In re J. D. ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 5/14/2014 Unmodified opinion attached
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    In re J.D., a Person Coming Under the
    Juvenile Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                      A138584
    v.                                                     (Contra Costa County
    J.D.,                                                  Super. Ct. No. J1101036)
    Defendant and Appellant.                       ORDER MODIFYING
    OPINION AND DENYING
    REHEARING
    [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
    THE COURT:
    It is ordered that the published opinion filed herein on April 15, 2014, be modified
    as follows:
    1A. On page 1, the fourth sentence in the first paragraph of the opinion is deleted
    and replaced with the following sentence:
    He now appeals the court’s ruling on the suppression motion and challenges
    various conditions of his probation.
    1B. On page 1, after the sixth and last sentence in the first paragraph, the
    following text is added:
    We also modify appellant’s probation conditions. As modified, the judgment is
    affirmed.
    1
    2. On page 12, after the last paragraph of the “DISCUSSION” section, which
    states “The motion to suppress was properly denied,” and before the heading
    “DISPOSITION,” the following text is added:
    Appellant also challenges the validity of his probation conditions. After placing
    appellant on probation in his uncle’s home, the court stated: “You’re not to change your
    residence without prior approval of the probation officer and must notify change [sic] of
    address or phone number within five days.” The trial court has wide discretion in
    imposing reasonable conditions of juvenile probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd.
    (b)), including conditions which enable the court to determine the ward’s place of
    residence to ensure he or she is residing in a stable environment that promotes
    rehabilitation. However, we agree with appellant this condition is not narrowly tailored
    to avoid the possible impingement on his right to travel. (Cf. In re Sheena K. (2007) 
    40 Cal. 4th 875
    [probation condition prohibiting minor from associating with disapproved
    persons unconstitutionally vague].) We therefore modify the condition to provide that if
    defendant changes residence, he is to notify the probation officer of his change of address
    and phone number within five days.
    The court also forbade appellant to use or possess drugs, alcohol, weapons, or
    ammunition. Appellant argues these conditions do not give him fair warning or adequate
    notice of what is prohibited because “weapon” is not defined and there is no express
    scienter requirement. (In re Sheena 
    K., supra
    , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 890-892.) We agree. A
    person may be involuntarily drugged or intoxicated, or unknowingly in constructive
    possession of weapons or ammunition. Furthermore, the term “weapon” may include
    ordinary objects if used to inflict injury. In order to avoid any ambiguity, we modify the
    court’s prohibition to make clear that appellant is not to knowingly use or possess drugs,
    alcohol, dangerous or deadly weapons, or ammunition.
    3. On page 12, after the heading “DISPOSITION,” the following sentence is
    deleted: “The judgment is affirmed.” The following text is added:
    2
    The trial court’s order imposing conditions of probation is modified as follows:
    (1) if appellant changes residence, he is to notify the probation officer of his change of
    address and phone number within five days; and (2) appellant is not to knowingly use or
    possess drugs, alcohol, dangerous or deadly weapons, or ammunition. As modified, the
    judgment is affirmed.
    This modification is not to be published, except for the modified text on page 1 of
    the opinion (see paragraph nos. 1A and 1B, above) and the text added to page 12 of the
    opinion after “DISPOSITION” (see paragraph no. 3, above).
    This modification does not change the judgment.
    The petition for rehearing is denied.
    ___________________________
    Dondero, J.
    3
    Filed 4/15/14 Unmodified opinion
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    In re J.D., a Person Coming Under the
    Juvenile Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A138584
    v.
    J.D.,                                              (Contra Costa County
    Super. Ct. No. J1101036)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    In this appeal, we are asked to review the denial of a motion to suppress in a
    delinquency proceeding. Appellant’s locker was searched by high school security and a
    sawed-off shotgun was found in his backpack. The trial court upheld the search.
