Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods v. Salinas Union High School Dist. ( 2019 )


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  • Filed 4/26/19
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    TANIMURA & ANTLE FRESH FOODS,                     H045470
    INC.,                                            (Monterey County
    Super. Ct. No. 16CV000616)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    SALINAS UNION HIGH SCHOOL
    DISTRICT,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    In this appeal we consider whether a school district acted reasonably in imposing
    school impact fees on a new residential development project intended to house adult
    seasonal farmworkers employed by the company. The trial court found that there was no
    reasonable relationship between the fee and the project’s impact on school enrollment
    and so granted the developer’s petition for writ of mandate to refund the fees. The school
    district contends this was error because the authorizing statute does not require that
    school districts anticipate and analyze specific use cases for subtypes of residential
    housing, e.g., adult employees only. Rather, the law requires a reasonable relationship
    between the fee’s use, the need for the school facilities, and the type of development
    project—in this case, residential. The district also contends that the potentially
    discriminatory exclusion of children from a new residential development should not form
    an escape hatch for the developer to avoid paying mitigation fees under the statute.
    We find, as explained herein, that the statutes governing the imposition of school
    impact fees do not require a school district to separately analyze the impact of a unique
    subtype of residential construction not contemplated in the statute. To hold otherwise
    would disrupt the school district’s quasi-legislative authority to impose prospective,
    districtwide fees based upon development type. In this case, the school district properly
    determined a reasonable relationship between the fee imposed and new residential
    construction as the type of development. We conclude that it did not act arbitrarily in
    imposing the resulting fee on the agricultural employee housing project. We will
    therefore reverse the judgment.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    This case is situated at the intersection of two statutes. One is the Mitigation Fee
    Act, codified as Government Code sections 66000 through 66003.1 This statute requires
    local agencies seeking to impose fees on private developers as a condition of approval of
    a development project to determine how there is a “reasonable relationship” between the
    type of development project, the fee’s use, and the need for the public facilities.
    (§§ 66000, subd. (b), 66001, subd. (a)(3) & (4).)
    The other statute comprises detailed legislation governing the imposition of school
    impact fees on private development projects. (Ed. Code, § 17620; Gov. Code, §§ 65995,
    65995.5, 65995.7.) The Legislature has declared the financing of school facilities and the
    mitigation of development-related impacts on the need for school facilities to be “matters
    of statewide concern.” (§ 65995, subd. (e).) State statute authorizes a school district to
    levy fees on new construction in its service area for school facilities to accommodate a
    growing student population. To impose a school impact fee, a school district must
    determine the reasonable relationship required under the Mitigation Fee Act.
    A.       The Agricultural Employee Housing Project
    Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc. (T&A), is the developer of a 100-unit
    agricultural employee housing complex (the project) located within the boundaries of the
    1
    Unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code.
    2
    Salinas Union High School District (the District) in Monterey County.2 T&A designed
    the project to accommodate between 200 and 800 of the company’s seasonal and migrant
    farmworker employees in two-bedroom, dormitory-like apartment units during the
    approximately seven-month Salinas Valley growing season. The project description
    stated that it was designed for “ ‘agricultural employees only, without dependents.’ ” In
    May 2015, T&A applied to the County of Monterey for a combined development permit
    for the project. A report prepared for the county board of supervisors found that the
    project “for employees without dependents” would “not have an adverse impact on
    schools.”
    The county board of supervisors approved the project in September 2015. The
    board issued a resolution to adopt a mitigated negative declaration under CEQA3 and to
    approve a combined development permit consisting of a general development plan,
    administrative permit, and design approval “to allow the construction of a 100 unit
    agricultural employee housing complex comprised of two bedroom apartment units and
    related facilities . . . .” The project was approved subject to enumerated conditions,
    which in relevant part described the development for “agricultural employees only
    without dependents” and advised that any use “not in substantial conformance with the
    terms and conditions of this permit” would violate county regulations and require the
    approval of additional permits, including an amendment to the general development plan.
    As a condition of project approval, T&A executed an agreement with the county
    specifying in relevant part the developer’s obligation to comply with the conditions of
    2
    The factual background is drawn from the evidence admitted at trial. We take
    judicial notice of those matters properly noticed by the superior court as set forth in its
    intended statement of decision filed on September 8, 2017. (Evid. Code, § 459,
    subd. (a).)
    3
    California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Res. Code, § 21050 et seq.).
    3
    approval. The agreement was recorded in the county recorder’s office on September 3,
    2015, to be construed as a covenant running with the land.
    B.     Adoption of School Impact Fees
    Around the same time that T&A applied for project approval, the governing board
    of the District adopted a “Level 2” school impact fee on new residential construction in
    its service area. A Level 2 fee requires the school district to demonstrate need based on
    statutory prerequisites.4 (§ 65995.5, subd. (b).) Here, the District’s consultant prepared a
    school facilities needs analysis (SFNA or needs analysis) under the statutory guidelines
    and concluded that the District was authorized to collect Level 2 fees of $3 per square
    foot of residential development, based on a projection of the residential units to be built
    in the district over five years. The District voted to adopt the SFNA and to establish the
    Level 2 fee on residential construction within the grade 7 through 12 service area of the
    District for the 2015-2016 fiscal year.
    The parties disputed the applicability of the Level 2 fee to the project. T&A
    eventually tendered the fee amount of $294,210 to the District under protest. (§ 66020,
    subd. (a) [procedures to protest imposition of fees].)
    C.     Petition for Writ of Mandate and Court Trial
    T&A filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Monterey County Superior Court
    seeking declaratory relief and a refund of the fee paid, plus interest. T&A challenged the
    Level 2 fee under section 66001 as not reasonably related to the need for school facilities.
    It stressed that the project’s design and approval for agricultural employees only, without
    dependents, meant that it would not generate new students for the district. Since the
    4
    There are several alternative statutory formulas that dictate the maximum fee a
    school district can impose for each square foot of new construction. (§§ 65995, 65995.5,
    65995.7.) These are commonly known as Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fees. (Cresta
    Bella, LP v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2013) 
    218 Cal. App. 4th 438
    , 443 (Cresta
    Bella).)
    4
    employees-only designation was among the conditions recorded on title, T&A argued
    that the project was “not the typical type of residential project” covered by the District’s
    needs analysis.
    In support of its position that the project would not impact local schools, T&A
    filed the declaration of vice president Wesley Van Camp. Van Camp, charged with
    managing the planning, permitting, construction, and occupancy of the agricultural
    employee housing project, declared that the “vast majority” of T&A’s seasonal/migrant
    farmworker employees “have families and permanent homes outside of Monterey
    County.” Van Camp explained that employees leave their children at home when they
    come to work for T&A during the Salinas Valley growing season, from April through the
    end of October, and sometimes both parents come to work for T&A and leave children at
    home with other relatives. T&A also filed the excerpted deposition testimony of Kevin
    Sullivan, the designated PMK (person most knowledgeable) for the consulting firm that
    performed the District’s SFNA, to show that the student generation rate analysis for the
    SFNA did not consider any kind of residential development that does not allow children.
    The District responded that the reasonable relationship requirement applies to the
    type of development project on which the fee is imposed, not to a specific development.
    School districts otherwise would have “to somehow anticipate and separately analyze . . .
    every conceivable variation of residential development that might be proposed, including
    even legally questionable permutations, during the year-long life-span of a district’s
    developer fee.” The District argued that school districts are not required to anticipate
    alternate housing types or to determine whether a project actually generates enrollment at
    the rate anticipated by the needs analysis. The District pointed to express statutory
    exemptions for government-financed migrant worker housing (§ 65995.1, subd. (b)) as
    support for the argument that nonexempt housing types are included within the general
    class of residential development.
