Strouse v. Webcor Construction ( 2019 )


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  • Filed 3/27/19; Certified for partial publication 4/23/19 (order attached)
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    JAMES STROUSE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A148863
    v.
    WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION, L.P.,                                       (Alameda County
    Super. Ct. No. RG13670376)
    Defendant, Cross-complainant and
    Appellant;
    ACCO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS,
    Cross-defendant and Respondent.
    Webcor Construction, L.P. (Webcor) was the general contractor for the
    rehabilitation of the California Memorial Football Stadium in Berkeley (the Project).
    Webcor hired ACCO Engineered Systems (ACCO) to perform ventilation and plumbing
    services on the Project. James Strouse, an ACCO employee, suffered a workplace injury
    when his leg fell into a 12-inch deep expansion joint after the plywood safety cover gave
    way. He sued Webcor for negligence, and Webcor filed a cross-complaint against ACCO
    for indemnity. A jury found Webcor 100 percent liable for Strouse’s injuries.
    On appeal, Webcor contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury using
    CACI No. 1009B, which, in Webcor’s view, does not accurately state the holding of
    Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 
    27 Cal.4th 198
     (Hooker). Webcor
    further contends the trial court erroneously instructed on negligence per se based on
    regulations promulgated under the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Cal-
    OSHA). Finally, Webcor argues the trial court erred in granting ACCO’s motion for
    attorney fees. We affirm the judgment.
    1
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. Webcor’s Contract with the University of California and Subcontract with
    ACCO
    In 2009, Webcor entered into a contract with the University of California (UC) for
    the “California Memorial Stadium Seismic Safety Improvements.” Under the contract,
    Webcor was “solely responsible for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety
    precautions and programs in connection with the performance of the Contract.” Webcor
    was required to take adequate precautions to prevent damage, injury, or loss to
    “Employees involved in the Work and other persons who may be affected thereby.” The
    contract also required Webcor to “designate a responsible member of [its] organization at
    the Project site whose duty shall be the prevention of accidents.” Webcor was further
    obligated to “continuously require and follow up with Subcontractors about their job site
    maintenance and their conformance in providing a safe work place,” “enforce all safety-
    related requirements in the Contract Documents,” and “review, monitor and coordinate
    the implementation of individual Subcontractors’ Safety Programs.”
    Webcor hired ACCO to perform ventilation and plumbing services on the Project.
    Under the subcontract, ACCO agreed to “comply fully with all laws, orders, citations,
    rules, regulations, standards and statutes with respect to occupational health and safety
    [and] . . . accident prevention,” to “conduct inspections to determine that safe working
    conditions and equipment exist of their work area,” and to “accept[] sole responsibility
    for providing a safe place to work for its employees.”
    Webcor’s Safety Manual was part of the contract documents that ACCO was
    required to follow. It required ACCO employees to report any unsafe practice or
    condition to their supervisor immediately, and also report unsafe conditions to Webcor.
    With regard to floor openings, the Webcor Safety Manual reminded ACCO to check that
    openings were covered and that covers were secured and identified.
    B. Webcor’s Expansion Joints and Safety Covers
    An expansion joint is a gap left between concrete sections of a structure to allow
    the sections to move independently in the event of an earthquake. As part of the seismic
    2
    upgrade of the stadium, Webcor created and constructed 50 expansion joints that were
    placed throughout the structure.
    Before a permanent covering is installed over each expansion joint, there is a gap
    12 inches wide and 12 inches deep in the concrete. The gaps must be covered or have
    guardrails around them. For the Project, Webcor’s carpenters designed, constructed, and
    installed protective plywood covers for all of the expansion joints.
    It was undisputed at trial that Webcor was responsible for the Project’s general
    access areas, which were described as areas like “hallways” used by “everyone”
    including subcontractors for making deliveries and accessing different areas of the
    stadium. Strouse’s accident occurred at an expansion joint in line 53, a general access
    area near a loading dock used by ACCO and other subcontractors to make deliveries.
    Because this was a high-traffic area, the safety covers for the expansion joints had to
    withstand two times the maximum anticipated load, which would require either a metal
    plate or two layers of three-quarter inch plywood that were secured and labeled “do not
    remove.” Webcor’s site safety manager, Joe Villela, instructed Webcor’s carpenters to
    make sure the safety covers were secured and had smooth transitions.
    Webcor’s carpenter foreman, Victor Paz, testified that the safety covers were
    constructed with doubled-up three-quarter inch plywood, sized to cover the 12-inch gap.
    The wood was anchored with 16-penny nails, roto-hammered in place, and secured with
    pieces of tie wire. Webcor tested the design of the safety covers by driving a scissor lift
    over them to ensure they were strong and stayed in place.
    Villela testified Webcor was the sole entity that maintained the safety covers, and
    Webcor carpenters were the only ones allowed to repair them. This was a duty Webcor
    “did not delegate to its subcontractors.” ACCO did not perform any work on the safety
    covers and was not allowed to do any carpentry work on the Project. Subcontractors
    were told during weekly meetings to notify Webcor if they needed to remove a safety
    structure to perform their work, and Webcor would remove and replace it. Villela
    testified it was reasonable for ACCO employees to trust that Webcor had properly
    installed, secured, and inspected the safety covers.
    3
    C. Reports of Unsecured Covers
    Prior to Strouse’s accident, Webcor knew that the safety covers in the line 53 area
    had been damaged or had become unsecured due to subcontractors removing them
    without securing them back in place. ACCO’s general foreman Chris Ensel testified that
    he brought up the condition of the safety covers to Villela and informed him that people
    were removing safety covers to perform work in the expansion joints. The condition of
    the safety covers was “brought up more than a couple times” by Ensel and other
    tradesmen in the weekly foreman meetings when Webcor was asking for input. Ensel felt
    his concerns were not being adequately addressed, and he was dissatisfied with the
    response he received from Villela. Eventually, however, Ensel became “accustomed” to
    the condition and stopped bringing it up.
    Ensel did not contact ACCO’s safety department about the safety covers as
    required by ACCO’s mitigation escalation path. He was aware that ACCO’s subcontract
    required it to provide its employees with a safe place to work, but he felt this was not a
    “reachable goal” because Webcor was not adequately supporting ACCO.
