M.E. v. Superior Court ( 2023 )

Filed 3/6/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
M.E., 2d Juv. No. B323404
(Super. Ct. No. 22JV00131)
Petitioner, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
Respondent,
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
The courts should not abandon common sense when they
are called upon to construe a statutory scheme. They must
neither add language nor subtract language from the scheme.
We follow these percepts and hold that a 26-year-old adult is not
amenable to deferred entry of judgment for a minor. Why? Such
a person is no longer a minor in juvenile court. The program is
designed as a rehabilitative measure for a minor. A person, such
as petitioner, is beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
There is no enforcement mechanism if and when he or she is not
compliant with the program. We should not try to force a square
peg into a round hole.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition
alleges that about 10 years ago, while he was a minor, petitioner
committed a lewd act upon a child.1 This matter came to the
attention of law enforcement only because petitioner voluntarily
admitted to the police that he committed the lewd act. He now
seeks relief from the juvenile court’s order granting deferred
entry of judgment (DEJ).
Petitioner contends that the order must be vacated and the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated because “he [is] well
beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.” We
agree and grant the petition.
Procedural Background
In January 2022 when petitioner was 25 years old, a
section 602 petition was filed against him in Ventura County
Juvenile Court. The petition alleged that, “[o]n or about January
01, 2010 through December 31, 2013,” petitioner had committed
the felony offense of “lewd act upon a child . . . under the age of
fourteen years” in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision
(a). (Capitalization omitted.) Petitioner, consistent with his
candid statement to the police, admitted the allegation. The
juvenile court sustained the petition. It transferred the matter to
Santa Barbara County, where petitioner resided.
The Santa Barbara County Probation Department
concluded that petitioner was eligible and suitable for deferred
entry of judgment “[s]hould the Court determine jurisdiction
remains for this now 26 year old.” Petitioner requested that the
1All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2
Santa Barbara County Superior Court (hereafter the court or the
juvenile court) “order that jurisdiction be terminated” because he
was too old for the court to retain jurisdiction over him. In July
of 2022, the court denied the request and granted deferred entry
of judgment. The court stayed implementation to allow petitioner
to seek relief in the court of appeal. We issued an order to show
cause.
Deferred Entry of Judgment
“Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 et seq.,
which govern deferred entry of judgment . . . , first-
time juvenile felons may have their charges dismissed and
records sealed upon successfully completing probation.” (In re
Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) “‘The DEJ
provisions . . . were enacted as part of Proposition 21, The Gang
Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, in March
2000. The sections provide that in lieu of jurisdictional and
dispositional hearings, a minor may admit the allegations
contained in a section 602 petition and waive time for the
pronouncement of judgment. Entry of judgment is deferred.
After the successful completion of a term of probation, on the
motion of the prosecution and with a positive recommendation
from the probation department, the court is required to dismiss
the charges. The arrest upon which judgment was deferred is
deemed never to have occurred, and any records of the juvenile
court proceedings are sealed. [Citations.]’” (In re R.C. (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 1437, 1441.) The only age limit is that the minor
must be “at least 14 years of age at the time of the [DEJ]
hearing.” (§ 790, subd. (a)(5).) The DEJ statutes do not specify a
maximum age.
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“[U]pon any failure of the minor to comply with the terms
of probation, including the rules of any program the minor is
directed to attend, or any circumstances specified in Section 793,
the prosecuting attorney or the probation department, or the
court on its own, may make a motion to the court for entry of
judgment and the court shall render a finding that the minor is a
ward of the court pursuant to Section 602 for the offenses
specified in the original petition and shall schedule a
dispositional hearing.” (§ 791, subd. (a)(4), underline added.)
Section 790 Applies to Adults Who Were
Minors When They Committed a Felony Offense
Section 790, subdivision (a) provides, “[T]his article [the
DEJ article, §§ 790-795] shall apply whenever a case is before the
juvenile court for a determination of whether a minor is a person
described in Section 602 because of the commission of a felony
offense . . . .” (Italics added.) Only minors are eligible for
deferred entry of judgment.