    5
    The District also contended based in part on a passage in the board’s resolution
    and on the deposition testimony of the county’s resource manager that the “adult
    employees only” designation was not a condition of the project. According to the
    District, the county recognized the potentially discriminatory ramification of excluding
    children and so determined that T&A would submit the occupancy limitation in its
    project description, which the county would merely approve. T&A objected to the
    District’s references to housing discrimination and to its proffer of related evidence as
    irrelevant and inadmissible.
    At a bench trial, counsel for T&A clarified that it was not challenging the
    District’s needs analysis generally, but only the reasonable relationship between the fee
    “and this particular type of project.” Counsel for the District countered that unlike a
    project’s physical composition, a property owner’s intent for use of the property does not
    create a different “type” or class of development, especially when that intent may be
    unlawful. The District urged the court to consider the evidence of the county’s
    “uncomfortable solution” for approving the project and argued that if families were later
    allowed to live there, the District would have no clear legal authority or statutory
    mechanism to recover appropriate school impact fees.
    D.     Order Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate to Refund Fees
    The trial court entered an intended statement of decision in favor of T&A. The
    court cited three Court of Appeal decisions that led “to the inescapable conclusion
    that . . . there are no facts to support a reasonable relationship between the fees and the
    project’s impact on school enrollment.” The decisions are Shapell Industries, Inc. v.
    Governing Board (1991) 
    1 Cal. App. 4th 218
    (Shapell), Warmington Old Town Associates
    v. Tustin Unified School Dist. (2002) 
    101 Cal. App. 4th 840
    (Warmington), and Cresta
    
    Bella, supra
    , 
    218 Cal. App. 4th 438
    .
    The trial court reasoned that although section 66001, subdivision (a) directs a
    school district to determine the required reasonable relationship based on “type” of
    6
    development, “case law—and common sense—preclude the application of an overbroad
    label in a fee study that does not account for a project’s actual impact.” The court
    explained that the SFNA “lumped all residential development into one category of
    ‘residential construction’ without taking into account that no children would live in this
    type of development.” It sustained T&A’s objections to the evidence related to housing
    discrimination, finding it was not relevant, and interpreted the conditions of approval as
    showing “that the County’s approval prohibit[ed] occupation of the housing project by
    anyone other than adult employees.”
    After additional briefing by the parties, the trial court issued a minute order stating
    that it had not modified its intended statement of decision which became the final
    statement of decision. The court issued a final order and judgment and peremptory writ
    of mandamus on November 8, 2017. This appeal followed.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    The District, supported by amici curiae briefs from the Coalition for Adequate
    School Housing and Education Legal Alliance of the California School Boards
    Association, contends that if the trial court’s ruling is upheld, it will have wide-ranging
    implications for school funding. They claim that to avoid paying school impact fees,
    developers can characterize projects as a different “type” than that covered by the fee
    analysis, for which a fee has been established. T&A responds that to impose fees on a
    project that does not burden schools is contrary to the reasonable relationship
    requirement, which evolved as a principle of takings law to protect landowners and
    private developers from fees imposed as a condition of development that bear little or no
    relationship to the impact on public facilities. (See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996)
    
    12 Cal. 4th 854
    , 860 (Erlich) [examining application of the “ ‘essential nexus’ ” and
    “ ‘rough proportionality’ ” requirements set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal
    Comm’n (1987) 
    483 U.S. 825
    and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 
    512 U.S. 374
    to
    development fees as a permit condition].)
    7
    A.     Statutory Framework
    School impact fees emerged as a way for local governments to accommodate
    growing student populations perpetuated by new development. 
    (Shapell, supra
    , 1
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 225-226.) Fees imposed on developers to cover the costs of new
    school facilities “were generally considered to be a valid exercise of the police power
    under the California Constitution (Cal. Const. art. XI, § 7), so long as the local entity
    could demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the fee imposed and the need for
    increased facilities created by the development.” 
    (Shapell, supra
    , at p. 226; see also
    Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 
    4 Cal. 4th 911
    , 917 (Grupe).)
    In 1986, the Legislature “substantially revised and expanded” early statutory
    authorization for school impact fees imposed by local government. 
    (Shapell, supra
    , 1
    Cal.App.4th at p. 226.) It established what it declared was “a reasonable method of
    financing the expansion and construction of school facilities resulting from new
    economic development within the district.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 887, § 7(e), p. 3080.) The
    “comprehensive multibill package . . . consolidated the legal authority for assessment of
    developer fees for school facilities into a single body of law.” 
    (Shapell, supra
    , at p. 226.)
    The provisions enabled school districts to impose districtwide fees within specified limits
    and restricted the issuance of building permits absent certification that the appropriate
    school impact fee had been paid. (Ibid., citing former Gov. Code, § 53080.)5
    Education Code section 17620 authorizes a school district governing board to levy
    fees against construction within the boundaries of the district to fund the construction or
    reconstruction of school facilities, subject to the limitations set forth in Government Code
    5
    Later legislative enactments repealed Government Code section 53080 et seq.
    and effectively replaced it with provisions added to the Education Code. (See Stats.
    1996, ch. 277, § 3, p. 2180 [adding Ed. Code, § 17620], §§ 7-14, p. 2219 [repealing Gov.
    Code § 53080 et seq.], § 15, p. 2219 [stating that the provisions added are substantially
    the same as existing provisions relating to the same subject matter].)
    8
    section 65995 et seq. The authorization applies to “new residential construction” (Ed.
    Code, § 17620, subd. (a)(1)(B)) and, with exceptions, to “new commercial and industrial
    construction” (id., § 17620, subd. (a)(1)(A)). The relevant Government Code provisions
    cap the amount of the fee that may be imposed per square foot of new residential
    construction based upon the criteria met by the school district. (§§ 65995, 65995.5,
    65995.7.) Level 2 fees, at issue here, come under section 65995.5.
    “Section 65995.5 provides for a Level 2 fee that may be used when the school
    district meets certain statutorily specified criteria that show a particular need for
    additional funds for school construction.” (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 445-446.) To be eligible to adopt a Level 2 fee, the school district must “[c]onduct
    and adopt a school facility needs analysis pursuant to Section 65995.6.” (§ 65995.5,
    subd. (b)(2).) The SFNA is designed “to determine the need for new school facilities for
    unhoused pupils that are attributable to projected enrollment growth from the
    development of new residential units over the next five years.”6 (§ 65995.6, subd. (a).)
    The projection is “based on the historical student generation rates of new residential units
    constructed during the previous five years that are of a similar type of unit to those
    anticipated to be constructed . . . , and relevant planning agency information, such as
    multiphased development projects, that may modify the historical figures.” (§ 65995.6,
    subd. (a), italics added.) The school district calculates the maximum Level 2 fee that may
    be imposed per square foot of residential construction using a statutory formula; the fee
    ultimately “reflects only a portion of the estimated new facilities costs generated” by the
    projection in the needs analysis. (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , at p. 446; see § 65995.5,
    subds. (c), (h).)
    6
    “ ‘Unhoused pupils’ ” are students who lack seats in existing school facilities.
    (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 446, fn. 4.)
    9
    The statute limits the expenditure of Level 2 fees to “solely . . . the school
    facilities identified in the needs analysis as being attributable to projected enrollment
    growth from the construction of new residential units.” (§ 65995.5, subd. (f).) This
    restriction mirrors in part the broader reasonable relationship requirement for developer
    fees under the Mitigation Fee Act.
    The Mitigation Fee Act applies to a monetary exaction imposed by a local agency
    as a condition of approval of a development project to defray public facility costs related
    to the project. (§ 66000, subd. (b); 
    Ehrlich, supra
    , 12 Cal.4th at p. 865.) It “was passed
    by the Legislature ‘in response to concerns among developers that local agencies were
    imposing development fees for purposes unrelated to development projects.’ ” (
    Ehrlich, supra
    , at p. 864.) Section 66001 requires the local agency to identify the purpose of the
    fee and the use to which the fee will be put. (§ 66001, subd. (a)(1), (2).) The agency
    must also determine that both “the fee’s use” (§ 66001, subd. (a)(3)) and “the need for the
    public facility” are reasonably related to “the type of development project on which the
    fee is imposed.” (Id., subd. (a)(4).)
