United States v. Daniel Cuellar Castro , 632 F. App'x 539 ( 2015 )


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  •             Case: 15-11496    Date Filed: 11/19/2015     Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-11496
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00090-LC-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DANIEL CUELLAR CASTRO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 19, 2015)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-11496    Date Filed: 11/19/2015   Page: 2 of 6
    Daniel Cuellar Castro appeals his 12-month sentence, which constituted a
    variance above the advisory guideline range, following his conviction for illegal
    re-entry. Mr. Castro argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
    unreasonable. Upon review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we disagree, and
    therefore affirm.
    I
    Mr. Castro pled guilty to one count of illegal re-entry, in violation of 8
    U.S.C. § 1326(a). According to the pre-sentence report this was not his first such
    violation.
    He initially entered the United States in 1994 on a visa but was deported in
    2002 after the visa was cancelled. Mr. Castro first re-entered the United States on
    June 8, 2007, but was caught at the Houston airport and again deported. On June
    12, 2007, he was apprehended while attempting to re-enter a second time. He pled
    guilty at that time to a charge of illegal re-entry, was sentenced to unsupervised
    probation, and deported. Mr. Castro again re-entered without permission, and was
    arrested, in November of 2008. The case was no-prossed. On November 12, 2012,
    Mr. Castro was arrested in the U.S. Virgin Islands and deported to Mexico. His
    next re-entry, sometime between December of 2012 and November of 2013, led to
    the instant conviction.
    2
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    Mr. Castro was assigned a base offense level of 8 under U.S.S.G § 2L1.2(a),
    which was reduced by 2 levels for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal
    history category of I, his resulting advisory guideline range was 0-6 months. The
    district court varied upward and imposed a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
    In doing so, the court stated that it considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
    3553(a). The court noted that Mr. Castro was a repeat offender, explained that his
    conduct was a burden on the courts, and stated that it believed the sentence was
    necessary to punish Mr. Castro and deter further criminal conduct. See D.E. 44 at
    9–10 (sentencing transcript).
    II
    We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Moran, 
    778 F.3d 942
    , 982 (11th Cir. 2015). The party challenging the
    sentence has the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. 
    Id. In reviewing
    the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the district court
    committed no significant procedural error and then examine whether the sentence
    is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51(2007).
    A
    We find no procedural error. The district court correctly calculated the
    advisory guideline range and considered the § 3553(a) factors. On this record, the
    3
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    district court’s statement that it considered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient. See
    United States v. Owens, 
    464 F.3d 1252
    , 1254 (11th Cir. 2006). Although Mr.
    Castro argues that the district court focused solely on deterrence, our review of the
    record shows that the court considered other relevant factors as well. And the
    weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion
    of the district court. See United States v. Garza–Mendez, 
    735 F.3d 1284
    , 1290
    (11th Cir. 2013). See also United States v. Shaw, 
    560 F.3d 1230
    , 1237 (11th Cir.
    2009) (explaining that although a district court must evaluate each of the § 3553(a)
    factors, it is permitted to assign different weight to each of the relevant factors).
    Moreover, the district court did not err in assigning significant weight to Mr.
    Castro’s past conduct. Mr. Castro had, in fact, illegally entered the United States
    various times and had been deported four times. When the district court remarked
    that Mr. Castro’s actions were “four times greater than that of the norm[al
    offender],” it was simply pointing out, correctly, that Mr. Castro is a recidivist.
    B
    We also conclude that Mr. Castro’s sentence is not substantively
    unreasonable. A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “does not achieve the
    purposes of sentencing stated in § 3553(a).” United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    ,
    1191 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).         In addition, a sentence may be
    substantively unreasonable if a district court unjustifiably relied on any one §
    4
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    3553(a) factor, failed to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, selected the sentence
    arbitrarily, or based the sentence on impermissible factors. 
    Id. at 1191–92.
    If a district court imposes a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range, it
    should explain why the variance is appropriate. 
    Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238
    . The
    district court should justify the variance with reasons compelling enough to support
    the sentence.     
    Id. The justifications
    must be “complete enough to allow
    meaningful appellate review.”        
    Id. We have
    explained, however, that
    “extraordinary justifications” are not required to support a variance above the
    advisory guideline range. See 
    Id. Here, considering
    the § 3553(a) factors, the district court expressed concern
    over the burden that Mr. Castro’s repeated and similar illegal conduct placed on
    the courts, and stated that, based on this previous conduct, a 12-month sentence
    was necessary to punish and deter Mr. Castro. As noted above, we conclude that
    the district court did not rely exclusively on any one factor. Nor was the district
    court unjustified in emphasizing the need for deterrence given that Mr. Castro had
    repeatedly flouted the law. We also note that Mr. Castro’s sentence is well within
    the two-year statutory maximum, which is some indication that the sentence is
    reasonable. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
    III
    5
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    Mr. Castro’s 12-month sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively
    unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-11496

Citation Numbers: 632 F. App'x 539

Filed Date: 11/19/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023