People v. Watson CA4/2 ( 2014 )

Filed 4/17/14 P. v. Watson CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E059628
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV1300918)
AARON BRANDON WATSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Jon D. Ferguson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Aaron Brandon Watson appeals after he pleaded no
contest to one felony count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine),
and one count of maintaining a place for using drugs. Defendant had elected to plead no
1
contest to these counts, with an agreement to dismiss the remaining counts (felony
possession of marijuana for sale and misdemeanor possession of a drug smoking pipe),
after his motion to suppress evidence was denied. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case arose out of an incident in which a hotel manager called police for
assistance in removing a guest (defendant) who refused to leave. Defendant had paid for
one night’s stay at the hotel. Check-out time was 12:00 noon. Defendant came to the
hotel manager’s attention because other hotel guests, as well as hotel cleaning staff,
complained of a very strong odor of marijuana coming from defendant’s room. The
manager told defendant that he was not allowed to smoke in the room, and that smoking
marijuana was illegal. The manager informed defendant that he would have to leave by
check-out time. Defendant made excuses and asked for extensions of time, saying he had
nowhere to go or that he was waiting for someone to come pick him up, but in essence he
refused to leave.
By 1:00 p.m., after defendant had been called several times and still refused to
leave, the hotel manager decided to call police. The officers responded, and proceeded to
defendant’s room. The officers knocked on the door and announced themselves.
Defendant initially opened the door, saw the officers, and then tried to shut the door
again. One of the officers blocked the door with his foot. The officer asked defendant
whether defendant “had anything illegal on him.” Defendant denied having anything
2
illegal. The officer persisted, asking if he could check whether defendant possessed
anything illegal. Defendant responded by turning around and raising his hands.
The officers then entered the room and began by searching defendant. The
personal search turned up a drug smoking pipe in one pocket, and a baggie with
methamphetamine residue in another. Defendant was then handcuffed and seated on a
chair in the room. The search expanded to other items in the hotel room. Defendant’s
backpack, found on the bed, contained a plastic jar, a glass bottle, and a large plastic
baggie, all containing marijuana. The backpack also contained several empty plastic
baggies, and a white envelope with $900 cash. Defendant’s cell phone was on the
bedside table. Defendant gave the password on request, and officers found several text
messages offering to sell “herb,” i.e., marijuana.
Defendant was charged with one felony count of possession of marijuana for sale,
one felony count of possession of methamphetamine, and a misdemeanor count of
possession of a drug smoking pipe.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code
section 1538.5. Defendant argued that he had been searched without a warrant, and that
it was therefore the People’s burden to justify the search and the seizure of the evidence.
The trial court denied the motion.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant negotiated
a very favorable plea bargain. Defendant would not have to plead to the charge of
possession of marijuana for sale, but only to the charge of possession of
3
methamphetamine. The sale of marijuana and the possession of a drug pipe charges
would be dismissed. A fourth count—maintaining a place for the use of drugs in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11366—was added, with the purpose of
ensuring that any sentence on the admitted charges would have to be served in state
prison rather than in local custody. Defendant would admit that charge. However,
defendant would not have to serve any time in prison. Defendant would be released from
custody on a Vargas waiver (People v. Vargas (1990) 223 Cal. App. 3d 1107) and, on his
return, his state prison sentence of five years eight months would be vacated and he
would be admitted to probation. In addition, defendant’s cell phone (minus its memory
card), the $900 cash, his laptop computer, a pair of headphones, and a Swiss Army knife
would all be returned to him.
After a great deal of back-and-forth discussion, defendant eventually agreed to the
plea bargain on these terms. He also admitted two prison term prior convictions.
Defendant did violate the terms of his Vargas release, but the result was only a minor
change in the outcome: rather than having the state prison sentence vacated and
defendant sentenced to probation, the state prison sentence was suspended, and defendant
was placed on probation, subject to the suspended prison sentence.