    The court in Shapell invoked a three-part standard to determine compliance with
    the nexus requirement in the context of school impact fees. 
    (Shapell, supra
    , 1
    Cal.App.4th at p. 235.) The school district must show that it (1) projected the total
    amount of new housing expected to be built within the district, (2) estimated how many
    students will be generated by the new housing, and (3) estimated what it will cost to
    provide the necessary school facilities for that approximate number of new students.
    (Ibid.) For a general fee applied to all new residential development, a site-specific
    showing is neither available nor needed. (Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified
    School Dist. (1992) 
    3 Cal. App. 4th 320
    , 334 (Garrick).) Instead, “[t]his showing may
    properly be derived from districtwide estimations concerning anticipated new residential
    development and impact on school facilities. [Citations.] The district is not required to
    evaluate the impact of a particular development project before imposing fees on a
    10
    developer; rather, the required nexus is established based on the justifiable imposition of
    fees ‘on a class of development projects rather than particular ones.’ ” (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 447, quoting 
    Garrick, supra
    , at p. 335.)
    B.     Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
    The District’s establishment of the Level 2 fee on new residential development
    was a quasi-legislative action. (SummerHill Winchester LLC v. Campbell Union School
    Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 545, 552 (SummerHill).) Judicial review of the District’s
    action proceeds “under the narrower standards of ordinary mandate.” (Home Builders
    Assn. of Tulare/Kings Counties, Inc. v. City of Lemoore (2010) 
    185 Cal. App. 4th 554
    , 561
    (Home Builders); 
    SummerHill, supra
    , at p. 552.) This limited review recognizes the
    legislative delegation of authority to the District and its presumed expertise within its
    scope of authority. 
    (Shapell, supra
    , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; 
    Garrick, supra
    , 3
    Cal.App.4th at p. 328.) We determine only whether the District’s action was arbitrary,
    capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. (Home 
    Builders, supra
    , at p. 561;
    
    SummerHill, supra
    , at p. 674; 
    Garrick, supra
    , at p. 328.) We proceed as a matter of law
    and accord no deference to the trial court’s decision. (
    SummerHill, supra
    , at p. 675;
    
    Shapell, supra
    , at p. 233.)
    A school district establishing a school impact fee “has the initial burden of
    producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it used a valid method for imposing the
    fee in question, one that established a reasonable relationship between the fee charged
    and the burden posed by the development.” (Home 
    Builders, supra
    , 185 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 561.) If the district meets its burden, the developer challenging the fee must “show
    that the record before the local agency clearly did not support the underlying
    determinations regarding the reasonableness of the relationship between the fee and the
    development.” (Ibid.; accord Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.) We will
    therefore uphold the imposition of the Level 2 fee on T&A’s project if the District
    adequately considered all relevant factors and demonstrated a rational connection
    11
    between those factors, the decision to enact the fee, and the purposes of the enabling
    statute. (Home 
    Builders, supra
    , at p. 561; 
    SummerHill, supra
    , 30 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 674-675.)
    C.       Analysis
    The District frames the question on appeal by asking whether a real estate
    developer can “avoid paying school impact fees by professing an intention to employ the
    potentially illegal tactic of excluding families from a new residential development?” It
    challenges T&A’s characterization of the project “as a ‘unique sub-type of migrant
    farmworker employee housing,’ ” arguing there is no statutory authority for a developer
    to “create a separate ‘type’ of residential development by merely declaring an intention to
    exclude families.” Amici curiae supporting the District further argue that the trial court’s
    ruling improperly creates a de facto, nonstatutory exemption for atypical housing projects
    that fall outside the range of project data covered by the school district’s fee analysis.
    T&A responds that imposition of the Level 2 fee on the project in this case was
    arbitrary and lacked evidentiary support because any nexus between the fee and the
    school facilities necessitated by residential development in the district did not extend to
    T&A’s agricultural employees-only project, which it argues was not a type of residential
    development analyzed by the District’s needs analysis. T&A disagrees that the
    developer’s intent or any evidence related to a discrimination argument is relevant, since
    the condition pertaining to adult employees only is specified in the county’s approval of
    the project and is recorded on title as part of the development plan.
    1.       Developer “Intent” Does Not Drive the Determination of Project “Type”
    We dispel the notion that T&A’s intent not to house children in the proposed
    project dominates the reasonable relationship analysis. The premise of the District’s
    argument is that the county avoided conditioning its approval of the project on a
    potentially unlawful restriction against children and families; nevertheless, the trial court
    12
    credited the developer’s intent to exclude families while refusing to consider the
    potentially discriminatory nature of that exclusion.
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining T&A’s objections to the
    evidence regarding discrimination. Both parties recognize that whether the project’s
    adults-only designation could be challenged under fair housing laws is not at issue in this
    case. Instead, the District seeks to show that the county’s approval of the project was
    formulated to refrain from imposing a condition that would preclude children, due to
    concerns about discrimination.
    The District relies on a statement in the mitigated negative declaration finding in
    the board resolution approving the project. It says, “The project is not conditioned to
    preclude residents with children as this is what was requested in the application and
    evaluated in the Initial Study.”7 The District argues that the trial court improperly
    excluded evidence that provided context for this statement and revealed the county’s
    concern about potential discrimination. For example, the District proffers the deposition
    testimony of the county’s resource management agency manager, who testified that “[w]e
    came to the uncomfortable solution . . . that the request to limit the occupants would
    come from the applicant and the county would simply be responding to the applicant’s
    request. And so the county would not be in a position of conditioning a project to
    exclude anybody.” The District maintains that the excluded evidence was relevant both
    to challenge T&A’s claim that families would not be allowed based on the project
    7
    The cited statement appears in a finding responding to public comment related to
    the impact on public services. The entire passage reads: “The Initial Study evaluated
    that no students would be generated by the project because the project is defined as
    employee housing with no dependents. The applicant has alternative housing available
    for employees with families . . . . The project is not conditioned to preclude residents
    with children as this is what was requested in the application and evaluated in the Initial
    Study. Any change to this would require an amendment to this Combined Development
    Permit.” (Italics added.)
    13
    approval and to illustrate why the District was not required to anticipate and analyze the
    school facilities impact of a housing subtype that is potentially unlawful.
    The District’s focus on the county’s ostensible effort to sidestep the exclusionary
    condition distracts from what was actually approved. The conditions of approval for the
    combined development permit plainly state that “[t]he project is for agricultural
    employees only, without dependents.” This condition is reinforced throughout the board
    resolution approving the project, including in the project description findings, the
    consistency findings, and the mitigated negative declaration findings.8 What is more, the
    conditions of approval are recorded in an agreement between T&A and the county, which
    by its terms is given binding effect as a covenant running with the land. Any change to
    these conditions would require an amendment to the combined development permit.
    By contrast, the statement touted by the District as showing the project was not
    conditioned to preclude residents with children appears only once, in a paragraph
    responding to public comment related to the impact on public services. It is, at best,
    ambiguous in meaning and contradictory of the condition of approval which states that
    the project is for agricultural employees only, without dependents. This evidence does
    not negate the conditions of approval and the recorded agreement. Accordingly, we find
    8
    For example, the project description findings note that T&A “provides housing
    for employees with dependents at other locations . . . .” The consistency finding
    references a county ordinance for farmworker housing and explains that “[n]o children’s
    play area is provided because it is expected that the occupants of the units will be
    employees without dependents.” The findings in response to public comment about
    compliance with federal and state housing guidelines, as well as about impacts on the
    affected elementary school district (which is not the subject of this case), state that
    federal guidelines referring to rural development of multi-family rental housing units do
    not apply, that “[i]f families occupy the units, the applicant would be required to apply
    for an amendment to the General Development Plan,” and that “[i]f the project
    description ever changes, the applicant will be required to apply for an amendment to the
    [general development plan] which would trigger additional environmental review and
    consideration of the impact on schools.”