“The term [‘minor’] is not defined in the Welfare and
Institutions Code per se. The Family Code defines ‘minor’
as traditionally understood, anyone under the age of 18. (Fam.
Code, § 6500.)” (In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017,
1022.) To be eligible for deferred entry of judgment, must a
person still be a minor at the time of the DEJ hearing?
“‘In construing a statute, we seek “‘to ascertain the intent of
the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the
construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.’”
[Citations.] Our analysis starts with the statutory language
because it generally indicates legislative intent. [Citations.]
. . . [Citations.]’ . . . ‘[T]he language [of a statute] is construed in
the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory
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scheme . . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, when the same word appears in
different places within a statutory scheme, courts generally
presume the Legislature intended the word to have the same
meaning each time it is used. [Citations.]” (People v. Gray (2014)
58 Cal.4th 901, 906.)
Section 790 and section 602 are part of the same statutory
scheme. Section 790, subdivision (a) expressly refers to section
602. Section 602, subdivision (a) provides that “any minor who is
between 12 years of age and 17 years of age . . . when he or she
violates any law of this state . . . is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court . . . .” (Italics added.) A minor under the age of 12
when he or she committed an offense falls within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court only if the minor is alleged to have
committed specified serious felony offenses. (§ 602, subd. (b).)
Thus, within the meaning of section 602, a minor is anyone under
the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense.
Section 790, subdivision (a) “puts the operative date [for
determining whether a person is a minor] at the date of the
offense by direct reference to section 602.” (In re Jeffrey M.,
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) Eligibility for DEJ “is tied
directly to jurisdiction of the juvenile court as defined by section
602, i.e., a person under 18 years of age at the time of the
offense.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, an adult may be technically eligible
for DEJ if he or she was under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the felony offense. This, however, does not provide
an answer to the instant writ petition.
The Juvenile Court Lacked Jurisdiction
To Grant Deferred Entry of Judgment
“A ‘juvenile court’ is a superior court exercising limited
jurisdiction arising under juvenile law.” (In re Chantal S. (1996)
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13 Cal.4th 196, 200.) “Because the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is
based on age at the time of the violation of a criminal law or
ordinance, ‘[i]t is therefore possible that a person might commit a
murder at age 17, be apprehended 50 years later, and find
himself subject to juvenile court jurisdiction at age 67.’” (People
v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 66 (Ramirez).) Such
jurisdiction is referred to as “‘initial’ jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
“Once the juvenile court has ‘initial’ jurisdiction, it may
retain jurisdiction over a ward until he or she turns 21 years old
(§ 607, subd. (a)) . . . .” (Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 66.)
If a person has committed one of the serious offenses listed in
subdivision (b) of section 707, the retention of jurisdiction may be
extended until the age of 23 or 25 years depending upon the
maximum sentence for the offense in a criminal court. (§ 607,
subds. (b), (c).)2 Petitioner’s offense – a violation of Penal Code
2 Effective June 30, 2022, subdivisions (b) and (c) were
amended by Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 38). The amendment became effective before the
juvenile court granted DEJ on July 29, 2022. As amended, the
subdivisions currently provide: “(b) The court may retain
jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a person described in
Section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of Section 707, until that person attains 23 years
of age, or two years from the date of commitment to a secure
youth treatment facility pursuant to Section 875, whichever
occurs later, subject to the provisions of subdivision (c).
[¶] (c) The court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is
found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the
commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707
until that person attains 25 years of age, or two years from the
date of commitment to a secure youth treatment facility pursuant
to Section 875, whichever occurs later, if the person, at the time
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section 288, subdivision (a) – is not listed in subdivision (b) of
section 707. Therefore, the juvenile court could retain
jurisdiction over him only until his 21st birthday.