4
On September 6, 2013, defendant filed a notice of appeal, asserting grounds
related to sentencing or other matters occurring after the plea, which did not affect the
validity of the plea, and to denial of his motion to suppress evidence.1
ANALYSIS
I. Appellate Counsel’s Brief
On defendant’s request, this court appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 436
and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493], setting
forth a statement of the case, but raising no specific issues. Counsel has requested this
court to undertake a review of the entire record.
II. Defendant’s Personal Supplemental Brief
Defendant was informed of his right to file a personal supplemental brief, raising
any issues he felt should be brought to the attention of the court. Defendant has filed a
personal supplemental brief, in which he advances numerous claims of impropriety.
As clearly as we can understand defendant’s claims, he argues:
1) His conviction resulted from a conspiracy, consisting of vindictive prosecution
and “outrageous government conduct.”
2) The case was infected with police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct,
misconduct of defense counsel, and judicial misconduct, “including a collusion that
1 Among other rights defendant waived pursuant to the Vargas waiver was the
right to appeal, including the right to appeal on the motion to suppress evidence.
5
resulted in the appellant’s deprivation of right[]s” under the Civil Rights Act (Title 42
U.S.C.A., § 1983) and under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
3) The plea was not valid because “it was a fraudulently induced plea taken under
duress with no factual basis.”
4) The prior prison term enhancements should be “void, due to one
conviction . . . being made with fraud on the court . . . and the other enhancement prior
being more than five years old.” With respect to his admissions of the prison term priors,
defendant contends “the court reporter[’]s transcripts are erred, with fraud on the
inducement of the plea bargain with willful misconduct by the court, officers, and it[]s
agents and misleading the appellant,” such that there was “fraud upon the court and there
to having an illegal sentence from the coerced plea taken [sic].”
5) Defendant urged a Brady violation (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87
[83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215]), on the theory that evidence affecting defendant’s
sentence was not disclosed by the prosecution. He reiterates the contention that “[t]here
is fabricated evidence amounting to false evidence and concealing of exculpatory
evidence,” in that “[t]he evidence [was] gathered improperly and was tainted and
contaminated [because it was] scraped with a paper clip that [D]eputy Paredes testified to
in the preliminary hearing . . . .”
6) Defendant contends that meritorious defense motions were not filed,
amounting to a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (ineffective
6
assistance of counsel, or IAC). Among the motions defendant wanted filed were a
Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 531 (Pitchess) [concerning
records of police misconduct]), a Murgia motion (Murgia v. Municipal Court for
Bakersfield Judicial Dist. (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 286 (Murgia) [concerning dismissal for
selective prosecution for improper purposes]), a motion for reconsideration, and a
petition for writ of mandate to reconsider or review defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence based on the warrantless search and seizure of the evidence.
7) Specifically with respect to the alleged unlawful search and seizure, defendant
asserts that the items seized are “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” and obtained by illegal
means, which he describes as “Noble Cause Corruption.”
8) Defendant includes, as a catch-all claim, the assertion that “There are errors of
law and errors of fact in this case that [led] to violations to the appellant’s 5th
Amendment’s due process of law protections, double jeopardy clause protection, and the
right against self-incrimination, 8th Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment including excessive misappropriate sentence, and the U.S. Supremacy Clause
Article 6, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.”
III. Defendant’s Claims Are Vague, Unsubstantiated, and Without Merit, and After
Examination of the Entire Record, No Error Appears
Defendant’s many claims of error are patently without merit. Defendant has some
familiarity with legal terminology, but he cannot tie any of his supposed claims to any
facts, nor is he able to articulate an argument in any relevant sense.
7
The sole issue as to which any articulable claim could be made is the propriety of
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Notably, as part of
his plea bargain, defendant waived the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. However, even if the merits could be considered, the trial court properly
denied the motion to suppress evidence.