    14
    that it is not the developer’s stated intent but the recorded terms of government agency
    approval that determine project “type” for purposes of the reasonable relationship
    analysis under the applicable statutes.
    2. The Statutory Scheme Does Not Mandate Analysis of the Adult
    Employees-only Housing Project as a Distinct “Type” of Residential
    Development
    We turn to whether the District was required to separately analyze the projected
    impact of agricultural employee-only housing on school facilities as a “type” of
    residential development under the reasonable relationship test. The pivotal issue is how
    the reasonable relationship requirement under section 66001 applies in this scenario.
    The District and amici curiae stress that designation of the project as agricultural
    employee housing does not qualify it as a separate “type” of residential development
    within the meaning of section 66001 and outside the scope of the Level 2 fee for new
    residential construction. The District emphasizes that the statutory language and case
    authority do not require project-specific reasonable relationship findings for the
    imposition of a districtwide school impact fee. The District also points to exceptions in
    the statute for certain types of development, including government-financed agricultural
    migrant worker housing, to show that non-excepted types of development come within
    the umbrella of residential construction.
    T&A relies on the same statutory language as support for its contention that the
    District’s SFNA findings simply do not address an adult employees-only type of housing
    that will not generate additional students for the district. T&A requests that this court
    take judicial notice of local code sections that define “agricultural employee housing” as
    a housing type. T&A also cites the Warmington and Cresta Bella decisions as
    reinforcement for its position that a school district’s reasonable relationship findings do
    not support the imposition of school impact fees where the fee study does not address the
    15
    type of construction being proposed, even if the study adequately addresses the projected
    impact of residential development generally.
    There is no dispute for purposes of this appeal that the District was authorized to
    establish a school impact fee to fund facilities necessitated by new residential
    development in the District’s service area.9 T&A’s protest action challenges the fee “as
    applied” to the project, arguing that the District incorrectly assumed that all “residential
    development projects, regardless of type” would generate additional students for the
    district. T&A does not contest, as a general matter, the District’s adoption of the Level 2
    fee based on the District’s needs analysis.
    The trial court took a similar view, finding “no facts to support a reasonable
    relationship between the fees and the project’s impact on school enrollment” since “no
    children would live in this type of development.” The court rejected “an overbroad label
    in a fee study that does not account for a project’s actual impact.” The trial court’s
    reasoning is logically sound and thoughtfully articulated. We find, however, that it fails
    to reconcile its project-specific focus with the controlling statutes. As stated earlier, we
    accord no deference to the trial court’s decision and review the District’s action only to
    determine whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or lacking evidentiary support.
    (
    SummerHill, supra
    , 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 552-553.)
    We are not convinced that the unique or atypical designation of a residential
    development—in this case restricting occupancy to seasonal farmworkers without
    dependents—qualifies it for separate consideration as a “type” of residential development
    under the relevant statutes. “In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to determine
    and give effect to the underlying purpose of the law. [Citation.] ‘Our first step is to
    9
    Other grounds raised in T&A’s petition for writ of mandate and complaint
    challenging the Level 2 fee imposed against it, including timeliness, are not at issue in
    this appeal.
    16
    scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense
    meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘ “If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to
    or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or
    from its legislative history.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, we are not free to ‘give words
    an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.’ ” (Goodman v.
    Lozano (2010) 
    47 Cal. 4th 1327
    , 1332.) Furthermore, “[t]he words of the statute must be
    construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory
    sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each
    other, to the extent possible. [Citations.] Where uncertainty exists consideration should
    be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.” (Dyna-Med,
    Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 
    43 Cal. 3d 1379
    , 1387 (Dyna-Med).)
    “To determine the most reasonable interpretation of a statute, we look to its legislative
    history and background.” (Goodman v. 
    Lozano, supra
    , at p. 1332.)
    The Mitigation Fee Act broadly defines “development project” as “any
    project undertaken for the purpose of development.” (§ 66000, subd. (a).) This makes
    sense because section 66001 is not limited to school impact fees but “governs a wide
    range of local agency actions taken under differing statutory requirements.” (
    Garrick, supra
    , 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 336.) There are two ways that a local agency—here the
    District—can satisfy the Mitigation Fee Act’s “reasonable relationship” requirement for
    the imposition of developer fees. Section 66001, subdivision (a) requires in relevant part
    the determination of a reasonable relationship between both “the fee’s use and the type of
    development project on which the fee is imposed” (id., subd. (a)(3)) and “the need for the
    public facility and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.” (Id.,
    subd. (a)(4).) Section 66001, subdivision (b) requires the more specific determination of
    “a reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee and the cost of the public
    facility or portion of the public facility attributable to the development on which the fee is
    imposed.”
    17
    In Garrick, the Court of Appeal explained that section 66001, subdivision (a)’s
    reference to “use and need in relation to a ‘type’ of development project . . . applies to an
    initial, quasi-legislative adoption of development fees” (
    Garrick, supra
    , 3 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 336), whereas section 66001, subdivision (b) “applies to adjudicatory, case-by-case
    actions” (ibid.). The difference between subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 66001 is
    revealing because only the latter demands information pertaining to an individual
    development. (
    Garrick, supra
    , at pp. 335-336.) By contrast, section 66001,
    subdivision (a) “clearly applies to decisions to impose fees on a class of development
    projects rather than particular ones.” (
    Garrick, supra
    , at p. 335.) “The fact that
    subdivision (a) speaks of a relationship between the use and need on one hand and the
    ‘type’ of development on the other . . . defeats any argument that some nexus must be
    found between the fee and a particular project on which it is imposed.” (Ibid.)
    We emphasize the language of section 66001, subdivision (a) because T&A’s
    briefing on appeal at times blurs this distinction, suggesting that the District needed to
    identify a reasonable relationship “between the purpose of the fee, the amount of the fee,
    and the projected impacts of the project the fee is imposed on.” That depiction is subtly
    inaccurate. The District’s adoption of a prospective, districtwide Level 2 fee was
    quasi-legislative. As shown above, the plain language of section 66001, subdivision (a)
    focuses the reasonable relationship test on “type” or class of development and the fee’s
    use and need for the facility (§ 66001, subd. (a)), not on the project itself (cf. § 66001,
    subd. (b)). Viewed in relation to “development project” as defined in section 66000, use
    of the word “type” in section 66001, subdivision (a)(3) and (a)(4) provides the agency a
    realistic means of fulfilling its statutory mandate to determine reasonableness when
    adopting a fee of general applicability. In other words, “type” in the context of
    section 66001, subdivision (a) allows an agency to impose a general fee reasonably
    related to projected development impacts without tying its analysis to an individual
    18
    project. It is a generic enabler for an agency to proceed with a quasi-legislative
    determination.
    To discern what a “type” of development project means in any specific context—
    here the imposition of school impact fees—requires us to look beyond section 66001 to
    the statutory framework governing the subject of the fee. In doing so, we attempt to
    construe the statutory provisions in a way that is internally consistent and reasonable in
    view of the statute’s plain meaning, legislative history, and background (Goodman v.
    
    Lozano, supra
    , 47 Cal.4th at p. 1332), paying in this case close attention to the
    Legislature’s treatment of residential development.
    The authorizing statute for school impact fees identifies three categories of
    construction against which a school district’s governing board may levy a fee. (Ed.
