People v. Fleming CA4/2 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 11/13/14 P. v. Fleming CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       E059240
    v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. FCH1200209)
    CHRISTOPHER FLEMING,                                                     OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gerard S. Brown,
    Judge. Reversed with directions.
    Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
    Peter Quon, Jr., and Parag Agrawal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    1
    On May 17, 2012, defendant and appellant Christopher Fleming entered a plea
    agreement and pled no contest to one count of obtaining property by false pretenses (Pen.
    Code, § 532, subd. (a), count 1)1 in exchange for three years of probation and a 365-day
    suspended county jail sentence. Defendant was released from custody on his own
    recognizance and was to return to court for pronouncement of judgment on June 28,
    2012. The plea agreement listed the terms of his release, which included the orders that
    he stay away from two specified residences and have no contact with certain individuals.
    A trial court subsequently found that defendant violated the terms of his release. The
    court intended to place defendant on probation, pursuant to the plea agreement.
    However, when the court repeatedly asked him if he would agree to abide by the terms
    and conditions of probation, defendant refused to give a definitive answer. The court
    treated his response as a rejection of the probation terms and sentenced him to the
    midterm of two years in county prison.
    On appeal, defendant argues that the court improperly sentenced him to a
    punishment that was outside the terms of the plea agreement. He contends that when the
    court could not enforce the plea agreement, it should have withdrawn its approval of the
    negotiated plea and permitted him to withdraw his plea. We agree and reverse the
    judgment with directions for the court to either enforce the plea agreement, or withdraw
    1   All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
    noted.
    2
    its approval of the agreement and permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and go to
    trial on the original charge.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On May 8, 2012, defendant was charged by felony complaint with obtaining
    money, labor or property by false pretenses. (§ 532, subd. (a), count 1.)
    On May 17, 2012, defendant entered a no contest plea to the charged offense, in
    exchange for three years of probation and a suspended 365-day county jail sentence. The
    prosecutor informed the court that defendant was not actually going to be placed on
    probation until June 28, 2012, and that he was going to be released on his own
    recognizance under terms specified on the plea form. Such terms required defendant to
    stay away from two specified residences and have no contact with certain individuals.
    The court warned defendant that, pending his sentencing on June 28, 2012, he had to
    follow those terms. Defendant agreed and then pled no contest to count 1. The court
    ordered him to return for sentencing and referred the matter to the probation department
    for a presentence report.
    The sentencing hearing was continued several times. On July 5, 2012, the court
    held a hearing and noted that a new complaint had been filed alleging that defendant went
    to one of the prohibited residences on June 16, 2012. Thus, the court kept him in custody
    in the instant case and set bail at $250,000. Defendant informed the court that he posted
    an affidavit outside of the courtroom and “revoked” his plea. The court explained that he
    3
    did not have a unilateral right to withdraw his plea and that his attorney would be making
    a formal motion to withdraw the plea in the next few days.
    On July 12, 2012, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that he
    was forced to enter his plea out of fear that if he did not, he would be sent to Patton State
    Hospital for a psychological evaluation.
    On July 30, 2012, defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s mental
    competence, pursuant to section 1368. The court suspended the proceedings. Defendant
    underwent a psychological evaluation on August 14, 2012. The psychologist opined that
    he was competent to stand trial.
    At a hearing on September 12, 2012, the parties stipulated that defendant was
    competent to stand trial, and the court reinstated the proceedings. The court then heard
    arguments regarding defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied the
    motion. Defendant argued with the court and said that his attorney did not represent him.
    The court gave him a form to fill out regarding self-representation, but then denied his
    request to represent himself.
    On October 3, 2012, the court held a hearing to determine whether or not
    defendant complied with the terms of his release from custody, prior to sentencing. A
    police detective testified that he went to one of the residences listed in the plea agreement
    and saw defendant there. The court determined that defendant violated the release terms
    by going to the residence. Defendant argued extensively with the court to the point that it
    ordered him removed from the courtroom. The prosecutor asked the court to place
    4
    defendant on probation that day and order him to serve 365 days in county jail. The court
    noted that a probation report was filed on June 20, 2012. Defense counsel said he had
    reviewed the report but had not reviewed the probation terms with defendant. The court
    took a recess to allow defense counsel to do so. Defendant was then brought back into
    the courtroom. The court asked defendant if he agreed to abide by the probation terms,
    but defendant said he did not understand them. Defendant then challenged the court on
    matters such as the court’s jurisdiction and its oath of office. The court refused to
    indulge defendant in his inquiries and told him he had two options—he could either agree
    to the probation conditions and be placed on probation, or he could be sentenced to
    county prison. Defendant asked how long the county prison term would be, and the court
    explained that the term for his offense was 16 months, two years, or three years.
    Defendant would not answer the court directly as to which option he wanted, so the court
    repeatedly asked him if he would accept the terms of probation. Defendant asked the
    court to read him the terms of probation and go through them “point by point.” The court
    confirmed with defense counsel that he went over the terms with defendant.