At the time the officers were called in, defendant retained no reasonable
expectation of privacy because his tenancy had expired. (See People v. Van Eyk (1961)
56 Cal. 2d 471, 478 [where a defendant’s tenancy could be found to have expired before
the search was made, the manager of the hotel was entitled to permit the police to enter
and search the room].) In addition, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding,
in denying the motion, that defendant consented to the initial personal search. (See
People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 354, 362 [in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court defers to the trial court’s express or
implied findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence]; People v. Leyba
(1981) 29 Cal. 3d 591, 596-597 [on review of a motion to suppress evidence, the factual
findings of the trial court are upheld if supported by substantial evidence].) The
consensual search led to the discovery of the methamphetamine pipe and the baggie
containing methamphetamine residue. These discoveries provided probable cause for
defendant’s arrest.
The search of the backpack was not a search incident to arrest, but defendant had
been arrested and presumably was soon to be taken away for booking. He had no
8
reasonable expectation of privacy remaining as to the hotel room and, if his property
were left behind, it would be considered abandoned. When someone leaves a hotel room
after the tenancy has expired, and leaves property behind, he or she retains no reasonable
expectation of privacy in what is essentially abandoned property. (See People v. Parson
(2008) 44 Cal. 4th 332, 345-348 [the defendant did not pay for another night’s lodging
and left a motel room by removing a screen from a window; this evidence was sufficient
to support a finding that the defendant abandoned the room and had no reasonable
expectation of privacy].)
Even if the property in the hotel room were not subject to the landlord’s taking
possession after abandonment, the perceptible odor of marijuana, sufficient to emanate
from the room even through a closed door and into the hallway, gave the officers
probable cause to believe that additional contraband—marijuana—not discovered during
the personal search, was located within the room. At the same time that defendant was
being taken into custody, his belongings would need to be gathered and inventoried,
presuming that he did not intend to abandon them. Under either scenario, abandonment
or inventory of defendant’s property at booking, the evidence would inevitably have been
discovered.
“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence may be used
where it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means. As the United
States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the
independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact
9
discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would
have been discovered.’” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 789, 800-801.) To
establish inevitable discovery, the prosecution “must demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that, due to a separate line of investigation, application of routine police
procedures, or some other circumstance, the [challenged evidence] would have been
discovered by lawful means.” (People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1072.)
The trial court also found that the search of the mobile phone was consensual. The
finding was supported by substantial evidence: one of the officers had asked defendant if
the phone was his. Defendant admitted that it was. The officer then asked for the
password to the phone, and defendant immediately supplied the password.
Under all the circumstances, the searches of the backpack and the mobile phone
were reasonable. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence found in the search.
As to defendant’s remaining claims of error, however, he fails to make any
reasoned argument, or to offer any facts to support his various claims.
There was no “vindictive prosecution,” as there was no increase of charges or
greater aggregate sentence imposed as a result of defendant’s exercise of any of his
rights. His ultimate sentence was modified slightly: instead of the prison sentence being
vacated and defendant being admitted to probation in the first instance, the state prison
term was suspended and defendant was placed on probation while remaining subject to
ultimate imposition of the stayed prison sentence. This alteration resulted from
10
defendant’s violation of his Vargas release, and not from any lawful conduct or exercise
of rights on defendant’s part. Defendant does not articulate any other basis for an alleged
“vindictive prosecution,” and we find none.
Defendant can point to no outrageous government conduct to support his generic
claims of conspiracy. He offers nothing to suggest of what the alleged outrageous
government conduct supposedly consisted. In the absence of any facts—and none are
suggested by the record—or articulable argument, we find the contention to be without
merit.
There is also nothing to support his claims that his case was infected with police
misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, misconduct of defense counsel or judicial
misconduct. There was no misconduct by any of the persons defendant accuses, and
certainly no collusion among them. The record belies any such claim.
Defendant argues that his plea was invalid, because “it was a fraudulently induced
plea taken under duress with no factual basis.” Defendant does not describe any manner
in which the plea was fraudulently induced. Rather, the record is replete with the court’s
efforts to ensure that defendant fully understood his rights and the consequences of his
pleas, and that defendant knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily agreed to the pleas.
