In re M.P. CA4/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 5/17/21 In re M.P. CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    In re M.P., a Person Coming Under
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    D078246
    SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
    AND HUMAN SERVICES
    AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J519892)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    M.P.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    Marian Gaston, Judge. Affirmed.
    Linda B. Puertas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant M.P. (Mother).
    Office of County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel,
    and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    Mother appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her
    parental rights as to minor child, M.P. Mother asserts the juvenile court
    erred by concluding the beneficial parent-child bond exception set forth in
    Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not
    apply to preclude the termination of her parental rights. We find no error
    and affirm the judgment.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Juvenile Dependency Petition
    M.P. first came to the attention of the San Diego County Health and
    Human Services Agency (the Agency) in September 2019, when she was
    approximately 18 months old. The Agency received a report indicating
    Mother suffered severe complications from a surgical procedure and was in a
    coma, unable to care for M.P. The reporting party indicated M.P.’s father
    (Father) was also unable to care for M.P. due to mental health concerns and
    prolonged substance abuse. Father had several outbursts at the hospital and
    was seen laughing and talking to himself.
    The Agency spoke with a maternal great aunt at the hospital. She
    indicated Mother had recently separated from Father due to his drug use.
    She said Father was unemployed, did not have stable housing, and was
    diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia. While at the hospital,
    Father had told her demons were telling him what to do and he saw angels
    floating over Mother’s bed.
    Father admitted he used methamphetamine and marijuana regularly
    but denied the allegations regarding mental illness. Father said he asked
    M.P.’s godparents to care for her while he got himself “right” and got a job.
    1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
    Code.
    2
    Mother came out of the coma in early October but remained in the
    hospital with a tracheal tube and severe brain damage. At a Child and
    Family Team (CFT) meeting on October 5, 2018, Father agreed to move M.P.
    into the home of the maternal aunt, Alyssa C., until he could provide
    adequate care for her himself.
    Father also agreed to meet with a substance abuse specialist and
    attend regular Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings. Father called the
    substance abuse specialist but avoided meeting in person and failed to
    complete an initial assessment. He also failed to produce records of
    attendance at NA meetings.
    During a supervised visit on October 21, Father stated he had
    “something” for M.P. and took her out to his vehicle. Alyssa followed Father
    outside and observed him placing M.P. in the backseat of his car and buckling
    her in, without a proper child’s car seat. Father got into the car as if he
    planned to drive away with M.P. Alyssa opened the rear door and removed
    M.P. from the car. Father did not make any attempt to explain the incident.
    The Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of M.P. the
    following week. In the associated detention report, the Agency noted Father
    had not addressed his substance abuse issues and remained unable to care
    for M.P., but that there were growing concerns that he would try to remove
    her from Alyssa’s care. Alyssa stated she would not continue to care for M.P.
    without intervention of the juvenile court. The juvenile court found the
    Agency made a prima facie showing on the petition and detained M.P. with
    Alyssa.
    Six-Month Review Period
    By November, Mother was able to speak with the Agency social worker,
    although her speech was slow and labored. She denied having any
    3
    knowledge about Father’s drug use. She acknowledged Father “hears things”
    and indicated he had never sought treatment or taken medication to address
    his mental health. Mother was unable to walk, depended on others for her
    basic needs, and was not sure what the next steps were for her recovery. The
    hospital social worker said Mother was making progress but would not be
    released from the hospital until they could establish a safe discharge plan.
    She said Mother was often tearful and worried M.P. would forget her, but
    also had to be reminded regularly that Alyssa was caring for M.P.
    Mother’s relatives brought M.P. to visit her in the hospital. M.P. was
    initially upset by all of the tubes and machines but began to visit more often
    after the tubes were removed. Alyssa reported M.P. had some difficulty being
    separated from Mother but was beginning to adjust to her home and develop
    new routines.
    Father had several supervised visits each week but regularly missed
    visits or stayed for only 30 minutes. Alyssa initially supervised Father’s
    visits but they were later moved to the child welfare services office due to
    safety concerns.