    Defendant continued to refuse to answer the court’s question about whether he
    wanted to abide by the probation conditions or be sentenced to county prison, and instead
    began ranting at length. The court warned defendant that if he continued to “play games”
    with the court, it would have him removed again. Defendant said he would
    “conditionally accept” the court’s offer to have him removed, and continued to
    5
    antagonize the court. The court ordered him removed, and defendant cursed at the court
    and said he did not accept any of the court’s offers or probation.
    After defendant was removed from the courtroom, the court stated on the record
    that it gave defendant an opportunity to accept or reject the probation terms, and since
    defendant did not give a definitive answer, the court would treat that as a rejection. The
    court stated that it was in no position to place defendant on probation and that it was clear
    he did not wish to abide by the terms of probation. The prosecutor agreed, and the court
    said it intended to sentence defendant to county prison. Defense counsel asked for the
    low term. Based on defendant’s criminal record, the court sentenced him to the midterm
    of two years in county prison.
    ANALYSIS
    The Court Improperly Sentenced Defendant on the Plea
    Defendant argues that even though he may have rejected probation at the
    sentencing hearing, the court did not have the authority to impose a more severe
    punishment than that specified in the plea agreement. We agree. Since the court could
    not enforce the plea agreement, it should have withdrawn its approval of the negotiated
    plea and allowed defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea, pursuant to
    section 1192.5.
    “Under section 1192.5, if a plea agreement is accepted by the prosecution and
    approved by the court, the defendant ‘cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment
    more severe than that specified in the plea . . . .’ The statute further provides that if the
    6
    court subsequently withdraws its approval of the plea agreement, ‘the defendant shall be
    permitted to withdraw his or her plea if he or she desires to do so.’ [Citations.]”2
    (People v. Masloski (2001) 
    25 Cal. 4th 1212
    , 1217.) Furthermore, “[i]f the court is for
    some reason unable to effectuate the bargain, a defendant must be given an opportunity to
    withdraw his guilty plea. [Citations.]” (People v. Pinon (1973) 
    35 Cal. App. 3d 120
    , 124-
    125 (Pinon).)
    In People v. Cruz (1988) 
    44 Cal. 3d 1247
    (Cruz), the defendant entered into a plea
    bargain, was released on bail, but then failed to appear for sentencing. (Id. at p. 1249.)
    When he was apprehended and sentenced, the trial court announced its intention not to
    abide by the plea bargain, and it refused to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.
    (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s failure to appear for sentencing was
    not a breach of the plea agreement, but rather a separate offense for which the defendant
    was entitled to trial. Accordingly, the trial court’s determination not to follow the terms
    2  Section 1192.5 provides, in relevant part: “Where the plea is accepted by the
    prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as
    otherwise provided in this section, cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more
    severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea other
    than as specified in the plea. [¶] If the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the
    defendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, at
    the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of
    judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter, and (3)
    in that case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his or her plea if he or she
    desires to do so.”
    7
    of the plea bargain required that the defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw his
    plea. (Id. at pp. 1249, 1253-1254.)
    In People v. Johnson (1974) 
    10 Cal. 3d 868
    (Johnson), the defendant pled guilty in
    exchange for a misdemeanor sentence and probation. (Id. at p. 870.) The trial court
    subsequently learned that the defendant had concealed his true name and criminal history
    during plea negotiations; so, it sentenced him to prison, contrary to the terms of the plea
    bargain, without offering him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. (Id. at pp. 870-871.)
    The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provisions of section 1192.5, requiring that
    a defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw a plea if the court withdraws its
    approval, “makes no exception for defendants who have committed fraud in negotiating a
    plea bargain.” (Id. at pp. 872-873.)
    In the instant case, defendant entered a plea agreement that specified he would be
    put on probation at a future date. He was brought back for sentencing when he violated a
    condition of his release. The court attempted to place him on probation and asked if he
    would be willing to abide by the probation conditions. When defendant refused to
    directly respond, the court concluded that he did not wish to abide by the conditions. The
    court then unilaterally modified the terms of the agreement and sentenced defendant to
    two years in county prison. This course of action was improper. A defendant “cannot be
    sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the
    court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.” (§ 1192.5.)
    Here, defendant pled no contest in reliance on the court’s promise to grant probation.