    D. Webcor’s Retained Control of Safety on the Jobsite
    Webcor’s safety expert J. Robert Harrell testified that Webcor retained overall
    safety responsibility on the job site. Villela testified that he was responsible for
    conducting daily inspections of the jobsite to look for safety problems, as required by
    Webcor’s contract with the UC, even on weekends if workers were present (as they were
    the weekend before Strouse’s accident). Up to 12 superintendents and 12 foremen of
    Webcor were also required to perform daily inspections. Villela was responsible for
    documenting each of his daily inspections in an inspection report.
    The last documented inspections before Strouse’s January 9, 2012, accident were
    conducted on January 3, 4, and 5, 2012. There was no documentation of any inspection
    on January 6, 7, or 8, 2012, even though there were workers at the site on those days.
    Although Villela initially testified that he had performed, but simply failed to log,
    inspections on January 6, 7, and 8, he later testified that he did not conduct an inspection
    on January 7 or 8, and was not present at the jobsite on either of those days. He did not
    4
    know if foremen or a superintendent present on those days performed the daily
    inspections.
    Villela further testified it was his job to ensure that safety conditions at the jobsite
    complied with applicable Cal-OSHA regulations.1 The Webcor Safety Manual
    specifically required Webcor to comply with section 1632. Both Strouse’s safety expert,
    Gerald Fulghum, and Webcor’s safety expert, Harrell, testified that Webcor, as the
    “controlling employer,” was responsible for compliance with section 1632 on the jobsite.
    E. The Accident
    On the morning of January 9, 2012, a crew of seven ACCO employees was
    unloading materials from an ACCO truck at an access point into the stadium. The ACCO
    crew made multiple trips across an expansion joint at line 53. The area around line 53
    was covered with plywood.
    Walking immediately in front of Strouse was Alexander Osborne, a first-year
    ACCO apprentice. As he walked across the expansion joint, he felt the plywood move a
    sixteenth to an eighth of an inch. Crossing the expansion joint behind Osborne was
    Strouse, who was carrying a large section of spiral pipe on his shoulder. As Strouse
    crossed the expansion joint, the plywood gave way. One of Strouse’s legs went down
    into the joint, causing injuries to his knee, hip, and sacroiliac.
    The safety cover involved in Strouse’s accident appeared to have been modified
    from its original condition, as plywood had been pried up so that a cable could be run
    underneath. Strouse’s safety expert, Fulghum, testified that the condition of the area
    1
    The applicable Cal-OSHA regulation is found in California Code of Regulations,
    title 8, section 1632 (hereinafter “section 1632”), part of subchapter 4, entitled
    “Construction Safety Orders.” It requires floor openings at a construction site to be
    “guarded by . . . covers.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1632, subd. (b)(1).) “Covers shall be
    capable of supporting the greater of 400 pounds or twice the weight of the employees,
    equipment and materials that may be imposed on any one square foot area of the cover at
    any time. Covers shall be secured in place to prevent accidental removal and
    displacement, and shall bear a pressure sensitized, painted, or stenciled sign with legible
    letters not less than one inch high, stating: ‘Opening—Do Not Remove.’ Markings of
    chalk or keel shall not be used.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
    5
    around line 53, as depicted in the photographs, constituted a safety hazard. Even though
    two layers of plywood were used in some places, they appeared to be “lapped,” and there
    were gaps and holes. Webcor’s safety expert, Harrell, also testified the photographs
    showed a safety cover that was not properly maintained.
    F. The Instant Lawsuit
    In 2013, Strouse filed a complaint and first amended complaint against Webcor for
    general negligence. Webcor answered the first amended complaint and filed a cross-
    complaint against ACCO, seeking to enforce a contractual defense and indemnity
    provision against ACCO.
    Trial commenced in March 2016. In April 2016, the jury rendered a special
    verdict finding that Webcor designed the safety cover where Strouse fell; Webcor
    retained control over the safety cover and safety conditions where Strouse fell; Webcor
    negligently exercised its retained control over safety conditions; and Webcor’s
    negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing harm to Strouse. Finding that neither
    ACCO nor Strouse was negligent, the jury apportioned no fault to them and attributed
    100 percent of the fault to Webcor. Judgment was entered in favor of Strouse in the
    amount of $2,626,750, and in favor of ACCO on Webcor’s cross-complaint. Webcor
    moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. Both
    motions were denied.
    ACCO moved for attorney fees as the prevailing party in Webcor’s cross-action.
    The motion was granted in the amount of $298,843.
    Webcor appealed the judgment, as well as the post-judgment orders denying its
    motions for JNOV and a new trial and the order granting ACCO’s motion for attorney
    fees.
    DISCUSSION
    A. The Privette Doctrine and Exceptions
    Webcor’s contentions on appeal implicate the so-called “Privette doctrine” set
    forth in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 689
     (Privette) and its progeny.
    6
    Accordingly, we provide a general overview of the doctrine before addressing Webcor’s
    claims.
    In Privette, our Supreme Court held that when an employee of an independent
    contractor is injured in the workplace, he or she may not recover tort damages from the
    hirer of the independent contractor. The court concluded it would be unfair to permit the
    injured employee of an independent contractor to obtain full tort damages from the hirer
    because work-related injuries are compensable under the exclusive remedy of the
    Workers’ Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.), and the hirer likely paid
    indirectly for the workers’ compensation insurance as a component of the contract price
    but had no right to reimbursement from the contractor.2 Thus, workers who happened to
    work for an independent contractor would enjoy a windfall that is not available to other
    workers. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 698–700.)
    In Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 
    18 Cal.4th 253
     (Toland), the
    Supreme Court held that the hirer of an independent contractor has no obligation to
    specify in the subcontract the special precautions the contractor must take for the safety
    of the contractor’s employees. (Toland, at p. 267.) The court held that such liability
    would negate the hirer’s “right to delegate to independent contractors the responsibility of
    ensuring the safety of their own workers.” (Id. at p. 269.)
    In Hooker, supra, 
    27 Cal.4th 198
    , and McKown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002)
    
    27 Cal.4th 219
     (McKown), the Supreme Court articulated an exception to the Privette
    doctrine. Under this exception, the hirer of an independent contractor may be liable to
    the contractor’s injured employee when the hirer has retained control over safety
    conditions at a worksite, and the hirer’s negligent exercise of retained control has
    “affirmatively contributed” to the employee’s injuries. (Hooker, at p. 202; McKown, at
    2
    Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, “an employer that provides compensation
    coverage has no further liability for workplace injuries to an employee. Therefore, if a
    nonnegligent third party pays damages for an employee’s injuries that are attributable in
    whole or in part to the negligence of the employer, the [Workers’ Compensation] Act’s
    limitations on employer liability preclude the third party from obtaining equitable
    indemnity from the employer.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 698.)
