STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CEDRIC A. PARRISH (13-10-1372 AND 13-10-1373, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2236-17T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CEDRIC A. PARRISH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    Argued March 5, 2019 – Decided July 19, 2019
    Before Judges Yannotti, Rothstadt, and Natali.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 13-
    10-1372 and 13-10-1373.
    Kimberly A. Yonta argued the cause for appellant.
    Valeria Dominguez, Deputy Attorney General, argued
    the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy
    Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Cedric A. Parrish appeals from his convictions for second-
    degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and second-
    degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).         After
    denying defendant's motion to suppress, and following the jury's verdict, the
    court sentenced defendant to five years of imprisonment with three and one-
    half years of parole ineligibility on the unlawful possession of a weapon
    charge, and a concurrent five-year sentence, subject to five years of parole
    ineligibility on the certain persons offense.
    Defendant raises the following issues on appeal, which we have
    renumbered for ease of reference:
    POINT I
    THE EVIDENCE RECOVERED FROM THE
    DEFENDANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE
    THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE
    ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE CAR,
    NOR DID THE POLICE HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
    TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT.
    POINT II
    AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP, AS IT IS A
    WARRANTLESS       INTRUSION    ON AN
    INDIVIDUAL'S     LIBERTY,    MUST BE
    CONDUCTED IN THE LEAST INTRUSIVE WAY
    POSSIBLE IN BOTH TIME AND SCOPE.
    POINT III
    A-2236-17T4
    2
    THE    INVESTIGATIVE   STOP   QUICKLY
    TRANSFORMED INTO A DE-FACTO ARREST,
    REQUIRING THE POLICE TO HAVE PROBABLE
    CAUSE.
    POINT IV
    WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AS
    PART OF THE ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION, THE
    POLICE LACKED THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
    FOR THE CONTINUED DETENTION.
    POINT V
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR A JUDGMENT OF
    ACQUITTAL OF THE TWO CONVICTIONS AND
    FOR A NEW TRIAL.
    After reviewing the record in light of the contentions on appeal and the
    applicable law, we affirm.
    I.
    We glean the following facts from the record.         Access Self Storage
    (Access) is an outdoor self-storage facility located in Woodbridge. Access has
    "a secure gate" with a keypad that requires entry of a valid code to access the
    individual storage units. When an individual enters a rental agreement with
    Access, the renter receives a four-digit personal number that, combined with
    the number of the renter's particular storage unit, serves as the access code to
    enter the facility. A separate key is required to open the units.
    A-2236-17T4
    3
    On June 1, 2013, two Access employees "smell[ed] a strong odor of raw
    marijuana emanating from unit 9066." Consistent with Access policy, which
    permits employees to unlock a renter's storage unit if it contains prohibited
    items, an Access employee entered unit 9066, opened a chest inside the locker,
    and saw "two large bags of green leafy substance" that he "believe[d] to be
    marijuana."
    Later that same day, one of the Access employees who had smelled the
    marijuana called the Woodbridge police. Officer Robert Bartko responded at
    around 4:00 p.m., entered vacant unit 9065, which adjoined storage unit 9066,
    and "smelled an odor of raw marijuana inside the locker."      The odor was
    strongest on the right side of the locker, adjacent to unit 9066. Because unit
    9066 was occupied, Bartko "called for a supervisor" and "also asked for a
    [canine] unit to come [with] a detective."
    Sergeant Nelson1 arrived first, and he also smelled marijuana emanating
    from the locker. At 5:00 p.m., Detective Bryan Jaremczak received a phone
    call from his supervisor, Sergeant Murphy, who asked him "to respond to
    1
    The first names of Sergeants Nelson and Murphy, and Officer Cruz are not
    provided in the record.
    A-2236-17T4
    4
    Access . . . to assist patrol in a narcotics investigation." Jaremczak reached the
    facility by 5:50 p.m., at which point he was "in charge" of the investigation.
