People v. Stewart CA4/2 ( 2021 )


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  •          Filed 5/21/21 P. v. Stewart CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E074763
    v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF10003595)
    THURSTON STEWART IV,                                                    OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
    Affirmed with directions.
    Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Christopher P.
    Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    1
    Defendant and appellant, Thurston Stewart IV, filed a petition for resentencing
    pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95,1 which the court denied. Defendant contends
    the court erred in denying his petition on the grounds that section 1170.95 does not apply
    to those convicted of attempted murder. We affirm.
    I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On July 13, 2011, the People charged defendant by amended felony complaint
    with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), two counts of robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 3),
    voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 4), and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
    subd. (a); count 5). The People additionally alleged that defendant had been engaged in
    the commission of an attempted robbery when he committed the count 1 offense.
    (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)
    On July 13, 2011, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant pled guilty to two
    counts of robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 3), voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a);
    count 4), and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 5). Defendant also
    admitted a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of the count 4 offense.
    (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) In return, the remaining count and allegation were dismissed.
    On June 11, 2012, the court sentenced defendant to the agreed upon term of 16 years four
    months of imprisonment.
    On January 30, 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
    section 1170.95. At the hearing on defendant’s petition, the People moved to dismiss
    1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    defendant’s petition because defendant had been convicted of attempted murder and
    voluntary manslaughter, not murder. The court denied the petition.2
    II. DISCUSSION
    Defendant contends the court erred in denying his petition on the grounds that
    section 1170.95 does not apply to those convicted of attempted murder. We disagree.
    “Senate Bill 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] narrowed the scope of liability for first
    and second degree murder by altering the doctrines that had allowed convictions for those
    offenses in the absence of malice. Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 made that
    change by amending sections 188 and 189 to restrict the scope of first degree felony
    murder and to eliminate murder liability based on the natural and probable consequences
    doctrine.” (People v. Sanchez (2020) 
    48 Cal.App.5th 914
    , 917.)
    “The Legislature also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code. That provision
    creates a procedure for offenders previously convicted of felony murder or murder under
    a natural and probable consequences theory to obtain the benefits of these changes
    retrospectively. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief
    under section 1170.95, subdivision (a), the petitioner is entitled to receive ‘a hearing to
    determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and
    2  The reporter’s transcript reflects that the trial court denied the petition. The
    minute order indicates the court dismissed the petition. We shall direct the court to
    correct its minute order. (See People v. Jones (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 1
    , 89 [The minute order
    “‘does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or
    modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.’”].) The reviewing court has the
    authority to correct clerical errors in the minute order. (People v. Contreras (2009)
    
    177 Cal.App.4th 1296
    , 1300, fn. 3.)
    3
    resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner
    had not been previously . . . sentenced.’” (People v. Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 917.)
    “By its plain language, section 1170.95 . . . makes resentencing relief available
    only to qualifying persons convicted of murder.” (People v. Sanchez, supra,
    48 Cal.App.5th at p. 918; accord People v. Larios (2019) 
    42 Cal.App.5th 956
    , 970,
    review granted Feb. 26, 2020, S259983 [“[T]he relief provided in section 1170.95 is
    limited to certain murder convictions and excludes all other convictions, including a
    conviction for attempted murder.”]; accord People v. Lopez (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 1087
    ,
    1105, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 [“The plain language meaning of Senate
    Bill 1437 as excluding any relief for individuals convicted of attempted murder is fully
    supported by its legislative history.”]; People v. Munoz (2019) 
    39 Cal.App.5th 738
    , 753,
    review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234 [“Senate Bill 1437 does not apply to attempted
    murder convictions.”]; People v. Medrano (2019) 
    42 Cal.App.5th 1001
    , 1018, review
    granted Mar. 11, 2020, S259948 [“[T]he relief provided in section 1170.95 is limited to
    certain murder convictions and excludes all other convictions, including a conviction for
    attempted murder.”]; People v. Dennis (2020) 
    47 Cal.App.5th 838
    , 841, review granted
    July 29, 2020, S262184 [“Senate Bill 1437 . . . reaches the crime of murder but has no
    application to attempted murder.”]; accord People v. Love (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 273
    ,
    286, review granted Dec. 16, 2020, S265445 [“In our view, Senate Bill 1437’s legislative
    history pretty clearly establishes that its amendments apply to the crime of murder and to
    that crime alone.”]; People v. Alaybue (2020) 
    51 Cal.App.5th 207
    , 223 [“Senate Bill 1437
    4
    does not apply to attempted murder.”]; accord People v. Harris (2021) 
    60 Cal.App.5th 557
    , 566, review granted Apr. 21, 2021, S267529 [“[R]elief under section 1170.95 is not
    available to those convicted of attempted murder.”].) We agree with the previous panels
    of this court in People v. Sanchez, supra, 
    48 Cal.App.5th 914
     and People v. Harris that
    the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief to those convicted of murder; no
    reference to attempted murder appears in section 1170.95. Thus, the court properly
    denied defendant’s section 1170.95 petition because defendant had been convicted of
    attempted murder, not murder.
    Three courts have held that Senate Bill No. 1437 does apply to those convicted of
    attempted murder but only on direct appeal from the judgment: “[W]e conclude Senate
    Bill 1437 precludes any imposition of vicarious liability under the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine if the charged offense requires malice aforethought. Because
    malice cannot be imputed to a defendant who aids and abets a target offense without the
    intent to kill, the natural and probable consequences doctrine is no longer a viable theory
    of accomplice liability for attempted murder.” (People v. Medrano, supra,
    42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013; accord People v. Larios, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 968
    [“Senate Bill 1437’s abrogation of the natural and probable consequences doctrine as
    stated in section 188, subdivision (a)(3) necessarily applies to attempted murder.”];
    accord People v. Sanchez (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 637
    , 644, review granted June 10, 2020,
    S261768 [“[W]e conclude Senate Bill No. 1437 abrogates the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine in attempted murder prosecutions.”].) However, “the section
    1170.95 petitioning procedure does not apply to defendants for their convictions of
    5
    attempted murder . . . .” (Medrano, at p. 1008; accord Larios, at p. 961 [“[S]ection
    1170.95 provides no relief for the crime of attempted murder.”]; accord People v.
    Sanchez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 644 [The conclusion that “Senate Bill No. 1437
    abrogates the natural and probable consequences doctrine in attempted murder
    prosecutions . . . applies retroactively on direct appeal.”]) Thus, even if we assumed that
    Senate Bill No. 1437 applied to convictions for attempted murder, the petitioning and
    resentencing procedures of section 1170.95 do not. Therefore, because defendant’s
    appeal is from the denial of a section 1170.95 petition and not from the judgment, he is
    not entitled to any relief. The court properly denied his section 1170.95 petition.
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to modify its February 14,
    2020, minute order to reflect that it denied, rather than dismissed, defendant’s petition for
    resentencing.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    McKINSTER
    Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    FIELDS
    J.
    MENETREZ
    J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E074763

Filed Date: 5/21/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/21/2021