    Following a jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained count one of the wardship petition
    alleging the minor possessed a firearm in a school zone, a felony (Pen. Code, § 626.9,
    subd. (b)), and dismissed two other counts on the People’s motion. He now appeals the
    court’s ruling on the suppression motion. His appeal is authorized by Welfare and
    Institutions Code section 800. We conclude the conduct undertaken by school security
    was reasonable and sustain the trial court’s decision.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Charles Johnson was a campus security officer (CSO) for the West Contra Costa
    Unified School District (WCCUSD). At the time of the offense, he was assigned to
    Richmond High School, a part of the WCCUSD. On February 10, 2011, while on duty at
    1
    the school, Johnson was approached by a female student who seemed concerned and
    wished to speak with Rose Sanders, another CSO at Richmond High School. Johnson
    accompanied her to see Sanders. A short while later, Johnson was called to Sanders’s
    office to hear what the student had to say. The student related that on the day before,
    while the student was on an AC Transit bus, a Richmond High School student, T.H.,
    pulled out a gun and shot someone. The student witness had been on the bus and
    indicated another student told her what T.H. had done with the weapon.
    T.H. was currently enrolled at Richmond High School. Sanders wanted to know if
    T.H. was on campus and if he had a weapon on the premises. Johnson met with school
    administrators and was directed to detain T.H. and determine if he had any weapon.
    Johnson proceeded to the security office on campus to call Richmond police for
    help. When he arrived, Sergeant Russell of the Richmond Police Department was present
    for a visit. Russell told Johnson to locate T.H. but not confront him. Russell also advised
    Johnson to determine where T.H.’s locker is located.
    To follow up on identifying T.H.’s locker, Johnson met with CSO Driscoll, the
    campus security officer who “deals with [student] lockers.” Each year, Driscoll re-keys
    the lockers and changes the combinations. While he does not assign lockers to individual
    students, Driscoll had information about who was assigned to particular lockers. Driscoll
    also is responsible for supervising the cleaning out of school lockers during the year and
    handling repair of jammed lockers. When Driscoll noticed the assigned locker of T.H.,
    he told Johnson that was not the locker he “hangs around.” Driscoll related he had seen
    T.H. several times in the area of locker number 2499. On the day of the reported
    shooting, Driscoll had observed T.H. with his girlfriend in front of locker 2499. The
    couple was facing the set of lockers but Driscoll was not able to determine which one, if
    any, they might be using. This behavior seemed suspicious to Driscoll. The incident
    occurred when students were required to be either in class or at lunch but not in the hall
    area where T.H. was seen.
    2
    During their conversation, Driscoll advised Johnson that Richmond High students
    often shared their assigned locker with other students who were not assigned to that
    locker for the purpose of concealing contraband such as drugs and other items not
    permitted on campus. The CSO’s were familiar with this behavior at the school.
    Driscoll and Johnson along with Russell went to the area of locker 2499 to see if
    weapons were present. When opened, locker 2499 contained a couple of books, but
    nothing else. Russell then told Driscoll to check the adjacent lockers because the student
    had frequented the “area” of 2499. Shortly, Driscoll opened 2501, which was next to
    2499. A backpack was found in it and, when removed from the location, the security
    officers noticed the butt of a sawed-off shotgun.
    As these men were inspecting this group of lockers, other personnel had located
    T.H. on campus. He was discovered and surveilled as Driscoll, Johnson and Russell
    began inspecting the lockers in the area of 2499.
    At the approximate time of this search, Sergeant Robert Gray of the Richmond
    Police Department was on campus based on the shooting report. Gray and another
    officer found T.H. on the campus and confronted him. While T.H. personally had no
    weapon, he was asked by the officers about a weapon. T.H. stated he had a handgun in
    his backpack, which was near him. This was verified by the officers checking the
    backpack.
    Regarding the backpack found in locker 2501, in addition to the sawed-off
    shotgun, the school investigators found miscellaneous papers in the backpack belonging
    to minor J.D. These papers containing the minor’s name included school assignment
    papers. Eventually, Gray met with the minor. He was Mirandized by the officer. The
    minor acknowledged a waiver of his rights. He admitted the shotgun belonged to him.
