In re D.R. CA2/6 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 6/30/14 In re D.R. CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    In re D.R., a Person Coming Under the                                         2d Juv. No. B253866
    Juvenile Court Law.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J068807)
    (Ventura County)
    VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
    SERVICES AGENCY,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    J.G.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    J.G. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to her son,
    D.R., selecting adoption as the permanent plan and summarily denying her petition under
    Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 to modify a previous order terminating
    reunification services. (§ 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court committed reversible
    error by declining to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition. We
    affirm.
    1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Mother has three children. Her oldest child was removed from her custody
    in 2009. In April 2012, D.R., who was then 5, and his younger half-brother were
    detained as a result of mother's history of substance abuse, her failure to provide them
    with regular and necessary care and their subjection to an unsafe, unsanitary and drug-
    laden living environment. The juvenile court sustained the dependency petition as to
    both children (§ 300), and ordered reunification services as outlined in the case plan.
    Only D.R.'s case is at issue here.
    Mother has a number of health issues, including a history of substance
    abuse, weight issues, food addiction, dental problems, thyroid dysfunction, sleep apnea
    and mood and anxiety disorders. She has criminal convictions for petty theft, failure to
    have her child attend school, possession of a controlled substance, being under the
    influence of a controlled substance and possession of a smoking device. Between 2004
    and 2010, mother was reported to respondent, Ventura County Human Services Agency
    ("HSA"), for drug use, for housing her children in a filthy environment and for failing to
    care for them.
    D.R.'s father died in December 2011. When the children were detained,
    mother, who was on probation, was living with her boyfriend in an apartment known for
    high-traffic drug activity. Witnesses saw about two dozen people going in and out of the
    apartment daily, and police attributed at least 10 drug-related arrests to mother or the
    apartment. During a search, officers discovered hashish brownies, methamphetamine and
    hypodermic needles, all within reach of the children. Others in the apartment were found
    to be under the influence of a controlled substance.
    Mother's apartment presented a number of other dangerous conditions.
    Clothes, trash and other items were stacked so high that they could topple over and fall
    on the children. Electrical outlets were exposed, and there was no running water in the
    kitchen. The apartment had no fire alarm, and because the windows were barred, it had
    no emergency exit.
    2
    D.R. displayed typical signs of neglect. Physically, he had nine cavities,
    five of which required nerve treatment and IV sedation. Cognitively, he had learning and
    developmental delays. Emotionally, he was "detached from his feelings" and unwilling
    to discuss his home life. He also exhibited strange behaviors, such as falling on the
    ground and saying, "I'm drunk."
    During supervised visits, mother would talk on her cellular telephone while
    D.R. played alone. Staff at Casa Pacifica Shelter did not observe a close bond between
    them. D.R. did not cry or ask for his mother, and did not get excited when relatives came
    to visit him. A month after his detainment, a social worker noted that D.R. "seems to be
    uninterested and not attached to his mother or any caregiver."
    In July 2012, a social worker observed mother engaging D.R. in
    inappropriate conversations about the case, including discussing reunification in violation
    of court orders, admonishing him for calling his foster mother "step mom" and telling
    him that he was making her cry. A few months later, mother said she was "not ready" for
    unsupervised visits and did not "want [the children] here right now" because she
    "need[ed] to get the house ready first." Mother also missed several visits with D.R. and
    at one point said she would prefer to focus on reunification with his younger sibling.
    As visitation with mother increased, D.R. began acting out, defecating and
    urinating in his bedroom at his then foster home. He had difficulty sleeping the night
    before scheduled visits and was anxious in car rides to and from the visits. On one
    occasion he tried to avoid a visit by asking his foster mother to lie and say he was sick.
    When mother and D.R. did engage in unsupervised visits, D.R. reported
    that she read him court papers, accused him of causing his own detention and told him to
    lie about what they did during their visits. Mother gave D.R. unhealthy food and drove
    him around even though she did not have a driver's license. After one visit, D.R. started
    crying and said, "my mother left me somewhere with a lot of rooms." He also said she
    "was yelling at the park . . . I told her to stop."