    7
    p. 222.) As the court explained, “Imposing tort liability on a hirer of an independent
    contractor when the hirer’s conduct has affirmatively contributed to the injuries of the
    contractor’s employee is consistent with the rationale of our decisions in Privette, Toland
    and Camargo [v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 1235
    ] because the liability of the hirer
    in such a case is not ‘ “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative’ in the sense that it derives
    from the ‘act or omission’ of the hired contractor.” ’ [Citation.] To the contrary, the
    liability of the hirer in such a case is direct in a much stronger sense of that term.”
    (Hooker, at pp. 211–212.)
    Hooker involved the death of a crane operator employed by a contractor hired by
    the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to construct an overpass. The
    decedent was killed when, after retracting the crane’s outriggers to allow construction
    vehicles to pass, he attempted to swing the boom without first reextending the outriggers,
    causing the crane to tip over. (Hooker, 
    supra,
     27 Cal.4th at p. 202.) The Supreme Court
    upheld summary judgment in favor of Caltrans against the decedent’s estate, finding the
    estate failed to raise triable issues of material fact that Caltrans affirmatively contributed
    to the decedent’s death. Although Caltrans had retained control over safety conditions at
    the worksite in permitting traffic to use the overpass, the court concluded Caltrans did not
    affirmatively contribute to the crane operator’s unsafe practice. (Id. at p. 215.)
    In a footnote, Hooker explained that affirmative contribution “need not always be
    in the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee. There will be
    times when a hirer will be liable for its omissions. For example, if the hirer promises to
    undertake a particular safety measure, then the hirer’s negligent failure to do so should
    result in liability if such negligence leads to an employee injury.” (Hooker, 
    supra,
    27 Cal.4th at p. 212, fn. 3.)
    In McKown, the employee of an independent contractor was injured by a defective
    forklift that belonged to the hirer and which the hirer asked the contractor to use in
    performing the work. (McKown, 
    supra,
     27 Cal.4th at p. 223.) McKown held that “when
    a hirer of an independent contractor, by negligently furnishing unsafe equipment to the
    contractor, affirmatively contributes to the injury of an employee of the contractor, the
    8
    hirer should be liable to the employee for the consequences of the hirer’s own
    negligence.” (Id. at p. 225.)
    In SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 590
     (SeaBright), the
    Supreme Court applied the Privette rule where a hirer failed to comply with Cal-OSHA
    workplace safety requirements concerning the precise subject matter of the contract, and
    the injury allegedly occurred as a consequence of that failure. In SeaBright, an airline
    hired a contractor to maintain and repair a conveyor used to move luggage, and an
    employee of the contractor was injured when his arm got caught in the conveyor.
    (SeaBright, at p. 594.) The conveyor lacked safety guards required by applicable
    regulations. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held the airline was not liable for the
    contractor’s employee’s injuries because the airline implicitly delegated to the contractor
    any tort law duty it owed to the contractor’s employees to ensure the safety of the specific
    workplace that was the subject of the contract, and this included any tort law duty the
    airline owed to the contractor’s employees to comply with applicable statutory or
    regulatory safety requirements. (Id. at p. 594.)
    With these authorities in mind, we now turn to Webcor’s claims of instructional
    error.
    B. Claims of Instructional Error
    Webcor argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CACI No. 1009B,
    which omits any language that a hirer “affirmatively contribute” to the plaintiff’s injury,
    and uses “substantial factor” causation in lieu of “affirmative contribution.” Webcor
    contends the trial court erred in rejecting its proposed instructions—one based on BAJI
    No. 8.30, and two special instructions further elaborating on affirmative contribution—
    which would have clearly and accurately informed the jury on the applicable law.
    Webcor also contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on negligence
    per se based on workplace safety regulations promulgated under Cal-OSHA because:
    (1) the jury was not first instructed to find affirmative contribution by Webcor; and
    (2) Webcor had delegated its Cal-OSHA responsibilities to ACCO in the subcontract.
    9
    “A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative instructions on
    every theory of the case advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence.”
    (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 
    8 Cal.4th 548
    , 572 (Soule).) “The independent or
    de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state
    the law [citations] and also whether instructions effectively direct a finding adverse to a
    defendant by removing an issue from the jury’s consideration.” (People v. Posey (2004)
    
    32 Cal.4th 193
    , 218.) “ ‘[I]n determining whether or not the instructions given are
    correct, we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the
    [cause of action or defense of] the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct
    instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in
    favor of the losing party.’ ” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 
    12 Cal.3d 663
    ,
    674.)
    “ ‘That is not to say, however, that a failure properly to instruct a jury is
    necessarily or inherently prejudicial.’ ” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004)
    
    117 Cal.App.4th 635
    , 655.) “[T]here is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’
    prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission
    or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case
    ‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall
    be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’
    [Citation.] . . . [¶] Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial ‘where it seems
    probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ ” (Soule, 
    supra,
     8 Cal.4th at
    p. 580.) “[A] ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an
    examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is
    reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
    reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836
    (Watson).)
    We address Webcor’s claims of instructional error in seriatim.
    10
    1. CACI No. 1009B
    CACI No. 1009B applies to claims against hirers for negligently retaining control
    over worksite safety. The instruction given by the trial court stated, in relevant part: “To
    establish this claim, Mr. Strouse must prove all of the following: [¶] 1. That Webcor
    Construction controlled the area of the worksite where James Strouse fell; and [¶] 2. That
    Webcor Construction retained control over safety conditions at the location where James
    Strouse fell; and [¶] 3. That Webcor Construction negligently exercised its retained
    control over safety conditions by failing to make sure the expansion joint covers were
    safe for people to walk over them; and [¶] 4. That James Strouse was harmed; and
    [¶] 5. That Webcor Construction’s negligent exercise of its retained control over safety
    conditions was a substantial factor in causing James Strouse’s harm.” The trial court
    gave CACI No. 430 to define “substantial factor.” It stated, in relevant part: “A
    substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to
    have contributed to the harm. It must be more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not
    have to be the only cause of harm. [¶] Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm
    if the same harm would have occurred without that conduct.”
