Embroidery Industries v. ROC Fashion CA4/2 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 5/2/14 Embroidery Industries v. ROC Fashion CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
    publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    EMBROIDERY INDUSTRIES, INC.,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                         E057767
    v.                                                                        (Super.Ct.No. CIVRS1206905)
    ROC FASHION, LLC et al.,                                                  OPINION
    Defendants and Respondents.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gilbert G. Ochoa,
    Judge. Dismissed.
    Century City Law Group and Robin Mashal for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
    Embroidery Industries, Inc. (Embroidery) applied for a right to attach order and
    petitioned for a writ of attachment against RVC Enterprises LLC, Roc Fashions LLC
    (Roc), and Aussie Fashions LLC (collectively “defendants”) in San Bernardino County
    Superior Court. The trial court denied the application and petition and stayed
    Embroidery’s lawsuit because Embroidery had a lawsuit pending in New York
    1
    involving the same parties and the same issues. The trial court concluded the New York
    case was filed first, and therefore the New York court had exclusive concurrent
    jurisdiction over the defendants and their assets. Embroidery asserts the trial court erred
    in denying its application and petition because the New York court lacked jurisdiction
    over defendants’ property in California and therefore could not issue a writ of
    attachment to protect Embroidery’s interests.1 We dismiss the appeal.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Embroidery does embroidering and screen-printing work. Defendants placed
    orders with Embroidery for designs on T-shirts and blouses. Embroidery asserts it
    accepted the orders, performed the work, and delivered the items to a logistics company
    in Chino. Defendants allegedly did not pay Embroidery for the items delivered.
    Defendants are all New York limited liability companies. Embroidery is a California
    corporation located in Los Angeles.
    Embroidery sued defendants in the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
    The New York lawsuit concerned allegations that Embroidery delivered goods to
    defendants but was not paid for the items delivered. Embroidery sought $656,409.79
    from defendants. The New York complaint was filed August 14, 2012.
    While the New York case was pending, on September 6, 2012, Embroidery filed
    a lawsuit in San Bernardino County Superior Court seeking to recover $660,549.79
    1 Embroidery requests this court take judicial notice of eight published non-
    California cases. We grant the request as required by Evidence Code section 453.
    (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (a), 453.)
    2
    from defendants for goods that were delivered but never paid for. In the California
    complaint, Embroidery asserted it brought the suit for the limited purpose of obtaining
    provisional relief against defendants, because defendants had goods and assets located
    within San Bernardino County. Embroidery asserted it would “agree to a stay of this
    action other than in connection with such provisional relief.”
    In the points and authorities in support of its attachment application and writ
    petition, Embroidery asserted the goods delivered to the logistics company in Chino
    “were kept in transit,” and therefore were still in Chino. Embroidery sought an order or
    writ authorizing the sheriff to enter the logistics company and seize the items delivered
    there by Embroidery. Embroidery asserted there was an urgent need for the order or
    writ because Embroidery is “a small family-owned business” and defendants’
    outstanding balance was “devastating [Embroidery’s] business.” Embroidery explained
    the cash flow problems caused (1) payroll delays, which resulted in the United States
    Department of Labor restraining Embroidery’s shipments, and (2) Embroidery being
    unable to pay its “trade creditors.”
    Embroidery asserted the lawsuit in New York did not preclude the San
    Bernardino County Superior Court from issuing an attachment order or writ because a
    New York court cannot issue an attachment order for property located in California.
    Embroidery further asserted California courts have the authority to issue provisional
    remedies while a lawsuit is “being resolved in a different forum.”
    Roc made a special appearance for purposes of contesting jurisdiction and
    opposing (1) the application for an order to attach, and (2) the petition for writ of
    3
    attachment. Roc asserted “the goods manufactured by [Embroidery] had significant
    problems requiring their return, including foul odors, poor workmanship, and sizing
    problems.” Roc asserts the goods did not meet Roc’s specifications and resulted in
    some orders being canceled by Roc’s customers and “tens of thousands of dollars”
    being spent to repair the goods.
    Roc asserted the claims were required to be litigated in New York, where the
    initial lawsuit was filed, so it would be improper for a California court to exercise
    jurisdiction in the matter. Roc contended Embroidery was incorrectly relying on
    arbitration cases for the rule that a California court can issue a prejudgment attachment
    order while a case is pending in a different forum. Roc also contended Embroidery
    could not show a probability of prevailing on its claims because Embroidery delivered
    non-conforming goods that caused Roc to lose business and damaged its relationships
    with retail buyers.
    The trial court denied Embroidery’s application and petition and stayed the
    matter pending adjudication of the issues in New York.2 The trial court reasoned the
    New York case was filed first, and therefore New York had exclusive in personam and
    in rem jurisdiction over defendants and their assets.
    DISCUSSION
    In Embroidery’s opening brief, Embroidery concedes its allegations of error
    should have been raised via a petition for writ of mandate, rather than an appeal.
    2  The trial court’s order refers to the application and writ petition as two writ
    petitions.
