Buchanan v. Alhino CA3 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Filed 6/17/14 Buchanan v. Alhino CA3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    (Plumas)
    ----
    JAMIE A. BUCHANAN,                                                                           C072653
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     (Super. Ct. No. FL0626643)
    v.
    ANTHONY G. ALHINO,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Jamie A. Buchanan (mother) appeals from a postjudgment order requiring her to
    contribute $4,000 toward Anthony G. Alhino’s (father) attorney fees. Mother claims the
    trial court abused its discretion in making its order, because: 1) father failed to file the
    required forms; 2) her new husband’s income should not have been a factor in the court’s
    determination of the parties’ relative abilities to pay attorney fees; and 3) the 60-day
    payment order was unsupported and inappropriate. Disagreeing, we shall affirm.
    1
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On February 27, 2012, father filed an order to show cause (Judicial Council form
    FL-300)1 asking the court for orders regarding child support, child custody, and attorney
    fees. Father supported his requests with an attached application for order and supporting
    declaration (form FL-310). On March 29, 2012, father filed a current income and
    expense declaration (form FL-150).
    On August 21, 2012, the parties appeared before the trial court. The court
    acknowledged it had not yet ruled on father’s request for attorney fees, and indicated it
    would allow the parties to argue and then take the matter under submission. Mother’s
    counsel objected that father had failed to file the mandatory forms “FL 158” and “FL
    319.” The court noted the forms father had filed were “comparable” to those forms, as
    permitted under the Rules of Court, and sufficient to put the issue before the court. The
    court nevertheless instructed mother and father to file current income and expense
    declarations and any forms, pleadings, or authorities that they wanted the court to
    consider in support of and in opposition to father’s request for fees. The court gave the
    parties until September 10, 2012, to complete the filings and it would then take the matter
    under submission.
    Prior to the August 21 hearing, father’s counsel had filed a cost memorandum in
    support of father’s request for attorney fees, wherein counsel indicated father owed him
    $14,720 in fees. On August 24, 2012, counsel filed a supplemental cost memorandum
    that included counsel’s declaration attesting to the fees listed. That same day, father filed
    a current income and expense declaration, in which he declared his monthly income to be
    $2,166.40 each month ($76.40 from disability, $798 from social security, and $646 in
    public aid for each of his two children). Father also estimated his monthly expenses to be
    1 Further form references are to Judicial Council forms. All section references are to the
    Family Code. All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
    2
    approximately $2,150, and declared he owed his attorney $14,620 in fees. Father also
    filed a request for attorney’s fees and costs attachment (form FL-319), and a supporting
    declaration for attorney’s fees and costs attachment (form FL-158).
    On September 4, 2012, mother filed points and authorities in opposition to father’s
    request for fees. She also filed a supporting declaration for attorney’s fees and costs
    attachment (form FL-158) and a current income and expense declaration (form FL-150).
    On September 20, 2012, the trial court issued a written decision on father’s request
    for attorney fees. In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged that both parties were
    disabled, but college educated and employable but for their injuries. The court found
    father’s monthly income was $2,166 per month, and his estimated expenses were
    $2,150.00 per month. The court also found father already paid his attorney $100 but still
    owed $14,620. Mother received $923 per month in disability and her husband’s monthly
    income totaled $5,262 per month, bringing her household income to $6,185 each month.
    Mother indicated her estimated monthly expenses were $4,795. The court also found
    mother paid her own attorney a total of $15,300, using money from her own retirement
    account and her new husband’s income.
    Based on the parties’ testimony, the trial court found mother “has a much higher
    standard of living than [father], considering their property and other assets . . . [mother]
    and her husband recently moved into a nicer home, with ample room for the family.
    [Father] remained in his home, which [mother] described as a very unattractive
    environment.” Based on those findings, the trial court concluded mother’s “combined
    family income and accessible resources has made it easier for her to retain counsel,
    whereas [father] has been disadvantaged in retaining counsel. . . . In balancing their
    hardships, it appeared to the court that it would be a greater hardship on [father] than
    [mother] in paying for attorney’s fees.” The court then ordered mother to pay $4,000
    toward father’s attorney fees and to pay the money “within 60 days from the date of this
    ruling.”
    3
    Mother appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Standard of Review
    Mother makes the general argument that the trial court abused its discretion when
    it made the disputed order for partial payment of fees.
    “ ‘[A] motion for attorney fees and costs in a dissolution proceeding is left to the
    sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] In the absence of a clear showing of
    abuse, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal.’ [Citation.] Thus, we affirm the
    court’s order unless ‘ “no judge could reasonably make the order made.” ’ ” (In re
    Marriage of Duncan (2001) 
    90 Cal.App.4th 617
    , 630 (Duncan).)
    II
    Forms and Consideration of Information Therein
    A. Forms
    Mother first contends father failed to timely file forms FL-319 (request for
    attorney’s fees and cost attachment), FL-157 (spousal or partner support declaration
    attachment), or FL-158 (supporting declaration for attorney’s fees and costs attachment).
