Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 10/29/14; pub. & mod. order 11/21/14 (see end of opn.)
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    MARK LAFFITTE et al.,                                          B249253
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,                            (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC321317)
    v.
    ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC.
    et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents,
    DAVID BRENNAN,
    Plaintiff and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mary
    Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Office of Lawrence W. Schonbrun and Lawrence W. Schonbrun for Plaintiff
    and Appellant.
    Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes, Kevin T. Barnes and Gregg Lander for Plaintiffs
    and Respondents.
    Paul Hastings, Judith M. Kline and M. Kirby C. Wilcox for Defendants and
    Respondents.
    _____________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Plaintiff Mark Laffitte, on behalf of himself and other class members, settled a
    class action lawsuit against defendants Robert Half International Inc., Robert Half of
    California, Inc., Robert Half Incorporated, and Robert Half Corporation doing business as
    RHC (collectively Robert Half or the Robert Half defendants) for $19 million. David
    Brennan, a member of the class, objected to the settlement. The trial court overruled his
    objections and approved the settlement, which included an award of attorneys’ fees to
    class counsel of one-third of the settlement, or approximately $6.3 million. Brennan
    appeals from the order approving the settlement and entering final judgment, challenging
    both the class action settlement notice regarding the award of attorneys’ fees and the
    amount of attorneys’ fees awarded. Laffitte asks that we affirm the trial court’s order.
    The Robert Half defendants state that the attorneys’ fees issue does not affect them
    directly because class counsel will receive their fees from the common fund the Robert
    Half defendants agreed to pay to settle the case, but they ask that we affirm the order “in
    order to bring this lawsuit to closure.” We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On September 10, 2004 Laffitte filed a wage and hour class action suit against
    Robert Half. The complaint alleged five causes of action based on violations of the
    Labor Code: misclassification of staffing professionals as exempt and failure to pay
    statutorily mandated wages, failure to provide adequate meal periods (premium wages),
    failure to provide rest periods, failure to furnish timely and accurate wage statements, and
    “waiting time” penalties. The complaint also alleged unfair business practices in
    violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.
    On March 13, 2006 the trial court denied Robert Half’s motion for summary
    judgment or in the alternative for summary adjudication. On September 18, 2006 the
    court denied Robert Half’s motion to strike the class allegations, and granted Laffitte’s
    2
    motion for class certification with respect to the wage, wage statements, waiting time,
    and unfair business practices causes of action. The court denied Robert Half’s
    subsequent motion for reconsideration of the class certification order.
    The parties participated in a mediation. After a second session of the mediation on
    June 18, 2012 Laffitte and the class representatives in two other class actions against
    Robert Half involving similar claims and allegations reached a settlement of the three
    class actions.1
    On September 5, 2012 the class representatives filed a joint motion for conditional
    certification of the class and preliminary approval of the settlement. The trial court, after
    relating the three class actions, granted the motion, conditionally certified the class, and
    preliminarily approved the settlement. The court also approved the proposed class notice
    and related materials, appointed a settlement administrator, and scheduled a hearing for
    final approval on October 19, 2012.
    On November 13, 2012 the trial court granted the parties’ ex parte application for
    an order amending the settlement agreement, class notice, and claim form. Among other
    things, the amended settlement agreement provided that Robert Half would pay a gross
    settlement amount of $19,000,000. Subject to court approval, the settlement agreement
    provided that the following payments would be made from the gross settlement amount:
    class counsel attorneys’ fees of not more than $6,333,333.33 (33.33 percent of the gross
    settlement amount) and costs not to exceed counsel’s actual costs, class representative
    payments not to exceed $80,000, settlement administrator fees not to exceed $79,000,
    civil penalties owed to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and
    applicable payroll taxes on the employees’ recovery. The amended settlement agreement
    1      The two other class actions were Williamson v. Robert Half International Inc.
    (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2013, No. BC377930) and Apolinario v. Robert Half
    International Inc. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2013, No. BC455499).
    3
    also included a “clear sailing” provision stating that class counsel would apply for their
    attorneys’ fees “and Robert Half will not oppose their request.”2
    On January 28, 2013 Brennan objected to the proposed settlement. Relying in part
    on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Brennan made the following
    objections: (1) the attorneys’ fee request was excessive; (2) “[m]oney to charity should
    not be a part of the Court’s attorneys’ fee award calculation”; (3) information necessary
    for class members to intelligently object to or comment on the proposed settlement was
    missing from the notice and the pleadings; (4) the clear sailing provision warranted the
    appointment of a class guardian; (5) the notice to the class was deceptive regarding the
    responsibility for payment of attorneys’ fees; (6) class counsel and counsel for Robert
    Half had not filed a report, as required by the amended settlement agreement; (7) the
    notice did not disclose that unclaimed funds would be donated to a charity of the Robert
    Half defendants’ choice; and (8) certain other provisions of the settlement were improper.
    On February 28, 2013 the class representatives and Robert Half filed a joint
    motion for final approval of the class action settlement and a response to Brennan’s
    objections. The class representatives reported that they had sent class notices to 3,996
    class members and had received only two objections: an objection from Brennan and an
    “objection” that was actually a dispute over the amount the individual class member was
    to receive. The class representatives also filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and
    class representative enhancements. The motion requested $6,333,333.33 in attorneys’
    fees for class counsel, $127,304.08 in costs, $79,000 in settlement administrator
    expenses, and $80,000 in class representative enhancement payments. The class
    representatives explained that class counsel were requesting as attorneys’ fees one-third
    2      Clear sailing provisions “allow counsel for the plaintiff class (class counsel) to
    seek an award of attorney fees from the trial court, with the assurance that defendant will
    not oppose the fee application if the amount sought is less than or equal to a specified
    dollar amount.” (Ruiz v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-Insurance Bureau
    (2013) 
    222 Cal.App.4th 596
    , 598; see Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 
    223 Cal.App.4th 1309
    , 1323, fn. 7.)
    4
    of the gross settlement, which constituted a common fund for the benefit of class
    members, and argued that this amount was reasonable and appropriate. Class counsel
    asserted that their hourly rates and number of hours worked were fair and reasonable and
    that the successful result, the difficulty of the issues in the case, the quality of their
    representation, the contingency risk, and the preclusion of other employment justified a
    lodestar multiplier.
