In re Jeremiah R. CA2/8 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 4/28/16 In re Jeremiah R. CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    In re JEREMIAH R., a Person Coming                                   B266452
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                   (Los Angeles County
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND                                           Super. Ct. No. DK11485)
    FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    L.R.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Debra Losnick, Commissioner. Dismissed.
    Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
    Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel,
    and Tracey F. Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
    _______________________________
    The juvenile dependency court adjudged a minor to be a dependent of the court.
    Appellant L.R. (hereafter Mother) contends the court’s jurisdiction orders are not
    supported by substantial evidence. We dismiss Mother’s appeal because it is moot.
    FACTS
    Mother and Angel E. (Father) are the parents of Jeremiah R., born in September
    2010. Father, whose whereabouts are unknown, is not involved in the current appeal.
    At all relevant times, Mother and Jeremiah lived in an apartment with maternal
    grandmother, and other relatives, including Mother’s sister.
    In March 2015, a “mandated reporter”1 contacted the Los Angeles County
    Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to express concerns about “general
    neglect” involving Mother and then four-year-old Jeremiah. According to the mandated
    reporter, Jeremiah had stated that Mother yelled at him and used “bad words.” Further,
    the mandated reporter had asked the maternal grandmother whether Mother “was an
    alcoholic,” and maternal grandmother answered that Mother “drinks sometimes.”
    Over a course of several days in March, April and May 2015, after receiving the
    report noted above, a DCFS social worker talked to Mother, Jeremiah and the maternal
    grandmother. Mother denied yelling at Jeremiah, but admitted to using inappropriate
    language in his presence. Jeremiah reported that Mother hit him on the hand when he
    misbehaved, and it hurt. The social worker talked to Mother about participating in a
    parent-child interactive therapy program, but Mother said that she did not want any
    services that would require her to leave her home. The social worker also advised
    Mother that Jeremiah was eligible to enroll in a transitional kindergarten program,
    to which Mother said that she would “look into” the subject. The social worker also
    referred Mother to Partnership for Families (PFF) services. Jeremiah was not current in
    his immunization shots, and the social worker reminded Mother to make sure that
    1
    The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.) defines
    certain persons, for example, teachers, school administrators and child day care workers,
    as mandated reporters, and requires such persons to report any suspected child abuse or
    neglect to local police officials or county social welfare department. (See, generally, Pen.
    Code, §§ 11165.7, 11165.9.)
    2
    Jeremiah received his shots. Mother only participated in the initial intake for the PFF
    services. After her initial visit, Mother refused to meet with her counselor or return any
    telephone calls. The counselor opined that Mother agreed to services solely for the
    purpose of “getting DCFS off her back.”
    Maternal grandmother reported an incident when Mother came home intoxicated,
    and said that Mother often came home drunk. Further, Mother spent all of her time in the
    house, and did not work or go to school. Maternal grandmother also reported that she
    believed that Mother “mistreated” Jeremiah, including “scream[ing]” at him. Mother’s
    explanation was that the maternal grandmother was very religious, and disapproved of
    how Mother lived her life. Mother said that she drank about once a week, normally four
    18-ounce beers, but never in the family home. She would not drink until she became
    “drunk,” only “tipsy.” She would leave Jeremiah either with her sister or the maternal
    grandmother when she went out drinking.
    In late May 2015, DCFS filed a petition on Jeremiah’s behalf pursuant to Welfare
    and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Mother’s drinking caused her
    to be unable to provide regular care to Jeremiah.2 The court detained Jeremiah and
    ordered that he remain released to Mother on the condition that she continue to reside
    with the maternal grandmother.
    In June 2015, DCFS submitted its jurisdiction/disposition report. According to
    that report, Mother told the social worker that she lacked the motivation to participate in a
    parenting class or individual counseling. Although family preservation services were
    offered, Mother said she was not willing to participate unless it was court ordered.
    Mother had failed to enroll Jeremiah in school, and she did not follow up with his
    immunizations. DCFS recommended that the dependency court take jurisdiction and
    declare Jeremiah a dependent of the court. The social worker opined that Jeremiah could
    2
    All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. DCFS’s
    petition also included an allegation pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a)––“physical
    harm”––, involving Mother’s “striking” Jeremiah. That dependency court eventually
    found that this allegation was not sustained by the evidence, and we hereafter ignore the
    dependency ground of physical harm in this opinion.
    3
    safely remain with Mother, provided she participated in family preservation services,
    including individual counseling, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and random testing
    for drugs and alcohol.
