In re Blake D. CA2/3 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 8/1/13 In re Blake D. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    In re BLAKE D., a Person Coming Under                                B242148
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    (Los Angeles County
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                   Super. Ct. No. CK87816)
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    KENNETH R.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Veronica McBeth, Judge. Affirmed.
    Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and
    Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Kenneth R. appeals from the order of the juvenile court taking jurisdiction over his
    son, three-year-old Blake. He contends the record lacks sufficient evidence to support
    the finding that his conduct justifies declaring Blake a dependent under Welfare and
    Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a).1 We conclude the evidence supports the
    finding under section 300, subdivision (a). Accordingly, we affirm the order.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On April 28, 2011, Kenneth returned Blake to mother’s house2 with bruises and
    marks about the child’s head, face, and ears. Photographs of Blake taken before the
    child’s visit with Kenneth showed no marks or bruises. Receiving no explanation from
    Kenneth about Blake’s condition, mother took the child to the emergency room and
    contacted the police. The police observed red marks, bruising, and swelling around
    Blake’s right eye, the right side of his head and his right ear, along with bruising on the
    top part of his ear lobe and a speck of dried blood just outside of his ear canal. The
    maternal grandmother informed the Department of Children and Family Services (the
    Department) that she answered the door when Kenneth returned Blake. Kenneth handed
    the child to her and “ ‘immediately bolted to his car and took off.’ ”
    The social worker saw that Blake had visible scratches on the right side of his
    face, a slight purplish bruise on the right side of his forehead, a red mark under his right
    eye, and bruising around his left ear. Otherwise, the child was dressed appropriately, was
    smiling and happy, and appeared to be well nourished.
    A nurse practitioner reported the forensic examination revealed that Blake’s
    injuries were caused by blunt force trauma consistent with being slapped about the face
    and head. The pattern finger marks were visible but the skeletal survey showed no
    fractures or other medical concerns.
    1
    All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    2
    Mother is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    Kenneth denied that Blake had any marks when he dropped the child off with
    grandmother and blamed both mother and grandmother for the marks.
    The Department filed a petition alleging, as to Kenneth, that Blake sustained
    injuries while in Kenneth’s care. (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b).) The juvenile court ordered
    Blake be detained. The court found Kenneth to be Blake’s biological father.
    At the adjudication hearing, Kenneth testified that pursuant to a family-law court
    order, Blake probably visited Kenneth over 100 times and the child never suffered an
    injury in Kenneth’s care. He testified he never struck Blake or allowed anyone else to
    strike the child. Mother never told Kenneth she thought he physically abused Blake. He
    denied there were any marks on Blake when he returned the child on April 28 and blamed
    the maternal grandmother. He claimed to have first learned of Blake’s injuries from the
    police.
    At the close of the hearing, the trial court indicated it did not think Kenneth’s
    testimony was consistent and did not believe Kenneth’s assertion that the maternal
    grandmother was responsible for the injury. The court then modified and sustained the
    petition under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300 based on Kenneth’s conduct. As
    modified, the petition stated under section 300, subdivision (a): “On 4/28/11, one year
    old Blake [D.] was medically examined and found to have sustained injuries including
    bruising, and swelling, to the left side of the child’s face, the child’s inner and outer left
    ear and the right side of the child’s face while the child was in the care and supervision of
    the child’s father, Kenneth R[.] The child sustained bruising to the child’s face consistent
    with a handprint. The child’s injuries are consistent with the child being slapped in the
    face. Such injures would not ordinarily occur except as the result of unreasonable and
    neglectful acts by the child’s father who had care, custody and control of the child. Such
    unreasonable and neglectful acts on the part of the child’s father endangers the child’s
    physical health, safety and well-being, creates a detrimental home environment and
    places the child at risk of physical harm, damage and danger.” (Italics added.) While
    modifying the petition, the court stated: “I am striking deliberate and it’s [sic] exactly as
    3
    it reads. I think by a preponderance of the evidence the child was injured while he was in
    the care of his father. [¶] I am not finding that the father did it.”
    After the court entered disposition orders, Kenneth filed the instant appeal.
    (§ 395.)
    CONTENTIONS
    Kenneth contends there is insufficient evidence to support the findings as to him
    under section 300, subdivision (a), and reversal of the order sustaining the section 300,
    subdivision (a) allegations will provide him relief.
    DISCUSSION
    The juvenile court declared Blake a dependent of the court based on findings that
    Kenneth’s conduct brought the child within the meaning of both subdivisions (a) and (b)
    of section 300. “When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
    that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can
    affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the
    statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
    substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any
    or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
    evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 
    171 Cal.App.4th 438
    , 451.) As Kenneth does not
    challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that Blake is described by
    section 300, subdivision (b), we affirm the jurisdictional order on that ground. However,
    we have discretion to reach the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding (In re
    Drake M. (2012) 
    211 Cal.App.4th 754
    , 762), and so we will address the subdivision (a)
    finding.
    Subdivision (a) of section 300 authorizes juvenile court jurisdiction over any child
    who “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical
    harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (§ 300,
    subd. (a), italics added.) Kenneth cites the juvenile court’s statement, “I am not finding
    that the father did it” to argue without the finding Kenneth “did it,” the record lacks
    4
    sufficient evidence to support the finding that Blake is defined by section 300,
    subdivision (a). (Italics added.)
    On the contrary, the court found prima facie evidence to support the finding under
    subdivision (a) of section 300. The reason is that section 355.1, subdivision (a) provides,
    “Where the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that an injury,
    injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily
    not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions
    of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor,
    that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by
    subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.” (Italics added.) In sustaining the section 300,
    subdivision (a) allegations, the juvenile court amended the petition to parrot the italicized
    language of section 355.1 above.
    The record contains competent professional evidence supporting the court’s
    finding under section 300, subdivision (a). (§ 355.1, subd. (a).) According to the nurse
    practitioner, the forensic examination determined that Blake’s injuries were caused by
    “blunt force trauma consistent with being slapped about the face and head” and that
    “finger marks were visible.” This evidence gives rise to a presumption there is prima
    facie evidence that Blake is described by section 300, subdivision (a), which affects the
    burden of producing evidence. (§ 355.1, subd. (c).)3 To carry his burden, Kenneth
    testified that he did not slap Blake, and surmised that mother or the maternal grandmother
    was responsible for the injuries. Yet, the juvenile court rejected that hypothesis. Thus,
    the record contains sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Blake
    is described by section 300, subdivision (a) based on Kenneth’s conduct. (§ 355.1,
    subd. (a).)
    3
    Section 355.1, subdivision (c) reads “[t]he presumption created by subdivision (a)
    constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.”
    5
    Given our conclusion, we need not address Kenneth’s additional contention that
    reversal of the order sustaining the section 300, subdivision (a) allegations will provide
    Kenneth with relief.
    DISPOSITION
    The order appealed from is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    ALDRICH, J.
    We concur:
    CROSKEY, Acting P. J.
    KITCHING, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B242148

Filed Date: 8/1/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021