    Mother was discharged from the hospital in December. She was
    diagnosed with impaired short-term memory, impaired cognition, emotional
    lability, and decreased mobility. She continued to be dependent on others
    and required extensive additional therapy. Mother’s relatives indicated she
    was “totally different” and spent a lot of time crying. In addition, Mother no
    longer remembered her plans to divorce Father, who, himself, had not made
    efforts to check in on M.P. and now seemed preoccupied with Mother.
    Mother moved in with family members as she was unable to care for
    herself. The Agency allowed M.P. and Mother to have an extended holiday
    visit at the relatives’ home. Mother’s sister reported Mother stayed in bed
    4
    much of the time and refused to care for M.P. She said Mother continued to
    call Father. At one point, Father arrived at the home and Mother wanted to
    leave with him, despite M.P. being there. The caregivers told Mother she
    would not get M.P. back if she left with Father and Mother said she did not
    care.
    On January 22, 2019, the juvenile court made true findings on the
    petition. The court continued the placement with Alyssa and ordered that
    the Agency provide services to Mother.
    Mother remained in active recovery and still had a number of
    challenges, including being unable to speak above a whisper and continuing
    to lose weight and muscle mass. She continued to live with relatives, and
    M.P. continued to live with Alyssa but had regular overnight visits in the
    relatives’ home with Mother. Father had minimal contact with the Agency
    and M.P. over the following several months. He was arrested in June for
    possession of a controlled substance and burglary tools, among other charges.
    In a status review report submitted before the 6-month review hearing
    on July 23, 2019, the Agency noted M.P. was sometimes aggressive with
    Mother. She pushed Mother, causing her to fall, and hit Mother during
    diaper changes. The Agency indicated it would like to see Mother taking
    more of a parental role during the visits and recommended in home support
    services. The Agency also raised concerns that Mother continued to pursue a
    relationship with Father, who had not yet addressed his mental health or
    substance abuse issues. The Agency noted Mother had complied with her
    primary goal of focusing on her health and attending all medical
    appointments, but indicated it remained unclear whether Mother would be
    able to safely parent M.P.
    5
    A court appointed special advocate (CASA) indicated M.P. enjoyed
    playing with the family members during visits, Mother had “slowly been
    getting more interactive with M.P.,” and M.P. missed Mother after the visits.
    She noted M.P. had demonstrated some aggressive behaviors, but indicated
    she was nevertheless thriving in her placement with Alyssa.
    At the six-month review hearing in July 2019, the Agency
    recommended that M.P. remain in her current placement with Alyssa and
    that the family receive an additional six months of services. The juvenile
    court adopted the Agency’s recommendation.2 In addition, the court granted
    the Agency discretion to allow Mother unsupervised and overnight visits.
    12-month Review Period
    In the following months, Mother continued to struggle interacting with
    M.P. In August, Mother’s cousin reported Mother ignored M.P. when she
    asked to go outside during a visit. The cousin encouraged Mother to help
    M.P. get her shoes on to go outside and Mother ignored the cousin as well.
    M.P. then fell and hit her chin on the floor. She ran to Mother for comfort,
    but Mother ignored her, and she went to the cousin instead. The cousin told
    Mother she should get off her phone to spend time with her daughter, and
    Mother responded by yelling expletives, waving her middle fingers, and
    throwing her phone at the cousin.
    Mother then indicated she planned to leave, so the cousin called Alyssa
    to pick up M.P. Mother became upset, said M.P. was leaving with her, and
    grabbed M.P. by the wrist. The cousin told Mother to let M.P. go before she
    hurt her, and Mother let go but then picked M.P. up. Mother was crying
    2     It is unclear from the orders whether the court ordered reunification
    services for both parents or just Mother. Regardless, Father did not
    participate in the case, and thus did not receive services, and is not a party to
    this appeal.
    6
    hysterically, and M.P. began to cry as well. The family members had to
    forcibly remove M.P. from Mother. Mother then began swinging her fists at
    the cousin and the cousin pushed her away, causing Mother to fall. The
    cousin left the house and returned M.P. to Alyssa. M.P. was able to verbalize
    that the cousin and Mother were fighting, and the cousin expressed concern
    the incident would add to the anger and aggression M.P. was already
    experiencing.