    In support of their motion for attorneys’ fees, class counsel submitted declarations
    from the attorneys in each of the three law firms serving as class counsel. The attorneys
    did not submit detailed time records. The declarations stated that Kevin T. Barnes, who
    served as lead counsel supervised and handled all aspects of the litigation, worked
    2,259.5 hours on the case at an hourly rate of $750, and his partner, Gregg Lander,
    worked 807.3 hours at an hourly rate of $600. Joseph Antonelli worked 709.3 hours on
    the case at an hourly rate of $750, and his partner, Janelle Carney, worked 14.4 hours at
    an hourly rate of $600. Finally, Mika Hilaire worked 423 hours on the case at her hourly
    rate of $500. Barnes determined that class counsel worked a total of 4,263.5 hours on the
    case (and anticipated working 200 hours on the appeal) and, using the hourly rate for
    each attorney, calculated that the total lodestar amount was $2,968,620 ($3,118,620
    including the appeal). Class counsel requested a lodestar multiplier of between 2.03 to
    2.13 for a total requested attorneys’ fee award of $6,333,333.33.
    Barnes also described the contentious nature of the litigation and summarized the
    work class counsel had performed: “The settlement that has been reached is the product
    of tremendous effort, and a great deal of expense by the parties and their counsel. The
    parties’ assessment of the matter is based on one of the most heavily litigated cases I have
    ever been a part of and the extensive research and litigation for the past 8 ½ years. This
    litigation included extensive written discovery, extensive law and motion practice, 68
    depositions, three Motions for Summary Judgment, a Class Certification Motion,
    subsequent Reconsideration Motion and then another Motion to Decertify, numerous
    experts, consultation with an economist regarding potential damage exposure and two full
    day mediations.”
    5
    On March 22, 2013 the trial court held a hearing on the motion for approval of the
    settlement and the motion for attorneys’ fees. The court stated in a tentative ruling that
    the requested fee amount “amounts to 33 1/3[] percent of the gross settlement amount,
    and is not an atypical contingency agreement in a class action. The primary factor for
    determining whether an attorney fee award is fair is whether the fee bears a reasonable
    relationship to the value of the attorney’s work.” The court stated that the 4,263.5
    attorney hours spent by class counsel litigating this action “is a fairly reasonable number
    of hours to have billed on a class action matter that was heavily litigated for 8.5
    years . . . .” The court noted that “Class Counsel billed $2,968,620 on this amount of
    time, based on hourly rates of $750/hour for Barnes and Antonelli, $600/hour for Lander
    and Carney, and $500/hour for Hilaire. . . . This rate is justified by the high level of Class
    Counsel’s experience in litigating wage and hour claims/class actions.” The court stated
    that, “[b]ased on the reasonable number of hours billed and the legitimate hourly rate,
    Class Counsel’s lodestar is $2,968,620.” The court acknowledged Brennan’s objections
    to the proposed settlement but stated that rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, not
    rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governed the requirements of a class
    action settlement notice. The court stated that “[t]he Parties’ method of calculation of
    attorneys’ fees is supported under California law. The court in Lealao v. Beneficial
    California Inc. (2000) 
    82 Cal.App.4th 19
    , 27 approved of the use of a common fund
    whereby attorneys’ fees are calculated as a percentage of the amount recovered.”
    During the hearing the court found that the class action notice “that was given
    fully complies with California law, with due process and is not misleading.” The court
    also found that “the tasks that were performed by class counsel and the number of hours
    that they spent on those tasks were reasonable and that . . . [t]he hourly fees, if you’re
    looking at lodestar, are within the range of what is reasonable for this type of work in this
    community.” Nevertheless, the court also asked for further briefing on (1) “how the
    attorneys’ fees are to be allocated” among the three law firms serving as class counsel
    “and whether named Plaintiffs have signed a fee sharing agreement”; (2) “the amount
    that is [in] controversy and how it is calculated, estimates as to realistic ranges of
    6
    outcomes” if the case were to go to trial, “and why the risks of litigation make the
    settlement fair, reasonable and adequate”; and (3) support for a multiplier of two on “the
    lodestar figure.” The court noted that some of the statements in Barnes’ declaration were
    “a bit conclusory,” asked for further explanation about class counsel’s statement that the
    case involved “novel and complex legal issues,” and “asked for further briefing on the
    reasonable range of expected outcomes versus the settlement amount . . . .”
    Barnes subsequently submitted an 18-page supplemental declaration responding to
    the court’s questions and providing additional information regarding the work class
    counsel had performed during the eight and one-half years of the litigation. Barnes
    calculated, based on the average number of hours per week and the number of
    workweeks of the class members, that “the total amount in controversy in the Laffitte
    class is approximately $90,690,000 and the total amount in controversy in the Apolinario
    class is approximately $25,800.000.” Barnes stated, however, “there were numerous
    risks in both cases related to both class certification and the merits,” including loss of
    class certification in Laffitte, changes in the law “as to certification in exempt
    misclassification cases (making it much harder today to obtain and/or maintain class
    certification),” the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores,
    Inc. v. Dukes (June 20, 2011, No. 10-277) ___ U.S. ___ [
    131 S.Ct. 2541
    , 
    180 L.Ed.2d 374
    ], and California Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Superior Court (2011) 
    53 Cal.4th 170
     and decision to grant review in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012)
    
    203 Cal.App.4th 212
    , review granted May 16, 2012 and affirmed by Duran v. U.S. Bank
    National Assn. (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 1
    . Barnes stated that, after applying a 70 percent class
    certification risk factor for the Laffitte class action and a 25 percent class certification risk
    factor for the Apolinario class action, and a 50 percent merits risk factor for both, “the
    total settlement exposure for the class claims is approximately $34,966,500,”3 so that the
    3      Using the “70 [percent] chance of maintaining class certification in Laffitte” and
    “25 [percent] chance of obtaining class certification in Apolinario,” class counsel
    calculated that the value of the two class actions was $69,933,000 ($63,483,000 +
    $6,450,000). Class counsel then reduced this figure by a “50 [percent] chance of
    7
    $19,000,000 settlement represented “54[] percent of the value of the total claim, which
    Plaintiffs believe is outstanding considering the risk of prevailing on class certification,
    prevailing on the merits, and maintaining any part of Plaintiffs’ victory through appeal.”4
    Barnes also provided further information and argument in support of a multiplier. Barnes
    concluded that “[a]ll this hard work and determination resulted in the settlement of
    $19,000,000. . . . [T]he average Class Member award is over $4,300 and the highest
    award is over $48,000 [citation]. . . . [¶] . . . The risks of this class action case were
    enormous. Litigating this wage and hour class action . . . took between 4,263.5 and
    4,463.5 attorney hours and involved litigation costs of $127,304.08 . . . .”