    8
    The fact that defendant later would not agree to abide by the probation conditions did not
    provide the court with the option of holding him to his plea and sentencing him to
    something other than as specified in the plea agreement. Since defendant refused to
    agree to the probation conditions, the court could not effectuate the plea bargain. At that
    point, it should have withdrawn its approval of the plea agreement and permitted
    defendant to withdraw his plea. (§ 1192.5; 
    Pinon, supra
    , 35 Cal.App.3d at pp. 124-125
    [“If the court is for some reason unable to effectuate the bargain, a defendant must be
    given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.”]) We note that if defendant had been
    placed on probation at the time he entered his plea, and he subsequently violated
    conditions of his probation, the court would have been able to sentence defendant,
    notwithstanding the terms of the plea agreement. (People v. Martin (1992) 
    3 Cal. App. 4th 482
    , 487 [“[W]here a defendant granted probation as part of a plea bargain violates that
    probation, subsequent sentencing is not limited by the terms of the original plea.”])
    However, defendant was never put on probation.
    The People assert that defendant “obstructed the court’s ability to impose the
    terms of the plea agreement” and should not be allowed to benefit from his own conduct.
    However, in both 
    Cruz, supra
    , 
    44 Cal. 3d 1247
    and 
    Johnson, supra
    , 
    10 Cal. 3d 868
    , it was
    the defendants’ conduct that made enforcement of the plea bargains inappropriate.
    Nonetheless, the courts in those cases withdrew approval of the bargains, and the
    defendants were given the opportunity to withdraw their pleas. (Cruz, at pp. 1249, 1254;
    Johnson, at p. 872.)
    9
    The People next note that defendant’s formal motion to withdraw his plea was
    unsuccessful and argue that he should not be allowed to benefit from his “act of
    circumventing the trial court’s proper decision” to deny the motion. The People reason
    that, since defendant had already pled no contest, and there were no legal grounds to
    withdraw the plea, the court was well within its discretion to find an alternative sentence
    for him, outside of the plea agreement. However, the People cite no authority for this
    proposition. “‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities
    on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
    waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley
    (1995) 
    10 Cal. 4th 764
    , 793.) Moreover, defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea alleged
    that he entered his plea out of fear that he would be sent to Patton State Hospital for a
    psychological evaluation if he did not do so. The court denied the motion, noting that it
    had thoroughly questioned defendant and found his plea free and voluntary.
    Additionally, the court found that, aside from his own declaration, defendant did not
    provide any evidence to support his allegation that his counsel threatened to send him for
    a psychological evaluation. Thus, the court denied the motion because defendant failed
    to show good cause to withdraw his plea. (§ 1018.) However, permitting a defendant to
    withdraw his plea under section 1192.5 is a completely separate issue. As discussed
    above, because the court could not effectuate the plea bargain, it should have withdrawn
    its approval of the plea agreement and permitted defendant to withdraw his plea.
    (§ 1192.5; 
    Pinon, supra
    , 
    35 Cal. App. 3d 120
    , 124-125.)
    10
    In a similar argument, the People contend that if we allow a defendant who refuses
    probation conditions to then withdraw his plea, we would provide “a backdoor to
    achieving the goal of having a plea withdrawn.” However, as both parties agree, this was
    an unusual situation. Most defendants who bargain for probation want to be placed on
    probation. Thus, we do not anticipate this situation occurring often. If it does,
    prosecutors could avoid the situation by requiring defendants to be placed on probation
    immediately after entering their guilty pleas, or by simply not offering plea agreements
    that place defendants on probation.
    The People additionally argue that “policy reasons” support the court’s decision to
    sentence defendant on the plea. The People cite People v. Hester (2000) 
    22 Cal. 4th 290
    ,
    295 (Hester) to say that “defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain
    should not be allowed to trifle with the courts.” The People contend that a defendant
    should not be able to refuse to agree to probation conditions, and thereby “force” the trial
    court to allow him to withdraw his plea, since that amounts to trifling with the court.
    However, Hester is not on point. Defendant here originally pled no contest in return for
    being put on probation. Probation is a privilege. (People v. Bravo (1987) 
    43 Cal. 3d 600
    ,
    608.) Defendant did not actually receive the benefit of his bargain, since he was never
    put on probation. In effect, he obstructed his own benefit of receiving probation by
    refusing to agree to the probation conditions. If defendant no longer wanted the privilege
    of probation, the court should have permitted him to withdraw his plea. (See ante.)
    11
    We now decide the appropriate remedy. “The usual remedies for violation of a
    plea bargain are to allow defendant to withdraw the plea and go to trial on the original
    charges, or to specifically enforce the plea bargain.” (People v. Mancheno (1982) 
    32 Cal. 3d 855
    , 860-861.) Thus, we will remand the matter for the trial court to specifically
    enforce the plea agreement and place defendant on probation, in accordance with the
    agreement. If defendant again refuses to agree to abide by the probation conditions, then
    the court will permit him to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on the original
    charge.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is reversed. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County is
    directed to specifically enforce the plea agreement. If defendant does not agree to abide
    by the probation terms, the court is directed to withdraw its approval of the plea
    agreement, pursuant to section 1192.5, and permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea
    and go to trial on the original charge.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    HOLLENHORST
    Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    RICHLI
    J.
    12
    CODRINGTON
    J.
    13