    "Within a couple minutes," Officer Cruz and his canine arrived.
    According to Jaremczak, "[t]he dog went into [storage unit] 9065 and was
    smelling the[] adjoining wall very aggressively." After the dog smelled the
    exterior of unit 9066, it "had a positive hit for the odor of narcotics."
    An Access employee informed Jaremczak of the facility's access code
    protocol and that each entry into the facility is logged electronically.
    Jaremczak reviewed the rental agreement for unit 9066, Access' rules and
    regulations, and a list of prohibited items. The original rental contract was
    entered between Access and Ramon Marti, defendant's stepfather, for storage
    unit 4032, but an addendum to the agreement transferred Marti's rights in un it
    4032 to unit 9066.     Both the original agreement and the addendum list ed
    Marti's Perth Amboy address.
    Shortly after 6:00 p.m., Sergeant Christopher McClay responded to
    Access to relieve Bartko.      McClay "stayed in [his] patrol car and stayed
    exactly where [he] was told to stay and keep surveillance of the storage unit,"
    specifically in a parked position parallel to unit 9066. Jaremczak decided to
    apply for a warrant to search the locker, so he returned to police headquarters
    A-2236-17T4
    5
    to attempt to contact an on-call judge.        Initially, no on-call judge was
    available, but the prosecutor eventually reached a judge "who was out of state
    at the time," and advised that he was on his way home and would call back
    once there.
    Meanwhile, McClay saw a silver "sedan type" vehicle with tinted
    windows slowly drive by the locker and observed that the driver was staring at
    the locker the entire time without noticing McClay. McClay "thought that was
    odd," so he wrote down the license plate number and relayed the information
    to Jaremczak. Shortly after McClay contacted Jaremczak, an Access employee
    informed McClay that at 8:09 p.m., a code specific to locker 9066 was used to
    enter the gate, and Jaremczak was later made aware of that information.
    Jaremczak advised dispatch of the license plate number and told them to
    put out an alert for the vehicle, as he needed the "car stopped if somebody
    could find it." At around 8:30 p.m., Jaremczak called then-Sergeant Joseph
    Licciardi, who was on patrol, and told him to "detain" the vehicle. Jaremczak
    advised Licciardi that a "vehicle went into the suspect location, drove down
    the specific aisle where a locker is," and that the vehicle's registration address
    matched the address listed for the specific locker.         Jaremczak also told
    A-2236-17T4
    6
    Licciardi that the vehicle's registered owner, defendant, had a prior drug
    distribution conviction.
    Two minutes later, Licciardi saw defendant's vehicle driving near the
    Access facility and pulled it over. Licciardi approached the vehicle and asked
    defendant what he was doing at Access. Defendant gave conflicting answers,
    then produced valid identification, and Licciardi returned to his vehicle for the
    next twenty-seven minutes. Meanwhile, at 8:34 p.m., the judge contacted the
    prosecutor and Jaremczak to initiate the warrant application process, which
    concluded twenty minutes later.
    While back in his patrol vehicle, Licciardi performed a warrant check for
    defendant. He also spoke with Lieutenant Joseph Goodheart, who explained,
    "[w]e're in the process of getting [a search warrant]." Goodheart told Licciardi
    to "[j]ust make [defendant] wait for a while." After the phone call, Licciardi
    stated, "[t]his is ridiculous," but testified at the suppression hearing that he di d
    not know why he said that.      Licciardi also testified he did not know whether
    he had enough information at that time to arrest defendant.
    Approximately seven minutes into the stop, Licciardi called McClay and
    asked whether "[t]hat storage locker . . . [was] registered to this guy I got
    pulled over?" McClay explained that the vehicle drove past him at the gated
    A-2236-17T4
    7
    facility, the driver stared at the particular locker that smelled of marijuana, did
    not notice McClay, and that the driver of the vehicle used a code specific to
    the locker to open the gate.     Licciardi responded, "[g]ot it," stated that he
    initially thought he stopped defendant for "no reason, basically," and then told
    McClay that since defendant's "got the code. . . . he's done."