    The trial court held another hearing on Brennan’s objections on April 10, 2013.
    The trial court overruled Brennan’s objections and concluded that it had “sufficient
    information at this point to determine that this is a fair and reasonable settlement.” The
    court stated that “[t]he supplemental declaration from Mr. Barnes has addressed the
    court’s question about how the attorneys fees are to be allocated between the firms
    representing plaintiffs, whether the named plaintiffs have signed a fee sharing agreement,
    and addressed the requirement under the California Rules of Court that the terms of any
    attorneys fees agreement be set forth in full.” The court also stated that it “received
    sufficient information to evaluate the strength of plaintiffs’ case, detailed information
    about the factual and legal risks involved, the valuation on a claim by claim basis and the
    discount factor that plaintiff[s] applied in coming up with a reasonable range of
    outcomes.” The court further acknowledged receipt of “significant information on the
    risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining
    prevailing on the merits,” giving a total value of $34,966,500. Class counsel valued the
    Williamson class action at $0 because they “felt that there was virtually no chance of
    prevailing at the time of class certification and/or the merits” of that case.
    4       Actually, the $19,000,000 settlement represented approximately 16 percent
    (excluding any appellate risk) of the value of the total claim of $116,490,000
    ($90,690,000 for Laffitte + $25,800,000 for Apolinario), because class counsel had
    already discounted the total value of the claim for the risk of prevailing on class
    certification and the merits.
    8
    a class action status throughout trial; the extent of discovery completed; the experience
    and views of counsel; and the views of the class members.” The court found that “[t]hese
    three actions have a lengthy procedural history including one class certification, a motion
    to decertify in another case, a class certification not yet having been granted, [and] the
    uncertainties introduced by case law in this area . . . throwing into significant doubt the
    maintenance of the certification . . . .”
    Turning to the amount of attorneys’ fees, the court stated it “considers in this case
    that there is a contingency case, and so I do a double check on the attorneys fees by
    looking at the lodestar amount. I do believe I have sufficient information on the number
    of hours that were present and that the hourly rates charged therefore were within the
    norm and not overstated. Given the lodestar, I then also find I have information in the
    record which supports the multiplier that would be applied to lodestar if you’re looking at
    a strict lodestar calculation, which we’re not, we’re looking at a contingency calculation,
    the amount of the contingency is not unreasonable. I’m considering the novelty and
    difficulty of the questions involved, the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent to
    which the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys and the inherent risk
    whenever there is a fee award that is contingent. On that basis, I am granting final
    approval.” The trial court granted final approval of class action settlement and awarded
    $6,333,333.33 in attorneys’ fees, $127,304.08 in costs, $79,000 in settlement
    administrator expenses, and $80,000 in class representative enhancement payments.
    Laffitte served a notice of ruling on the parties on April 12, 2013. Brennan timely
    filed a notice of appeal on June 10, 2013.
    DISCUSSION
    Brennan argues that the notice to the class members denied them due process
    because the nature and timing of the settlement approval procedure set forth in the notice
    was unfair, and because the language in the notice describing a class member’s financial
    responsibility for attorneys’ fees was misleading. Brennan also argues that, in reviewing
    9
    the class counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees, the trial court erred by using the
    percentage of fund method and then made mistakes when performing lodestar
    calculations. Finally, Brennan contends that class counsel breached their fiduciary duty
    to the class members by including a collusive clear sailing provision in the amended
    settlement agreement.
    A.     The Class Notice Did Not Violate the Class Members’ Due Process Rights
    1.     Timing of Objections
    The class notice describing the preliminarily-approved settlement included the
    proposed attorneys’ fees award for class counsel, a schedule for final approval, and the
    procedure for making objections. The notice stated: “Class Counsel, consisting of Law
    Offices of Kevin T. Barnes, Law Office of Joseph Antonelli, and Appell | Hilaire |
    Benardo LLP, will seek approval from the Court for the payment in an amount not more
    than $6,333,333.33 for their attorneys’ fees in connection with their work in the Actions,
    and an amount not more than $200,000 in reimbursement of their actual litigation
    expenses that were advanced in connection with the Actions. Class Counsel’s attorneys’
    fees and litigation expenses as approved by the Court will be paid out of the Gross
    Settlement Amount.” The trial court did not require class counsel to file, and they did not
    file, their motion for attorneys’ fees until February 28, 2013, which was after the January
    28, 2013 deadline stated in the notice for class members to file their objections.
    Brennan argues that requiring class members to file objections to the proposed
    settlement and request for attorneys’ fees before class counsel filed their motion for
    attorneys’ fees was a violation of due process and a breach of fiduciary duty. Brennan
    asserts that the statement in the notice that class counsel would request not more than
    $6,333,333.33 did not give the class members sufficient information to evaluate whether
    to object to the request. In support of his contention Brennan relies on Federal Rules of
    10
    Civil Procedure, rules 23 (rule 23) and 54 (rule 54) (28 U.S.C.),5 and the Ninth Circuit’s
    opinion in In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation (9th Cir. 2010) 
    618 F.3d 988
    , 993-995.
    Under rule 23 class counsel must file a motion for attorneys’ fees prior to the time
    class members must file objections to the settlement (rule 23(h)(1)-(4)), and the motion
    must include not only the settlement agreement’s provisions but also the actual amount
    sought or a “fair estimate” (rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iii)). In Mercury the Ninth Circuit,
    interpreting rule 23(h), held that, with respect to the timing of a motion for attorneys’
    fees, “a schedule that requires objections to be filed before the fee motion itself is filed
    denies the class the full and fair opportunity to examine and oppose the motion that Rule
    23(h) contemplates.” (In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation, supra, 618
    F.3d at p. 995.)