    Mother underwent further testing in September 2019 and the doctor
    indicated her brain had shrunk due to a lack of oxygen and there was nothing
    more they could do to improve her condition. The associated report from the
    physician indicated Mother suffered from dementia related to cerebral anoxia
    and was not capable of making meaningful decisions. Around the same time,
    Mother was released from physical therapy because she refused to do the
    recommended exercises at home.
    By October, Mother had moved out of the family home due to conflict
    between her and the relatives and was residing in a hotel. Mother gave the
    Agency social worker Father’s mailing address as her own and the family
    indicated Mother and Father were staying together. Mother’s visits became
    less frequent as she was no longer in the home with relatives. When Mother
    did visit with M.P., she did not play with her or meet her needs, and often
    ignored her altogether.
    The Agency referred Mother to in home services through Intensive
    Family Preservation Program (IFPP). A social worker from IFPP completed
    an assessment. Mother stated she wanted to care for M.P. but could not
    explain how she would be able to carry out basic tasks like cooking or bathing
    M.P. Mother said she was still in contact with Father and thought it would
    help the dependency case if she got back together with him. IFPP ultimately
    7
    determined Mother was not appropriate for services as it did not appear
    reunification was possible in the near term, even with the help of IFPP.
    In a status report dated October 22, 2019, the Agency said it could not
    recommend returning M.P. to Mother’s care. The Agency explained Mother
    did not have the physical skills or mental capacity to provide for M.P. on a
    daily basis. In addition, Mother continued to pursue a relationship with
    Father and suggested she would rely on him to help care for M.P., but that
    was not a viable option as Father had not addressed his substance abuse or
    made himself available to the Agency.
    As Mother was no longer living with relatives, her overnight visits were
    suspended, and she began visiting with M.P. twice a week at restaurants or a
    relative’s home. At one of the restaurant visits, Mother forgot how to walk
    while in the parking lot and a stranger ended up carrying her into the
    restaurant. In the following months, Mother missed a number of visits and
    continued to pay little attention to M.P. during visits she did attend.
    In November, the San Diego Police Department conducted a welfare
    check after Father left Mother alone outside a welfare office after an
    argument. Father eventually returned and was arrested on an outstanding
    warrant. The officer called Mother’s sister and she came to take Mother back
    to the family home. When she arrived, Mother had the keys to the car she
    and Father had reportedly been living in and refused to let go of them. The
    aunt agreed to drive the car home but asked the police officers to search it
    first. The police found “a knife and a crystal meth pipe” in the car.
    In an addendum report dated January 10, 2020, the Agency
    recommended the juvenile court terminate reunification services. After a
    hearing that same day, the juvenile court accepted the Agency’s
    8
    recommendation, terminated services for Mother and Father, and set a
    section 366.26 permanency hearing.
    Section 366.26 Hearing
    Mother had sporadic visits with M.P. over the next two months. On
    February 23, Mother moved out of her relatives’ home once again. Mother
    said she would resume in-person visits with M.P. once she had a permanent
    address and, in the meantime, would continue with phone and video visits.
    The visits generally lasted between two and 30 minutes. M.P. often said she
    did not want to participate, and that she was “bored,” “frustrated,” and “[did]
    not want to talk.” At times, she would set the phone down and walk away, or
    would end the call early herself.
    An Agency social worker observed a video visit in April. During the
    call, Mother continued to call M.P. by her first and middle name despite M.P.
    asking her not to and becoming visibly upset. Eventually, M.P. laid on the
    ground and refused to engage further with Mother.
    Around the same time, the social worker conducted a “Permanency
    House” activity with M.P. She told M.P. they were going to make her
    “forever” home and asked who she would want to live with if she could live
    with anyone forever. M.P. stated she wanted to live with Alyssa and no one
    else. The social worker asked if she wanted anyone to visit and M.P.
    responded, “Elsa” and “Moana.” The social worker asked if Mother and
    Father could visit and M.P. said “yes”. She later stated, “I want everyone to
    visit.”
