In re D.P. CA2/7 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 12/5/22 In re D.P. CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    In re D.P. et al, Persons Coming                              B315051
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00581A-B)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    JOHNEISHA C.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County, Susan Ser, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and
    remanded.
    Darlene Azevedo Kelly, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel and David Michael Miller, Senior
    Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ___________________________________
    Johneisha C., the mother of eight-year-old D.P. and five-
    year-old S.P., appeals the orders made at the July 23, 2021
    selection and implementation hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 366.26)1 appointing a legal guardian for the children, granting
    Johneisha monitored visitation at the discretion of the guardian
    and terminating dependency jurisdiction. Johneisha contends
    the juvenile court erred in delegating complete discretion to the
    guardian to determine whether any visitation would occur. She
    also contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children
    and Family Services failed to fulfill its statutory duties of inquiry
    and notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)
    (
    25 U.S.C. § 1901
     et seq.) and related California law and the
    juvenile court failed to ensure the Department had complied with
    those duties before concluding ICWA did not apply to these
    proceedings.
    In its respondent’s brief the Department agrees a remand
    is appropriate for the juvenile court to specify the frequency and
    duration of visits between Johneisha and the children and to
    ensure compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of
    ICWA. However, the Department suggests we conditionally
    affirm the findings and orders granting legal guardianship and
    terminating jurisdiction, rather than remanding for a new
    permanency hearing as initially requested by Johneisha.
    1     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
    stated.
    2
    In a letter in lieu of a reply brief Johneisha agrees with the
    Department’s recommendation, as do we. Accordingly, we
    conditionally affirm the court’s July 23, 2021 findings and orders
    except as to visitation and the applicability of ICWA and remand
    with directions to enter a new order specifying the frequency and
    duration of visitation and to ensure full compliance with the
    inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and California law.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1. The Dependency Proceedings
    The juvenile court on October 15, 2019 sustained the
    Department’s amended petition pursuant to section 300,
    subdivision (b)(1), based on the ongoing substance abuse of
    Johneisha and Thomas P., S.P.’s father. The children were
    declared dependents of the court in December 2019 and removed
    from the custody of their parents. The court ordered family
    reunification services for Johneisha and Thomas, but denied
    them to Samuel P., D.P.’s father, who was incarcerated for a
    lengthy prison term. Johneisha’s case plan included a full
    drug/alcohol program with testing and aftercare and parenting
    education. She was granted monitored visitation. The court did
    not specify the frequency or duration of the visits.
    The children were placed in the home of Jacqueline P., a
    nonrelated extended family member, in November 2019, where
    they remained placed following the December 2019 disposition
    hearing.
    At the continued six-month review hearing (§ 366.21,
    subd. (e)), finally held in March 2021, the court found Johneisha
    was in partial compliance with her case plan: She had completed
    a 12-week parenting course, but dropped out of her drug
    treatment program and failed to submit to drug testing. Thomas
    3
    was not in compliance. The court terminated reunification
    services for both parents and scheduled a selection and
    implementation hearing (§ 366.26) for July 6, 2021.
    Johneisha filed a section 388 petition on July 6, 2021,
    asking the court to return D.P. and S.P. to her custody or, in the
    alternative, to reinstate reunification services and to liberalize
    her visits to unmonitored and overnight. The court ordered a
    hearing on the section 388 petition for July 23, 2021 and
    continued the section 366.26 hearing to that date.
    At the combined hearing on July 23, 2021 the court denied
    the section 388 petition, finding Johneisha had not shown
    changed circumstances and the requested modifications would
    not be in the children’s best interests. As the children’s
    permanent plan, the court appointed Jacqueline P. their legal
    guardian. (Jacqueline P. had indicated she was interested in
    adoption, but opted for legal guardianship to allow the parents to
    regain custody in the future.) The court ordered monitored
    visitation for Johneisha “at the discretion of the legal guardian.”
    Over the objection of Johneisha, who contended Jacqueline P.
    was thwarting her visitation, the court terminated its
    jurisdiction.
    Johneisha filed a timely notice of appeal.
    2. The Department’s ICWA Inquiry
    At the detention hearing on August 16, 2019 Johneisha
    submitted an ICWA-020 form stating she may have Indian
    ancestry (tribe unknown) through the maternal grandmother,
    Luella B., and provided a telephone number. Although ordering
    the Department to investigate Johneisha’s possible Indian
    ancestry, the court did not question Johneisha regarding her
    ancestry at the hearing.
    4
    On his ICWA-020 form, also submitted on August 16, 2019,
    Thomas P. stated, to his knowledge, he had no Indian ancestry.
    The court did not question Thomas P. regarding his possible
    Indian ancestry at the detention hearing.
    Samuel P.’s first appearance was in October 2019. His
    ICWA-020 form stated he may have Indian ancestry through the
    Blackfoot tribe and indicated his mother may have additional
    information. The court ordered the Department to investigate,
    but, as with the other two parents, made no inquiry of Samuel P.,
    who was present in the courtroom.
    A social worker contacted Luella B., who confirmed
    Cherokee and Blackfeet ancestry and provided names and other
    information about family members. Luella B. said she was not
    registered with a tribe. The social worker also spoke to
    Johneisha, who said she was not registered with a tribe and, to
    her knowledge, neither Thomas P. nor Samuel P. had Indian
    ancestry.
    There is no indication in the record that any further
    inquiry was made of additional maternal relatives or any of
    Thomas P.’s or Samuel P.’s family members, including
    Samuel P.’s mother, with whom the children had initially been
    placed.
    In a last minute information report for the court, filed
    October 15, 2019, the Department stated it had mailed notices to
    the Blackfeet tribe, three Cherokee tribes, the Secretary of the
    Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Unsigned copies of the
    certified mail receipts addressed to the parents were attached to
    the report, but not copies of the ICWA forms or the mail receipts
    addressed to the tribes. In a report dated December 19, 2019 the
    Department described and attached letters from the Eastern
    5
    Band of Cherokee Indians and the Blackfeet Nation stating
    Johneisha and the children were not registered or eligible to
    register with the tribe. Again, no copies of the letters sent to the
    tribes were submitted with the report. At the disposition hearing
    on December 19, 2019 the court found ICWA did not apply to the
    case.
    DISCUSSION
    1. The Juvenile Court Erred in Failing To Make a Specific
    Visitation Order
    When the juvenile court at the selection and
    implementation hearing orders a legal guardianship for a child, it
    must “‘make an order for visitation with the parents . . . unless
    the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-
    being of the child.’” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C); accord, In re
    Ethan J. (2015) 
    236 Cal.App.4th 654
    , 661.) And if the court
    orders visitation, “‘it must also ensure that at least some
    visitation, at a minimum level determined by the court itself, will
    in fact occur.’” (In re Ethan J., at p. 661; accord, In re Korbin Z.
    (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 511
    , 516 [“the juvenile court cannot delegate
    the decision whether visitation will occur to any third party,
    including the child, the social services agency, or the guardian”];
    see In re S.H. (2003) 
    111 Cal.App.4th 310
    , 313.)
    As Johneisha argues (and the Department concedes), under
    this well-established statutory and case authority, the juvenile
    court erred in delegating to Jacqueline P., the children’s legal
    guardian, the power to determine whether any visitation would
    occur. Although we conditionally affirm the order granting the
    legal guardianship, we reverse the visitation order and remand
    for the juvenile court to issue a new order specifying the
    6
    frequency and duration of visits between Johneisha and the
    children. (See In re M.R. (2005) 
    132 Cal.App.4th 269
    , 271
    [visitation order reversed and remanded where juvenile court
    improperly delegated to legal guardian the power to decide
    whether visits would occur]; In re Randalynne G. (2002)
    