    Rule 23 does not control in California. “As a general rule, California courts are
    not bound by the federal rules of procedure but may look to them and to the federal cases
    5       Rule 23(h) provides: “In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
    attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’
    agreement. The following procedures apply: [¶] (1) A claim for an award must be made
    by motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time
    the court sets. Notice of the motion must be served on all parties and, for motions by
    class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner. [¶] (2) A class
    member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion. [¶] (3) The
    court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state its legal conclusions under
    Rule 52(a). [¶] (4) The court may refer issues related to the amount of the award to a
    special master or a magistrate judge, as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).”
    Rule 54(d)(2) provides in part: “Costs; Attorney’s Fees. [¶] . . . [¶]
    (2) Attorney’s Fees. [¶] (A) Claim to Be by Motion. A claim for attorney’s fees and
    related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires
    those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages. [¶] (B) Timing and Contents
    of the Motion. Unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise, the motion must: [¶]
    (i) be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment; [¶] (ii) specify the judgment
    and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award; [¶] (iii) state the
    amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it; and [¶] (iv) disclose, if the court so orders,
    the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for which the claim is made.”
    11
    interpreting them for guidance or where California precedent is lacking. [Citations.]
    California courts have never adopted Rule 23 as ‘a procedural strait jacket. To the
    contrary, trial courts [are] urged to exercise pragmatism and flexibility in dealing with
    class actions.’ [Citations.]” (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 
    91 Cal.App.4th 224
    , 239-240; see Cartt v. Superior Court (1975) 
    50 Cal.App.3d 960
    , 970, fn. 16 [“[w]e
    note the obvious: Rule 23, as such, does not bind California courts”].) California courts
    follow the federal rules for class action only in the absence of controlling state authority
    and only “look to Rule 23 for guidance where California precedent is lacking.” (Los
    Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center v. Superior Court (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 288
    , 301, fn. 7;
    see Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 
    44 Cal.3d 1103
    , 1118 [“in the absence of controlling
    state authority, California courts should utilize the procedures of rule 23”]; La Sala v.
    American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 
    5 Cal.3d 864
    , 872 [“trial courts, in the absence of
    controlling California authority, [should] utilize the class action procedures of the federal
    rules”].)6
    California precedent and authority governing court approval of class action
    settlements and attorneys’ fees applications, however, are not lacking. Rule 3.769 of the
    California Rules of Court states the procedure for including an attorneys’ fees provision
    in a class action settlement agreement and for giving notice of the final approval hearing
    on the proposed settlement. Under rule 3.769(b) of the California Rules of Court, “[a]ny
    agreement, express or implied, that has been entered into with respect to the payment of
    attorney’s fees or the submission of an application for the approval of attorney’s fees
    must be set forth in full in any application for approval of the dismissal or settlement of
    an action that has been certified as a class action.” This rule “protect[s] class members
    from potential conflicts of interest with their attorneys by requiring the full disclosure of
    6      The cases cited by Brennan contain similar statements. (See, e.g., Lealao v.
    Beneficial California, Inc., 
    supra,
     82 Cal.App.4th at p. 38 [“when there is no relevant
    California precedent on point, federal precedent should be consulted”]; Dunk v. Ford
    Motor Co. (1996) 
    48 Cal.App.4th 1794
    , 1801, fn. 7 [“[i]n the absence of California law
    on the subject, California courts look to federal authority”].)
    12
    all fee agreements in any application for dismissal or settlement of a class action.” (Mark
    v. Spencer (2008) 
    166 Cal.App.4th 219
    , 223.) “Under the California Rules of Court
    governing class actions, ‘notice of the final approval hearing must be given to the class
    members in the manner specified by the court. The notice must contain an explanation of
    the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written
    objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any
    objections to the proposed settlement.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f).)” (Litwin v.
    iRenew Bio Energy Solutions, LLC (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 877
    , 883; accord, Cellphone
    Termination Fee Cases (2010) 
    186 Cal.App.4th 1380
    , 1390.)
    The notice given to the class members complied with California Rules of Court
    rule 3.769 by apprising them of the agreement concerning attorneys’ fees. The notice
    told the class members that class counsel could receive up to $6.3 million in attorneys’
    fees. The notice also advised the class members of the procedures for objecting to the
    proposed settlement and appearing at the settlement hearing, where they could present
    their objections to any aspect of the settlement, including the amount of attorneys’ fees to
    be awarded to class counsel. Such objections could include an objection to the amount of
    information available regarding class counsel’s attorneys’ fees and, if appropriate, a
    continuance of the hearing to obtain more information (which is exactly what Brennan
    did). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f); Litwin v. iRenew Bio Energy Solutions,
    LLC, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 883 [“[p]rocedural due process requires that affected
    parties be provided with ‘the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
    manner’”]; In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 
    107 Cal.App.4th 820
    , 829 [“[t]he primary purpose
    of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with the right to be heard at a
    meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” but “[i]t does not guarantee any particular
    procedure but is rather an ‘elusive concept,’ requiring only ‘“notice reasonably calculated
    to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action affecting their property interest
    and an opportunity to present their objections”’”].) The notice in this case “‘“fairly
    apprise[d] the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options
    open to dissenting class members.”’ [Citation.]” (Cho v. Seagate Technology Holdings,
    13
    Inc. (2009) 
    177 Cal.App.4th 734
    , 746.) The notice did not violate the class members’
    due process rights.
    2.      Responsibility for Attorneys’ Fees
    The notice of settlement states: “The Court will also be asked to approve Class
    Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs and the class representative payments. A
    Class Member who does not request exclusion from the settlement may, but is not
    required to, enter an appearance through counsel. As a Class Member, you will not be
    responsible for the payment of attorneys’ fees . . . unless you retain your own counsel, in
    which event you will be responsible for your own attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Italics
    added.) Brennan argues that the statement “you will not be responsible for . . . attorneys’
    fees” is deceptive and misleading because class counsel were to receive their attorneys’
    fees from the common fund and each class member is economically responsible for his or
    her share of the attorneys’ fees award out of the gross settlement amount. Brennan also
    argues that the phrase “you will be responsible for your own attorney’s fees” is “(1)
    wrong as a matter of law; and (2) had the effect of discouraging class members from
    seeking the assistance of their own counsel.”
    When the “settlement agreement is read in its entirety and placed into context”
    Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 
    220 Cal.App.4th 107
    , 119), the meanings of
    these phrases are straightforward and not misleading. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J.
    Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 
    107 Cal.App.4th 516
    , 527 [phrase in settlement agreement
    “reasonably read in context”].) The reasonable interpretation of these provisions is that
    attorneys’ fees for class counsel are part of the settlement amount. (See Kurtin v. Elieff
    (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 455
    , 471-472 [“courts prefer a more natural reading of text to a
    less natural one, whether that text be found in a statute . . . or a contract”].) A class
    member will not be individually billed and obligated to pay for class counsel’s fees. If,
    however, the class member chooses to retain an attorney to object to some aspect of the
    settlement, the class member will be responsible for paying that attorney.
    14
    Brennan also argues that the “misinformation” about responsibility for attorneys’
    fees “is compounded by the fact that the Notice failed to advise class members that they
    even had a right to object to Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fee request.” The notice,
    however, states: “If you are dissatisfied with any of the terms of the Settlement you may
    object to the Settlement.” The notice also states: “The Court will hold a final approval
    hearing . . . to determine whether the Settlement should be finally approved as fair,
    reasonable, and adequate. The Court will also be asked to approve Class Counsel’s
    request for attorneys’ fees and costs and the Class Representative payments. . . .” The
    notice advises the class members that settlement will be reduced by “Class Counsel’s fees
    not to exceed $6,333,333.33 . . . .” The notice, read reasonably and considered in its
    entirety, sufficiently advises class members of the amount of attorneys’ fees class counsel
    were requesting and of the class members’ right to object to the request.
    B.     The Trial Court’s Method for Calculating Attorneys’ Fees Was Proper
    and the Award Was Reasonable
    Brennan argues that the trial court erred by calculating the amount of class
    counsel’s attorneys’ fees based on a percentage of the common fund, rather than the
    lodestar method. He cites the statement in Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., 
    supra,
     
    82 Cal.App.4th 19
     that the “primary method for establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’
    attorney fees is the lodestar method.” (Id. at p. 26.) While Brennan is correct that, as a
    general rule, the lodestar method is the primary method for calculating attorneys’ fees,
    the percentage approach may be proper where, as here, there is a common fund.
    1.     Standard of Review
    We review an award of attorneys’ fees in a class action settlement under an abuse
    of discretion standard. (Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 
    224 Cal.App.4th 808
    , 819;
    Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 972
    , 1004.) “‘“The
    ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in
    his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed
    15
    unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong[’]”—meaning that it
    abused its discretion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“‘“[T]he appropriate test for abuse of
    discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.”’ [Citations.]”
    [Citation.] . . . We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior
    understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review
    of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v.
    Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 
    222 Cal.App.4th 1228
    , 1249; accord, Holguin v. DISH
    Network LLC (2014) 
    229 Cal.App.4th 1310
    , 1329; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
    
    205 Cal.App.4th 140
    , 159.) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be
    reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases
    (2009) 
    175 Cal.App.4th 545
    , 556; see Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 
    supra,
     48 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 1809.)
    2.     Percentage of the Common Fund
    In Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., 
    supra,
     
    82 Cal.App.4th 19
     the court stated
    that “[t]he primacy of the lodestar method in California was established in 1977 in
    Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 
    20 Cal.3d 25
    . . . . [O]ur Supreme Court declared: ‘“The
    starting point of every fee award . . . must be a calculation of the attorney’s services in
    terms of the time he has expended on the case.”’” (Id. at p. 26.) The court added that
    “[i]n so-called fee shifting cases, in which the responsibility to pay attorney fees is
    statutorily or otherwise transferred from the prevailing plaintiff or class to the defendant,
    the primary method for establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees is the
    lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of
    hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has
    fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or
    negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality
    16
    of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and
    the contingent risk presented. [Citation.]”7 (Ibid.)
    The court in Lealao was discussing the circumstances in which trial courts could
    use the percentage of fund method, rather than the lodestar method, to calculate the
    amount of attorneys’ fees to award to class counsel. The court explained that “[f]ee
    spreading occurs when a settlement or adjudication results in the establishment of a
    separate or so-called common fund for the benefit of the class. Because the fee awarded
    class counsel comes from this fund, it is said that the expense is borne by the
    beneficiaries. Percentage fees have traditionally been allowed in such common fund
    cases, although, as will be seen, the lodestar methodology may also be utilized in this
    context.” (Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., 
    supra,
     82 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) The
    court noted that, “[b]ecause the common fund doctrine ‘rest[s] squarely on the principle
    of avoiding unjust enrichment’ [citations], attorney fees awarded under this doctrine are
    not assessed directly against the losing party (fee shifting), but come out of the fund
    established by the litigation, so that the beneficiaries of the litigation, not the defendant,
    bear this cost (fee spreading). Under federal law, the amount of fees awarded in a
    common fund case may be determined under either the lodestar method or the
    percentage-of-the-benefit approach [citation], although, about a decade ago, as the Ninth
    Circuit then noted, there commenced a ‘ground swell of support for mandating the
    percentage-of-the-fund approach in common fund cases.’ [Citation.] Prior to 1977,
    7       “‘[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it
    may be adjusted by the court based on factors including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty
    of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to
    which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the
    contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a
    fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines,
    retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary
    legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the
    fair market rate for such services.’” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 553
    , 579; see Chodos v. Borman (2014) 
    227 Cal.App.4th 76
    , 92.)
    17
    when the California Supreme Court decided Serrano [v. Priest], supra, 
    20 Cal.3d 25
    ,
    California courts could award a percentage fee in a common fund case. [Citation.] After
    Serrano . . . , it is not clear whether this may still be done.” (Id. at p. 27.)
    Subsequent judicial opinions have made it clear that a percentage fee award in a
    common fund case “may still be done.” For example, in Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008)
    
    162 Cal.App.4th 43
     the court stated that “the Lealao court did not purport to mandate the
    use of one particular formula in class action cases. The method the trial court used here
    and that [was] discussed in Lealao are merely different ways of using the same data—the
    amount of the proposed award and the monetized value of the class benefits—to
    accomplish the same purpose: to cross-check the fee award against an estimate of what
    the market would pay for comparable litigation services rendered pursuant to a fee
    agreement. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 65.) Therefore, “fees based on a percentage of the
    benefits are in fact appropriate in large class actions when the benefit per class member is
    relatively low . . . .” (Id. at p. 63.)