    About twenty-nine minutes into the stop, defendant waved at Licciardi to
    get his attention, so Licciardi approached and asked defendant to exit the
    vehicle. Defendant then received a phone call, and Licciardi instructed him
    not to use his phone while they were talking. Within the next seven minutes,
    thirty-six minutes into the stop, Jaremczak arrived.
    Jaremczak informed defendant, "I just got a search warrant for your
    storage facility." Defendant said "okay," then began denying that he had a
    storage unit at the facility before Jaremczak asked him about the vehicle he
    was driving. Approximately three minutes later, the officers placed defendant
    into the back of the police vehicle and asked for his phone.
    Defendant sat in the back of the police vehicle but would not put his feet
    in the vehicle, so the officers removed defendant from the car, instructed him
    to place his hands behind his back and forcibly handcuffed him.          Licciardi
    testified that he also "punch[ed] [defendant] in the head because he was
    A-2236-17T4
    8
    refusing to submit." Defendant was placed in the back of the vehicle forty-two
    minutes after the initial stop.
    Jaremczak searched the locker three minutes later. He recovered, among
    other items, receipts and paperwork in defendant's name, receipts with Ramon
    Marti's name on them, 200 grams of marijuana, a red marijuana grinder, and a
    locked Century safe. Licciardi brought defendant to police headquarters, and
    Jaremczak returned to defendant's vehicle to have the car towed.
    Jaremczak testified that he personally drove defendant's vehicle onto the
    back of the tow truck and then off of the truck when they reached the tow yard,
    and retained the key to defendant's car. Defendant's car key was on a keychain
    along with a Century key, which Jaremczak used to open the safe he recovered
    from the locker. Inside the safe was a loaded semi-automatic handgun.
    Thereafter, defendant was charged with third-degree possession with
    intent to distribute marijuana in a quantity between one ounce and five pounds,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(11); fourth-degree possession of a controlled
    dangerous substance (CDS), marijuana, in a quantity exceeding fifty grams,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); second-degree possession of a firearm while engaged
    in CDS activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1; second-degree unlawful possession of a
    weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree possession of a weapon for
    A-2236-17T4
    9
    unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second-degree certain persons not to
    have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b); and two disorderly persons offenses,
    obstruction of the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), and resisting
    arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1).
    Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence "seized
    from [his] vehicle and from [his] person" during and after the traffic stop. At
    the suppression hearing, Jaremczak explained that he "ask[ed] [defendant] to
    sit in the back of a cop car to be detained," and did not want defendant "to
    have a cell phone" because he did not "know if there's a weapon in that phone,
    razor blades," or if defendant was "going to make phone calls to send people.
    You don't know what he could do with it." As to whether he believed he had
    probable cause to arrest defendant at the time he arrived, Jaremczak testified:
    A.   I didn't want to. No. Not at that moment.
    Q.   I didn't ask if you wanted to. I asked if legally,
    you had any authority, in your professional
    opinion, Officer, to arrest Mr. Parrish.
    A.   I believe yes. I would. Based off of the raw
    marijuana coming from that locker, he enters a
    secure facility, drives past the locker, and the
    registration for that vehicle matches the
    registered address of that locker.
    Q.   Okay.
    A-2236-17T4
    
    10 A. I
    believe so. Yes. That I would.
    Q.   Okay. So let's . . . take that hypothesis. Let's take
    that theory, then. You had all the information
    that you just placed on the record. All of that
    information that you said gives you enough to
    arrest Mr. Parrish was at your disposal at the time
    that Sergeant Licciardi made the motor vehicle
    stop. You knew all of that by then. Correct?
    A.   Yes.
    When asked why he did not arrest defendant when he arrived at the
    scene if he had probable cause to do so, Jaremczak testified, "I knew that there
    was only a few more minutes from the time I left there to execute the search
    warrant. I wanted to be as thorough as possible and make sure -- I want to
    actually see the evidence in front of me before I place handcuffs on someone."