    The minor stated he had been bothered by other students at Richmond High School and
    possessed the weapon for his safety at the school.
    3
    DISCUSSION
    Recent events have demonstrated the increased concern school officials must have
    in the daily operation of public schools. Sites such as Columbine, Sandy Hook
    Elementary, and Virginia Tech have been discussed in our national media not because of
    their educational achievements, but because of the acute degree of violence visited on
    these and other campuses— hostility often predicated on killings with firearms. During
    the 2009-2010 school year, 33 students, staff, and others died in a school-associated
    violent event.1 In 2009, 8 percent of students in grades nine through twelve reported
    being threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least one time.2
    According to the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, a division of the
    Center for Disease Control (CDC), in 2010, there were 828,000 nonfatal victimizations at
    school among students 12 through 18 years of age. In 2011, 5.9 percent of the students in
    grades nine through 12 did not attend school within 30 days of the CDC survey because
    they felt the school, or their way to or from school, was unsafe. Also, 7.4 percent of the
    same group reported being threatened or injured with a weapon on school property one or
    more times in the past 12 months before the survey.3 We must be cognizant of this
    alarming reality as we approach our role in assessing appropriate responses by school
    administrators to campus safety issues.
    Education “is perhaps the most important function” of government. (Brown v.
    Board of Education (1954) 
    347 U.S. 483
    , 493.) As such, “government has a heightened
    obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school. The special need for
    1
    National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Bureau of
    Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Indicators of School Crime and Safety
    (2011) Key Findings: Violent Deaths, p. iii.
    2
    National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Bureau of
    Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Indicators of School Crime and Safety
    (2011) Indicator 4: Threats and Injuries With Weapons on School Property, p. 18.
    3
    National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control.
    Understanding School Violence: Fact Sheet (2012) p. 1.
    4
    an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and
    teachers or the education process itself justified the Court in excepting school searches
    from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined
    by balancing the relevant interests.” (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 
    469 U.S. 325
    , 353
    (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.) (T.L.O.).) Of course, it is a given that students do not “shed
    their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.” (Tinker v. Des Moines
    Independent Community School District (1969) 
    393 U.S. 503
    , 506.) Yet “the ‘primary
    duty of school officials. . . is the education and training of young people. A State has a
    compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first
    establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
    students.’ ” (In re Randy G. (2001) 
    26 Cal. 4th 556
    , 562 (Randy G.).) After all, all minor
    students are required to be in school. (Ed. Code, § 48200.) And “All students and staff
    of public primary, elementary, junior high, and senior high schools . . . have the
    inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.” (Cal. Const.,
    art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(1); italics added.) Among the ways school districts achieve this is by
    having security departments in the school to enforce the rules of the State and school
    district. (Ed. Code, § 38000; Randy 
    G., supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at pp. 562-563.)
    To properly employ the balance between the privacy interests of public school
    children with the important need to maintain order and discipline in schools today, the
    accommodation does not require rigid adherence to the requirement that searches be
    based on probable cause to believe the subject of the search has violated or is violating
    the law. Instead, the validity of a search on school property should depend on the
    reasonableness of the official conduct to deal with the particular school problem. 
    (T.L.O., supra
    , 469 U.S. at p. 341.) “Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and
    sometimes require immediate, effective action.” (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 
    419 U.S. 565
    ,
    580.) Therefore, school administrators and security personnel need to have “a certain
    5
    degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures . . . .” 
    (T.L.O., supra
    , 469 U.S. at
    pp. 582-583.)