    The crux of Webcor’s instructional error claim as to CACI No. 1009B is that it
    wrongly equates “substantial factor” causation with “affirmative contribution” even
    though they are distinct legal concepts.3 Webcor argues that the policies underlying the
    3
    In its reply brief, Webcor additionally contends that under Trejo v. Johnson (2017)
    
    13 Cal.App.5th 110
     (Trejo), the special verdict was defective because the trial court
    failed to submit a key element to the jury, and it cannot be inferred from the jury’s
    findings that it resolved this controverted issue. Strouse moved to strike this portion of
    Webcor’s reply brief as a new argument not raised in the opening brief, and ACCO
    joined the motion. We deferred ruling on the motion and ordered that it be considered
    with the appeal. We now grant it. Although Trejo was not available at the time Webcor
    filed its opening brief, the rule for which it is cited—that a special verdict is fatally
    defective if it does not allow the jury to resolve every controverted issue—is not new.
    (See Trejo, at pp. 136–137, citing Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014)
    
    222 Cal.App.4th 1228
    , 1240; Falls v. Superior Court (1987) 
    194 Cal.App.3d 851
    , 854–
    855.) Because Webcor did not raise this argument in its opening brief, it was improper
    11
    two standards are different, as the substantial factor test was chosen over the “but for”
    test to protect plaintiffs in comparative fault tort cases, while the affirmative contribution
    requirement was borne out of an effort to protect hirer defendants from lawsuits by
    employees of their subcontractors.
    This same argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Regalado v.
    Callaghan (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 582
     (Regalado). As in the instant matter, the jury in
    Regalado was instructed with CACI No. 1009B, and on appeal, the defendant argued that
    the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with his special instructions regarding
    Hooker’s affirmative contribution requirement. (Regalado, at pp. 591–592). The Court
    of Appeal held that the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s proposed special
    instructions because they were “somewhat misleading in that they suggest[ed] that in
    order for the hirer to ‘affirmatively contribute’ to the plaintiff’s injuries, the hirer must
    have engaged in some form of active direction or conduct. However, ‘affirmative
    contribution need not always be in the form of actively directing a contractor or
    contractor’s employee. There will be times when a hirer will be liable for its
    omissions.’ ” (Id. at p. 594, quoting Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 212, fn. 3.) The
    Regalado court also found support for its conclusion in the use note for CACI No.
    1009B, in which the Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions recognized the
    potential for confusion in the “affirmative contribution” language in CACI No. 1009B
    and stated the view that the “affirmative contribution” requirement simply requires
    causation between the hirer’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury under the “substantial
    factor” test, as set forth in CACI No. 1009B. (Regalado, pp. 594–595.)4
    for Webcor to raise this argument for the first time in its reply. (REO Broadcasting
    Consultants v. Martin (1999) 
    69 Cal.App.4th 489
    , 500.)
    4
    In Sandoval v. Qualcomm Inc. (2018) 
    28 Cal.App.5th 381
    , review granted
    January 16, 2019, S252796 (Sandoval), a differently-composed panel of the same court
    reaffirmed Regalado’s holdings that CACI No. 1009B is an accurate statement of the
    law, and that the affirmative contribution requirement simply “require[s] causation
    between the hirer’s retained control and the plaintiff’s resulting injury.” (Sandoval, at
    p. 417.)
    12
    Attempting to sidestep this holding, Webcor argues that Regalado “was really a
    sufficiency of the evidence case” and that the court’s discussion of CACI No. 1009B was
    “dicta.” This is incorrect. The portion of Regalado discussed above was not dictum
    because it was hardly “ ‘unnecessary to the decision in the case.’ ” (People v. Vang
    (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 1038
    , 1047, fn. 3.) Rather, it was part of the court’s rationale in
    rejecting the appellant’s express claim of instructional error. That it was one of several
    independent bases for affirming the judgment does not make it dictum.
    We acknowledge there are differing viewpoints among the courts that have
    touched upon this issue. (Compare Regalado, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594–595
    [relying on advisory committee’s use note to CACI No. 1009B] and Sandoval, supra,
    28 Cal.App.5th at p. 417 [same], with McCarty v. Department of Transportation (2008)
    
    164 Cal.App.4th 955
    , 977 [affirmative contribution requirement is “a limitation on the
    liability that the hirer would otherwise have” under common law negligence].) That said,
    it is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue today. Even if Webcor were correct that
    CACI No. 1009B’s use of substantial-factor-causation does not correctly state the law
    regarding affirmative contribution, Webcor must still demonstrate prejudice from the
    claimed error. (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 580–581.) We conclude any error did not
    result in a miscarriage of justice and was harmless.
    “[W]hen deciding whether an error of instructional omission was prejudicial, the
    court must also evaluate (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions,
    (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was
    misled.” (Soule, 
    supra,
     8 Cal.4th at pp. 580–581.)
    Here, the state of the evidence strongly supports the inference that the jury found
    Webcor to have affirmatively contributed to Strouse’s injury. Although in reviewing
    claims of instructional error, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    appellant (Regalado, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 594), some of the most probative
    testimony on this issue was undisputed and came from Webcor’s own safety manager and
    its safety expert. Both Villela and Harrell acknowledged that Webcor created the
    expansion joints and retained exclusive control over the maintenance and repair of the
    13
    safety covers, thereby prohibiting the subcontractors from maintaining or repairing the
    safety covers themselves. The evidence at trial also established that the accident took
    place in a general access area under Webcor’s control where subcontractors traversed for
    deliveries, and that Webcor retained control over safety in this area and knew about the
    problems with the safety covers in that area. Moreover, Villela testified it was reasonable
    for ACCO employees to trust that Webcor had properly installed, secured, and inspected
    the safety covers. Villela also admitted Webcor was responsible for conducting daily
    safety inspections of the worksite, though there was no documentation of inspections
    performed on the weekend before Strouse’s Monday morning accident.
    Additionally, the fact that the jury apportioned no fault to ACCO or Strouse and
    100 percent fault to Webcor necessarily establishes its determination that Webcor’s
    liability “is not ‘ “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative’ in the sense that it derives from
    the ‘act or omission’ of the hired contractor.” ’ ” (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 212.)