The People claim that petitioner is eligible for deferred
entry of judgment because he meets all of the seven criteria for
DEJ eligibility. (§ 790, subd. (a)(1)-(7).) The People correctly
observe that “section 790 makes no reference to an upper age
limit.” They argue, “Had the legislature intended to impose an
upper age limit on individuals placed on deferred entry of
judgment by the juvenile court, [it] could certainly have added an
eighth eligibility criterion or otherwise incorporated the age
limits from section 607.”
There was no need for the legislature to include such an
eighth eligibility criterion. Its inclusion would have been an idle
act. As a matter of law, a juvenile court’s grant of deferred entry
of judgment is void if it does not have jurisdiction over the person
because of his age. (See Doe v. Regents of University of California
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 295 [“‘A judgment is void if the court
rendering it lacked subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over
the parties’”]; In re David C. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 514, 521
[because “the juvenile court lost its continuing jurisdiction over
minor at that point,” “any and all [subsequent] actions taken by
the juvenile court . . . that were based on the original petition . . .
were void for lack of jurisdiction”].)
The Juvenile Court Cannot Retain Jurisdiction over
Petitioner Pursuant to Section 607, Subdivision (h)(2)
The People contended below that if the court declares
petitioner a ward and commits him to “an authorized facility,” it
of adjudication of a crime or crimes, would, in criminal court,
have faced an aggregate sentence of seven years or more.”
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“can retain jurisdiction” over him “for a two-year period of
control,” irrespective of his age, pursuant to section 607,
subdivision (h)(2). (Italics added.) Subdivision (h)(2) provides: “A
person who, at the time of adjudication of a crime or crimes,
would, in criminal court, have faced an aggregate sentence of
seven years or more, shall be discharged [from the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction] upon the expiration of a two-year period of
control, or when the person attains 25 years of age, whichever
occurs later . . . .” (Italics added.) The People argued, “[A] plain
reading of the statute clearly allows for a Subject, who meets the
seven-year qualification, to stay under juvenile jurisdiction for
two years, or until he reaches 25, whichever is later.” The People
asserted that petitioner “meets the [aggregate] seven-year
[sentence] qualification” because the charged violation of Penal
Code section 288, subdivision (a) is punishable in criminal court
by imprisonment for up to eight years.
According to the People’s theory regarding section 607, we
should not terminate the juvenile court’s jurisdiction because
instead of granting DEJ, the court could declare petitioner a
ward, commit him to an authorized facility, and thereby retain
jurisdiction over him for a two-year period of control pursuant to
section 607, subdivision (h)(2). But the court decided not to
declare petitioner a ward. And, it did not commit him to an
authorized facility.
We construe section 607, subdivision (h)(2) as applying to
the discharge from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction after the court
has retained jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to subdivisions
(a) through (c). Pursuant to section 607, subdivision (a), the
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner because he was
over the age of 21 years.
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Conclusion
Common sense compels the conclusion that petitioner is
just too old to be “treated” as a “minor” and the section 602
petition must be dismissed. Any action other than a dismissal
would be void. (In re David C., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 521.)
We do not lightly so conclude. Lewd act with a child is a very
serious felony offense. Nevertheless, if the deferred entry of
judgment were upheld and petitioner performed unsatisfactorily,
the court’s sole recourse would be to “lift the deferred entry of
judgment[, declare petitioner a ward of the court,] and schedule a
dispositional hearing.” (§ 793, subd. (a); see also § 791, subd.
(a)(3).) But because of petitioner’s age, the court would be
without jurisdiction to declare him a ward and conduct a
dispositional hearing. It makes no sense for a juvenile court to
grant deferred entry of judgment if the terms of probation are
unenforceable.
Disposition
The order to show cause is vacated. Let a peremptory writ
of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Santa Barbara
County to vacate its order granting petitioner deferred entry of
judgment and to dismiss the section 602 petition.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. BALTODANO, J.
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Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Tracy Macuga, Public Defender, Sara Elturk, Laura
Arnold, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Joyce E. Dudley, District Attorney, Marguerite Clipper
Charles, Snr. Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in
Interest.