    In normal situations, any search or seizure requires an individualized suspicion of
    criminal activity. (Brinegar v. United States (1949) 
    338 U.S. 160
    , 175.) Without such,
    the search is not reasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. (Randy 
    G., supra
    ,
    26 Cal.4th at p. 565.) However, the Fourth Amendment protections are rooted always in
    reasonableness—individualized suspicion triggers reasonable inquiry by the police in the
    usual case. Yet over time, the reasonableness of any search must be reflective of a
    balance between the particular intrusion on a person’s Fourth Amendment interests
    against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (Vernonia School District 47J
    v. Acton (1995) 
    515 U.S. 646
    , 652-653 (Acton).) Neither a warrant nor probable cause is
    inevitably required “when ‘special needs [exist] beyond the normal need for law
    enforcement to make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ”
    (Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 
    483 U.S. 868
    , 873, italics added.) This “special needs”
    rationale has allowed the Supreme Court to require drug testing of customs officials at the
    border (National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989) 
    489 U.S. 656
    , 665-666
    (Von Raab)) and railway workers (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989)
    
    489 U.S. 602
    , 619-620 (Skinner).)
    The reasonableness assessment based on special needs has been deemed
    appropriate in public schools by the Supreme Court. “We have found such ‘special
    needs’ to exist in the public school context. There, the warrant requirement ‘would
    unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
    [that are] needed,’ and ‘strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based upon
    probable cause’ would ‘undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
    freedom to maintain order in the schools.’ ” 
    (Acton, supra
    , 515 U.S. at p. 655, citing
    
    T.L.O., supra
    , 469 U.S. at p. 341.)
    6
    Of course, there is the need to recognize and consider individual student rights in
    this review. Against the strong governmental interest or special need in the public school
    arena, the courts have developed the need to focus not on individualized suspicion, but on
    the circumstances triggering administrative action and whether the execution is arbitrary,
    capricious, or for the purpose of harassment. (Randy 
    G., supra
    , 26 Cal.4th at p. 567.)
    While Randy G. involved only the detention of a student in a public school, its reasoning
    has been adopted in campus search cases as well. (In re Sean A. (2010) 
    191 Cal. App. 4th 182
    , 188-189; In re K.S. (2010) 
    183 Cal. App. 4th 72
    , 79; see also, In re Latasha W.
    (1998) 
    60 Cal. App. 4th 1524
    , 1527.)
    In our case, the administration and its security staff at Richmond High School
    faced a report from an identified student who overheard that, the previous day, one of the
    school’s students, T.H., shot another person on a bus after school. The student reportee
    demonstrated concern over the incident and was interviewed by CSO Sanders and also
    CSO Johnson. This information triggered two responsible initiatives by the school
    security officers. The first was to determine if T.H. was on the school property with a
    weapon. The second was to inspect lockers that could be used by T.H. to conceal such an
    item. Neither step by the school would be considered inappropriate or unreasonable.
    Each was narrow and focused, and based on the identity of T.H. and an area of the school
    he was known to frequent.
    The belief that T.H. may have stored contraband in another person’s locker, in the
    context of the special needs doctrine, does not serve to preclude the action of school
    security. Even if another student validly had the assigned use of a particular locker at the
    school, that fact did not make the official behavior here suspecting an alleged shooter
    also had access to the same lockers unreasonable. Privacy concerns needed to be
    balanced against the official need to address school safety. The principles developed in
    T.L.O., Acton, and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
    Pottawatomie County v. Earls (2002) 
    536 U.S. 822
    (Earls), as well as Skinner and Von
    7
    Raab, are authoritative precedent here because they also involve a proactive policy based
    on government obligations aimed at protecting students, travelers, and our national
    borders, not hindsight reflection.
    This assessment of reasonableness requires judicial review of its quality and the
    behavior by school officials at the outset of official reaction. “[T]he legality of a search
    of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of
    the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry:
    first, one must consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’ [Citation];
    second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably
    related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’
    [Citation]. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other
    school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for
    suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
    violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its
    scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
    and are not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature
    of the infraction.” 
    (T.L.O, supra
    , 469 U.S. at pp. 341-342, fns. omitted.)
    The cases that apply special needs factors to the public school have allowed
    random practices by school officials because they are a reasonable way to handle school
    problems. In Acton, the Court approved random urine testing of students who
    participated in school athletic programs. A refusal to supply a urine sample precluded
    participation in the District football program. 