    In other words, it cannot be said, for purposes of applying Privette’s bar to liability, that
    the “sole factual basis” for Webcor’s liability was that it “failed to exercise a general
    supervisory power to require [ACCO] to correct an unsafe procedure or condition of
    [ACCO’s] own making” or that “there [was] no evidence that [Webcor’s] conduct
    contributed in any way” to the injury. (Hooker, 
    supra,
     at pp. 210–211.) On the contrary,
    Webcor’s affirmative act of prohibiting subcontractors from maintaining or repairing the
    safety covers, combined with its retention of control over safety in the general access area
    and its act of conducting daily inspections, reasonably induced the subcontractors and
    their employees to rely on the presumed adequacy of the safety covers in the line 53 area.
    Thus, the state of the evidence and the record here is amply distinguishable from that in
    Hooker, where Caltrans merely permitted the unsafe practices of the crane operator to
    continue, but was not shown to have contributed to the accident either through
    affirmative conduct or by inducing reliance. (Id. at p. 215.)
    We see nothing in counsel’s arguments at trial that may have capitalized on the
    claimed instructional error. Webcor cites portions of the closing argument of Strouse’s
    counsel in which he argued that CACI No. 1009B was “the key instruction” regarding
    14
    Webcor’s liability, and called the lack of inspections in the days before the accident “a
    big deal in this case.” But Strouse’s counsel also argued that Webcor negligently
    exercised its retained control over safety conditions by failing to make sure the safety
    covers were safe and secure; that the accident took place in a general access area that
    Webcor controlled; and that Webcor built, maintained, and was the responsible party for
    the condition of the safety covers. Meanwhile, Webcor’s counsel clarified in his closing
    argument that in order to find Webcor’s conduct was a substantial factor in Strouse’s
    injury, the jury had to find that Webcor provided “a substantial contribution to the harm,”
    which was more than simply “preventing [the condition] from existing.” Taken together,
    counsels’ arguments properly directed the jury to determine whether Webcor
    affirmatively contributed to the injury.
    Finally, there is no indication in the record of jury confusion. The jury requested
    no rereading of CACI No. 1009B, submitted no questions concerning the substantial
    factor standard,5 and requested no readback of any testimony pertinent to it. The jury
    deliberated for less than 90 minutes and unanimously found Webcor to be fully liable.
    After an examination of the entire cause, we conclude Webcor has not
    demonstrated a reasonable probability that it would have obtained a more favorable result
    in the absence of the claimed instructional error. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at
    p. 836; Soule, 
    supra,
     8 Cal.4th at pp. 580–581.) Thus, any perceived error regarding
    CACI No. 1009B was harmless.
    2. Webcor’s Modified BAJI No. 8.30
    Webcor further argues the trial court erred in rejecting its proposed instructions.
    The first proposed instruction was a modified version of BAJI No. 8.30, which stated, in
    pertinent part: “A hirer who retains control over safety conditions at the work site is not
    liable to employees of the subcontractor for injuries sustained at the work site, unless the
    5
    The jury had only two questions. The first was directed to question 7 on the
    special verdict form regarding the design of the expansion joint cover. The second was
    regarding damages and whether they could have an itemized list of the past medical
    expenses that were part of the stipulated amount presented to them.
    15
    hirer negligently exercised the retained control, and that negligent exercise affirmatively
    contributed to the employee’s injuries. . . . Examples of affirmative contribution include,
    but are not limited to: [¶] 1. Actively directing a contractor or employee about the
    manner of performance of the contracted work. [¶] 2. Directing that work to be done in a
    particular manner or otherwise interfering with the means and methods of accomplishing
    the work. [¶] When the hirer does not fully delegate the task of providing a safe working
    environment but in some manner actively participates in how the job is done, the hirer
    may be held liable to the employee if its participation affirmatively contributed to the
    employee’s injury. [¶] Passively permitting an unsafe condition to occur rather than
    directing it to occur does not constitute affirmative contribution. [¶] A failure to institute
    specific safety measures does not cause the hirer to be subject to liability unless the hirer
    had agreed to implement these measures. Thus, a failure to exercise retained control does
    not constitute affirmative contribution to the injury. An affirmative contribution must be
    based upon a negligent exercise of control. [¶] In order for James Strouse to recover
    against Webcor Construction, L.P., Webcor Construction, L.P. must engage in some
    active participation. While the passive permitting of an unsafe condition to occur is not
    an affirmative contribution, the act of directing that it occur, is active participation.”
    A trial court does not err in refusing to give instructions that are incomplete or
    erroneous, and the court is under no duty to revise a requested instruction to make it state
    the law correctly. (Tossman v. Newman (1951) 
    37 Cal.2d 522
    , 524–525 (Tossman).) Nor
    is it error to refuse to give instructions that are substantially covered by other proper
    instructions given by the court. (Id. at p. 525.) “Moreover, it is error to give, and proper
    to refuse, instructions that unduly overemphasize issues, theories or defenses either by
    repetition or singling them out or making them unduly prominent although the instruction
    may be a legal proposition.” (Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. East Bay Union of
    Machinists (1964) 
    227 Cal.App.2d 675
    , 718 (Fibreboard), citing Chutuk v. Southern
    Counties Gas Co. (1942) 
    21 Cal.2d 372
    , 381.)
    We conclude the trial court did not err in rejecting Webcor’s modified BAJI
    No. 8.30. Most of the relevant subject matter in this proposed instruction was adequately
    16
    covered by CACI No. 1009B, and as we have discussed, CACI No. 1009B’s use of
    substantial-factor-causation in lieu of the term “affirmative contribution,” even if
    erroneous, was not prejudicial.
    Moreover, Webcor’s modified BAJI No. 8.30 overemphasized the circumstances
    of a hirer’s nonliability and the need for active direction by a hirer in order to show
    affirmative contribution, making these defense theories and issues unduly prominent.
    (Fibreboard, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p. 718.) Another portion of Webcor’s modified
    BAJI No. 8.30 (“Passively permitting an unsafe condition to occur rather than directing it
    to occur does not constitute affirmative contribution”) was substantially similar to
    language that was criticized in Regalado. (See Regalado, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 591
    [special instruction no. 8].) We agree with Regalado that such language is “somewhat
    misleading in that [it] suggest[s] that in order for the hirer to ‘affirmatively contribute’ to
    the plaintiff’s injuries, the hirer must have engaged in some form of active direction or
    conduct.” (Id. p. 594; see Hooker, 
    supra,
     27 Cal.4th at p. 212, fn. 3.) Although portions
    of Webcor’s modified BAJI No. 8.30 contained correct statements of law, the trial court
    was not obligated to rewrite the instruction by eliminating the objectionable matter.
