In re Adock CA3 ( 2023 )

Filed 1/13/23 In re Adock CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
In re MARK ADOCK on Habeas Corpus. C089547
(Super. Ct. No. )
05F01670
THE PEOPLE,
3 Crim.C089581
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
MARK ADOCK,
Defendant and Appellant.
In this matter on transfer from the California Supreme Court, we reverse the trial
court’s denial of defendant Mark Adcock’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 20, 2022, former section 1170.95 was recodified without substantive change to
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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with robbery and burglary special
circumstances and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. We affirmed
his convictions on appeal. (People v. Adcock (Mar. 24, 2009, C058167) [nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant later petitioned for habeas corpus and resentencing under section
1172.6 based on changes to the felony murder rule under Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019) (Senate Bill 1437). Section 1176.2, also part of
Senate Bill 1437, permits a person convicted of felony murder to petition the sentencing
court to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the person on any remaining counts
if, among other things, the petitioner could not be convicted of first- or second-degree
murder due to the change in the law, i.e., he neither killed nor intended to kill and was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (§§ 188, 189, 1172.6, subd. (a).) The trial court denied defendant’s petitions,
finding that neither made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. It denied the
resentencing petition without appointing counsel for defendant despite defendant’s
request and without receiving briefing from the People.
Defendant appealed the trial court’s order and petitioned for habeas relief in this
court. In an unpublished opinion, we denied the habeas petition and affirmed the trial
court’s order denying defendant’s resentencing petition. On the habeas petition, we
concluded sufficient evidence supported the jury’s special circumstance findings that
defendant was a major participant in the underlying felonies and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as those elements had been defined by the California Supreme
Court after defendant’s conviction in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). On the resentencing petition, we agreed
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Defendant filed his petition under former
section 1170.95, but we will refer to the current section number throughout this opinion.
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the trial court committed error under section 1172.6 by not appointing counsel for
defendant or receiving briefing from the People before determining whether defendant
had made a prima facie case, but we held that the jury’s special circumstance findings,
because they were not set aside through habeas, precluded relief under section 1172.6 as
a matter of law. (In re Adcock (Feb. 4, 2022, C089547, C089581) [nonpub. opn.].)
The California Supreme Court subsequently granted review and transferred the
matter to us with directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause under People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). By separate order, we vacated our decision.
In supplemental briefing after transfer, the parties agree that under Strong the
jury’s true findings on the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance
allegations, made before Banks and Clark, do not render defendant ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Having reconsidered the matter, we agree.
In Strong, the California Supreme Court held that a jury’s special circumstance
findings made before Banks and Clark “do not preclude a defendant from making out a
prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437. This is true even if the trial evidence
would have been sufficient to support the findings under Banks and Clark.” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.)
Strong further held that a trial court may not at the prima facie stage of section
1172.6 proceedings conduct a sufficiency-of-the evidence review of a special-
circumstance finding which predates Banks and Clark to determine if a defendant is
eligible for relief. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 718-720.) A substantial evidence
determination “would entail factfinding prohibited at the prima facie stage.” (Id. at
p. 720.)
The Supreme Court summarized: “Section 1172.6 offers resentencing for
petitioners who have not been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have the degree
of culpability now required for a murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction.
Neither the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings nor a court’s later sufficiency of the
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evidence review amounts to the determination section 1172.6 requires, and neither set of
findings supplies a basis to reject an otherwise adequate prima facie showing and deny
issuance of an order to show cause.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 720.)
Strong governs this case. Contrary to our and the trial court’s holdings, neither the
jury’s special circumstance findings nor the trial court’s finding of sufficient evidence
preclude defendant from resentencing under section 1176.2. The trial court thus erred
when it denied defendant’s resentencing petition at the prima facie stage on those
grounds.
The trial court erred further by determining that defendant had not stated a prima
facie case without first providing counsel, receiving briefing, and holding a hearing to
determine whether defendant had made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(b), (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963-964, 966.) The error is statutory
error. (Id. at pp. 972-973.) As a result, it is reviewed for prejudice under the Watson
standard of review. (Id. at pp. 974, 975; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.) Under that standard, defendant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability
that in the absence of the error, he would have obtained a more favorable result. (Ibid.)
“More specifically, a petitioner ‘whose petition is denied before an order to show cause
issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been
afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have been summarily
denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ [Citation.]” (Lewis, at p. 974.)
The error was prejudicial. It is reasonably probable that had defendant been
provided counsel, counsel would have ensured that defendant’s petition was not
summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing in violation of the statute.
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DISPOSITION
In C089581, the trial court’s order denying the petition to vacate defendant’s
sentence under section 1170.95 is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
In C089547, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as moot.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
DUARTE, J.
RENNER, J.
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