    4
    Embroidery is correct that the denial of a request for attachment is not an appealable
    order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.13; International Typographical Union etc. Pension Plan
    v. Ad Compositors, Inc. (1983) 
    142 Cal. App. 3d 733
    , 735 (International).) Since (1) all
    of Embroidery’s contentions relate to the denial of its attachment requests, and (2) the
    case is still pending, but stayed, in the trial court, we dismiss Embroidery’s appeal. (See
    International, at pp. 735-736 [dismissing an appeal from the denial of a writ
    attachment].)
    Embroidery asserts the lack of an appealable order or judgment can be overcome
    because (1) this court can correct the legislative oversight of not including denials of
    attachment requests among the statutory list of appealable orders, and (2) Embroidery
    was seeking only prejudgment attachment in California, not a final judgment, therefore
    the denial of the attachment request was akin to a final judgment. Alternatively,
    Embroidery requests this court deem the appeal to be a writ of attachment because it
    presents important public issues. We address each of the three issues in turn.
    First, this court cannot add an order to the list of appealable orders and
    judgments set forth in section 904.1. In San Diego Wholesale Credit Men’s Association
    v. Superior Court (1973) 
    35 Cal. App. 3d 458
    , the appellate court wrote, “There is no
    statutory right of appeal from an order denying an application for a writ of attachment.”
    (Id. at p. 462.) A footnote attached to that sentence read, “That may be the result of a
    legislative oversight which may be corrected.” (Id. at fn. 2.) The foregoing opinion
    3 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure
    unless otherwise indicated.
    5
    was issued in 1973. In the 40 years since that opinion, the Legislature has not added
    denials of attachment requests to the list of appealable orders. (§ 904.1.) This court
    cannot add words to the statute that the Legislature has chosen to omit. (Blankenship v.
    Allstate Ins. Co. (2010) 
    186 Cal. App. 4th 87
    , 94.) Accordingly, we find Embroidery’s
    first argument for appealability to be unpersuasive because the Legislature has clearly
    chosen not to add such orders to section 904.1, and we cannot amend the statute. (See
    Arthur Andersen LLP v. Superior Court (1998) 
    67 Cal. App. 4th 1481
    , 1500 [Legislature
    is presumed to know the common law].)
    Second, Embroidery asserts an appeal is the proper means of reviewing the
    denial of the attachment requests because Embroidery was not seeking a final
    adjudication of its claims in California—Embroidery was only in California to seek pre-
    judgment attachment—therefore, the denial of Embroidery’s request is akin to a final
    judgment. Embroidery’s argument is problematic because it contradicts established law
    in at least two ways. First, it contradicts the law that such orders are not appealable as
    discussed ante. Second, it contradicts the law requiring a plaintiff seeking a writ of
    attachment to show a probability of prevailing.
    The statutory requirement is that, in order to obtain a writ of attachment, a
    plaintiff must “establish[] the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment
    is based.” (§ 484.090, subd. (a)(2).) “A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more
    likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that
    claim.” (§ 481.190.)
    6
    In Embroidery’s complaint, it asserts it has brought the complaint “solely to seek
    provisional relief” and that it would “agree to a stay of this action other than in
    connection with such provisional relief.” Embroidery has not explained how it can
    show the probable validity of its claims when the complaint reflects an intent of not
    seeking a judgment in this case. The law specifically reflects probable validity is shown
    when it is likely “the plaintiff will obtain a judgment.” Here, Embroidery asserts it
    would agree not to obtain a judgment.
    We now describe the second contradiction created by Embroidery’s second
    appealability argument: Embroidery asserts it should be able to bring an appeal because
    it is not seeking a final judgment, which makes the denial of the attachment requests
    akin to a final judgment in this case. However, seeking a final judgment is a basic part
    of attachment law. As set forth ante, the probability of prevailing concerns a plaintiff’s
    likelihood of obtaining a judgment “on that claim”—not a claim in a separate case, in
    another state. (§ 481.190.) We cannot disregard a basic element of attachment law
    (seeking a final judgment) in order to deem the order appealable. Embroidery is
    ultimately asserting that we should contradict the probability of prevailing rule. Given
    the legal contradictions that would be created, we find Embroidery’s argument to be
    unpersuasive.
    Third, in the alternative, Embroidery asserts that if the order is not appealable,
    then this court should treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate because it
    concerns important public issues. Deeming an appeal to be a petition for writ of
    mandate is a power that should only be exercised “under unusual circumstances.”
    7
    (Olson v. Cory (1983) 
    35 Cal. 3d 390
    , 401.) This case does not present unusual
    circumstances. Rather, it appears to be a case wherein counsel filed a lawsuit in New
    York while the goods were located in California, and then filed an appeal rather than a
    petition for writ of mandate.
    In sum, we are not persuaded that the denial of Embroidery’s attachment
    application and petition is appealable. Accordingly, we conclude the appeal must be
    dismissed. (See 
    International, supra
    , 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 735-736 [dismissing an
    appeal from an order denying a writ of attachment].)
    DISPOSITION
    The appeal is dismissed. Parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    MILLER
    J.
    We concur:
    HOLLENHORST
    Acting P. J.
    CODRINGTON
    J.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E057767

Filed Date: 5/2/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021