    Code, § 17620, subd. (a)(1).) These are “new commercial and industrial construction”
    (id., § 17620, subd. (a)(1)(A)), “new residential construction” (id., § 17620,
    subd. (a)(1)(B)), and subject to specified limitations, “other residential construction, only
    if the resulting increase in assessable space exceeds 500 square feet” (id., § 17620,
    subd. (a)(1)(C)). “[C]onstruction” means “new construction and reconstruction of
    existing building for residential, commercial, or industrial.” (Gov. Code, § 65995,
    subd. (d); Ed. Code, § 17620, subd. (a)(2).) The definition excludes certain facilities,
    such as those that are “used exclusively for religious purposes” or that are government
    “owned and occupied . . . .” (§ 65995, subd. (d).) It also categorizes hotels, inns, and
    “other lodging for which the maximum term of occupancy for guests does not exceed 30
    days” as “ ‘commercial or industrial construction’ ” but excludes from the
    commercial/industrial category “any residential hotel . . . .” (Ibid.)
    Connecting these definitions to the Mitigation Fee Act requirements, it appears
    that the “type of development project on which the fee is imposed” (§ 66001,
    subd. (a)(3)) in the context of school impact fees means, at a minimum, residential,
    commercial, or industrial construction. (Ed. Code, § 17620; Gov. Code, § 65995,
    19
    subd. (d).) The statutory language also provides guidance on what comprises residential
    construction. First, the statute defines the development of short-term lodging like hotels
    and inns as commercial or industrial, but that of longer-term lodging (exceeding 30 days)
    as residential (§ 65995, subd. (d)), suggesting that housing in which a person resides for
    more than 30 days—though outside the traditional single-family or multi-family
    arrangement—qualifies as residential for the purpose of calculating school impact fees.
    Second, the statute limits the authorization of Level 2 fees under section 65995.5 to
    “residential construction” (§ 65995.5, subd. (a)) as justified in the school facilities needs
    analysis pursuant to section 65995.6. (§ 65995.5, subd. (b)(2).)
    In this second category, the statutory formula to calculate the maximum allowable
    Level 2 “square foot fee” (§ 65995.5, subd. (c)) requires the sum cost, derived in part
    from the number of unhoused pupils, to be divided “by the projected total square footage
    of assessable space of residential units anticipated to be constructed during the next
    five-year period in the school district or the city and county in which the school district is
    located” (§ 65995.5, subd. (c)(3), italics added). The term “ ‘[r]esidential units’ . . .
    means the development of single-family detached housing units, single-family attached
    housing units, manufactured homes and mobilehomes, . . . condominiums, and
    multifamily housing units, including apartments, residential hotels, . . . and stock
    cooperatives . . . .”10 (§ 65995.5, subd. (g).) The statute reinforces that an authorized fee
    “shall be expended solely on the school facilities identified in the needs analysis as being
    10
    “ ‘Residential hotel’ means any building containing six or more guestrooms or
    efficiency units . . . , intended or designed to be used . . . for sleeping purposes by guests,
    which is also the primary residence of those guests . . . .” (Health & Saf. Code, § 50519,
    subd. (b)(1).)
    “ ‘Stock cooperative’ means a development in which a corporation is formed or
    availed of, primarily for the purpose of holding title to . . . improved real property,
    and . . . the shareholders of the corporation receive a right of exclusive occupancy in a
    portion of the real property, title to which is held by the corporation.” (Civ. Code,
    § 4190, subd. (a).)
    20
    attributable to projected enrollment growth from the construction of new residential
    units.” (§ 65995.5, subd. (f).)
    The same definition of “residential units” applies to section 65995.6, governing
    the SFNA. (§ 65995.5, subd. (g).) The statute directs the school district to base its
    projection of unhoused pupils “generated by new residential units” on the “historical
    student generation rates of new residential units constructed during the previous five
    years that are of a similar type of unit to those anticipated to be constructed either in the
    school district or the city or county in which the school district is located . . . . For
    purposes of this paragraph, ‘type’ means a single family detached, single family attached,
    or multifamily unit.” (§ 65995.6, subd. (a), italics added.)
    Despite the breadth of housing arrangements defined as “residential” under
    section 65995.5, none describe employee-only housing like that proposed by T&A. It is
    therefore unsurprising that, as T&A points out, neither the District’s board resolution
    adopting the Level 2 fee, nor the needs analysis it relied on, address “an adult agricultural
    employee-only type of residential development that will not allow children or other
    non-employee dependents.”11 It also places the District in a predicament. Is a school
    district required to anticipate and analyze a unique subtype of residential development
    that is not contemplated in the authorizing statutes but according to its designated use
    poses a lesser or different burden than the subtypes identified in the statute that comprise
    residential development generally? We believe the answer is no, based upon several
    guideposts in the statutory scheme.
    11
    The District identified the “types of new residential development” in the needs
    analysis as “including but not limited to single- and multi-family units . . . , single- and
    multi-family units in redevelopment projects, single- and multi-family units that replace
    demolished units (to the extent that the new units are larger than the demolished units),
    additions of residential space to existing single- and multi-family units, manufactured
    homes, mobile homes and condominiums . . . .”
    21
    The first of these guideposts, discussed above, is the language of section 66001,
    subdivision (a) as it pertains to quasi-legislative determinations by a government agency.
    We concluded that tying the reasonable relationship standard to “the type of development
    project on which the fee is imposed” (§ 66001, subd. (a)(3), (4)) enables quasi-legislative
    action. In this case, for example, the District established the Level 2 fee prospectively
    upon “residential construction of $3.00 per square foot of residential development”
    located within its service area. To construe “type of development project” more narrowly
    risks conflating the statutory distinction between subdivision (a) of section 66001, as it
    applies to quasi-legislative fee determinations, and subdivision (b), as it applies to
    adjudicatory or ad-hoc fee determinations.
    Garrick provides insight into this distinction. The school district in Garrick
    imposed school impact fees on new residential development under former Government
    Code section 53080 (now Education Code section 17620) and section 65995. (
    Garrick, supra
    , 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.) The developer challenged the fees by arguing in part
    that section 66001 required “site-specific information.” (
    Garrick, supra
    , at p. 335.) The
    court rejected this interpretation of the statute, which would have applied the site-specific
    analysis required under subdivision (b) of section 66001 to subdivision (a). (
    Garrick, supra
    , at p. 336.) Garrick observed that adjudicatory-stage findings were not required for
    residential projects. (Ibid.) To the contrary, “[t]he Legislature was apparently satisfied
    that a need for new school facilities based generally on projected new residential
    development was nexus enough as a matter of law, without a need for case-by-case
    adjudication, so long as fees did not exceed the prescribed maximum rate.” (Id. at
    pp. 336-337.) The court thus rejected the developer’s claim that the fee was invalid
    because the school district’s report failed to show “a ‘close connection’ ” between new
    development and the fees to be imposed using site-specific data. (Id. at p. 333.) As the
    court explained, “[t]he fee at issue here is a general one applied to all new residential
    development and valid if supported by a reasonable relationship between the amount of
    22
    the fee and estimated cost of services. Site-specific review is neither available nor
    needed.” (Id. at p. 334.)
    The observation that future facilities needs based on projected residential
    development provides a sufficient nexus to satisfy section 66001 finds support in the
    relevant legislative history. In enacting former section 53080, the Legislature declared
    the need for “a comprehensive school facilities finance program” (Stats. 1986, ch. 887,
    § 7(d), p. 3080) to address overcrowded school facilities due to development and
    population growth in many areas of the state. (Stats. 1986, ch. 887, § 7(a), p. 3080.) It
    found “that the levying of appropriate fees by school district governing boards at the rates
    authorized by this act is a reasonable method of financing the expansion and construction
    of school facilities resulting from new economic development within the district.” (Stats.