    (Acton, supra
    , 
    515 U.S. 646
    , 651.) The
    District’s approach was an appropriate way to deal with campus drug issues deemed
    serious by the administration. (Id. at pp.664-665.) The policy also served to lessen
    liability concerns with sports-related injuries. (Id. at p. 649.) No individualized suspicion
    or probable cause was necessary for the test. (Id. at pp. 664-665.)
    8
    In Earls, the Court upheld a drug testing policy for all students who participated in
    any competitive extracurricular activity in the school district. “[I]n the context of safety
    and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be
    reasonable ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
    warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” ’ ” 
    (Earls, supra
    , 
    536 U.S. 822
    ,
    829.) “ ‘Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere; the
    “reasonableness” inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary
    responsibility for children.’ ” (Id. at p. 830.)
    Other jurisdictions have dealt with locker searches on school property in the same
    fashion we do today. The case of In re Patrick Y. (2000) 
    358 Md. 50
    dealt with an
    unidentified source advising a school security officer there were drugs and weapons in
    the “middle school area” of Mark Twain School. (Id. at p. 53.) The principal directed
    that all lockers in the “middle school area” be searched. As a result, inside Patrick’s
    locker was located an illegal folding knife and a pager---both items forbidden on school
    property. (Ibid.) There was no original focus on Patrick in this case. All lockers in the
    middle school were opened and inspected. Under school policy, lockers were assigned to
    individual students and, because they are the property of the school, subject to inspection
    by school officials. (Id. at p. 63.) Any interest individual students had in the contents of
    assigned lockers was secondary to the school administration’s obligation. Under Acton,
    “ ‘when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the
    search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake’ and . . . the answer
    [is] in the affirmative.” (Patrick Y., supra, 358 Md. at p. 60, quoting 
    Acton, supra
    , 515
    U.S. at p. 665.)
    The Iowa Supreme Court followed the reasoning in Acton and Earls when it
    upheld locker searches in State v. Jones (2003) 
    666 N.W.2d 142
    . In the case, Muscatine
    High School advised 1,700 students that they should clean out lockers before winter
    break. (Id. at p. 144.) Approximately 1,400 of the students did so. However, a sizable
    9
    number did not. Two school aides went through each locker that was not emptied and
    inspected the contents. The aides were checking for school property but also drugs and
    weapons. (Ibid.) In Jones’s locker, they found a nylon jacket which, upon close
    inspection, had marijuana in a pocket. This seized evidence was not suppressed because
    the conduct by school aides was reasonably based. (Id. at p. 150.) “We believe the
    locker search conducted by the school officials in this case is most closely analogized to
    the broad searches conducted in Acton and Earls. Although this search eventually
    focused on Jones’[s] locker, the process leading to that point was random and carried out
    with the purpose of protecting the health and safety of the whole student body to preserve
    a proper educational environment.” (Id. at p. 146.) In the end, the Court found that even
    if Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker, “that privacy
    may be impinged upon for reasonable activities by the school in furtherance of its duty to
    maintain a proper educational environment.” (Id. at p. 150.)
    A final case for discussion is Commonwealth v. Carey (1990) 
    407 Mass. 528
    .
    There, an assistant principal was told by another teacher about a report that teacher
    received from two students. The students had seen Carey, a student, on school property
    brandishing a weapon that morning. (Id. at p. 529.) The administrator and a police
    officer searched Carey’s locker without his knowledge and found a jacket containing a
    gun. (Id. at p. 530.) The evidence disclosed the school had an unannounced policy of
    checking student lockers for contraband if they received a report meriting such inquiry.
    Students at the school were not notified of this option. (Id. at p. 530.) However, the
    Massachusetts Supreme Court found whether an announced policy existed was not
    relevant in this case. “[W]e pass over the expectation of privacy issue because we
    conclude that the warrantless search of the locker was in any event justified under the
    Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 533.) Following T.L.O., the Court observed “a school
    administrator’s task of maintaining discipline in the school has become a more difficult
    one, as ‘in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: . . .