    At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court found:
    Here, the information is that there was a suspicion that
    there was raw marijuana . . . in locker 9066, located at
    the Access storage facility. There was information
    that a car that was driven by this defendant . . . went
    on the property.         The testimony is, and it's
    uncontroverted testimony . . . [that] . . . [t]he only way
    to get on that property is to punch in a code. . . . The
    code that he punched in was not a general access code
    that gives general access to the property, but a code
    that was specifically tied to 9066.
    Much has been made of the fact that the person listed
    on the rental agreement was not the defendant. But the
    fact was that the . . . defendant shared a residence –
    A-2236-17T4
    11
    [the] same exact address as the person on the code
    (sic). He drives onto the property, drives past 9066,
    and then drives away. His actions are noticed.
    Information is put out that this car should be stopped
    because there's now reasonable suspicion that this
    individual is connected to 9066.
    A warrant is obtained telephonically and . . . just
    before the warrant is obtained, the car is identified by
    Sergeant Licciardi and the car is stopped. The car is
    stopped because of this connection to the locker. It's
    not stopped for any tinted windows or anything of the
    sort. Why this officer insisted to say that, I do not
    know.[2] But it does not change the analysis. That
    was the reason for the car stop. That car stop was
    legitimate. And the police properly detained him until
    the information was obtained, the search warrant was
    obtained.
    The Court does not find that the . . . stop, which was
    [forty-five] minutes in length, was unreasonable.
    There's no evidence that the police actions here were
    dilatory or delayed the process or pretextual. There
    was a reasonabl[e] suspicion that tied this individual
    to that locker. This is not someone who just drove by
    an open road or things of that sort. There was a strong,
    strong connection to that locker.
    The detention, the Court finds, is reasonable under the
    Constitution.
    2
    Licciardi testified that he initially stopped the car because it had tinted
    windows, but on cross-examination he was confronted with the videotape that
    showed he began writing the tinted-window ticket only after he received a
    phone call from McClay who mentioned defendant's tinted windows.
    A-2236-17T4
    12
    After the court denied defendant's pre-verdict motion for judgment of
    acquittal, the jury found defendant guilty of the unlawful possession of a
    weapon and certain persons not to have weapons charges, and acquitted him of
    all of the drug-related charges.3 The court denied defendant's post-verdict
    motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, and this appeal followed.
    II.
    In defendant's first four points, he maintains the police lacked reasonable
    and articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry4 stop of his vehicle, so the
    warrantless investigatory detention was invalid at its inception, and the seizure
    "of his keys without probable cause" was improper.            Further, defendant
    contends the police "prolong[ed] the stop beyond its mission," and the forty-
    minute delay from the time of the stop to his arrest was unreasonable.
    According to defendant, the police should have let him leave when they
    learned he "did not own the locker," and the officers transformed the
    investigatory detention into a de facto arrest when they ordered d efendant into
    the back of the police vehicle. Thus, defendant claims the police lacked both
    3
    The court dismissed the charge of possession of a weapon for unlawful
    purposes prior to trial. At sentencing, the court dismissed the two disorderly
    persons charges.
    4
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968).
    A-2236-17T4
    13
    reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause to believe he committed a
    crime at the inception of the stop, and that they did not gain any information to
    give them probable cause to arrest defendant by the time they placed him in
    the back of the police vehicle.
    The State maintains the "initial stop of defendant was lawful and based
    on reasonable, articulable suspicion," and "was not prolonged such that it
    amounted to de facto arrest." Further, the State argues that "even if the stop
    amounted to de facto arrest, there was sufficient probable cause for the officers
    to arrest defendant." Alternatively, the State contends that if "there was a de
    facto arrest and there was no probable cause, defendant's decision to obstruct
    justice and resist arrest sufficiently attenuated the causal link between the
    unlawful arrest and the evidence seized."