    In Consumer Privacy Cases, supra, 
    175 Cal.App.4th 545
     the court explained that
    “[r]egardless of whether attorney fees are determined using the lodestar method or
    awarded based on a ‘percentage-of-the-benefit’ analysis under the common fund
    doctrine, ‘“[t]he ultimate goal . . . is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to compensate
    counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” [Citations.]’
    [Citation.] It is not an abuse of discretion to choose one method over another as long as
    the method chosen is applied consistently using percentage figures that accurately reflect
    the marketplace. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 557-558; accord, Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 
    supra,
    162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65-66; see Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food
    Markets, Inc. (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 387
    , 397 [the common fund doctrine is “frequently
    applied in class actions when the efforts of the attorney for the named class
    representatives produce monetary benefits for the entire class”]; Wershba v. Apple
    Computer, Inc., 
    supra,
     91 Cal.App.4th at p. 254 [“[c]ourts recognize two methods for
    calculating attorney fees in civil class actions: the lodestar/multiplier method and the
    18
    percentage of recovery method”].)8 The percentage of fund method survives in
    California class action cases, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using it, in
    part, to approve the fee request in this class action.
    Finally, contrary to Brennan’s assertion, the trial court’s use of a percentage of 33
    1/3 percent of the common fund is consistent with, and in the range of, awards in other
    class action lawsuits. In Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 
    supra,
     
    162 Cal.App.4th 43
     the court held
    that attorneys’ fees of 27.9 percent of the class benefit awarded was “not out of line with
    class action fee awards calculated using the percentage-of-the-benefit method:
    ‘Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar
    method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.’
    [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 66, fn. 11; see Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 
    115 Cal.App.4th 715
    , 726 [“the court awarded to [class] counsel attorney fees in the amount
    of 25 percent of the total damages fund recovered for the class”]; Fischel v. Equitable
    Life Assur. Society of U.S. (9th Cir. 2002) 
    307 F.3d 997
    , 1006 [recognizing “a 25 percent
    ‘benchmark’ in percentage-of-the-fund cases that can be ‘adjusted upward or downward
    to account for any unusual circumstances involved in [the] case’”].)
    3.      Lodestar Cross-check
    The trial court did not use the percentage of fund method exclusively to determine
    whether the amount of attorneys’ fees requested was reasonable and appropriate. The
    8       The Supreme Court in Serrano even recognized the viability of the “percentage of
    the common fund” method. The court observed that “the so-called ‘common fund’
    exception to the American rule regarding the award of attorneys fees (i.e., the rule set
    forth in section 1021 of our Code of Civil Procedure), is grounded in ‘the historic power
    of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recovering a
    fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to recover his costs, including his
    attorneys’ fees, from the fund of property itself or directly from the other parties enjoying
    the benefit.’ [Citation.] [¶] First approved by this court in the early case of Fox v. Hale
    & Norcross S. M. Co. (1895) 
    108 Cal. 475
     . . . , the ‘common fund’ exception has since
    been applied by the courts of this state in numerous cases. [Citations.]” (Serrano v.
    Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 35.)
    19
    trial court also performed a lodestar calculation to cross-check the reasonableness of the
    percentage of fund award. This was entirely proper. “[A]lthough attorney fees awarded
    under the common fund doctrine are based on a ‘percentage-of-the-benefit’ analysis,
    while those under a fee-shifting statute are determined using the lodestar method, ‘[t]he
    ultimate goal . . . is the award of a “reasonable” fee to compensate counsel for their
    efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.’ [Citations.]” (Apple Computer, Inc. v.
    Superior Court (2005) 
    126 Cal.App.4th 1253
    , 1270.) It therefore is appropriate for the
    trial court to cross-check an award of attorneys’ fees calculated by one method against an
    award calculated by the other method in order to confirm whether the award is
    reasonable. (See Consumer Privacy Cases, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 557; Cundiff v.
    Verizon California, Inc. (2008) 
    167 Cal.App.4th 718
    , 724; see also In re Bluetooth
    Headset Products Liability Litigation (9th Cir. 2011) 
    654 F.3d 935
    , 944, 945 (Bluetooth)
    [“we have also encouraged courts to guard against an unreasonable result by cross-
    checking their calculations against a second method,” and “the lodestar method can
    ‘confirm that a percentage of recovery amount does not award counsel an exorbitant
    hourly rate’”]; Shaffer v. Continental Cas. Co. (9th Cir. 2010) 
    362 Fed.Appx. 627
    , 632
    [district court properly “used the lodestar method to cross-check the percentage
    method”]; Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp. (9th Cir. 2002) 
    290 F.3d 1043
    , 1050 [district court
    did not abuse its discretion in “apply[ing] the lodestar method as a cross-check of the
    percentage method” because “the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the
    reasonableness of a given percentage award”].)
    Brennan argues that, in connection with the court’s lodestar calculations, class
    counsel did not submit detailed attorney time records. Such detailed time records,
    however, are not required. “It is well established that ‘California courts do not require
    detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations
    of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of
    hours reasonably spent. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin
    (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 691
    , 698-699; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 
    supra,
     162 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 64 [“detailed timesheets are not required of class counsel to support fee awards in class
    20
    action cases”].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the hours
    worked and hourly rates provided by each of the class attorneys, and the description of
    the work the attorneys performed, in calculating a lodestar cross-check on the award.
    The trial court followed a process similar to the one approved in Sutter Health
    Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 
    171 Cal.App.4th 495
    . There, the Court of Appeal
    affirmed the trial court’s order approving class counsel attorneys’ fees as a percentage of
    a common fund after a lodestar “‘cross-check to test the reasonableness of [the]
    amount.’” (Id. at pp. 503, 512.) The court observed that “several law firms worked for
    class plaintiffs and all submitted declarations attesting to the hours worked and hourly
    rates of the various specific attorneys who worked on this case. Most of these
    declarations were summaries and . . . the lead firm . . . did not submit hourly timesheets.
    [¶] Courts have held that such detail is not required. [Citations.] We see no reason why
    [the trial court] could not accept the declarations of counsel attesting to the hours worked,
    particularly as [the court] was in the best position to verify those claims by reference to
    the various proceedings in the case.” (Id. at p. 512.) The trial court here did not abuse its
    discretion in performing a lodestar calculation based on the declarations of class counsel
    to cross-check the percentage of fund award.