    (Tossman, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 525.) Given the objectionable content, it was not error
    for the trial court to refuse Webcor’s modified BAJI No. 8.30.6
    3. Webcor’s Special Instruction No. 2
    For similar reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to give
    Webcor’s proposed special instruction no. 2, which stated that Webcor, “as the hirer,
    owes no duty of care to James Strouse as an employee of [ACCO], a subcontractor, to
    prevent or correct unsafe procedures or practices to which the hirer did not contribute by
    direction, induced reliance, or other affirmative conduct. The mere failure to exercise the
    power to compel the subcontractor to adopt safer procedures does not, without more,
    6
    Webcor argues it remedied the problem identified in Regalado by clarifying in its
    proposed special instruction no. 3 that an omission may constitute affirmative
    contribution. However, as we discuss below, special instruction no. 3 contained
    objectionable language of its own, which impaired its ability to provide clarification to
    the other instructions.
    17
    violate any duty to James Strouse.” Portions of this instruction were substantially similar
    to language that was criticized in Regalado (see Regalado, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 590
    [special instruction no. 2]), and we agree that such language, combined with the
    objectionable language in Webcor’s modified BAJI No. 8.30, misleadingly suggested that
    a hirer must engage in active direction or conduct in order to affirmatively contribute to a
    plaintiff’s injuries. (Regalado, at p. 594.) The trial court was not obligated to rewrite
    special instruction no. 2 by eliminating the objectionable matter. (Tossman, supra, 37
    Cal.2d at p. 525.) Additionally, special instruction no. 2 was objectionable in that it
    repeated and compounded the overemphasis of Webcor’s defense theories. (Fibreboard,
    supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p. 718.)
    4. Webcor’s Special Instruction No. 3
    This proposed instruction, entitled “Affirmative Contribution: Definition of
    Omission,” stated: “Affirmative contribution need not always be in the form of actively
    directing a subcontractor or subcontractor’s employee. There will be times when a hirer
    will be liable for its omissions. For example, if the hirer promises to undertake a
    particular safety measure, then the hirer’s negligent failure to do so should result in
    liability if such negligence leads to a subcontractor employee’s injury. Such an omission
    occurs when the hirer reserves exclusive control over whether to take action to protect
    against potential construction-related hazards. Where either the hirer or subcontractor
    could take action, and the subcontract expressly delegated the hirer’s workplace safety
    responsibilities to the subcontractor, the hirer’s failure to exercise retained control is not a
    negligent exercise of control.”
    The first three sentences of Webcor’s special instruction no. 3 correctly state the
    law set forth in Hooker’s footnote 3 as to when an omission can constitute affirmative
    contribution. The next sentence, however, suggests that in order for “[s]uch an omission”
    to constitute affirmative contribution, the hirer must retain “exclusive control” over the
    safety measure or condition. This does not accurately reflect the law as stated in Hooker.
    As Strouse and ACCO point out, and Webcor acknowledges, the “exclusive
    control” language in special instruction no. 3 is derived from Brannan v. Lathrop Const.
    18
    Assoc., Inc. (2012) 
    206 Cal.App.4th 1170
     (Brannan). In that case, a bricklayer (Brannan)
    working for a masonry subcontractor (Bratton) was injured after he slipped on wet
    scaffolding and fell. Brannan sued the general contractor (Lathrop) for negligence and
    premises liability for coordinating work on a rainy day. Division One of this court
    affirmed summary judgment for Lathrop because it was undisputed that Lathrop did not
    direct Brannan’s work, did not direct him to climb over the scaffolding, and did not even
    know Brannan or other Bratton employees were climbing over the scaffolding in the
    manner they did. (Brannan, at pp. 1178–1179.) In so concluding, the court rejected
    Brannan’s reliance on Ray v. Silverado Constructors (2002) 
    98 Cal.App.4th 1120
     (Ray)
    by distinguishing it as a case in which the general contractor “had contractually reserved
    exclusive control over whether to close the roadway in order to protect motorists from
    potential construction-related hazards, and barred the subcontractor from closing it
    without the general’s written consent. [Citation.] Here, there was no dispute either
    Bratton or Lathrop could have called a rain day and Bratton’s subcontract expressly
    delegated Lathrop’s workplace safety responsibilities to Bratton without reservation.”
    (Brannan, at p. 1180.)
    Brannan, however, was simply distinguishing Ray and did not purport to set forth
    a requirement of “exclusive control” in order for a hirer’s omission to constitute
    affirmative contribution. And notably, the cited portion of Ray was not even about
    affirmative contribution; rather, it concerned whether the general contractor had retained
    control over the decision to close a roadway. (Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.)
    Brannan’s statement distinguishing inapposite case authority provides no support for
    Webcor’s proposed “exclusive control” instruction.7 (See Tait v. San Francisco (1956)
    
    143 Cal.App.2d 787
    , 792 [statement in opinion may be inapplicable in different case].)
    7
    Furthermore, even if a hirer’s exclusive control over a safety measure or condition
    were required in order for the hirer’s omission to affirmatively contribute to the
    plaintiff’s injury, Webcor was not prejudiced by the refusal to instruct the jury using this
    language. As discussed, the undisputed evidence established that Webcor did retain
    exclusive control over the condition of the safety covers.
    19
    The final sentence of Webcor’s special instruction no. 3 states that even if the
    hirer’s retained control is not exclusive (“Where either the hirer or subcontractor could
    take action. . . .”), the hirer nevertheless cannot be liable for an omission if the
    subcontract expressly delegated the hirer’s workplace safety responsibilities to the
    subcontractor. This sentence is objectionable because it would have improperly directed
    the jury’s attention to particular facts (i.e., the “sole” responsibility language in the
    Webcor–ACCO subcontract) and away from other evidence of the hirer’s conduct that
    affirmatively contributed to the employee’s injury. (See Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc.
    (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 1640
    , 1678 [instruction “should not draw the jury’s attention to
    particular facts”].) It also inaccurately restated Brannan, where the subcontract expressly
    delegated general contractor Lathrop’s safety responsibilities to subcontractor Bratton
    “without reservation.” (Brannan, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1180.) Thus, to the extent
    Webcor contends proposed special instruction no. 3 was appropriate based on Brannan,
    the instruction did not state the delegation must be “without reservation” and therefore
    did not correctly capture Brannan’s holding.8
    For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to give
    Webcor’s special instruction no. 3.