    We disagree with defendant's arguments and affirm his convictions
    because we conclude that the police not only had a reasonable articulable
    suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of defendant, but they also had probable
    cause to arrest him at the time he was initially stopped by Licciardi.
    Accordingly, we affirm the court's decision denying defendant's motion to
    suppress, and affirm his convictions.
    III.
    A-2236-17T4
    14
    When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress evidence, appellate
    courts defer to the judge's factual findings "unless they [are] 'clearly mi staken'
    or 'so wide of the mark' that the interests of justice require[] appellate
    intervention." State v. Elders, 
    192 N.J. 224
    , 245 (2007). However, the motion
    judge's "legal conclusions reached from the established facts" are reviewed de
    novo, as the court's "application of the law is subject to plenary review on
    appeal." State v. Jefferson, 
    413 N.J. Super. 344
    , 352 (App. Div. 2010).
    As noted, the motion judge found "[t]here was a reasonabl[e] suspicion
    that tied [defendant] to that locker," indeed, "a strong, strong connection to
    that locker." Therefore, the court concluded the detention was "reasonable
    under the Constitution," and denied defendant's motion on that ground. The
    court did not, however, address whether the investigative stop became a de
    facto arrest when defendant was ordered into the police car, or whether the
    police had probable cause to arrest at that moment or when the stop was
    initiated. Nonetheless, the judge's findings that the police had reasonable and
    articulable suspicion to detain defendant are amply supported by the record,
    and the legal consequences that flow from those facts demonstrate not only
    that the Terry stop was valid at its inception, but also that the police had
    probable cause to arrest defendant before the alleged de facto arrest occurred.
    A-2236-17T4
    15
    In order to thoroughly address all of defendant's arguments, we detail the
    constitutional principles supporting a detention pursuant to a Terry stop and
    after a formal arrest. Our federal and state constitutions safeguard the "right of
    the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
    unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const.
    art. I, ¶ 7. Warrantless seizures are presumptively unreasonable, and the State
    bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an
    exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Pineiro, 
    181 N.J. 13
    , 19-
    20 (2004). Here, the State invoked the Terry stop exception to the warrant
    requirement to justify the warrantless seizure of defendant's vehicle and
    person.
    An investigatory detention or Terry stop occurs "when an objectively
    reasonable person feels that his or her right to move has been restricted." State
    v. Nishina, 
    175 N.J. 502
    , 510 (2003) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 
    172 N.J. 117
    , 126 (2002)); see Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 809-10 (1996)
    ("Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the
    police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a
    'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].").
    A-2236-17T4
    16
    A temporary Terry stop is proper "if it is based on specific and
    articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
    facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 
    Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 20
    (quoting 
    Nishina, 175 N.J. at 510
    ). However, an investigative stop
    based on "a mere hunch" is invalid. State v. Coles, 
    218 N.J. 322
    , 343 (2014).
    The reasonableness of a continued detention is
    determined through application of a two-pronged
    inquiry.     First, the detention must have been
    reasonable at its inception. Second, the scope of the
    continued detention must be reasonably related to the
    justification for the initial interference. Thus, the
    detention must be reasonable both at its inception and
    throughout its entire execution.
    [Id. at 344 (citations omitted).]
    "[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for
    which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against
    unreasonable seizures." State v. Chisum, 
    236 N.J. 530
    , 547 (2019) (alteration
    in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 
    135 S. Ct. 1609
    ,
    1612 (2015)). While "the duration of the investigative stop may be extended
    for a reasonable but limited period for investigative purposes," a delay that is
    "unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers" is
    unreasonable. 
    Id. at 546
    (first quoting 
    Coles, 218 N.J. at 343-44
    ; then quoting
    United States v. Sharpe, 
    470 U.S. 675
    , 687 (1985)). Ultimately, the lawfulness
    A-2236-17T4
    17
    of a Terry stop depends on "the totality of the circumstances," State v. Privott,
    
    203 N.J. 16
    , 28 (2010), including "whether the police diligently pursued a
    means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
    quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." 