    97 Cal.App.4th 1156
    , 1164, 1167, 1170-1171 [order of
    guardianship affirmed but visitation order reversed and
    remanded where juvenile court delegated its discretion to
    determine whether any visitation would occur to the guardian];
    see also In re Rebecca S. (2010) 
    181 Cal.App.4th 1310
    , 1312
    [visitation order reversed and remanded for juvenile court to
    specify the frequency and duration of visits].)
    2. Remand Is Necessary for Compliance with ICWA Inquiry
    and Notice Requirements
    To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in
    dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related
    state law (see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 1
    , 5), an
    investigation of a child’s possible Indian ancestry must be
    undertaken and, where appropriate, notice provided to interested
    tribes. (See § 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court and child
    protective services agencies “an affirmative and continuing duty
    to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child”].)
    The duty to inquire “begins with the initial contact” (§ 224.2,
    subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
    services agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether
    the child may be an Indian child. (In re Rylei S. (2022)
    
    81 Cal.App.5th 309
    , 316; § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).)
    In addition, section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of
    further inquiry regarding a child’s possible Indian status “[i]f the
    court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe
    7
    that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not
    have sufficient information to determine that there is reason to
    know that the child is an Indian child.” (See also Cal. Rules of
    Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) [further inquiry must be conducted if the
    social worker “knows or has reason to know or believe that an
    Indian child is or may be involved”].)
    If those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an
    Indian child, notice to the relevant tribes is required. (
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3.) The governing federal
    regulations require ICWA notices to include, if known, the
    names, birthdates, birthplaces and tribal enrollment information
    of all direct lineal ancestors of the child. (
    25 C.F.R. § 23.111
    (d)(3)
    (2022).) State law mandates inclusion of “[a]ll names known of
    the Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-
    grandparents, or Indian custodians, including maiden, married,
    and former names or aliases, as well as their current and former
    addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal
    enrollment information of other direct lineal ancestors of the
    child, and any other identifying information, if known.” (§ 224.3,
    subd. (a)(5)(C).)
    As reflected in the record and acknowledged by the
    Department on appeal, after Thomas P. stated he had no Indian
    ancestry as far as he knew, the Department did not interview any
    of his known extended family members about ICWA’s possible
    application to the case, a violation of section 224.2,
    subdivision (b), which expressly states the duty to inquire
    includes, but is not limited to, asking extended family members
    whether the child may be an Indian child. Similarly, although a
    social worker spoke to Luella B., Johneisha’s mother, the
    Department did not conduct further interviews concerning the
    8
    children’s possible Indian ancestry with other maternal family
    members or with members of Samuel P.’s family. This, too, was
    error. Finally, again as conceded by the Department, the record
    does not include the ICWA-030 forms sent to the Indian tribes or
    indicate what information was included on those forms. Yet
    another error.
    Based on the record, the Department has asked this court
    to remand the matter for compliance with the ICWA inquiry and
    notice requirements as set forth in both federal and state law.
    Johneisha agrees with this request, as do we.
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s findings and orders granting a legal
    guardianship for D.P. and S.P. and terminating dependency
    jurisdiction are conditionally affirmed. The visitation order is
    vacated and the cause remanded for the juvenile court to issue a
    new order specifying the frequency and duration of visits between
    Johneisha and the children, for full compliance with the inquiry
    and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law and for
    further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    We concur:
    SEGAL, J.
    FEUER, J.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B315051

Filed Date: 12/5/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/5/2022