    Rule 5.427 requires that: “(1) Except as provided in Family Code section 2031(b),
    to request attorney’s fees and costs, a party must complete, file and serve the following
    documents:
    “(A) Request for Order (form FL-300);
    “(B) Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Attachment (form FL-319) or a
    comparable declaration that addresses the factors covered in form FL-319;
    “(C) A current Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150);
    “(D) A personal declaration in support of the request for attorney’s fees and costs,
    either using Supporting Declaration for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Attachment (form FL-
    158) or a comparable declaration that addresses the factors covered in form FL-158; and
    4
    “(E) Any other papers relevant to the relief requested.
    “(2) The party requesting attorney’s fees and costs must provide the court with
    sufficient information about the attorney’s hourly billing rate; the nature of the litigation;
    the attorney’s experience in the particular type of work demanded; the fees and costs
    incurred or anticipated; and why the requested fees and costs are just, necessary, and
    reasonable.”
    We agree with the trial court that father met his burden by filing documents
    “comparable” to the required forms, as permitted by rule 5.427. Father’s order to show
    cause and supporting declaration are sufficiently comparable to the attorney’s fees and
    costs attachment to put the issue before the court. In addition, before the matter was
    submitted, father filed the very forms which mother now complains are lacking--a current
    income and expense declaration (form FL-150) a request for attorney’s fees and costs
    attachment (form FL-319), and a supporting declaration for attorney’s fees and costs
    attachment (form FL-158). Although mother argues those documents were “untimely”
    filed; she clearly had the opportunity to respond. Mother has, therefore, failed to show
    prejudice. (In re Marriage of Jones (1998) 
    60 Cal.App.4th 685
    , 694; Cal. Const., art.VI,
    § 13 [a judgment may be set aside for procedural error only if the error resulted in a
    miscarriage of justice].)
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the requisite information had
    been submitted to allow it to consider father’s request for fees.
    B. Consideration of the Forms’ Information
    As a disjointed supplement to her argument alleging deficiencies in father’s form
    filing, and still under the general heading of abuse of discretion, Mother argues that she
    “has no ability to pay for all of her attorney fees, let alone [father’s].” But she fails to
    discuss all the factors properly considered by the trial court. “In determining need, the
    court was required to and did, consider the parties’ relative circumstances. Those
    5
    circumstances included the parties’ income, expenses and assets.” (Duncan, supra,
    90 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) The court considered both parties’ disabilities and
    acknowledged neither was able to work; however, the court also considered that mother’s
    household income was higher than father’s.2 The court also compared the parties’
    standard of living, noting mother’s was higher, and found mother had assets of greater
    value than did father. Thus, balancing the hardships, the court concluded the hardship in
    retaining an attorney was more significant for father than it was for mother.
    Mother notes that she is paying to father $492 in child support each month, which
    she claims the court did not consider in calculating father’s monthly income. “A support
    award is made to defray support expenses, and should not be considered in determining
    financial ability to maintain a proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Hatch (1985)
    
    169 Cal.App.3d 1213
    , 1220.) Accordingly, the trial court correctly declined to consider
    the support money in calculating father’s monthly income for purposes of retaining
    counsel.
    III
    New Husband’s Income
    Mother next contends the trial court erred in considering her new husband’s
    income when assessing the parties’ relative abilities to pay attorney fees. Mother fails to
    cite any relevant authority to support her contention; indeed there is authority to the
    contrary.
    “While new mate or partner income is generally irrelevant in child support matters
    (see § 4057.5, subd. (a)(2)), it is not statutorily irrelevant in pendente lite fee orders.
    (New mate income doesn’t usually come up in spousal support matters because most
    spousal support awards end on remarriage. But it does come up when an ex-spouse
    2 We conclude post in Part III that the trial court’s consideration of the mother’s new
    husband’s income was appropriate.
    6
    cohabits with someone, and in that context it is relevant; see In re Marriage of Geraci
    (2006) 
    144 Cal.App.4th 1278
    , 1298 [relevant because of possible economies of scale].)
    The expansive language of section 2032--the ‘relevant circumstances of the respective
    parties’--also shows it is certainly relevant for fee awards.” (Alan S. v. Superior Court of
    Orange County (2009) 
    172 Cal.App.4th 238
    , 255.)
    Given the directive of section 2030 that trial courts “shall ensure that each party
    has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party’s rights . . . ” and the well-
    established authority that trial courts have wide discretion in fashioning an award of
    attorney fees in marital proceedings (see In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 
    101 Cal.App.4th 120
    , 133), we agree that new spouse income may be considered when determining an
    award of attorney fees under section 2030. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in considering this income.
    IV
    60-Day Payment Order
    Absent a stay, this issue is moot. Our review of the record provided to us did not
    reveal a stay. Nonetheless, mother’s claim the trial court erred in ordering her to pay the
    fees within 60 days also fails. As we discussed ante, mother’s monthly household
    income was $6,185 and her monthly household expenses were estimated at $4,795;
    leaving her with $1,390 each month. Moreover, mother has a retirement account from
    which she has already taken money to pay her own attorney fees. We find no abuse of
    discretion.
    7
    DISPOSITION
    The orders of the court are affirmed. Costs are awarded to father. (Cal. Rules of
    Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
    DUARTE                , J.
    We concur:
    RAYE                  , P. J.
    MURRAY                , J.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C072653

Filed Date: 6/17/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021