Marriage of Puppi CA4/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 2/16/23 Marriage of Puppi CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of MICHAEL AND
DANA D. PUPPI.
MICHAEL JAMES PUPPI,
E077430
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. RID87717)
v.
OPINION
DANA D. PUPPI,
Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Belinda A. Handy,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Law Office of Zulu Ali & Associates and Zulu Ali, for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Michael James Puppi appeals the family court’s order lowering, but not
terminating, the amount of spousal support he must pay to his ex-wife, Dana D. Puppi.
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We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
James and Dana were married for about 17 years before they divorced in 2001. As
part of their marriage dissolution, they stipulated that James would pay Dana $900 per
month in spousal support indefinitely. The 2001 judgment of dissolution gave Dana a
“Gavron warning,” informing her that she was expected to become self-sufficient. (See
In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705.)
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In June 2020, James filed a request to terminate his spousal support. James
argued he should no longer have to pay Dana spousal support because his health had
deteriorated, his business was less profitable, and Dana had not become self-sufficient in
the 17 years since their divorce.
The family court held an evidentiary hearing on James’s request during which
James, his doctor, and Dana testified. After considering the factors enumerated in Family
Code section 4320 (section 4320), the family court denied James’s request to terminate
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his spousal support to Dana, but reduced it to $600 per month. James timely appealed.
1
James did not provide a copy of his request in his appellant’s index as required
under California Rules of Court, rule 8.124, but we can glean the nature of his request
from the reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the request.
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The family court also ordered James to pay Dana spousal support he failed to
pay, but James does not challenge that order.
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III.
DISCUSSION
James argues the family court erred because (1) Dana failed to comply with the
Gavron warning and did not do enough to become self-supporting and (2) the court did
not consider all of the factors under section 4320. We disagree.
A “Gavron warning” “is a fair warning to the supported spouse he or she is
expected to become self-supporting.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
43, 55.) The warning is codified in Family Code section 4330, subdivision (b), which
reads in relevant part: “When making an order for spousal support, the court may advise
the recipient of support that the recipient should make reasonable efforts to assist in
providing for their support needs, taking into account the particular circumstances
considered by the court pursuant to [s]ection 4320.” Section 4320, subdivision (b), in
turn states that in modifying a spousal support order, the family court must consider
“[t]he extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education,
training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.”
The parties’ marriage dissolution judgment gave Dana a Gavron warning, which
informed her that she had to “become self-sufficient and make reasonable efforts to
become self-supporting,” and that the family court could “consider that for future
modifications and termination.” The family court found (at least implicitly) that Dana
did not comply with the Gavron warning given that she “could have done more” to
become more self-sufficient since the parties’ divorced 20 years prior. James argues the
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family court erred because it declined to terminate his spousal support despite Dana’s
failure to become self-sufficient.
We reject the argument for two reasons. First, James forfeited it by failing to
support it with any authority. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779,
784-785.) Second, a supported spouse’s efforts to become self-supporting is just one of
many factors the family court may consider in fashioning a spousal support order. (See
§ 4320, subds. (a)-(n), (l); In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman (2000) 24 Cal.4th 39,
53.)
“Spousal support must be determined according to the needs of both parties and
their respective abilities to meet these needs. [Citation.] In this regard, a trial court has
broad discretion and an abuse thereof only occurs when it can be said that no judge
reasonably could have made the same order.” (In re Marriage of Rome (1980) 109
Cal.App.3d 961, 964.) “‘“So long as the court exercised its discretion along legal lines,
its decision will not be reversed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.”’”
(In re Marriage of Biderman (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 409, 412.)
In exercising its discretion on whether to modify a spousal support order, “the
[family] court considers the same criteria set forth in section 4320 as it considered when
making the initial order and any subsequent modification order.” (In re Marriage of
Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) The court has “significant discretion when
weighing” these factors. (In re Marriage of T.C. & D.C. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 419,
426.)
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“[T]he marital standard of living[] is relevant as a reference point against which
the other statutory factors are to be weighed. [Citations.] The other statutory factors
include: contributions to the supporting spouse’s education, training, or career; the
supporting spouse’s ability to pay; the needs of each party, based on the marital standard
of living; the obligations and assets of each party; the duration of the marriage; the
opportunity for employment without undue interference with the children’s interests; the
age and health of the parties; tax consequences; the balance of hardships to the parties;
the goal that the supported party be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time;
and any other factors deemed just and equitable by the court.” (In re Marriage of
Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 303-304.)
James contends the family court erred because it failed to “fully consider” all of
the section 4320 factors. James, however, does not identify which factors the family
court ignored. Instead, he essentially argues that he should no longer have to pay Dana
spousal support because his health has deteriorated and their children are now in their
30s.
The family court expressly considered both James’s health issues and the age of
the parties’ children, and found that neither justified terminating James’s spousal support.
The court correctly observed that “the children are no longer
minors, which is a factor that can be taken into consideration.” As for James’s health, the
family court thoroughly considered it, but concluded that there was no evidence that
James’s health issues prevented him from working or affected his earning capacity.
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Although James outlines his many health issues in his opening brief, he does not
challenge the family court’s finding that he failed to show that his health issues lowered
his income.
When stating its ruling, the family court prefaced its pronouncement by stating
that it had to “go through the [section 4320] factors.” The court first found that James’s
income had remained “almost identical” to what he earned in 2001 (§ 4320, subds. (c),
(d).) The court explained that James’s testimony about his other assets was “vague,” so
the court did not have “a very clear picture” of James’s assets (§ 4320, subds. (c)-(e)).
James also did not submit evidence about his new wife’s earning capacity (§ 4320, subd.
(c)-(e)). Although the court found that Dana did not do enough to become self-
supporting (§ 4320, subd. (l)), the court noted that neither party presented evidence about
Dana’s marketable skills or education or the market for “jobs . . . out there that [Dana]
can do” (§ 4320, subd. (a)(1)). The court next observed that Dana stayed home and took
care of the parties’ children during their “long-term marriage” (§ 4320, subd. (f), but the
children were now adults (§ 4320, subd. (g)). Finally, the court considered James’s age
(in his late 50s or early 60s) and his health (§ 4320, subd. (h)). The family court
ultimately found that James could afford to continue supporting Dana while finding that
she continued to need the support (§ 4320, subds. (c), (d), (k)).
In other words, the family court thoroughly considered the relevant section 4320
factors and reasonably found that reducing James’s spousal support from $900 per month
to $600 per month was appropriate. James fails to show that the family court abused its
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“significant discretion” here. (In re Marriage of T.C. & D.C., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p.
426.)
Finally, James argues in passing that the family court erred by failing to “give
credit to [him] for his overpayment of support” to Dana over the years. James forfeited
the two-sentence argument by failing to support it with authority and reasoned argument.
(See Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [An
appellant forfeits an issue when he makes only a blanket, conclusory statement, with no
citation to authority or discussion of the authority as it applies to the facts of the case.].)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The family court’s order reducing James’s spousal support to Dana to $600 per
month is affirmed. Dana may recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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