    In a section 366.26 report dated May 5, 2020, the Agency concluded
    M.P. was both specifically and generally adoptable. Her relative caretaker
    Alyssa wanted to adopt her and expressed she would prefer adoption to
    guardianship. In addition, M.P. was happy, healthy, and meeting all
    9
    developmental milestones. The Agency noted Mother did maintain visitation
    with M.P. throughout the dependency, but the consistency of the visits had
    varied. In addition, Mother was often disengaged during the visits and relied
    on the help of family members to care for M.P. Father continued to struggle
    with substance abuse and Mother continued to pursue a relationship with
    him. Accordingly, the Agency concluded the benefits of adoption outweighed
    any possible detriment caused by the severance of Mother’s and Father’s
    parental rights.
    The permanency hearing was continued several times and Mother and
    Father continued to have video visits with M.P. in the meantime. The
    Agency received reports indicating Mother was living in a van with Father
    and had refused a hotel voucher because Father could not live with her in the
    hotel. M.P. often said she did not want to talk to Mother and covered her face
    or walked away during video visits. Alyssa tried to convince M.P. to
    participate and at times offered her rewards. During a visit in October,
    Mother appeared to be talking to Father and M.P. said, “Mom, you are not
    watching me,” and then stopped interacting with Mother. M.P. was often
    upset after the visits; she acted out, had trouble sleeping, and had increased
    restroom accidents.
    Despite these issues, M.P. continued to thrive in Alyssa’s care. The
    Agency continued to recommend the juvenile court terminate Mother’s and
    Father’s parental rights to allow for adoption.
    At the section 366.26 hearing on October 29, 2020, Mother asserted the
    court should not terminate her parental rights because there was a
    significant parent-child bond that would substantially outweigh the benefits
    of adoption. Counsel argued Mother had done everything in her power to
    reunify, that M.P. still referred to her as “mommy”, and that the issues with
    10
    visitation were largely the result of virtual visits. The juvenile court
    concluded Mother had visited regularly and it was clear she loved M.P., but
    the visits had never moved beyond short supervised visits and her
    relationship with M.P. was not a parent-child relationship under the law.
    The court therefore terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and
    granted prospective adoptive parent status to Alyssa.
    Mother appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    Mother asserts the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental
    rights because the court should have applied the beneficial parental
    relationship exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
    1. Applicable Law
    Once the juvenile court terminates reunification services in a
    dependency proceeding, the focus shifts from preserving the family to
    promoting the best interests of the child, including the child’s interest in a
    stable, permanent placement. (In re Fernando M. (2006) 
    138 Cal.App.4th 529
    , 534 (Fernando M.); In re Autumn H. (1994) 
    27 Cal.App.4th 567
    , 573
    (Autumn H.).)
    At this point, “the juvenile court has three options: (1) to terminate
    parental rights and order adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal
    guardian for the dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-
    term foster care.” (Fernando M., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Of those
    options, adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature, even
    though it requires termination of the natural parents’ legal rights to the
    child. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) Accordingly, if the
    juvenile court finds a caregiver is willing and able to adopt the child, the
    court must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds the
    11
    termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of
    the exceptions enumerated in the statute. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-
    (vi); Autumn H., at p. 573.)
    Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides one such exception to
    the preference for adoption where “[t]he parents have maintained regular
    visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
    continuing the relationship.” Courts have interpreted this exception as
    requiring a parent-child relationship that “promotes the well-being of the
    child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a
    permanent home.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 575.) “In other
    words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural
    parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and
    the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural
    parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
    emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the
    preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
    terminated.” (Ibid.)