    5. Negligence Per Se
    The trial court instructed the jury on negligence per se under CACI No. 418. The
    instruction first provided the text of Cal-OSHA section 1632(a) and (b) (see ante, fn. 1),
    and then stated: “If you decide: [¶] 1) That Webcor Construction violated this law, and
    [¶] 2) That the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to James
    Strouse, then you must find that Webcor Construction was negligent. [¶] If you find that
    Webcor Construction did not violate this law or that the violation was not a substantial
    8
    In its reply brief, Webcor provides tables purporting to show how the challenged
    portions of special instruction no. 3 are derived verbatim from Brannan and Ray. This
    does not demonstrate error by the trial court in rejecting the proposed instruction. Indeed,
    the practice of taking excerpts from court opinions and “indiscriminately changing them
    into instructions to juries has been frequently criticized by the courts of this state.”
    (Fibreboard, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p. 718.)
    20
    factor in bringing about the harm, then you must still decide whether Webcor
    Construction was negligent in light of the other instructions that are given.”
    Webcor argues the trial court erred in giving the jury a negligence per se
    instruction because an alleged violation of a Cal-OSHA regulation cannot be the basis for
    civil liability against a general contractor where compliance with that regulation has been
    delegated to the subcontractor. Webcor relies on Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc. (2005)
    
    130 Cal.App.4th 52
    , and SeaBright, 
    supra,
     
    52 Cal.4th 590
    , for the proposition that the
    “Safe Place to Work” statute (Lab. Code, § 6400) and Cal-OSHA regulations do not
    create a duty of care to a party that is not a defendant’s own employee. This argument
    lacks merit for two reasons.
    First, the premise of Webcor’s argument is that the negligence per se instruction
    was necessarily used in this case to establish Webcor’s duty of care. But Webcor
    provides no factual foundation for this claim of error, i.e., it provides no record cite
    indicating Strouse or ACCO relied on the Cal-OSHA requirements to establish an
    independent duty of care, as opposed to the relevant standard of care. Under Labor Code
    section 6304.5, “[s]ections 452 and 669 of the Evidence Code shall apply to this division
    and to occupational safety and health standards adopted under this division in the same
    manner as any other statute, ordinance, or regulation.”9 In other words, “Cal-OSHA
    provisions are to be treated like any other statute or regulation and may be admitted to
    establish a standard or duty of care in all negligence and wrongful death actions,
    9
    “Evidence Code section 452 permits judicial notice of state statutes and
    regulations. [Citation.] Evidence Code section 669, subdivision (a) codifies the common
    law doctrine of negligence per se, under which statutes and regulations may be used to
    establish duties and standards of care in negligence actions: The failure of a person to
    exercise due care is presumed if: [¶] (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of
    a public entity; [¶] (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
    property; [¶] (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the
    statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) The person suffering
    the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose
    protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” (Millard v. Biosources, Inc.
    (2007) 
    156 Cal.App.4th 1338
    , 1350 (Millard).)
    21
    including third party actions.” (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 915
    , 928, italics
    added.)
    Second, we are unpersuaded by Webcor’s contention, based on SeaBright, that it
    was error to instruct the jury on negligence per se based on Cal-OSHA section 1632
    because compliance with this regulation was delegated to ACCO. Although the
    subcontract generally stated that ACCO was “solely responsible” for the safety of its own
    employees, other relevant evidence, including the testimony of Webcor site safety
    manager Villela and Webcor safety expert Harrell, explicitly established that Webcor did
    not delegate to its subcontractors the duty to maintain and repair the safety covers, and
    that Webcor was the controlling employer responsible for compliance with section 1632
    on the Project. This distinguishes SeaBright, where the airline was found to have
    implicitly delegated to the contractor the responsibility of complying with Cal-OSHA
    safety regulations pertaining to the very work-related condition (lack of safety guards
    over conveyors) that led to the plaintiff’s injury.
    Webcor further argues it was error to give a negligence per se instruction without
    first instructing the jury on affirmative contribution because, under Millard, supra,
    
    156 Cal.App.4th 1338
    , Cal-OSHA regulations have not abrogated the Privette doctrine,
    and the regulations are admissible only where other evidence establishes the general
    contractor affirmatively contributed to the employee’s injuries. (See Millard, supra,
    156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1350–1351.) As we have already discussed, the undisputed
    evidence amply established that Webcor affirmatively contributed to Strouse’s injuries,
    and the jury apportioned no fault to ACCO or Strouse while finding Webcor 100 percent
    at fault. Thus, the failure to instruct the jury regarding the precise language of
    “affirmative contribution,” even if erroneous, was harmless.
    For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in giving a negligence per
    se instruction.
    22
    C. ACCO’s Motion for Attorney Fees
    Webcor argues the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to ACCO because
    ACCO did not plead entitlement to attorney fees in its answer to the cross-complaint, and
    because it lacked standing to recover attorney fees paid by its insurance company.
    “We review an order granting or denying fees for an abuse of discretion. . . .
    ‘However, “ ‘[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied,
    i.e., in the “legal principles governing the subject of [the] action. . . .” Action that
    transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of
    discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’ ” (Graciano v. Robinson
    Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 
    144 Cal.App.4th 140
    , 148–149.)
    The prevailing party in an action or proceeding is entitled as a matter of right to
    recover costs, which includes attorney fees if authorized by contract. (Code Civ. Proc.,
    §§ 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A).) There is no dispute that the subcontract
    between Webcor and ACCO contained an attorney fee provision.10 Nor is there any
    dispute that ACCO was the prevailing party in Webcor’s cross-action for indemnity, as
    Webcor obtained no relief from ACCO. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(2), (4).)
    Contrary to Webcor’s first contention, a party is not required to plead entitlement
    to attorney fees as an item of damages in order to recover them in California. (Allstate
    Ins. Co. v. Loo (1996) 
    46 Cal.App.4th 1794
    , 1797–1798.) “It is now well settled that
    attorney fees, whether authorized by contract or statute, are recoverable under section
    1033.5, subdivision (a)(10) as an element of costs, and rather than claim attorney fees as
    10
    The attorney fee provision stated: “In the event the parties become involved in
    litigation or arbitration with each other arising out of this Agreement or other
    performance thereof in which the services of an attorney or other expert are reasonably
    required, the prevailing party shall be fully compensated for the cost of its participation in
    such proceedings, including the cost incurred for attorneys’ fees and experts’ fees.