Moreover, the preliminary hearing transcript, to which both parties stipulated, provided a
fully adequate factual basis for the pleas. No duress whatsoever was applied to defendant
to induce him to enter the no contest pleas; the court at several points was ready to abort
the plea proceedings entirely, based on defendant’s seeming reluctance, but ultimately
11
took the pleas based on defendant’s repeated assurances that he did, indeed, personally
wish to enter them.
The prison term prior enhancements were proper. One enhancement was over five
years old, but the question is not whether it has been five years since the prior conviction;
the issue is whether defendant remained free both of another felony conviction and of
prison custody for five years after that conviction. (People v. Elmore (1990) 225
Cal. App. 3d 953, 957 [“washout” period does not apply if defendant committed a new
offense resulting in a felony conviction within five years even without a showing he was
incarcerated in state prison as a result thereof].) Defendant failed to meet these criteria.
As to defendant’s 2012 stalking conviction, the record shows only that defendant was
momentarily confused as to which prior he was being asked to admit. Even though
defendant asserted that the conviction was being reviewed on appeal, that conviction
remained valid unless and until it is reversed. Defendant made no showing that his
stalking conviction has been reversed, vacated, or otherwise rendered invalid.
Defendant asserts that the reporter’s transcript of the taking of his admissions of
the prison term prior enhancements is somehow erroneous, but he fails to identify any
mistake, mistranscription, or other irregularity beyond his bald assertion of the claim. He
claims there was fraud in the inducement with respect to the enhancements, but he fails to
state or indicate in any manner what misrepresentation was made to him in order to
induce him to admit the prison term priors. Instead, the record shows that the court
carefully inquired of defendant whether he wished to admit the priors, and the court
12
corrected defendant’s misunderstanding of which prior he was being asked to admit. In
addition, defendant stated plainly in open court that he had not been threatened or
coerced in any way to get him to change his pleas.
Defendant claims a Brady violation (Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87
[83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215]) occurred, i.e., that evidence affecting defendant’s
sentence was not disclosed by the prosecution. Defendant does not suggest what such
evidence might be, however.
Defendant next complains that he was deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel because a number of meritorious defense motions were not made below. The
contention is without merit.
There was no reason for defense counsel to file a motion to reconsider as to the
suppression ruling, because the motion to suppress was properly denied. Defendant
wanted defense counsel to file a Pitchess motion.2 Defendant suggests no good cause to
support any potential Pitchess motion.
Similarly, although defendant wanted to file a Murgia motion, concerning
selective enforcement, defendant suggests nothing that could have been proffered in
support of a claim of discriminatory prosecution.
As noted, defendant concludes his scattershot assertions of error with a catch-all
series of claims that, “There are errors of law and errors of fact in this case that [led] to
2 Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal. 3d 531.
13
violations to the appellant’s 5th Amendment’s due process of law protections, double
jeopardy clause protection, and the right against self-incrimination, 8th Amendment
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment including excessive misappropriate sentence,
and the U.S. Supremacy Clause Article 6, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.”
As usual, defendant’s claims are remarkably slim on any specifics to identify an
issue that is even capable of review. Defendant can point to no errors of law, and no
errors of fact. He patently does not know what “double jeopardy” means. By pleading
no contest and admitting the enhancements, defendant waived his due process and self-
incrimination rights. The only right that defendant specifically complained about below
was the right to a speedy trial. Defendant had waived that right and agreed to extend the
time for trial to begin. He maintained below that he was somehow tricked or coerced into
waiving this right, but he never suggested how this was accomplished. Defendant’s
sentence to three years eight months imprisonment for two admitted offenses, plus two
years for prison term priors, was neither cruel nor unusual. Defendant’s own misconduct
while he was on a Vargas release resulted in modification of the agreement to impose and
suspend this state prison sentence, rather than vacating the prison sentence. In either
case—vacated prison sentence or suspended prison sentence—defendant was placed on
supervised probation. The resulting punishment was extremely lenient, considering
defendant’s recidivist record.
14
IV. An Examination of the Entire Record Discloses No Arguable Issues
Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal. 4th 106, we have
conducted an independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
HOLLENHORST
J.
15