    A parent claiming the parental relationship exception has the burden of
    establishing it applies and must prove the child has a significant and positive
    emotional attachment to the parent. (In re T.S. (2009) 
    175 Cal.App.4th 1031
    ,
    1039; In re C.F. (2011) 
    193 Cal.App.4th 549
    , 555 (C.F.).) Because a selection
    and implementation hearing occurs “after the court has repeatedly found the
    parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case
    that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s
    preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 
    78 Cal.App.4th 1339
    , 1350 (Jasmine D.).)
    12
    The parent asserting the exception will not meet his or her burden by
    showing the existence of a “friendly and loving relationship,” an emotional
    bond with the child, or pleasant, even frequent, visits. (In re J.C. (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 503
    , 529 (In re J.C.); C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555; In re
    Beatrice M. (1994) 
    29 Cal.App.4th 1411
    , 1418-1419; In re L.S. (2014) 
    230 Cal.App.4th 1183
    , 1200 [“To avoid termination of parental rights, it is not
    enough to show that a parent-child bond exists”].) Rather, there must be a
    parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional
    attachment from the child to parent that if severed would result in harm to
    the child. (C.F., at p. 555; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 
    52 Cal.App.4th 318
    , 324;
    see also In re J.C., at p. 529 [observing that interaction between a natural
    parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child and
    for the exception to apply, “ ‘a parental relationship is necessary’ ” ].)
    We apply a hybrid standard of review on appeal. (In re J.C., supra, 226
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) We review the juvenile court’s findings
    regarding the existence of a beneficial parental relationship for substantial
    evidence and review the juvenile court’s determination as to whether there is
    a compelling reason for concluding the termination of parental rights would
    be detrimental to the child for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; In re Anthony B.
    (2015) 
    239 Cal.App.4th 389
    , 395; see also Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th
    at p. 1351 [practical difference between pure substantial evidence standard of
    review and hybrid standard of review is insignificant].)
    2. Analysis
    Mother has not met her burden to establish a beneficial parent-child
    relationship with M.P. sufficient to outweigh the benefits of adoption.
    M.P. was removed from Mother’s care when she was approximately 18
    months old. Although it does appear Mother played a parental role in M.P.’s
    13
    life prior to the removal, the unfortunate reality is that Mother has been
    unable to do so since.
    Mother visited M.P. throughout the dependency, but the consistency
    and length of the visits decreased over time. Early on, when M.P. was still
    living with relatives, she had frequent visits with M.P., including regular
    overnight visits. However, Mother was often disengaged during the visits
    and relied on the help of family members to care for M.P. The Agency
    indicated it would like to see Mother taking more of a parental role during
    the visits, but that did not occur, even when M.P. specifically sought out
    Mother for assistance or comfort.
    When Mother began having conflict with her family members, visits
    transitioned to locations outside the home. Mother often missed visits and
    continued to pay little attention to M.P. during visits she did attend. By the
    time of the section 366.26 hearing, Mother did not appear to have stable
    housing and had been visiting with M.P. primarily over video for several
    months. M.P. often said she did not want to talk to Mother and covered her
    face or walked away during video visits, despite Alyssa offering her rewards
    for participating. She was not upset when the visits ended and, instead,
    often said she was done or asked to end the visits after only a short period of
    time. After the visits, M.P. acted out, had trouble sleeping, and had
    increased restroom accidents.
    Meanwhile, M.P. was in a stable placement with a relative, Alyssa, and
    was thriving in that placement. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing,
    M.P. had been living with Alyssa for approximately two years, and more than
    half of her life. She was happy, healthy, and meeting her developmental
    milestones. Alyssa indicated she wanted to adopt M.P. and M.P. indicated
    she wanted her forever home to be with Alyssa. M.P. stated Mother could
    14
    visit, when prompted by the social worker, but did not express a desire for
    Mother to live in her permanent home with her.3
    Accordingly, the Agency concluded the benefits of adoption outweighed
    any possible detriment caused by the severance of Mother’s and Father’s
    parental rights. The juvenile court agreed with the Agency’s assessment and
    concluded Mother’s relationship with M.P. was not a parental relationship
    sufficient to thwart the preference for adoption. (See Autumn H., supra, 27
    Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding and
    the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the relationship did not
    outweigh the benefits of adoption. (See In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 530-531.)
