People v. Thomas CA4/1 ( 2014 )

Filed 6/18/14 P. v. Thomas CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063928
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD243795)
ROY WILLIAM THOMAS, III,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Albert T. Harutunian III, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Alastair J.
Agcaoili, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Roy William Thomas, III of making a criminal threat while using
a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Thomas to a 270-day commitment to the
sheriff followed by three years of formal probation with three alcohol-related probation
conditions. Thomas appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by imposing
alcohol-related probation conditions. We agree.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Thomas lived with Romeo Madrid. Thomas was in poor health, and Madrid acted
as his caregiver. In October 2012, Madrid and Thomas got in an argument after Madrid
did not respond to Thomas's questions. As the argument escalated, Thomas approached
Madrid with a knife in each hand with the blades pointing down. While standing two or
three feet away, Thomas told Madrid that he was the only friend he had contemplated
hurting. Thomas further told Madrid that he had contemplated killing Madrid's sister.
Thomas continued to threaten Madrid stating, "I'm going to kill you."
Madrid was able to talk Thomas out of hurting him. Thomas placed the knives
down and ultimately left the condominium and went to his car. Madrid walked to his
sister's condominium unit to call the police. The police arrived and arrested Thomas
shortly thereafter inside his parked car.
The probation department submitted its sentencing report in May 2013. The
report stated that Thomas has no criminal history apart from this offense. With respect to
alcohol use, the report stated that Thomas stated that he consumed an unknown amount
of alcohol daily for two weeks within the past year to ease his back pain, but he had not
consumed alcohol at any other time. The report also stated that Thomas stated that he has
not experimented with any controlled substances. Thomas has a college degree, was
honorably discharged from the Navy, and owns his own dog training business.
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The trial court held a sentencing hearing. The probation report recommended
formal probation. The conditions recommended included that Thomas "not knowingly
use or possess alcohol if directed by the [probation officer]," that Thomas "[a]ttend 'self-
help' meetings" if directed, and that Thomas submit to "any chemical test of blood,
breath, or urine to determine blood alcohol content." Thomas objected, requesting that
the court strike these conditions. The court denied the request and imposed the
challenged conditions, among others.
DISCUSSION
Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike the
alcohol-related probation conditions in his probation order because the conditions are not
related to the crime for which he was convicted, he has no history of alcohol or drug
abuse, and alcohol did not play a role in the underlying offense. We agree.
A. General Legal Principles
Sentencing courts have broad discretion in imposing conditions of probation
meant to protect the public and rehabilitate the defendant. (People v. Carbajal (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) We review the trial court's imposition of probation conditions
for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1121.) A probation condition is invalid if it (1) is not
related to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to noncriminal
conduct, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent).) All three parts of this
reasonableness test must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a condition
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of probation. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) We will analyze Lent
factors in order.
B. Analysis
Thomas's alcohol probation conditions are not related to the crime he was
convicted. He was not convicted of an alcohol- or drug-related offense. There is no
evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs before or during the
commission of the crime. Neither alcohol nor drugs were directly or indirectly related to
this offense. Additionally, the alcohol probation conditions prohibited noncriminal
conduct as Thomas was above the legal alcohol drinking age of 21 at the time of the
offense.
Thus, the analysis turns on whether the alcohol probation conditions are
reasonably related to future criminality. A condition of probation that does not relate to
the convicted crime may still be valid if it is reasonably related to prevent future
criminality. (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 380.) In order to relate to future
criminality, the probation condition must have some "rational factual basis . . . that
defendant may commit a particular type of crime in the future." (In re Martinez (1978)
86 Cal.App.3d 577, 583.)
Where a defendant has a history of drug abuse and is convicted of a drug-related
offense, alcohol use may lead to future criminality. (People v. Beal (1997) 60
Cal.App.4th 84, 87.) Courts have found a nexus between alcohol probation conditions
and future criminalities where there has been an alcohol- or drug-related conviction,
alcohol in the surrounding facts of a nonalcohol or drug-related crime, or a history of
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drug or alcohol abuse. (See People v. Moret (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 839, 842 [upholding
alcohol probation condition when the defendant was an admitted drug user; People v.
Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 61, 65-66, 68-69 [the court upheld an alcohol-related
probation condition when defendant came home, smelling of alcohol, and abused her
mother]; People v. Beal, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 86-87 [the court found a nexus
between alcohol use and future criminality because the defendant was convicted of
methamphetamine for sale]; People v. Lindsay (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1644-1645
[the court found a nexus between alcohol use and future criminality because the
defendant was convicted of selling cocaine and had a history of drug and alcohol abuse];
People v. Smith (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1034-1034 [the court found a nexus
between alcohol use and future criminality because the defendant was convicted of
possessing PCP].)
Here, Thomas has no history of alcohol or drug abuse. Neither alcohol nor drugs
were involved in the facts surrounding Thomas's conviction. Unlike Moret, Balestra,
Beal, Lindsay, and Smith, there is no nexus between the alcohol probation conditions and
future criminality. Thomas has never been convicted of an alcohol- or drug-related crime
and, other than the instant offense, he has no criminal history. Despite the Attorney
General's and our dissenting colleague's argument that alcohol probation conditions are
reasonable since Thomas suffers from "impulsive behavior," there is no factual basis here
that alcohol had aggravated any impulsive behavior that would lead to future
criminalities. The alcohol probation conditions do not have a "rational factual basis . . .
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that defendant may commit [this] particular type of crime in the future." (In re Martinez,
supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 583.)
There must be some factual basis for the trial court's exercise of discretion. There
is none. Because all of the Lent factors are satisfied, the alcohol probation conditions are
invalid.
DISPOSITION
Probation conditions 8b, 8f, and 8h are stricken. As so modified, the order
granting probation is affirmed.
MCINTYRE, J.
I CONCUR:
MCDONALD, J.
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HALLER, Acting P. J., Dissenting:
Unlike the majority, I am satisfied the trial court did not violate People v. Lent
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 when it imposed the alcohol probation conditions at issue here.
Although it is not entirely clear exactly what precipitated appellant's anger, it is
abundantly clear that on the night of the incident appellant's conduct quickly escalated
from verbal accusations directed at the victim to appellant confronting his roommate with
two eight-inch kitchen knives and threatening to kill him and his sister who lived next
door. Following repeated threats, the victim was able to deescalate the situation. The
appellant packed a bag with clothing and medications, told the victim there was no point
living any longer, and left the apartment. The victim later reported appellant would
frequently get mad "at anything"; "just gets mad about things" in general; and on the day
of the incident ingested his medications after stating he had no reason to live.
After reviewing the facts of the case, investigating the defendant's background and
interviewing the appellant, the probation officer opined appellant does not recognize the
seriousness of his behavior and needs to address his impulsive behavior, mental health
issues and lack of anger management skills. The probation officer recommended three
years of formal probation, subject to various terms and conditions, including the alcohol
conditions challenged here. Rather than recommending alcohol conditions "as directed"
by the probation officer, the probation officer suggested the less onerous option of
requiring compliance only "if directed" by the probation officer. The court agreed and
imposed this option.
Taking into account the appellant's anger and impulse control issues and the
probation officer's obligation to monitor a defendant on formal felony probation, the
ability of a probation officer to impose alcohol conditions, if appellant's behavior
warrants it, seems entirely consistent with efforts to rehabilitate a probationer, reform
conduct and prevent future criminality. Accordingly, I find no error and would affirm.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
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