    Unless judgment goes by default, the attorneys’ fees award shall not be computed in
    accordance with any court schedule, but shall be such as to fully reimburse all attorneys’
    fees actually incurred in good faith, regardless of the size of a judgment, it being the
    intention of the parties to [be] fully compensated for all attorneys’ fees and experts’ fees
    paid or incurred in good faith.”
    23
    an element of damages, the proper method to recover attorney fees is as an item of costs
    awarded upon noticed motion. [Citation.] Attorney fees based on a contract provision do
    not need to be demanded in the complaint.” (Chinn v. KMR Property Management
    (2008) 
    166 Cal.App.4th 175
    , 194 (Chinn), disapproved on other grounds in DeSaulles v.
    Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 1140
    , 1158.) Webcor
    cites no authority suggesting the rule should be any different for a cross-defendant in
    response to a cross-complaint.
    Webcor’s reliance on Wiley v. Rhodes (1990) 
    223 Cal.App.3d 1470
     (Wiley) is
    misplaced. In Wiley, the court reversed part of a default judgment awarding attorney fees
    and punitive damages against the defendants on the grounds that such award violated due
    process where the plaintiff had not alleged entitlement to attorney fees or punitive
    damages in the complaint, and no notice of the amount of punitive damages had been
    given to the defendants prior to entry of default. (Id. at p. 1473.) Here, however, the due
    process considerations involved in a default judgment have no application. “Due process
    is satisfied by a noticed motion for attorney fees, duly served on the opposing party.”
    (Chinn, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.)
    Webcor cites Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2004) 
    116 Cal.App.4th 694
    (Garamendi) as a non-default-judgment case where a different panel of this division
    found that an award of unpled attorney fees and damages violated the defendants’ due
    process rights. But Garamendi involved a unique situation in which the defendants—a
    subcontractor (Rampart) and its insurer (Golden Eagle)—answered the complaint,
    actively defended the case, but then abandoned the litigation after the subcontractor failed
    to reactivate its corporate status and the insurance company declined to intervene on its
    own behalf. Although Garamendi was not a default judgment case, it involved the same
    concerns about the defendants’ inability to anticipate their potential liability for unpled
    damages and attorney fees at the time they made the decision to forego litigating the case.
    (Garamendi, at pp. 708–709.) These concerns are entirely absent here. Webcor never
    withdrew from the case, and it cannot be said that Webcor had no ability to anticipate
    potential liability for attorney fees before they were awarded. Indeed, Webcor sought
    24
    attorney fees against ACCO in the prayer to its cross-complaint, so it knew from the
    inception of the cross-action that there was a contractual basis for the award of such fees
    to the prevailing party. And even then, fees were not awarded until after ACCO brought
    a noticed motion for attorney fees as costs, which Webcor opposed. Webcor’s attempt to
    derive due process considerations from Wiley and Garamendi is meritless.
    Webcor’s standing argument fares no better. In Staples v. Hoefke (1987)
    
    189 Cal.App.3d 1397
    , the court squarely held that the plaintiffs “were not entitled to
    avoid their contractual obligation to pay reasonable attorney fees based on the fortuitous
    circumstance that they sued a defendant who obtained insurance coverage providing a
    defense.” (Staples, at p. 1410; International Billing Services, Inc. v. Emigh (2000) 
    84 Cal.App.4th 1175
    , 1193–1194 [defendants entitled to attorney fees even though fees were
    paid by their employer].)
    Finally, Webcor cites Bramalea California, Inc. v. Reliable Interiors, Inc. (2004)
    
    119 Cal.App.4th 468
     (Bramalea) for the position that the award of attorney fees to
    ACCO constitutes a prohibited double recovery because ACCO suffered no out-of-pocket
    loss, and the collateral source rule does not apply because the cross-action was based in
    contract, not tort. In Bramalea, the court held that the collateral source rule (which
    allows an injured person to recover from the wrongdoer for damages suffered even if he
    has been compensated for the injury from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer)
    applies only to tort damages, not to damages for breach of contract due to punitive nature
    of the rule. (Bramalea, at pp. 472–473.) This discussion has no application to the instant
    case. The defendant/cross-complainant in Bramalea sought attorney fees against the
    cross-defendants as damages on its breach of contract claim, not as the prevailing party in
    the litigation, and the court’s decision was based on the inapplicability of the collateral
    source rule to contract actions and the fundamental principle that “[a] breach of contract
    is not actionable without damage.” (Id. at pp. 472–473.) ACCO did not seek attorney
    fees as compensation for contractual damages, but as costs to which it was entitled as the
    prevailing party in Webcor’s cross-action.
    25
    For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    awarding attorney fees to ACCO as the prevailing party in the cross-action.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Strouse and ACCO shall recover their costs on appeal.
    26
    _________________________
    Fujisaki, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Siggins, P.J.
    _________________________
    Petrou, J.
    A148863
    27
    Filed 4/23/19
    CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    JAMES STROUSE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A148863
    v.
    WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION, L.P.,                        (Alameda County
    Super. Ct. No. RG13670376)
    Defendant, Cross-complainant, and
    Appellant;                                        ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
    ACCO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS,                          FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
    Cross-defendant and Respondent.
    [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
    THE COURT:
    The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on March 27, 2019, was not
    certified for publication in the Official Reports. Upon due consideration, the request to
    publish the opinion, filed on April 15, 2019, is granted in part. Pursuant to California
    Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, the opinion is certified for publication with
    the exception of parts B.2, B.3, B.4, and C of the Discussion.
    There is no change in judgment.
    Dated: ______________                     _____________________________ P.J.
    1
    James Strouse v. Webcor Construction, L.P.
    (A148863)
    Trial court:       Alameda County
    Trial Judges:      Hon. Julia Spain
    Attorneys:         LeClairRyan, Robert G. Harrison, Christiane Kinney; Lynch Gilardi
    & Grummer, William Alexander Bogdan, Andrew Spaulding;
    Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Appellant.
    Gerald A. Clausen; Jonathan Brand for Plaintiff and Respondent;
    Foley Mansfield, Keith M. Ameele, Louis C. Klein, Margaret I.
    Johnson for Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
    2