    thereafter, Talford’s ballot captains continued their collection and delivery of ballots from
    other members during business hours. An alleged e-mail from Talford’s supervisor
    subsequently admonished Talford for collecting a ballot envelope from a county janitor as
    Talford stood outside another supervisor’s office on November 1, 2017.
    The Fresno County rules for collecting and returning the Board-election ballots
    specify that “[v]oted ballots shall be returned, each in its official return envelope, by United
    States Postal Service, over the counter, or by County messenger, to the Fresno County
    Clerk/Registrar of Voters Office not later than 5:00 p.m. on the date of the election.”41
    These local election regulations further dictate, “Bulk delivery of voted ballots, defined
    here as over the counter delivery of more than one ballot by a single individual, will not be
    accepted by the Fresno County Clerk/Registrar of Voters office.”42 Nothing recorded in
    the clerk’s official canvass of votes reflects that any ballots were rejected because they
    were part of a bulk delivery.43 If it is true that Defendants Talford and Adams directed the
    collection and delivery of voters’ ballots, in violation of election procedures, these ballots
    were more likely to have been cast in their favor, in which case the ballots may have
    affected the outcomes of the narrowly decided contests, potentially warranting Defendants’
    removal from the Board.44
    deprived the relator of office.
    41
    Fresno County Bd. of Supervisors, Res. 15-586, supra, at p. 8.
    42
    Ibid.
    43
    Canvass of Election, supra, at pp. 1-5.
    44
    Cf. Elec. Code, § 16100, subd. (d) (a ground for an election contest is “[t]hat illegal
    votes were cast”); Gooch v. Hendrix (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 266
    , 271, 279-284 (election contest
    granted based on a political association’s collection of absentee ballots, which rendered
    them “illegal votes” in violation of former Elections Code section 1013). These ballots
    9
    18-202
    Third, Relators claim that Defendants improperly used county resources to
    campaign for election. To support this claim, Relators submit witness declarations and
    other documentary evidence indicating that Defendants Talford and Adams, in addition to
    organizing ballot captains to collect and deliver ballots, stationed tables on county property
    and at a county health fair (where they gave away campaign flyers and pizza), lobbied
    county employees, and “allowed entry into a raffle in exchange for written commitment
    pledges to vote for Defendants Talford and Adams.” Regarding Defendant Robinson,
    Relators allege that his “supporters used County-issued computers and County-issued
    email addresses to actively campaign for Defendant Robinson during business hours,”
    utilizing mass e-mails in favor of him and against Relator Gomez. If this alleged conduct
    occurred, it likely ran afoul of laws regarding political activities in the course of public
    employment,45 and may also have had an impact on the close trustee elections.46
    also could have affected the outcome of Defendant Robinson’s election, which was decided
    by only three votes. (See Gooch v. Hendrix, 
    supra,
     5 Cal.4th at p. 282 [election vacated
    where “illegal votes cannot be attributed to any one candidate, but nevertheless ‘appear’
    sufficient in number or effect to have altered the outcome of the election”].)
    45
    See Gov. Code, §§ 3201 (“political activities of public employees are of significant
    statewide concern”), 3202 (this chapter applies to officers of local agencies), 3204 (no one
    seeking office in a local agency may attempt to use his or her authority to influence a person
    in securing a vote in exchange for consideration), 3206 (“No officer or employee of a local
    agency shall participate in political activities of any kind while in uniform”), 3207 (a local
    agency may establish regulations restricting officers and employees from engaging in
    political activity during working hours or on the premises of the local agency), 8314, subd.
    (a) (prohibiting the use of public resources for campaign activities unless authorized by
    law); Fresno County Ord. No. 3.08.110, §§ A.1 (a county officer or employee may not
    engage in any political activity in connection with any election during his or her hours of
    employment), A.2 (a county officer or employee may not engage in any political activity
    in connection with any election while on county premises or using county property); Fresno
    County Bd. of Supervisors, Admin. Policy No. 71 (“Government assets, including money,
    grant funds, paid staff time, equipment and supplies, facilities or any other government
    asset shall not be used for political campaigns of any type” and “Department Heads shall
    be held responsible for ensuring that government assets within their control are not used to
    advocate for or against any matter or person that has qualified for the ballot”).
    46
    Whether Defendants’ alleged campaign violations, standing alone, would invalidate
    Defendants’ title to office is another question that a court could resolve, if necessary. (Cf.
    Elec. Code, §§ 16100, subd. (c) [a ground for an election contest is “[t]hat the defendant
    has given to any elector or member of a precinct board any bribe or reward, or has offered
    any bribe or reward for the purpose of procuring his election”], 18521, subd. (a) [it is a
    10
    18-202
    We find that Relators’ factual allegations are well-supported and that their legal
    claims present viable grounds to attack the validity of Defendants’ elections. While we do
    not purport to resolve these allegations, or determine their legal effect,47 we believe
    Relators have presented substantial questions of fact or law that warrant a judicial
    resolution.
    3.     Would It Serve the Public Interest to Grant the Quo Warranto
    Application?
    Absent countervailing circumstances, we view the existence of a substantial
    question of fact or law as presenting a sufficient “public purpose” to warrant granting leave
    to sue in quo warranto.48 Here, too, it is uncontested that the practice of “ballot captains”
    is a longstanding one in elections to this retirement board; thus, judicially resolving the
    parties’ dispute would have the additional salutary effect of clarifying whether this practice
    is proper in future Board elections.49
    crime to give any gift or other consideration to a person before an election in exchange for
    the person’s agreement to vote for a particular candidate].) Here, we conclude only that in
    conjunction with the two claims of balloting error, Relators’ allegations of unlawful
    electioneering would merit presentation in quo warranto.