    4.     Lodestar 2.13 Multiplier
    Class counsel’s proposed lodestar was $2,968,620 without an appeal and
    $3,118,620 including an appeal. Class counsel asked the court to apply a multiplier of
    2.02 to 2.13 to the lodestar cross-check to support the total fee request of $6,333,333.33.
    Brennan acknowledges that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.”
    (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 
    supra,
     91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; accord, In re Lugo
    (2008) 
    164 Cal.App.4th 1522
    , 1546; see Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 
    supra,
     162 Cal.App.4th
    at p. 66 [multiplier of 2.5 was not “out of line with prevailing case law”].)9 He argues,
    9       Even the authority Brennan relies on, Judge Richard Posner, has acknowledged
    that “[t]he need for such [a multiplier] adjustment is particularly acute in class action
    21
    however, that the trial court erred in applying the multiplier because the court did not
    have sufficiently detailed attorney time records. Brennan argues that he “seeks to
    establish a bright-line standard so that class action attorneys who do not submit sufficient
    evidence to allow the court to ‘carefully compile the time spent,’ ‘carefully review
    attorneys’ documentation of hours,’ and ‘thoroughly review fee applications’ to
    determine a reasonable lodestar cannot be awarded an enhancement to the lodestar.” (Fn.
    and underscoring omitted.)
    As noted, the “bright line standard” is not the law in California. The trial court in
    each case determines how much information and documentation the court needs in order
    to make a reasonable attorneys’ fees award. (See G.R. v. Intelligator (2010) 
    185 Cal.App.4th 606
    , 620 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing “to accept the
    declaration of [defendant’s] attorney as sufficient proof of the attorney’s hourly rate, the
    time spent, and the reasonableness of the time spent”].) Moreover, the trial court
    considered the proper lodestar multiplier factors in determining whether to apply a
    multiplier, including the difficulty of the issues in this case, the skill of class counsel, the
    contingent nature of the case, and the preclusion of other employment. (See Graham v.
    DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 579; Chodos v. Borman, supra, 227
    Cal.App.4th at p. 92.) Even where, unlike here, the trial court fails to give any
    explanation for its selection of the multiplier, such a failure does not justify reversal.
    (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.) “‘In reviewing
    a challenged award of attorney fees and costs, we presume that the trial court considered
    all appropriate factors in selecting a multiplier and applying it to the lodestar figure.
    [Citation.] This is in keeping with the overall review standard of abuse of discretion,
    which is found only where no reasonable basis for the court’s action can be shown.
    [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1249-1250.) The use of a multiplier of 2.13 was not
    an abuse of discretion.
    suits.” (Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation (7th Cir. 1992) 
    962 F.2d 566
    ,
    569.)
    22
    Brennan contends the trial court’s use of 2012 hourly rates “for work done
    between 2005 and 2011 amounted to a de facto multiplier.” Brennan’s contention is
    based on a misreading of the record. The trial court did not mistakenly apply 2012
    hourly rates to work performed in prior years. The trial court determined that the hourly
    rates for the attorneys who worked on the case were reasonable for all years of the
    litigation. And the trial court had ample basis for making that determination, including
    evidence of hourly rates from 2002 to 2012. Barnes’ declaration included a report based
    on a survey by the National Law Journal showing hourly rates for 2002 ranging from
    $500 to $850. The supporting declaration of Richard M. Pearl, an expert on hourly rates
    of attorneys’ fees in California, included a review of hourly rates approved by California
    courts ranging from $750 to $875. He also reported the result of surveys for 2009
    showing hourly rates ranging from $775 to $950. The trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by using the hourly rates of the attorneys serving as class counsel, nor did the
    court’s use of those rates constitute a de facto multiplier.
    Brennan also asserts that “[t]he awarding of any multiplier, much less a multiplier
    that compensated each attorney’s hour at $1,485.65, constituted a basic violation of the
    common fund doctrine,” citing Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
    (2004) 
    118 Cal.App.4th 123
    , 128. Garabedian does not prohibit the use of a multiplier.
    The court in Garabedian held that, “[e]ven where the parties agree as to the amount of
    attorney fees in . . . a settlement agreement, courts properly review and modify the
    agreed-upon fees if the amount is not reasonable.” (Id. at p. 127.) Thus, “the judicial
    determination of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees . . . does not depend solely upon hourly rates
    and the number of hours devoted to the case. While these two factors are ‘the starting
    point of every fee award’ [citation], numerous other factors must also be considered,
    including the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the quality of counsel’s
    services, the time limitations imposed by the litigation, the amount at stake, and the result
    obtained by counsel. [Citations.]” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (1988) 
    203 Cal.App.3d 78
    , 83; see Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino
    (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 603
    , 616 [“[a]fter making the lodestar calculation, the court may
    23
    augment or diminish that amount based on a number of factors specific to the case,
    including the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the attorneys’ skill in presenting the
    issues, the extent to which the case precluded the attorneys from accepting other work,
    and the contingent nature of the work”].) The fact that the multiplier applied may have
    resulted in an effective increase in the hourly rate does not, without more, establish that
    the attorneys’ fees award was unreasonable.
    C.     Clear Sailing Provision in Settlement Agreement
    Brennan argues that the inclusion of a clear sailing provision in the settlement
    agreement was a breach of the fiduciary duty by class counsel in the negotiation of the
    settlement. This provision states: “Class Counsel will apply to the Court for an award of
    not more than $6,333,333.33 (33.33 [percent] of the Gross Settlement Amount) as their
    Class Counsel Fees Payment . . . , and Robert Half will not oppose their request. . . .
    Brennan relies on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Bluetooth, supra, 
    654 F.3d 935
    , which
    includes this statement: “One inherent risk [in class action settlements] is that class
    counsel may collude with the defendants, ‘tacitly reducing the overall settlement in return
    for a higher attorney’s fee.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 946.) One sign of such collusion is
    “when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment of
    attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class funds, which carries ‘the potential of
    enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for
    counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class’ [citations] . . . .” (Id. at
    p. 947.) There is, however, no prohibition on clear sailing provisions, nor is there any
    evidence that the clear sailing provision in this case reflected any collusion between
    Laffitte and Robert Half.