    10
    violent crime[s] in the schools have become major social problems.’ ” (Commonwealth
    v. 
    Carey, supra
    , at pp. 533-534, quoting 
    T.L.O, supra
    , 469 U.S. at p. 339.) The search of
    Carey’s locker was “clearly based on common sense, and was reasonable both at its
    inception and in its scope.” (Commonwealth v. 
    Carey, supra
    , at pp. 533-534.)
    Importantly, in our case we are not reviewing the established policy of a district to
    engage in widespread conduct affecting many students. Instead, we are dealing with a
    shooting by a Richmond High School student on a public bus the previous day who was
    believed to be on school grounds on the day in question. Our matter called for the
    flexible but reasonable response demonstrated by school administrators and staff in the
    out-of-state cases cited above. The decision to detain the alleged shooter and check
    particular places on the campus T.H. frequented is a more limited response than the
    established practices condoned in Acton and Earls. The reasonable response here was not
    prolonged over time nor a widespread checking of all lockers at Richmond High School.
    The locker 2501 that was adjacent to the first locker checked, 2499, was properly
    examined based on the observations of CSO Driscoll, his experience with student
    concealment of items in other lockers, and the prompt need to address a serious shooting
    the previous day. The fact that minor J.D., rather than T.H., had stored an illegal weapon
    in locker 2501 should not disturb the legal validity of this search.
    In addition, we have no concern based on these facts that Richmond police officers
    assisted the school security personnel in carrying out this inquiry. The facts indicate the
    initial report was presented by known students to CSO Johnson and Sanders. In their role
    as security officers acting at the behest of Richmond High School administrators, they
    acted in the interests of campus safety. Johnson did advise Sergeant Russell of the
    Richmond Police Department, and that officer accompanied Johnson and Driscoll as they
    went to the area of lockers 2499 and 2501. It is also true Russell contacted his two fellow
    officers to come to the school, locate T.H., and confront him. But the secondary role of
    11
    the police officers does not cancel the fundamental feature of this case—administrators
    seeking to secure the school premises from potential for violence.
    In In re K.S. (2010) 
    183 Cal. App. 4th 72
    , Division Five of this district reviewed the
    denial of a motion to suppress. Police informed the campus resource officer, who was
    also a Livermore policeman, about a confidential tip that a student at the school
    possessed Ecstasy drugs. The resource officer advised the vice principal. While the
    suspect was in gym class, the vice principal along with the officer who relayed the report
    to the campus resource officer went to the locker of K.S. to check street clothing stored
    inside the locker. The school vice principal did not seek police permission. She wanted
    to see if the drugs were on the campus. Inside the pockets of the pants were several
    Ecstasy tablets. Later, K.S was arrested. In approving the search, the court followed
    T.L.O. Regarding the part the officers played in this search, the opinion focused on the
    school administrator’s role in the search. “It is noteworthy that the police role in the
    search of appellant was at all times clearly subordinate to the role of the vice-principal,
    who made the decision to search and conducted the search. For that reason, the T.L.O.
    standard applies.” (Id. at p. 80; see also In re William V. (2003) 
    111 Cal. App. 4th 1464
    ,
    1469-1472.)
    The motion to suppress was properly denied.
    12
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    _________________________
    Dondero, J.
    We concur:
    _________________________
    Margulies, Acting P. J.
    _________________________
    Becton, J.
    
    Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
    pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    13
    Trial Court:                                 Contra Costa County Superior Court
    Trial Judge:                                 Hon. Barry Baskin
    Counsel for Defendant and Appellant:         Eileen A. Manning-Villar,
    under appointment by the
    Court of Appeal
    Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent:        Ronald E. Niver
    Deputy Attorney General
    Kamala D. Harris
    Attorney General of California
    Dane R. Gillette
    Chief Assistant Attorney General
    Gerald A. Engler
    Senior Assistant Attorney General
    Eric D. Share
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General
    14