In re A.M. CA2/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 1/26/23 In re A.M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under B314655
the Juvenile Court Law.
_________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00708)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
M.H. (Mother) appeals from a dispositional order of the
juvenile court in dependency proceedings regarding her daughter,
A.M. (born March 2007), to the extent the order requires Mother
to take classes regarding parenting a special needs child and to
participate in a National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI)
support group. Mother acknowledges that A.M. has special
needs and that Mother has struggled to handle these and the
behavioral issues they have caused during the brief time Mother
has spent with A.M. She nevertheless argues the parenting
classes and support group are “duplicative” of the other services
in her case plan, and that the court erred in requiring them.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Mother’s Child Welfare History and Prior
Dependency Proceedings
Mother has a history with the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), including
dependency proceedings based on sustained allegations in a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition1 that Mother
had left her one-year-old child (not A.M.)2 with an unrelated
stranger who was unwilling to continue caring for the child. The
child was subsequently adopted.
In August 2013, DCFS received a referral alleging that
Mother physically abused A.M., and that A.M. had witnessed
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 The child is not a party to the instant appeal or the
underlying dependency proceedings. It is unclear from the
record whether the child was A.M.’s sibling or half sibling.
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sexual acts and been sexually molested. The referral also alleged
Mother was a prostitute and abusing drugs. DCFS “[e]valuated
[o]ut” the referral because it was “[h]istorical abuse in Texas by
[M]other, about [five] years ago, who no longer ha[d] custody, and
ha[d] no visits with [A.M.]”
B. Investigation and Section 300 Petition Leading
to Current Dependency Proceedings
In October 2020, DCFS received a referral that A.M.’s
father, J.M. (Father), who is not a party to this appeal, had
left then 13-year-old A.M. unsupervised, sold her medication
for attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), did not
ensure A.M. attended school, and smoked marijuana in the home.
During its investigation, DCFS learned that many years
earlier, when A.M. was two years old, A.M. had been placed
in the custody of her paternal aunt, who at some point had also
become A.M.’s legal guardian. The record is unclear as to the
circumstances leading to this arrangement. A.M. only started
living with Father in approximately September 2020, after an
unknown male sexually abused A.M. while she was in paternal
aunt’s care, and A.M. ran away. Around this same time, the
paternal aunt terminated the guardianship.
Following A.M.’s relocation to Father’s home, A.M.
exhibited runaway behavior. A.M. was hospitalized due to
threats of self-harm, and subsequently released back to Father’s
care. A.M. had diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder,
ADHD, alcohol-related neurodevelopmental disorder, and
oppositional defiant disorder, had been “prescribed Ritalin and
Prozac, . . . [and] ha[d] a history of running away, self[-]harm,
hospitalizations, . . . and ha[d] been a victim of sexual abuse
[in] two incidences.” Other reports indicated she was bipolar,
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had “anger issues,” and that she functioned at the level of an
eight-year-old.
Father reached out to DCFS and reported an inability to
adequately care for A.M. and her special needs. He reported that
A.M. repeatedly ran away, sometimes slept in the backyard with
her therapy dog, and had on one occasion taken her eight-year-
old half sister to the park without permission and left her there.
In November 2020, DCFS filed a section 300 petition,
alleging, in part, that Father had limited ability to care for
A.M. on account of her special needs. At the time, Mother’s
whereabouts were unknown, and Mother was not named in the
petition. The court detained A.M. and released her back into
Father’s care.
DCFS subsequently found Mother, who stated she had not
seen A.M. since the child was three years old. Mother reported
difficulty maintaining contact with A.M. since paternal aunt had
become A.M.’s caregiver, because the paternal aunt had obtained
a restraining order against Mother.
In January 2021, the court sustained the allegations in
the petition finding Father’s failure to care for A.M. placed A.M.
at substantial risk of harm given her special needs. The court
removed the child from Mother’s custody, and ordered A.M. to
remain in Father’s care. The court ordered unmonitored video
visits between Mother and A.M., as well as family maintenance
for Father and enhancement services for Mother. Mother’s
services included classes on parenting special needs children and
conjoint counseling with A.M. Mother objected to being required
to complete the parenting program.
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C. Mother’s Failed Extended Visit with A.M.
In March 2021, the court granted a DCFS request that the
court approve an extended visit for A.M. with Mother in Arizona.
Mother returned A.M. to DCFS’s care six days into the 10-day
visit, however, and refused to provide further care for A.M.,
because A.M. had been “disrespectful and rude.” Mother later
informed DCFS, “ ‘I didn’t believe it ([A.M.]’s issues) until she
came here and I had a hard time dealing with it. . . . There’s only
so much I can do, she needs help. . . . I haven’t talked to [A.M.]
since I gave her back. . . . I just didn’t want to deal with it and
that’s the way I shut down.’ ” Father likewise refused to allow
A.M. to return to his care following the unsuccessful extended
visit with Mother. Father had expressed regularly that he was
not able to care for A.M., due to her mental health issues, and
had on more than one occasion requested she be institutionalized.
DCFS placed A.M. in foster care.
D. Sections 342 and 387 Petitions
In April 2021, DCFS filed sections 342 and 387 petitions,
alleging that both parents requested A.M. be removed from their
care and were unwilling and unable to care for A.M. The juvenile
court ordered A.M. detained from both parents and ordered
monitored virtual visitation. A.M. remained in foster care.