    Mother had difficulty accepting responsibility for the issues causing the
    children's detainment. Initially, she blamed the landlord for placing bars on the
    3
    apartment windows. Later, she blamed the police. She said, "I get harassed just because
    I was on probation. I can't help that I don't make enough money and have to live where I
    do." Regarding the drugs found in her home, mother said the drug users were all upstairs
    and "[i]t's not my fault that the owner rents to drug users." She then started blaming D.R.
    Regarding his detainment, D.R. told his foster mother that "it's my fault." He said, "My
    Mom is poor. She gets no money if l don't live with her."
    After participating in reunification services for over a year, mother
    continued to make inappropriate comments to D.R. She cried in front of her children,
    and during one visit, she told D.R. he was her "bad boy." A social worker cautioned
    mother not to make negative comments to D.R., but mother again told D.R. he was "bad."
    During another visit, when D.R. asked mother why she was wearing glasses, she
    responded, "I am going blind because you don't live with me." She told him she had to
    pay over $1,000 in rent even though he was not living with her.
    D.R.'s paternal grandparents believe he has blossomed in his current foster
    family's care. D.R.'s court-appointed advocate observed that "[s]ince being placed in his
    current foster home he has truly become a child. When I met him in August of 2012 he
    was guarded and in survival mode. Now he feels safe, cared for, loved and part of a
    wonderful family. He is sleeping soundly and has let go of his worries." D.R. told his
    therapist that he wants to stay with his foster family forever and does not want to live
    with his mother. He said, "[I]f I live [with] my mom then I'll feel sad because she
    probably will do drugs and yell at me again."
    The dependency court held a six-month review hearing in December 2012.
    The court found that mother had partially complied with the case plan but that her
    progress was only moderate. At the 12-month review hearing, the court found that
    mother had not demonstrated a benefit in services, had only recently begun participating
    in mental health services and continued to be inappropriate in visits with D.R. It found
    "[t]he extent of progress made by the mother . . . toward alleviating or mitigating the
    causes necessitating placement has been minimal." On August 9, 2013, the court
    terminated reunification services to mother and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
    4
    On January 7, 2014, mother petitioned for a change of court order pursuant
    to section 388. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition, rejecting mother's
    request for an evidentiary hearing. It found by a preponderance of the evidence that
    mother had failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or that
    continued reunification services would be in D.R.'s best interests. The court terminated
    mother's parental rights and set adoption as the permanent plan. (§ 366.26.) This appeal
    followed.
    DISCUSSION
    Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily
    denying her section 388 petition seeking modification of the order terminating
    reunification services. We disagree.
    "The parent [seeking modification must] make a prima facie showing to
    trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing. [Citation.]" (In re Marilyn H.
    (1993) 
    5 Cal. 4th 295
    , 310; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 
    3 Cal. App. 4th 1407
    , 1412-1414.)
    "There are two parts to the prima facie showing: The parent must demonstrate (1) a
    genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that (2) revoking the previous
    order would be in the best interests of the children. [Citation.] If the liberally construed
    allegations of the petition do not show changed circumstances such that the child's best
    interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order, the dependency court need
    not order a hearing. [Citation.] We review the juvenile court's summary denial of a
    section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (In re Anthony W. (2001) 
    87 Cal. App. 4th 246
    , 250; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 
    56 Cal. App. 4th 519
    , 529.)
    To demonstrate changed circumstances, mother presented the following:
    (1) a report indicating she had completed in-home parenting services through July 29,
    2013; (2) certificates of achievement for parenting courses dated November 2012 and
    April 2013; (3) a six-month drug treatment program certificate dated September 20,
    2013; (4) a letter stating she and her boyfriend had attended couples counseling between
    5
    August 2013 and November 2013; and (5) letters stating she attended four individual
    counseling sessions from August 2013 to October 2013.