    Mother asserts this case is like In re S.B. (2008) 
    164 Cal.App.4th 289
    (S.B.), one of the few cases in which an appellate court has determined the
    juvenile court should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship
    exception to preclude adoption. In S.B., the court noted there were
    exceptional circumstances, in part because father suffered a medical
    condition, post-traumatic stress disorder, that was beyond his control but
    impaired his ability to care for S.B. (Id. at p. 294.) Similarly, here, Mother’s
    ability to care for M.P. has been severely affected by a medical condition that
    is largely beyond her control. However, the parent-child relationship at issue
    in S.B. was dramatically different than the relationship at issue here.
    The father in S.B. was the primary caregiver to S.B. for three years
    prior to the dependency case and maintained frequent loving visits with S.B.
    throughout the case. (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) As a result,
    3     Mother asserts M.P. included her in the drawing of the forever home
    but, consistent with the social worker’s description of the discussion
    surrounding the picture, it appears M.P. drew Mother outside the home,
    along with the other individuals M.P. said could visit.
    15
    the two shared “ ‘an emotionally significant relationship.’ ” (Ibid.) During
    visits, S.B. would sit on her father’s lap, ask to be picked up, and whisper and
    joke with him. (Ibid.) She was upset when visits ended, did not want to
    leave, and told her father she wished she lived with him. (Ibid.) An expert
    conducted a bonding study and indicated the bond between S.B. and her
    father was “fairly strong”. (Id. at p. 295.) Although S.B. had a “primary
    attachment” to her relative caregiver, the court determined severing the bond
    between S.B. and her father would be greatly detrimental to S.B. (Id. at
    pp. 299-300.)
    By contrast here, Mother had a difficult time engaging with M.P.
    throughout the case, and her visits became shorter and less frequent as the
    case progressed. When visits did occur, M.P. often refused to participate,
    walked away, or asked to end the visit early. Mother suggests this was
    because the visits were primarily over video for the last several months of the
    case, but it was Mother that chose to continue with video visits. Regardless,
    even when M.P. did have in-person visits with Mother, Mother would often
    ignore her and, in one exemplary case, did not make any effort to comfort her
    when she fell, causing M.P. to turn to another relative instead. Although
    M.P. referred to Mother as “mommy”, she did not express any desire to live
    with her and, instead, said that she wanted her forever home to be with
    Alyssa and no one else. She agreed that Mother could visit the home, but
    only upon prompting from the social worker. Accordingly, unlike the
    situation in S.B., there was no indication M.P. would suffer great detriment
    as a result of severing the relationship with Mother.
    Mother asserts the court cannot rely on the promise of a caregiver to
    continue visitation, and that, here, the contentious familial relationships
    suggest continued visitation may not occur. (See S.B., supra, 164
    16
    Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) However, there is no indication the juvenile court
    relied on the promise of continued visitation in reaching its conclusion.
    Instead, the court determined Mother’s relationship with M.P. did not rise to
    the level of a beneficial parental relationship, based largely on the lack of
    engagement that occurred during the visits Mother did have. As discussed,
    substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion.
    In addition, Mother asserts none of the cases the Agency relies upon
    arise from a situation in which the child became a dependent of the juvenile
    court due to a situation outside the control of the parent. Similarly, Mother
    asserts her poor decision making and inability to connect with M.P. were
    largely the result of her medical condition and, thus, not within her control.
    While the circumstances of removal may be relevant to the bond the child
    had with the parent at the outset of the case, the beneficial parent-child
    relationship exception focuses on the nature and quality of the actual bond
    that does or does not exist between the parent and child at the time of the
    section 366.26 hearing. (See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
    As the juvenile court acknowledged, the circumstances of this case are
    unfortunate, but it nevertheless remains that there was not a beneficial
    parent-child bond between Mother and M.P. at the time of the section 366.26
    hearing that was sufficient to overcome the preference for adoption.
    17
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HALLER, J.
    AARON, J.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D078246

Filed Date: 5/17/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2021