    Chisum, 236 N.J. at 547
    (quoting State v. Dickey, 
    152 N.J. 468
    , 477 (1998)).
    Here, the motion judge correctly concluded the investigatory detention
    was reasonable and valid at its inception. When McClay witnessed defendant's
    vehicle slowly drive by the marijuana locker at a gated facility, looking at the
    locker the entire time, McClay suspected something suspicious; he "just . . .
    thought that was odd." When Jaremczak learned the vehicle was registered to
    the same address as the rental agreement, he had a reasonable, articulable
    suspicion that the vehicle was associated with the marijuana in that locker.
    Jaremczak testified that he disclosed those facts to Licciardi before the initial
    stop, and Licciardi stated that Jaremczak also told him defendant had a prior
    CDS conviction.
    Further, we disagree with defendant's claim that the police should have
    ended the detention once they determined he was not the registered owner of
    the locker. Whether defendant was in constructive possession of the marijuana
    inside the locker does not depend on whether he was the lessee of the storage
    A-2236-17T4
    18
    unit, or on whether he owned the drugs. See State v. Brown, 
    80 N.J. 587
    , 598
    (1979) ("Ownership in conjunction with possession is not a required element
    of the possessory crime; one can knowingly control something without owning
    it and be guilty of unlawful possession.").     Rather, the relevant inquiry is
    whether defendant had "knowledge of [the marijuana's] character" and "an
    intention to exercise control over it manifested in circumstances where it is
    reasonable to infer that the capacity to do so exists." 
    Id. at 597.
    Here, the
    police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had such
    knowledge, intent, and capacity.
    We need not address defendant's argument that the investigatory
    detention became a de facto arrest requiring probable cause, because even if it
    was a de facto arrest, we conclude the police had probable cause to arrest
    defendant at the inception of the Terry stop. "Probable cause exists when,
    considering 'the totality of the circumstances,' a person of 'reasonable caution'
    would be justified in believing that" a crime has been, or is being committed.
    See State v. Smith, 
    212 N.J. 365
    , 388 (2012) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini,
    
    163 N.J. 336
    , 361 (2000)).
    Before Licciardi stopped defendant, Jaremczak told him that defendant's
    vehicle entered Access, "drove down the specific aisle" where unit 9066 was,
    A-2236-17T4
    19
    and that the vehicle was registered to the same address as the locker's
    registered owner. Jaremczak learned those facts through his communication
    with McClay, who witnessed the events unfold and wrote down defendant's
    license plate number. In addition, prior to the stop, McClay knew that at 8:09
    p.m. defendant used the entry code specific to locker 9066 to enter the gate.
    When the police are involved in a collaborative investigation, the
    probable cause analysis is not limited to the knowledge possessed by the
    officer who effects the arrest. United States v. Belle, 
    593 F.2d 487
    , 497 n.15
    (3d Cir. 1979) ("The collective knowledge of the investigating officers is
    measured in determining probable cause."); Wood v. Crouse, 
    436 F.2d 1077
    ,
    1078 (10th Cir. 1971) (same); see also United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
    ,
    229-33 (1985) (holding that officers who detain a suspect in reliance on a
    "wanted flyer" do not violate the Fourth Amendment if the flyer-issuing
    agency had reasonable, articulable suspicion "that the wanted person has
    committed an offense"); State v. Crawley, 
    187 N.J. 440
    , 457-58 (2006) ("if the
    dispatcher in th[at] case had been provided adequate facts from a reliable
    informant to establish a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed,
    common sense tells us that the dispatcher had the power to delegate the actual
    stop to officers in the field").
    A-2236-17T4
    20
    Because McClay, Jaremczak, and Licciardi were "'part of a coordinated
    investigation' and [we]re in communication," their "collective knowledge" is
    imputed to each other. United States v. Williams, 
    627 F.3d 247
    , 255 (7th Cir.