    On July 14, 2015, the dependency court sustained the section 300 petition based
    on the reports submitted by DCFS.3 Mother failed to appear for the jurisdiction hearing
    despite the court’s order to do so. During arguments, Mother’s counsel asserted that the
    petition should be dismissed in its entirety. Jeremiah’s counsel argued that the court
    should take jurisdiction over Jeremiah, noting Mother’s lack of cooperation with DCFS.
    In finding grounds existed for jurisdiction, the court stated:
    “The court looks at the jurisdiction report, page 9, where the
    grandmother indicates that Mother comes home so drunk, that she told
    Mother: ‘imagine what you would do if I was not here,’ which causes the
    court concern. I don’t feel it’s appropriate for . . . Mother to rely on the
    grandmother to care for her child if the grandmother had to work or so
    on. . . . [M]other is coming home under the influence, with a very young
    child in the home.”
    The dependency court placed Jeremiah in the home of Mother, on the condition
    that she continue to reside with the maternal grandmother. Further, the court ordered
    Mother to provide six random drug and alcohol tests, attend Alcoholics Anonymous
    meetings, and participate in parenting classes, counseling and Family Preservation
    programs.
    3
    As sustained, the section 300 petition read: “[Mother] is a substance abuser and
    currently abuses alcohol which renders [her] incapable of providing the child with regular
    care and supervision. On prior occasions, [Mother] was under the influence of alcohol
    while the child was in [Mother]’s care and supervision. The child is of such a young age
    requiring constant care and supervision and [Mother]’s substance abuse interferes with
    providing the regular care and supervision of the child. Such substance abuse by
    [Mother] endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk of
    physical harm and damage.”
    4
    Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. In November 2015, Mother filed her
    opening brief on appeal.
    On December 16, 2015, the dependency court terminated its jurisdiction over
    Jeremiah with orders that Mother have sole legal and physical custody of her son.
    DISCUSSION
    DCFS contends we should dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot because, while the
    appeal was pending in our court, the dependency court terminated its jurisdiction over
    Jeremiah and returned him to Mother’s custody, without any continuing orders adverse
    to Mother. We agree.
    In re N.S. (2016) 
    245 Cal. App. 4th 53
    (N.S.) is instructive and guides our decision
    to dismiss Mother’s appeal. In pertinent part and as edited so as to conform to Mother’s
    current appeal, N.S. reasons:
    “As a general rule, it is a court’s duty to decide ‘ “ ‘actual controversies by a
    judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions
    or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
    matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” ’ (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide
    Dogs for the Blind (1967) 
    67 Cal. 2d 536
    , 541.) An appellate court will dismiss an appeal
    when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant effective relief.
    (Ibid.) . . .
    “[¶] . . . [¶]
    “[As noted], the critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is
    moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible
    error. This standard was relied upon more than two decades ago in a case from Division
    Five of [the First District Court of Appeal] that dismissed an earlier appeal in light of a
    subsequent dismissal by the juvenile court of the dependency action. (In re Michelle M.
    (1992) 
    8 Cal. App. 4th 326
    , 328-329 (Michelle M.).) The procedural posture in that case
    was similar to the posture here. There, the father appealed jurisdictional and
    dispositional orders finding his children to be dependents of the juvenile court. (Id. at
    pp. 327-328.) During the pendency of the appeal, the juvenile court terminated its
    5
    jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 328.) The juvenile court also transferred its custody-and-visitation
    order, which prohibited contact between the father and his children except under certain
    circumstances, to the superior court under section 362.4. (Michelle M., at p. 328.) That
    statute provides that a juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction may be used as the
    sole basis for opening a separate file in the superior court when there is no current action
    pending relating to the minor’s custody. (See ibid.) Over the father’s objection, Division
    Five dismissed the appeal from the jurisdictional findings, concluding that there was no
    longer effective relief that could be granted because ‘the juvenile court no longer has
    jurisdiction and we are only reviewing that court’s ruling,’ as opposed to the subsequent
    ruling dismissing jurisdiction and transferring the matter to the superior court. (Id. at
    p. 330.)
    “In In re Joshua C. (1994) 
    24 Cal. App. 4th 1544
    , 1546-1547 (Joshua C.) the court
    similarly focused on whether it could grant any effective relief in deciding whether an
    appeal from earlier jurisdictional findings was moot in light of a dismissal of the
    dependency proceedings. In that case, the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition
    finding that a father sexually abused his daughter, awarded sole physical and legal
    custody of the girl and her twin brother to the mother (with whom the minors had been
    living throughout the dependency proceedings), and terminated dependency jurisdiction.
