Lucas v. United States ( 2018 )


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  •                                      ORIGINAL
    Jfn tbe Wniteb             ~tate%    C!Court of jfeberal C!Claim%
    No. 17-1838C
    (Filed: April 16, 2018)                      FILED
    APR 1 6 2018
    )
    TRACEY LUCAS,                                                                U.S. COURT OF
    )
    FEDERAL CLAIMS
    )
    Plaintiff,               ) Motion to Dismiss, RCFC
    ) 12(b)(l); Statute of Limitations,
    V.                                            ) Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
    )
    THE UNITED STATES,                            )
    )
    Defendant.               )
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
    Tracey Lucas, Washington, DC, prose.
    Eric J. Singley, Trial Attorney, with whom were Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Allison Kidd-Miller, Assistant
    Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.
    OPINION
    CAMPBELL-SMITH, Judge.
    Before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims
    (RCFC), ECF No. 7. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
    I.     Background
    In the mid-1980s, plaintiff worked as a clerk-typist for the Department of Justice.
    See ECF No. 1 at 1. In her complaint, she alleges that she was sexually assaulted in the
    workplace in February 1985. See 
    id. Following the
    incident, she attempted to file a
    complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but believes
    the complaint was never submitted to the agency. See 
    id. at 2.
    Thereafter, plaintiff
    alleges that she was reassigned to a different position, but given no official duties, in
    retaliation for complaining. See 
    id. II. Legal
    Standards
    Pursuant to the Tucker Act, this court has the limited jurisdiction to consider "any
    claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
    Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
    contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
    sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2012). To invoke the court's jurisdiction,
    plaintiffs must show that their claims are based upon the Constitution, a statute, or a
    regulation that "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
    Government for the damages sustained." United States v. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216-17
    (1983) (quoting United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 400 (1976)). In addition, claims
    in this court must be brought within six years of accrual, or the court is without
    jurisdiction to hear them. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 
    529 F.3d 1380
    , 1384 (Fed.
    Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 130
    , 133-39 (2008)).
    Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this court's subject matter jurisdiction by
    a preponderance of the evidence. See Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In reviewing plaintiffs allegations in support of
    jurisdiction, the court must presume all undisputed facts are true and construe all
    reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
    416 U.S. 232
    , 236 (1974),
    abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 814-15 (1982);
    
    Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 747
    (citations omitted). If the court determines that it lacks subject
    matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint. See RCFC 12(h)(3).
    III.   Analysis
    In its motion to dismiss, defendant argues that the court lacks jurisdiction to
    consider plaintiffs complaint for two reasons: (I) the allegations sound in tort, and (2)
    the claim accrued more than six years before the complaint was filed. See ECF No.7 at
    2-3. Plaintiffs complaint does not expressly identify the statute or constitutional
    provision on which she bases her claim for relief. See ECF No. 1. Despite the fact that
    the precise nature of plaintiffs claim is not clear, even assuming she bases her claim on a
    theory that would allow this court's review, the operative facts plainly fall outside the
    statute of limitations.
    The alleged assault and subsequent retaliation for her decision to file an EEOC
    complaint occurred in 1985. See 
    id. at 1-2.
    The statute of limitations, therefore, ran six
    years later, in 1991. In her reply, plaintiff indicates that she filed the instant complaint
    more than thirty years after the alleged offenses "due to the nature of the situation and the
    acknowledgement of this behavior now being addressed in society." ECF No. 11 at 2.
    The court accepts plaintiffs allegations as true, as it must at this stage in the litigation.
    2
    Certainly the conduct she describes is at best concerning and at worst illegal. However
    strong the merits of her allegations, the court simply lacks authority to consider her
    claims.
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims in
    plaintiffs complaint. Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED,
    pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l) and RCFC 12(h)(3). The clerk's office is directed to ENTER
    final judgment DISMISSING plaintiffs complaint without prejudice.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    3