    2010). Thus, the information that an Access employee conveyed to McClay
    before the Terry stop, that defendant used a code specific to locker 9066 to
    access the secure gate, is imputed to Licciardi as a fellow investigating officer.
    We therefore conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant at
    the inception of the Terry stop.
    In sum, the police had probable cause to believe defendant had
    constructive possession of marijuana when they knew he used the code
    specific to locker 9066 to access the facility in a car registered to the same
    address as the lessee and slowly drove by the locker, staring at it the entire
    time. Those facts were within the collective knowledge of the collaborating
    officers at the time of the initial Terry stop, and give rise to "a fair probability"
    that defendant had dominion and control over the marijuana in the storage
    locker. See 
    Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 29
    .
    Moreover, "[j]ust as a subjective belief by the arresting officer would not
    establish probable cause where none existed, a subjective belief by the
    arresting officer cannot destroy probable cause where it exists." United States
    A-2236-17T4
    21
    v. Anderson, 
    923 F.2d 450
    , 457 (6th Cir. 1991).              Thus, notwithstanding
    Licciardi's subjective doubts, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant
    at the time of the initial detention. 5
    IV.
    In defendant's fifth point, he claims the court erred in denying his
    applications for judgments of acquittal and for a new trial. We disagree.
    The standard governing a motion for a judgment of acquittal is whether,
    "viewing the State's evidence in its entirety . . . and giving the State the benefit
    of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which
    reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the
    charge beyond a reasonable doubt."             State v. Reyes, 
    50 N.J. 454
    , 458-59
    (1967). In addition, the trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial "shall
    not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice
    under the law." R. 2:10-1. Combining these two standards, defendant alleges
    it is in the interest of justice to grant him a new trial because the jury's verdict
    was against the weight of the evidence.
    5
    In light of our decision, we do not reach the State's alternative argument that
    defendant's act of not placing his feet in the police car furnished probable
    cause to justify an arrest sufficient to attenuate any unlawful detention.
    A-2236-17T4
    22
    "Any person who knowingly has in his possession any handgun . . .
    without first having obtained a permit to carry the same . . . is guilty of a crime
    of the second degree." N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). At trial, McClay testified that he
    witnessed the driver of a silver car staring at unit 9066, so he recorded and
    disseminated the license plate number. Shortly thereafter, Licciardi witnessed
    defendant driving that vehicle near the storage facility, which prompted the
    Terry stop.   The fact that defendant's vehicle was registered to the same
    address as the rental agreement gives rise to a reasonable inference that
    defendant was at Access in connection with unit 9066. That storage locker
    contained the Century safe in which the gun was found and to which defendant
    had a key. In addition, the parties stipulated that a records custodian "caused
    the records of the [New Jersey State] Firearms Investigation Unit to be
    thoroughly searched with regard to [defendant]," the "search failed to reveal"
    that defendant applied for a permit, and the gun seized from the locker was
    "not registered with the New Jersey State Police."
    Further, the fact that defendant entered the code specific to unit 9066
    demonstrated his access to that unit even though, as defendant stresses, the
    police were not able to locate the key to the locker itself. Although defendant
    contends the State could not satisfy its burden of proving his guilt beyond a
    A-2236-17T4
    23
    reasonable doubt without affirmative proof that he had the key to the locker,
    we conclude that was a proper question for the jury to decide. Moreover, as
    the trial court concluded, a reasonable juror could have found the Century key
    on defendant's keychain, which opened the safe recovered from the locker,
    established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had access to and control
    over the gun inside the safe.
    We therefore find no basis to disturb defendant's conviction for unlawful
    possession of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Similarly, because the jury
    found defendant guilty of that charge, and because defendant previously
    committed a predicate offense, the evidence supports his conviction for certain
    persons not to have weapons under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).
    To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
    arguments it is because we deem them without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11–3(e)(2).
    Affirmed.
    A-2236-17T4
    24