DCFS reported an improvement in A.M.’s behaviors in
her foster care placement, concurrent with her participating
in mental health and medical services that she had refused
to participate in when living at home with Father. DCFS
further reported that Mother did not want to be involved in
the proceedings and had stated A.M. “was not her problem.”
On July 27, 2021, the juvenile court found all the
allegations in the sections 342 and 387 petitions true as
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amended, sustaining them with interlineations to indicate both
parents were unable but not “unwilling” to provide appropriate
care for A.M., and that both had requested A.M. not be placed in
their care. The juvenile court stated “[i]t is clear that [A.M.] has
special and unique needs, and it is also clear to this court that
the mother and father are unable to provide for her care. . . .
They both have been given an opportunity, and she requires
an extraordinary amount of treatment, and the parent needs to
participate in treatment as well in order to be able to deal with
her unique and special needs.”
As to the disposition phase of the hearing, the juvenile
court removed A.M. from both parents’ custody and ordered
family reunification services for both parents. Mother’s trial
counsel objected to DCFS’s recommendation that her case plan
include a parenting class and participation in a NAMI support
group. Mother’s counsel suggested Mother participate in only
“counseling or even conjoint counseling.”
The case plan ultimately adopted by the court included
Mother’s participation in classes on parenting special needs
children, conjoint counseling with A.M., a NAMI support group,
and individual counseling to address case issues, including
parenting, effective coparenting, and children with mental
health issues. The court ordered online and in-state referrals
be provided to Mother. The court stated it was ordering classes
in parenting for special needs children “so that the unique needs
of [A.M.] and how to parent her can be addressed in a program.”
The court also noted “NAMI is nationwide, and so the mother
should be able to participate in that support group where she
resides.”
On August 18, 2021, mother filed a notice of appeal from
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the jurisdiction/disposition order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mother argues the court reversibly erred
by including what she describes as “an overbroad case plan”
in the July 27, 2021 dispositional order.3 (Capitalization
omitted.) Mother argues that the “case plan was duplicative”
because the court ordered a support group and a parenting class
that addressed special needs children despite also ordering
“case issues” and “the same issues” be addressed respectively
as part of Mother’s individual counseling, “to which mother had
no objection.”
At disposition, a juvenile court “may make any and all
reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of the child.” (§ 362, subd. (a).)
“ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what
3 We disagree with DCFS’s contention that because Mother
did not timely appeal an earlier (January 2021) dispositional
order that also required parenting classes and counseling for
Mother, this court is without jurisdiction to consider an appeal
challenging the inclusion of parenting classes and counseling in
the July 27, 2021 order. The appealed from July 27, 2021 order
provides the operative case plan for Mother and replaced the
January 2021 order. Her failure to appeal the former does not
affect our jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the latter.
Moreover, Mother’s appeal does not challenge the parenting
classes and counseling in a vacuum, but rather as components
of the July 27, 2021 case plan; Mother claims that total case
plan is overbroad. The January 2021 case plan included a
different total list of services for Mother. Therefore, Mother
could not have raised her current argument via an appeal from
the earlier dispositional order, and her failure to do so cannot
have forfeited the argument.
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would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion
a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination
cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re
A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.)
The record supports that A.M. has serious mental health,
emotional, and behavioral issues that, at least as of the date of
the challenged dispositional order, Mother was not capable of
handling. Mother admitted she was unable to care for A.M. due
to A.M.’s special needs and behavioral issues, and that she did
not fully understand these issues. She also demonstrated her
inability to parent A.M. by abandoning her extended visit with
A.M. after only six days and thereafter refusing to have A.M. in
her care.
Mother does not dispute any of this on appeal, but instead
argues the court abused its discretion by ordering her to address
her admitted inability in more than one way—that is, through
participation in not only counseling, but special needs parenting
classes and a support group. But given the severity of A.M.’s
issues, Mother’s history with A.M., and Mother’s DCFS history,
it was both reasonable and appropriate to require Mother
to use multiple modalities in developing the ability to handle,
understand, and address A.M.’s special needs. (See In re
Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229 [“ ‘[t]he reunification
plan “ ‘must be appropriate for each family and be based on the
unique facts relating to that family’ ” ’ ”].) Moreover, although
the various modalities the court ordered Mother to participate in
may all have the same goal—helping Mother develop the ability
to care appropriately for A.M.—that does not mean they are
duplicative. A parenting instruction program for parents of
special needs children would help Mother achieve this goal
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in a different way than would individual therapy sessions or
participation in a NAMI support group. One teaches skills;
another offers Mother emotional support, given that parenting a
special needs child—even after one learns the necessary skills—
is inherently challenging. The other can assist Mother to work
through her own issues and the traumas of past unsuccessful
efforts to parent A.M. Mother does not and cannot argue
that these various services would not assist Mother in such
nonoverlapping ways; nor does she argue that she does not need
any of these types of assistance. The court’s dispositional order
was “rationally tailored to advancing [A.M.]’s best interests”
(In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 187), and Mother
has not identified anything suggesting otherwise. There was no
abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
BENDIX, J.
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