    1986, ch. 887, § 7(e), p. 3080; see also 
    Shapell, supra
    , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 [noting
    that based on the enabling legislation, “a strong argument could be made . . . as a matter
    of law that the requisite nexus exists linking new development to the need for new school
    facilities . . . .”].)
    Although Education Code section 17620 replaced former Government Code
    section 53080, the substance of the statute remained largely the same. (See Legis.
    Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1562 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) [describing repeal of former
    § 53080 and addition of Ed. Code, § 17620 as “technical, nonsubstantive” and to “be
    construed as a restatement and not as a new enactment”].) The original legislative
    purpose thus remains relevant to our consideration. (Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho
    Mirage (1993) 
    16 Cal. App. 4th 383
    , 406 [reviewing court “may draw on the legislative
    history” of a statute’s “earlier form for whatever light it may shed on the purpose of that
    legislative scheme”].) This provides some indication that for quasi-legislative actions to
    impose school impact fees on new residential development, a nexus analysis based on
    general “type” of development, i.e., residential, may be adequate.
    23
    The second guidepost is that in crafting the law that authorizes the imposition of
    school impact fees and governs their implementation, the Legislature expressly occupied
    the field. It elected to “occup[y] the subject matter of requirements related to school
    facilities levied or imposed in connection with, or made a condition of, any land use
    approval, . . . to the exclusion of all other measures, financial or nonfinancial, on the
    subjects.” (§ 65995, subd. (e).) In doing so, the Legislature sought to “gather[] all
    [school] financing under one umbrella and impose[] statewide uniformity on the
    process . . . .” 
    (Grupe, supra
    , 4 Cal.4th at p. 919.)
    It is significant that the resulting legislative scheme provides what appears to be a
    comprehensive set of definitions under the statutes and only limited, express exceptions
    for certain project subtypes. The statutes authorize a school district to levy a fee “against
    any construction within the boundaries of the district” (Ed. Code, § 17620, subd. (a)(1)),
    define “construction” broadly to mean the “construction and reconstruction of existing
    building for residential, commercial, or industrial” (§ 65995, subd. (d)), include a range
    of housing subtypes for consideration in assessing the impact of new residential
    construction, including residential hotels (§ 65995.5, subd. (g)), and even include
    short-term lodging like hotels under commercial or industrial construction (§ 65995,
    subd. (d)). The limited exceptions to imposition of school impact fees are facilities used
    exclusively for religious purposes, private day schools, and state-owned facilities
    (§ 65995, subd. (d)), senior citizen housing and residential care facilities for the elderly
    (§ 65995.1, subd. (a)), and government housing for agricultural migrant workers
    (§ 65995.1, subd. (b)).12
    12
    Section 65995.1 limits fees on the construction of new senior citizen housing
    and residential care facilities for the elderly only to those applicable “in the case of
    commercial or industrial development.” (§ 65995.1, subd. (a).) The statute entirely
    exempts from fees “agricultural migrant worker housing which is owned by the state and
    which is subject to a contract” under certain provisions of the Health and Safety Code.
    (§ 65995.1, subd. (b).)
    24
    The paradigm that emerges is one of comprehensive coverage of construction
    types with limited, explicit exceptions, and apparent sensitivity to treatment of housing
    types with minimal potential to add children to the school district (i.e., providing for
    senior housing and care facilities to be assessed as commercial or industrial). Yet the
    Legislature made no express provision for employee-only housing. Even more telling,
    the Legislature exempted government-financed agricultural migrant worker housing from
    school impact fees but omitted any mention of privately-financed farmworker housing.
    This leads us to infer that where the Legislature intended to carve out certain
    development subtypes, it did so.
    The California Supreme Court’s analysis of a class of fee types under
    section 65995 is instructive. In Grupe, the court determined that a school district’s
    “ ‘special tax’ ” 
    (Grupe, supra
    , 4 Cal.4th at p. 914) on residential property developers to
    fund new school construction was preempted by the statutory scheme as a “ ‘fee, charge,
    dedication, or other requirement’ ” within the meaning of section 65995. 
    (Grupe, supra
    ,
    at p. 919.) The court acknowledged that “section 65995 does not expressly list ‘special
    taxes’ among the exactions that it preempts . . . .” (Id. at p. 921.) However, the court
    reasoned that the “omission may well be explained by reference to history” (ibid.) in
    view of the problem the Legislature sought to resolve in section 65995 and of the
    “relative rarity and novelty” of special taxes 
    (Grupe, supra
    , at p. 921). The court also
    emphasized that the same section “expressly excludes from the statute’s reach” a certain
    class of special taxes but does not exclude all special taxes. (Ibid.) The court found it
    reasonable to infer from the Legislature’s express specification to exclude one class of
    special taxes “that it intended that all other classes of special taxes fall within the statute.
    Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” (Ibid.)
    So too here, the absence of any reference to employee-only or adult-only housing
    “may well be explained by reference to history” 
    (Grupe, supra
    , 4 Cal.4th at p. 921) as
    well as by the apparent novelty of such a unique designation. Given the statute’s broad
    25
    coverage of housing subtypes and exceptions, it is reasonable to interpret those that were
    not identified for special treatment under the authorizing statutes as subject to the general
    scheme. More specifically, the express exemption of government-financed agricultural
    migrant worker housing under section 65995.1 suggests that the Legislature intended for
    non-government-financed migrant farmworker housing to be subject to the general
    provisions for residential construction. The omission of any employee-specific housing
    among the types of residential units specified in the statute also makes it largely
    irrelevant for our purposes whether “agricultural employee housing” is in fact, as T&A
    contends, a distinct subtype of residential development under local law.13
    The court in Loyola Marymount University v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
    (1996) 
    45 Cal. App. 4th 1256
    (Loyola) drew a similar conclusion in deciding whether the
    private university’s construction of a new business school was subject to the imposition
    of impact fees as commercial construction under former section 53080. 
    (Loyola, supra
    ,
    13
    T&A requests that this court take judicial notice of sections of the Monterey
    County Code of Ordinances (MCCO) that pertain to agricultural employee housing.
    These include MCCO section 21.06.014, which defines “agricultural employee housing,”
    and section 21.66.060, which regulates the permitting of agricultural employee housing.
    T&A contends that these ordinance sections are relevant to the District’s argument that
    the project is not a separate “type” of residential development from that addressed in the
    SFNA to support imposition of the Level 2 fee. The District opposes the request for
    judicial notice on the grounds that it failed at the outset to satisfy the requirements of
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a), and has not justified presenting the MCCO
    sections for the first time on appeal. T&A responds that although the MCCO sections
    were not presented to the trial court, as legal authority they fall outside the general rule
    that reviewing courts should not take judicial notice of evidence not in the record before
    the trial court. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 
    14 Cal. 4th 434
    ,
    444.)
    Evidence Code section 459 requires this court to take judicial notice of the
    requested MCCO sections even though they were not presented to the trial court for
    judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a) [“Judicial notice shall be taken of . . . public
    statutory law of this state”] (italics added); 
    id., 459, subd.
    (a) [“The reviewing court shall
    take judicial notice of . . . each matter that the trial court was required to notice under
    Section 451”]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).)
    26
    at p. 1259.) The court reasoned, based on the words and definitions in the statute, that
    “the Legislature intended to include virtually all construction except that exempted by
    sections 65995 et seq.” (Id. at p. 1261.) It rejected the argument that the construction
    project was excluded because “ ‘educational’ ” or “ ‘university’ ” were not among the
    categories of commercial development listed in the statute, noting the statutory language
    used the phrase “ ‘include’ ” as “ ‘a term of enlargement rather than limitation.’ ” (Id. at
    p. 1262.) It also rejected the contention that the university’s educational and nonprofit
    status placed it outside the statute’s commercial use category. (Id. at pp. 1265-1266.)