    “While it is true that the propriety of ‘clear sailing’ attorney fee agreements has
    been debated in scholarly circles [citations], commentators have also noted that class
    action ‘settlement agreement[s] typically include[] a “clear sailing” clause . . . .’
    [Citation.] In fact, commentators have agreed that such an agreement is proper. ‘[A]n
    agreement by the defendant to pay such sum of reasonable fees as may be awarded by the
    24
    court, and agreeing also not to object to a fee award up to a certain sum, is probably still a
    proper and ethical practice. This practice serves to facilitate settlements and avoids a
    conflict, and yet it gives the defendant a predictable measure of exposure of total
    monetary liability for the judgment and fees in a case. To the extent it facilitates
    completion of settlements, this practice should not be discouraged.’ [Citation.]”
    (Consumer Privacy Cases, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 553, fn. omitted; see Cellphone
    Termination Fee Cases (2009) 
    180 Cal.App.4th 1110
    , 1120 [“[c]lass action settlements
    frequently contain a ‘clear sailing’ agreement, whereby the defendant agrees not to object
    to an attorney fee award up to a certain amount”].)
    In Bluetooth, 
    supra,
     
    654 F.3d 935
     the Ninth Circuit stated that “[c]ollusion may
    not always be evident on the face of a settlement, and courts therefore must be
    particularly vigilant not only for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that
    class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain class
    members to infect the negotiations. [Citations.] A few such signs are: [¶] (1) ‘when
    counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when the class
    receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded,’ [citations]; [¶]
    (2) when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment of
    attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class funds, which carries ‘the potential of
    enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for
    counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class,’ [citation]; and [¶] (3) when
    the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be added to the
    class fund, [citation].” (Id. at p. 947.) Even Judge Posner, on whose writings Brennan
    relies, has written that “[c]lear-sailing clauses have not been held to be unlawful per se,
    but [where the case] involv[es] a non-cash settlement award to the class, such a clause
    should be subjected to intense critical scrutiny . . . .” (Redman v. RadioShack Corp. (7th
    Cir., Sept. 19, 2014, Nos. 14-1470, 14-1471, 14-1658, 14-1320) ___ F.3d ___, ___, [
    2014 WL 4654477
     at p. 13].)
    Unlike Bluetooth, where the “settlement agreement included all three of these
    warning signs” (Bluetooth, 
    supra,
     654 F.3d at p. 947), the settlement agreement here
    25
    contains none of them. As discussed, class counsel received a percentage of the recovery
    commensurate with percentages awarded in other cases, and the class members received
    a significant monetary distribution. The clear sailing agreement did not provide for a
    payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from the common fund but provided for a
    payment of attorneys’ fees out of the fund. Finally, there was no arrangement that fees
    not awarded would revert to the Robert Half defendants. (See In re Toys “R” Us-
    Delaware, Inc.—Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FCTA) Litigation (C.D.Cal.
    2014) 
    295 F.R.D. 438
    , 458 [“despite the clear sailing provision,” the “absence of a
    ‘kicker provision’ in the parties’ settlement and the fact that the class is receiving
    reasonable value reduces the likelihood that plaintiffs and [the defendant] colluded to
    confer benefits on each other at the expense of class members”]; Larsen v. Trader Joe’s
    Company (N.D.Cal. 2014) 
    2014 WL 3404531
     at p. 8 [“clear sailing provisions generally
    do not raise concerns where, as here, the fees are to come from the settlement fund,” as
    opposed to “where attorneys’ fees are paid on top of the settlement fund”].) In the
    absence of any of the recognized warning signs of collusion or other evidence of
    collusion, the inclusion of a clear sailing provision in the settlement agreement did not
    constitute a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of class counsel.
    26
    DISPOSITION
    The order entering final judgment is affirmed. The Laffitte class plaintiffs and the
    Robert Half defendants are to recover their costs on appeal.
    SEGAL, J.*
    We concur:
    WOODS, Acting P. J.
    ZELON, J.
    *       Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    27
    Filed 11/21/14
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    MARK LAFFITTE et al.,                                B249253
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,                  (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC321317)
    v.
    ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC.                       ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
    et al.,                                              AND CERTIFYING FOR
    PUBLICATION;
    Defendants and Respondents,                  NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
    DAVID BRENNAN,
    Plaintiff and Appellant.
    THE COURT:
    It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 29, 2014, be modified as
    follows:
    1. On page 2, under the Introduction heading, add the following paragraph as the
    first paragraph:
    This appeal arises from an order overruling objections to a
    settlement of several wage and hour class actions, and approving the
    settlement. We hold that rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, not
    rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, establishes the
    requirements in California for settlement notices to class members. We
    also confirm that the percentage of recovery method for calculating an
    award of attorneys’ fees is still viable in common fund cases. Finally, we
    hold that the presence of a clear sailing provision in a class action
    settlement does not, without more, invalidate the agreement as collusive.
    28
    2. On page 5, line 4 of the first full paragraph, add the word “and” between the
    words “counsel” and “supervised” so that the sentence reads in part:
    The declarations stated that Kevin T. Barnes, who served as lead counsel
    and supervised and handled all aspects of the litigation, . . .
    3. On page 20, second line from the bottom, add the word “see” before the
    citation Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 
    supra,
     162 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.
    4. On page 23, at the beginning of line 10 of the first full paragraph, change the
    word “of” to “and” so that the sentence reads in part as follows:
    The supporting declaration of Richard M. Pearl, an expert on hourly rates
    and attorneys’ fees in California, . . .
    5. On page 24, line 5 of the paragraph following subheading C, at the end of that
    line after the ellipses, add a closed quotation mark so that line 5 reads as follows:
    . . . Class Counsel Fees Payment . . . , and Robert Half will not oppose their
    request. . . .”
    6. On page 25, the citation at the end of the first full paragraph should be revised
    to read as follows:
    (Redman v. RadioShack Corp. (7th Cir. 2014) 
    768 F.3d 622
    , 637.)
    There is no change in the judgment.
    The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October 29, 2014 was not
    certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the
    opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court,
    rule 8.1105(c), and
    29
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the Official
    Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion be published in
    the Official Reports.
    ___________________              ___________________               ___________________
    WOODS, Acting P. J.              ZELON, J.                         SEGAL, J.*
    *
    Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
    VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    30