    The appellate court held that it could consider the father’s appeal from the jurisdictional
    findings, notwithstanding the termination of dependency proceedings, because those
    findings were the basis for restrictive visitation and custody orders that continued to
    negatively affect the father. (Id. at p. 1548.) ‘If the jurisdictional basis for orders
    restricting appellant’s visitation with, and custody of, [appellant’s son] is found by direct
    appeal to be faulty, the orders would be invalid.’ (Ibid.; see also In re 
    J.K., supra
    , 174
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 1431-1432 [juvenile court’s dismissal did not render appeal moot
    where sustained jurisdictional findings had an adverse effect on his custody rights, and
    court-imposed stay-away order would remain in effect against him after dismissal]; In re
    Hirenia C. (1993) 
    18 Cal. App. 4th 504
    , 517 [where an issue raised in a notice of appeal in
    6
    a dependency case continues to affect the rights of the child or parents, appeal not
    necessarily rendered moot by dismissal of underlying dependency proceedings].)
    “Here, unlike in Joshua C., no effective relief can be granted. Mother has been
    awarded custody of [Jeremiah], and the jurisdictional findings are not the basis of any
    current order that is adverse to her. . . . [T]here is no relief to provide her [on] her
    appeal from the jurisdictional findings . . . .
    “Mother . . . relies on Joshua 
    C., supra
    , 
    24 Cal. App. 4th 1544
    , in arguing that this
    court should review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings because possibly
    erroneous findings will otherwise be left unexamined. Her reliance is misplaced. It is
    true that Joshua C. noted that leaving the alleged jurisdictional errors unaddressed on
    appeal could have ‘the undesirable result of insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings from
    review.’ (Id. at p. 1548.) But, unlike here, the jurisdictional findings in Joshua C. were
    the foundation for visitation-and-custody orders that remained in effect.
    “Some courts have relied on Joshua C.’s language in declining to dismiss appeals
    from juvenile-court orders entered prior to the dismissal of dependency proceedings even
    though the parents made no showing that the challenged orders adversely affected them
    in light of the dismissal. (E.g., In re Daisy H. (2011) 
    192 Cal. App. 4th 713
    , 716 [appeal
    not dismissed even though underlying proceedings dismissed and father awarded joint
    custody under mediation agreement, because jurisdictional findings ‘could have severe
    and unfair,’ yet unspecified, consequences]; In re C.C. (2009) 
    172 Cal. App. 4th 1481
    ,
    1488-1489 [juvenile court terminated jurisdiction during pendency of appeal and awarded
    mother ‘the very relief’ she sought in her appeal; although mother’s concern about
    possible detriment in future proceedings ‘highly speculative,’ appellate court reviewed
    visitation order ‘in an abundance of caution’].)
    “We see no reason to review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings here on the
    basis of such speculation or caution. . . . [¶] . . . [E]ven if we were to conclude that the
    juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings erroneously resolved a close call, there remains no
    effective relief we could give Mother beyond that which she has already obtained.
    We are mindful that parents of young children face the prospect of possible future
    7
    juvenile court intervention. One commentator has observed that ‘[b]ecause the court’s
    jurisdictional findings could have negative consequences for the parent in collateral
    proceedings, it can be argued that a parent’s appeal challenging those findings is not
    moot. Although juvenile proceedings are confidential in nature, the jurisdictional facts
    might be disclosed by a social worker in a future petition or might be disclosed in the
    client’s future application for a foster license.’ (Abbott et al., Cal. Juvenile Dependency
    Practice [(Cont.Ed.Bar. 2015) Existence of Continuing Controversy], § 10.40, p. 861.)
    We are unconvinced, however, that any ruling we could issue here would have any
    practical effect on future dependency proceedings. . . . Because Mother has not shown
    any adverse effect from the jurisdictional findings, we decline to exercise our discretion
    to review them.” 
    (N.S., supra
    , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58-63, fns. omitted.)
    We agree with this analysis and find it fully applicable here, rendering the appeal
    moot.
    DISPOSITION
    Mother’s appeal is dismissed.
    BIGELOW, P.J.
    We concur:
    FLIER, J.
    GRIMES, J
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B266452

Filed Date: 4/28/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021