    The court viewed the university’s position as counter to “[t]he fact that the Legislature
    explicitly exempted state entities, as well as facilities used exclusively for religious
    purposes, but failed to mention private universities or colleges for exemptions . . . .” (Id.
    at pp. 1266-1267.)
    We agree with the assessment in Loyola. To construe the designation of
    agricultural employee-only housing as a distinct “type” would contravene the
    Legislature’s intent “to include virtually all construction except that exempted by
    sections 65995 et seq.” 
    (Loyola, supra
    , 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261.) Put differently, the
    adult-only restriction on the employee housing complex does not alter or expand the
    range of housing defined as “residential” under section 65995.5, subdivision (g), which a
    school district might be expected to analyze in the school facilities needs analysis under
    section 65995.6. The decisions in Warmington and Cresta Bella—which we believe are
    distinguishable—help to illustrate this point.
    Both cases involved the imposition of school impact fees on residential
    redevelopment, and each time the court found that the fee study failed to determine a
    reasonable relationship between redevelopment construction on preexisting square
    footage and school facilities needs. (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 453;
    
    Warmington, supra
    , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)
    27
    In Warmington, the redevelopment project decreased the number of residential
    housing units from 56 apartment units to 38 single family homes. (
    Warmington, supra
    ,
    101 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.) The court first examined the application of school impact
    fees on redevelopment construction as a matter of statutory interpretation. (Id. at pp. 845,
    850-857.) It found based upon the statutory scheme and legislative history that the
    statute did not mandate exclusion of redevelopment construction from the imposition of
    school-impact fees; however, to charge fees on preexisting square footage, a school
    district had to make the required nexus findings under section 66001, subdivision (a).
    (
    Warmington, supra
    , at p. 857.) Regarding that nexus requirement, the court found that
    the fee imposed on the project was invalid because the fee study did not address “the
    class of redevelopment construction that displaces existing residential housing on the
    same site” (id. at p. 862) and also contained no analysis to justify imposing a fee on
    redevelopment that would generate fewer students than before. (Id. at p. 860.) The court
    concluded that there was no evidence to support the imposition of school impact fees on
    preexisting square footage and affirmed a refund of those fees. (Id. at pp. 847, 862, 867.)
    Cresta Bella closely followed Warmington. (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th
    at pp. 442, 451.) The school district’s needs analysis calculated a Level 2 fee based on
    projected residential construction in the district, estimating that some of the new units
    would come from redevelopment based on the demolition and replacement of existing
    units. (Id. at p. 449.) Because the estimated “actual cost impact” of the projected
    residential development exceeded the maximum Level 2 fee under the statute, the school
    district determined it would be “ ‘fully justified’ in levying the Level 2 fee on all new
    residential units, including on units that replace existing units.” (Id. at p. 450.) The
    appellate court rejected this approach. It echoed the Warmington court in interpreting the
    reasonable relationship standard “to require a showing that reconstruction of preexisting
    square footage also contributes to an increase in student population.” (Id. at p. 451.)
    28
    The appellate court reasoned that contrary to showing a connection between
    replacement of preexisting square footage and the generation of new students, the
    district’s needs analysis in fact found that “replacement of preexisting units does not
    generate new students because the units were already in existence prior to the new
    construction.” (Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 453.) The court recognized
    the possibility that housing reconstruction “could support a correlation between
    reconstruction of preexisting residential units and the generation of new students” but
    concluded that the school district did not make such a showing. (Ibid.) Consequently,
    the court ordered the trial court to grant the writ of mandate for a partial refund to the
    developer based on the portion of fees derived from preexisting square footage. (Id. at
    p. 454.)
    T&A contends that Warmington and Cresta Bella support its position that a fee
    study that analyzes only general types of residential development cannot be the basis for
    imposing impact fees on a different type of residential project that was not considered in
    the study and that has different impacts from those studied. But in both of those cases,
    the “type” of project not considered was redevelopment construction, a class whose
    distinguishing characteristic (being built upon preexisting square footage) is readily
    compatible with analysis in a fee study using historic data per the statute.
    Here, by contrast, the distinguishing characteristic that renders imposition of the
    Level 2 fee problematic is the project’s designation for adults only, without dependents.
    Unlike the general category of redevelopment construction, this designation is not itself a
    “type” contemplated in the statute (as shown above), and it is highly project specific.
    Because the Legislature did not identify adults-only or even employee specific housing
    for either an exception or alternative treatment under the statute, we believe it would be
    incongruous to fault the needs analysis for failing to consider it.
    The third guidepost is practical. “Statutes are to be given a reasonable and
    commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent legislative purpose and intent
    29
    ‘and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.’ ”
    
    (Dyna-Med, supra
    , 43 Cal.3d at p. 1392.) Thus, when a court encounters uncertainty in
    interpreting a statute, the court should consider “the consequences that will flow from a
    particular interpretation.” (Id. at p. 1387.)
    We recognize that there are contrary views about what is the “reasonable and
    commonsense interpretation” 
    (Dyna-Med, supra
    , 43 Cal.3d at p. 1392) of the statutes
    here. What is more, both sides present interests that fulfill important needs in the
    affected community—those being T&A’s provision of housing for migrant farmworkers
    in the Salinas Valley, and the District’s effort to fund school facilities for its
    overburdened schools.
    According to T&A, the District’s needs analysis failed to establish the requisite
    reasonable relationship because it neither addressed “a type of residential project that will
    not allow children” nor proposed a method to estimate whether such a project “will in
    fact generate additional students.” But to adopt T&A’s position would have the practical
    effect of requiring a school district to expand its needs analysis to address the projected
    impact on school facilities of undefined, variant subtypes of residential construction not
    contemplated in the statute. We find such a consequence inconsistent with the purpose of
    section 66001, insofar as subdivision (a) enables the imposition of quasi-legislative fees
    that are applied prospectively. (See 
    Shapell, supra
    , 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 231-232.)
    However strained the connection between the findings of the District’s SFNA
    and the application of the Level 2 fee to T&A’s adults-only project, the alternative would
    be an untenable reading of the statute in which we construe section 66001,
    subdivision (a) to demand a level of specificity similar or equivalent to what
    subdivision (b) already provides. In our view, this would violate the tenant of statutory
    construction whereby the “ ‘ “ ‘court has no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it
    conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed.’ ” ’ ” (Haniff v. Superior Court
    (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 191, 202.)
    30
    Nor are we persuaded by T&A’s contention that the imposition of the fee on its
    project contradicts the nexus and proportionality principles that underlie the reasonable
    relationship standard. (See 
    Ehrlich, supra
    , 12 Cal.4th at p. 860.) The California
    Supreme Court has clarified that the heightened scrutiny applicable to a monetary
    exaction imposed ad hoc “on an individual and discretionary basis” (id. at p. 876) does
    not apply to a challenge involving the quasi-legislative application of developer fees.
    (San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 643
    , 669-670.)
    The court in San Remo Hotel declined the invitation to extend heightened takings
    scrutiny to all development fees, adhering instead to the distinction “[drawn] in Erlich . . .
    between ad hoc exactions and legislatively mandated, formulaic mitigation fees.” (Id. at
    pp. 670-671.) The court emphasized that fees not subject to heightened scrutiny remain
    subject to the means-end judicial review, including under statutory law pursuant to
    section 66001. (San Remo 
    Hotel, supra
    , at p. 671.) While the required showing “need
    not be so close or so thoroughly established for legislatively imposed fees as for ad hoc
    fees . . . , the arbitrary and extortionate use of purported mitigation fees, even where
    legislatively mandated, will not pass . . . muster.” (Ibid.)
    We conclude, based on our review of the statutory schemes, that the District
    was not required to anticipate and analyze agricultural employee-only housing (as a
    distinct subtype of residential housing) in the school facilities needs analysis under
    section 65995.6 for purposes of satisfying the reasonable relationship requirement under
    section 66001, subdivision (a).