    The first two categories of documents do not constitute new evidence or
    changed circumstances because they existed when the juvenile court terminated services
    on August 9, 2013. (In re H.S. (2010) 
    188 Cal. App. 4th 103
    , 108-109 [evidence of
    changed circumstances must not have existed at time of termination].) The drug
    treatment program certificate also is not a changed circumstance because most of the
    program was completed prior to the August 9 order. (Ibid.)
    The only "new" information was evidence of couples counseling between
    August and November 4, 2013, and four individual counseling sessions between August
    and October 2013. Mother provided no evidence of efforts to address her problems
    between November 4, 2013, and January 7, 2014, the date the petition was filed.
    Moreover, mere continuation of therapy is not a sufficient showing of changed
    circumstances for modification of an order under section 388. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994)
    
    24 Cal. App. 4th 596
    , 610; In re A.S. (2009) 
    180 Cal. App. 4th 351
    , 358 [completion of
    parenting class and participation in individual counseling insufficient to require
    evidentiary hearing on section 388 petition]; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 
    209 Cal. App. 4th 635
    , 641-642 [participation in 12-step meetings insufficient evidence of changed
    circumstances to justify a hearing because father already received extensive alcoholism
    treatment with no improvement].)
    Even if mother had demonstrated changed circumstances, she did not make
    a prima facie showing that granting her further services would serve D.R's best interests.
    Once reunification services are terminated, the juvenile court's focus shifts from
    reunification to the child's need for permanency and stability. (In re D.R. (2011) 
    193 Cal. App. 4th 1494
    , 1512-1513 ["[T]he disruption of an existing psychological bond
    between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing
    on any section 388 motion"].) When D.R. was detained, he was physically, cognitively
    and emotionally scarred. Since being placed with his current foster family, D.R. has
    6
    blossomed as a child and wants to stay with them forever. The family is committed to
    adopting him and providing him with permanency and stability. As the juvenile court
    observed, halting the adoption process and allowing mother additional reunification
    services would disrupt this placement. (See In re Jackson W. (2010) 
    184 Cal. App. 4th 247
    , 260 ["The petition made no showing of how the minors' best interests would be
    served by depriving them of a permanent, stable home in exchange for an uncertain
    future"].)
    Finally, mother asserts that, where credibility is at issue, the denial of an
    evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition constitutes a violation of due process. (See
    in re Clifton V. (2001) 
    93 Cal. App. 4th 1400
    , 1405.) Her petition alleges she has "a close
    relationship" with D.R. and "believe[s] . . . he wants to be returned to [her]." Mother
    claims that because these allegations contradict statements in the social workers' reports,
    the juvenile court must hold a hearing to assess the credibility of those statements.
    Nothing in the record suggests, however, that the juvenile court denied the petition
    because it questioned the credibility of mother's allegations. Absent express indications
    to the contrary, we must assume the court considered whether mother's allegations, taken
    as true, established a prima facie showing that reinstatement of services was justified by
    changed circumstances and would be in the child's best interests. (See Denham v.
    Superior Court (1970) 
    2 Cal. 3d 557
    , 564 [error not presumed but must be affirmatively
    shown].)
    In sum, mother's factual allegations and evidence failed to establish a prima
    facie case of changed circumstances or that the proposed modification would be in D.R.'s
    best interests. The juvenile court acted within its discretion in summarily denying the
    petition.
    DISPOSITION
    The orders terminating parental rights, selecting adoption as a permanent
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    plan and denying the section 388 petition are affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    PERREN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    YEGAN, J.
    8
    Bruce A. Young, Judge
    Superior Court County of Ventura
    ______________________________
    Michele Anne Cella, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Ronda J. McKaig, Assistant County
    Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B253866

Filed Date: 6/30/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021