    47
    A quo warranto action or an election contest may result in overturning an election.
    (Salazar v. City of Montebello, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 957; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.,
    supra, at p. 84, fn. 1.) The traditional remedy in a quo warranto action against a public
    official is removal from office. (See People v. Craig (1937) 
    9 Cal.2d 615
    , 616;
    International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Oakland (1985) 
    174 Cal.App.3d 687
    , 695-
    696; 82 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 219, 222 (1999).) In an election contest, judicial remedies
    include recounting the ballots, annulling and setting aside the election, and even declaring
    the contestant elected. (Elec. Code, §§ 16601, 16603, 16701, 16702, 16703; Gooch v.
    Hendrix, 
    supra,
     5 Cal.4th at pp. 276, 282; Stebbins v. Gonzales (1992) 
    3 Cal.App.4th 1138
    ,
    1142-1143.) We express no view on which such remedies would be available or
    appropriate here. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Budd v. Holden, supra, 28 Cal. at p. 129 [in a
    quo warranto action disputing the legality of an election, the People “have a prerogative
    right to enforce their will when it has been so expressed (through the ballot-box) by
    excluding usurpers and putting in power such as have been chosen by themselves”].)
    48
    98 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 94, 101 (2015).
    49
    See 97 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 12, 19 (2014).
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    Defendants nonetheless assert, as a countervailing circumstance, that Relators
    should have availed themselves of another remedy afforded by local regulation. To wit,
    Defendants point to a county resolution that provides, “Prior to opening the official
    envelopes containing voted ballots, any candidate may challenge the validity of any ballot
    based on good cause, and in the event of any such challenge, the Fresno County
    Clerk/Registrar of Voters shall, consistent with these procedures, decide the validity of
    such ballot so challenged.”50
    In our estimation, however, none of the alleged errors raised in Relators’ application
    could have been raised under this local election procedure.51 Exhaustion of an
    administrative remedy is not required “where it would be futile to pursue such remedy.”52
    Relators could not have ascertained that 28 envelopes contained two ballots until after they
    were opened, not “[p]rior to opening.” Besides, in canvassing the election results, the clerk
    reported this double-voting yet found she did not have the “jurisdiction” to determine its
    “legal effect.”53 As to Relators’ other two claims—the bulk delivery of ballots and the
    improper use of county resources for campaigning—neither one could be tied to a
    particular ballot when the envelopes were opened, and thus it appears that the clerk could
    not have afforded any relief. Moreover, we see nothing suggesting this local procedure
    was intended to be exclusive or mandatory, such that it would preclude a post-election quo
    warranto challenge, particularly as the county resolution provides that a candidate “may”
    contest the ballot’s validity to the registrar, not that the candidate “shall” or “must” do so.54
    50
    Fresno County Bd. of Supervisors, Res. 15-586, supra, at p. 9.
    51
    We also reject Defendant Robinson’s argument that Relators should have sought
    relief via writ of mandamus or injunction rather than quo warranto. The California
    Supreme Court has explained that “questions concerning the appointment or election of
    public officers” must be pursued by “statutory remedy” or “quo warranto,” not by a suit
    for an injunction. (Barendt v. McCarthy (1911) 
    160 Cal. 680
    , 683, internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal has held that quo warranto, not mandamus, is a
    proper vehicle to try title to office based on an invalid election. (Bd. of Supervisors of
    Nevada County v. Super. Ct., Nevada County (1957) 
    150 Cal.App.2d 618
    , 619-620.)
    52
    Automotive Management Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1993) 
    20 Cal.App.4th 1002
    , 1015, internal quotation marks omitted.
    53
    Canvass of Election, supra, at p. 1.
    54
    See Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Super. Ct. (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 538
    , 542 (ordinarily,
    “may” is construed as permissive and “shall” as mandatory); In re Kler (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 1399
    , 1402 (“‘must’ is mandatory”).
    12
    18-202
    Having determined that quo warranto is an appropriate remedy here, and that
    substantial issues of fact and law warrant a judicial resolution of this election controversy,
    and that the public interest would be served by such a judicial resolution, we must still
    consider separately each proposed defendant’s individual circumstances. Although the
    factual allegations made in this application involve all three proposed defendants, “[w]e
    have repeatedly declined to grant leave to sue in a quo warranto proceeding where the
    alleged unlawful term of office has expired, or the question of unlawfulness has become
    moot by subsequent events.”55
    As to Defendants Talford and Robinson, a quo warranto action seeking their
    removal from office based on their disputed elections continues to be viable because the
    terms of office resulting from those elections do not conclude until December 31, 2020.56
    However, as to Defendant Adams, we are informed that the term resulting from his
    disputed election ended on December 31, 2018 (while the now-dismissed election contest
    appeal was pending). Because Defendant Adams’s challenged term has now expired, we
    must deny the quo warranto application as to him.
    Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Relators’ application for leave to sue
    in quo warranto is GRANTED as to Defendants Talford and Robinson and DENIED as to
    Defendant Adams.
    *****
    87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 176, 179 (2004), citing 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 30, 34-35 (2004),
    55
    84 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 206, 207 (2001), 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 63, 71 (1989), and 25
    Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 223, 224 (1955).
    56
    We note that a public official’s actions prior to his or her ouster by quo warranto
    remain valid and binding if done within the scope and apparent authority of office. (In re
    Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B (1964) 
    61 Cal.2d 21
    , 42;
    McPhee v. Reclamation Dist. No. 765 (1911) 
    161 Cal. 566
    , 572; 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.,
    supra, at p. 44, fn. 46; 82 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 223, fn. 3.)
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