    3. Imposition of the Level 2 Fee Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious
    Our conclusion that the District was not required under the statutes to analyze
    adult-employee-only housing as a separate “type” of development project leads us to
    conclude that the District did not act arbitrarily in imposing the Level 2 fee on T&A’s
    project.
    31
    There is no dispute for purposes of this appeal that T&A’s agricultural employee
    housing project is “residential.”14 We noted earlier that T&A has not challenged the
    adequacy of the District’s needs analysis or the imposition of the Level 2 fee on
    residential development in the District’s service area. The SFNA determined based on
    the historical data it had collected that “[a]ll types of new residential development . . . are
    projected to cause new families to move into the District and, consequently, generate
    additional students in the District.” The SFNA also found that the District was operating
    over capacity at the 9 through 12 grade levels and did not have sufficient school facilities
    for the projected growth. The SFNA calculated the Level 2 fee and, citing section 66001,
    tied the use of the fee “to the type of projects (new residential developments) upon which
    it is imposed” and to the “need for additional school facilities . . . .” The District’s
    governing board adopted the SFNA, made related findings, and established the Level 2
    fee in the amount of $3 per square foot of residential development located within the
    service area.
    Nothing in the record or in T&A’s opposition on appeal suggests that the District’s
    methodology was invalid or failed to satisfy the three-part showing articulated in Shapell.
    The SFNA projected the total amount of new residential units expected to be built,
    approximated the number of students that would be generated by the new housing, and
    estimated the related cost-burden imposed on the District’s school facilities. (See
    
    Shapell, supra
    , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 235.) As far as residential development, the District
    “engaged in a reasoned analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between
    the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created.” (Ibid.)
    14
    The record reflects that early discussions between the county and the District’s
    sister school district for grades K through 8 grappled with whether the commercial rate or
    the residential rate should apply to T&A’s project.
    32
    The argument that the District lacked evidentiary support and failed to
    demonstrate a rational connection between the Level 2 fee and the project turns on the
    unique designation of the project as adults-only employee housing. That is, the question
    of a sufficient, reasonable relationship to the school impact fees arises only by virtue of
    the project’s designation as housing for adults only, without dependents. But the feature
    of being restricted to adults is entirely project specific. It returns us full circle to whether
    T&A’s project constituted a distinct “type” of development project requiring separate
    analysis under both section 66001 and the school impact fees statutory scheme. Having
    dispensed with that question as a matter of statutory interpretation and legislative
    purpose, we conclude that the District’s imposition of the Level 2 fee on new residential
    construction in its service area, including on T&A’s agricultural employee housing
    project, was not arbitrary or lacking in evidentiary support. Simply put, while we
    recognize that the SFNA does not analyze employee-only housing with no children, we
    have already established that such project-level specificity is not required.
    Because the District met its initial burden of demonstrating the validity of the
    Level 2 fee as based upon a reasonable relationship between the fee charged and the
    burden posed by residential development in its service area, we turn to T&A’s showing in
    the protest action. (Home 
    Builders, supra
    , 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 561; cf. Cresta 
    Bella, supra
    , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 453.) There is no question that T&A has established, based
    upon the recorded conditions of approval for the combined development permit, that the
    project is permitted for adult employees, without dependents. T&A has not shown,
    however, that the determinations underlying the District’s SFNA were unsupported by
    the record, such that the fee’s use and the need for the school facility are not reasonably
    related to the agricultural employee housing project. (Home 
    Builders, supra
    , at p. 561.)
    The Van Camp declaration, for example, states that T&A’s seasonal farmworkers
    leave their children at permanent homes in other locations during the seven-month
    growing season, including with relatives if both parents come to work. That may be the
    33
    case; but as the District points out, it is also possible that children accompany a parent or
    parents for the seven-month season, and whether placed with local friends, relatives, or
    elsewhere, those children enroll in school. Without any supporting documentation, the
    Van Camp declaration is inadequate to disturb the District’s districtwide assessment of
    the impact of new residential housing. (See 
    Loyola, supra
    , 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264
    [finding the declaration of the university’s vice president, stating that the construction of
    a new business school would not increase students or faculty, was inadequate as evidence
    to overcome the application of the impact fees].)
    T&A also points to the limits of the SFNA conducted by the District. Kevin
    Sullivan, who oversaw the SFNA in this case, testified that in his understanding, all
    development is classified as either commercial/industrial or residential, and all residential
    development generates additional students and is subject to paying school fees unless it is
    senior-restricted housing (and thus charged a commercial/industrial rate) or it satisfies a
    statutory exemption. Sullivan also acknowledged that the student generation rate analysis
    for the SFNA did not include any kind of residential development that does not allow
    children. According to T&A, Sullivan’s explanation demonstrates that the proposition
    that all types of new residential development are projected to cause new families to move
    into the district and generate additional students was “an assumption not supported by
    any facts in the SFNA.”
    This circular reasoning is not persuasive when we consider that the information
    purportedly missing from the District’s SFNA is a uniquely specific feature of the
    agricultural employee housing project which neither alters the “type” of construction
    subject to fees under the statute (see Gov. Code, §§ 66001, subd. (a), 65995, subd. (d);
    Ed. Code, § 17620, subd. (a)(1)(A)-(C)) nor qualifies for any legislatively-determined
    exception or exemption (see §§ 65995, subd. (d), 65995.1).
    In sum, the Legislature deemed school impact fees to be “a reasonable method of
    financing the expansion and construction of school facilities resulting from new
    34
    economic development within the district.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 887, § 7(e), p. 3080.) The
    authorizing statute is correspondingly broad. It evinces an intent to mitigate impacts on
    school facilities from economic development not limited to single- and multi-family
    residential construction, but “against any construction within the boundaries of the
    district.” (Ed. Code, § 17620, subd. (a)(1).) Employee-only housing (restricted,
    moreover, to adult occupancy) is undeniably not among the “types” of residential units
    specified for an alternative fee under section 65995.5; but neither do the range of housing
    arrangements defined as residential exclude such a configuration. Finally, the
    Legislature’s express treatment of certain housing types—most notably the exclusion of
    agricultural migrant worker housing financed by the government from the school impact
    fee scheme (§ 65995.1) suggests that other potential “subtypes” of residential
    construction are not considered distinct for purposes of the reasonable relationship test
    under section 66001.
    We conclude that the statutory scheme does not require separate analysis of
    “subtypes” of residential development not contemplated by the statute. As a result, the
    District’s needs analysis adequately determined a reasonable relationship between the
    Level 2 fee’s use, the need for school facilities, and new residential development in the
    District. Imposition of the Level 2 fee was not arbitrary or entirely lacking in evidentiary
    support for failing to account for the actual impact of T&A’s adults-only project, because
    nothing in the statute requires the school district imposing a quasi-legislative fee to
    justify its action based on a project’s actual impact.
    III.   DISPOSITION
    The judgment is reversed. Costs on appeal are awarded to the Salinas Union High
    School District.
    35
    Greenwood, P.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    Elia, J.
    Grover, J.
    Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc. v. Salinas Union High School District
    H045470
    Trial Court:                               Monterey County Superior Court
    Superior Court No. 16CV000616
    Trial Judge:                               Hon. Thomas W. Wills
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:           Davis & Young
    Salinas Union High School District         Steven B. Dippell
    Lozano Smith
    Devon Lincoln
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent:          Miles J. Dolinger
    Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc.
    Amici Curiae on behalf of                  Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud &
    Defendant/Appellant:                       Romo
    Salinas Union High School District         Martin A. Hom
    Jennifer D. Cantrell
    Dannis Woliver Kelley
    Clarissa R. Canady
    Jessika K. Johnson
    California School Boards Association
    Elaine M. Yama-Garcia
    D. Michael Ambrose
    Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc. v. Salinas Union High School District
    H045470