People v. Bernal CA4/2 ( 2014 )

Filed 11/13/14 P. v. Bernal CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E057853
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1200272)
SERGIO BERNAL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark Mandio, Judge.
Affirmed.
Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter Quon, Jr., Quisteen S.
Shum and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Sergio Bernal drove a stolen car. When a police officer
attempted to stop the car for a code violation, defendant sped away, parked the car in an
apartment complex parking lot, and walked away. As officers attempted to apprehend
him, he ran away. When he was caught, he physically struggled with an officer before
being subdued. He then gave a false name to one of the officers.
Defendant was charged with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (count 1; Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (hereafter section 10851), receiving a stolen vehicle (count 2;
Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), providing false identification to an officer (count 3; Pen.
Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)), and resisting arrest (count 4; Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)).
At trial, defendant testified that he bought the car and did not know it was stolen.
He said he received a bill of sale from the seller and produced the document at trial. He
explained that he ran from police because he believed he had violated parole and wanted
to “stay out.”
After a recess taken during the prosecution’s cross-examination of defendant,
defendant announced that he was “done” and would not testify further. As a
consequence, the court struck defendant’s testimony regarding the bill of sale, excluded
the bill of sale itself, and told the jurors that they could consider defendant’s refusal to
testify in evaluating his credibility.
The jury convicted defendant on counts 1, 3, and 4; count 2 (receiving stolen
property) was dismissed in the interests of justice. In a bifurcated court trial, defendant
2
admitted allegations of certain prison priors and a prior strike, and the court found the
allegations true. He was sentenced to nine years in prison.
Defendant makes the following contentions on appeal: (1) the prosecutor’s cross-
examination of defendant regarding his prior convictions exceeded the bounds of a
pretrial ruling and constituted misconduct; (2) the trial court erred in striking defendant’s
testimony regarding the bill of sale; (3) the court erred in refusing to give a requested
instruction on the claim-of-right defense; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain
the section 10851 conviction.
We agree with defendant’s argument regarding the claim-of-right instruction, but
conclude that the error was harmless. We reject defendant’s other contentions. We
therefore affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
A. Prosecution Evidence
In the early morning of January 19, 2012, Juan Fuentes’s green Honda Accord was
parked in front of Fuentes’s house in Hemet. Sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.
that morning, Fuentes started the engine of the Accord to warm it up before going to
work. As the car idled, Fuentes walked back into his house to get coffee. He heard the
car door slam. Fuentes stepped outside and saw his car being driven away. He could not
see the person driving the car. Fuentes reported the theft to police.
Three days later, in the afternoon of January 22, 2012, Hemet Police Officer Bryan
Anderson was in his patrol car driving westbound on Latham Avenue in Hemet. He saw
3
defendant driving eastbound on Latham Avenue in a green Accord. The Accord did not
have a front license plate. After defendant passed him, Officer Anderson made a U-turn
to make an “enforcement stop” of the vehicle. He did not activate his siren or overhead
lights.
The officer saw defendant accelerate through a four-way stop at the intersection of
Latham Avenue and Santa Fe Street without stopping. Defendant turned left
(northbound) onto Santa Fe Street without using his left turn signal. At that point,
Officer Anderson lost sight of the car. He gave police dispatchers a description of the
car.
A dispatcher notified Officer Anderson that the car had been seen pulling into an
apartment complex on Santa Fe Street, and that the occupants got out of the car and were
walking east on Latham Avenue. Soon afterward, Officer Anderson saw defendant and
another person walking into an alleyway adjacent to an apartment complex near the
intersection of Santa Fe Street and Latham Avenue. This apartment complex was not the
complex where the Honda had been parked. When defendant and his companion saw the
officer, they turned and ran “as fast as they could” into the apartment complex. Around
that time, Officer Anderson received word from dispatch that the Accord had been
reported stolen.
Other officers arrived and a perimeter was established around the apartment
complex defendant was seen entering. Defendant was spotted running away from the
apartment building. Officer Anderson and two other officers chased after defendant and
4
ordered him to stop. Defendant ran into a hobby store where he was apprehended after a
struggle with one of the officers.
Sergeant Daniel Reinbolt was in a police car with defendant. Defendant told
Sergeant Reinbolt his name was “Mario Bernal” and his birth date was “October 15,
1927.” When the sergeant questioned the year of his birth, defendant said, “’77. I meant
’77.” When Sergeant Reinbolt checked police records using that name and birth date,
there was no match. Later, when he searched using only the last name “Bernal,” he
found defendant’s real name and birth date of October 27, 1977.
Defendant told Sergeant Reinbolt that he ran from the officers “because every time
he gets contacted by the police he gets beat up.” He also said he ran because he wants to
be with his son, not in jail.
When defendant was told he would be charged with driving a stolen vehicle and
fleeing from the officers, he told Sergeant Reinbolt: “I don’t know anything about that.”
He did not tell the officer that he had purchased the vehicle or that he did not know it was
stolen.
A search of defendant turned up keys, but they were never checked to see if they
fit the stolen Accord. He did not have with him any record of car title, registration, or a
bill of sale for the car.
B. Defense
Defendant testified that he was asleep at his mother’s house at the time the Accord
was stolen. That morning, he awoke around 8:45 a.m., helped his mother with yard
5
work, then went to work with a relative on a home remodeling project. That afternoon,
he and a friend went to a home improvement store to buy paint. In the parking lot of the
store, defendant saw a 1993 green Honda Accord with a “for sale” sign that read, “$1,000
OBO.” Two people, who identified themselves as Ruben and Olivia Moreno, were
standing near the car.
Ruben told defendant his uncle had given him the car. There was nothing about
the appearance of the car to cause defendant to think the car might be stolen. Ruben had
the “[n]ormal Honda keys” to the car. There were no broken windows, and the locks and
ignition did not appear to be damaged.
Defendant and Ruben reached an agreement whereby defendant would buy the car
for $800; he would pay $400 at that time in exchange for immediate possession of the car
and a bill of sale;1 he would pay the remaining $400 on February 2, 2012, when Ruben
would deliver the car’s pink slip to him. He believed the transaction was legitimate.
Defendant gave Ruben $400; Ruben wrote out a bill of sale, gave it to defendant,
and gave him the car. Defendant drove the Morenos to his mother’s house to show them
where to complete the transaction on February 2. Defendant then drove the Morenos to
their apartment complex on Santa Fe Street—the same complex where defendant left the
car shortly before being arrested.
1 As explained below, the court subsequently excluded and struck all evidence
regarding the bill of sale.
6
On January 22, 2012, defendant drove to the Morenos’ apartment complex to talk
to Ruben about getting the pink slip to the car before February 2. He did not know that a
police vehicle was following him and did not try to get away from the officer. Defendant
parked the car at the Morenos’ apartment complex. He knocked on their apartment door,
but there was no answer. He decided to walk to a friend’s apartment nearby. He left the
car parked at the Morenos’ apartment complex so that they would see it and wait for
defendant to return.
Defendant explained that he ran when he saw the police officer because he
believed there was a warrant out for him “for absconding,” and that he wanted to “stay
out” to be with his family and son. He was also concerned because he has had a “lot” of
“negative experiences” with police officers.
Defendant admitted giving Sergeant Reinbolt a false name. He said he did so
because he did not want to go to jail. He believed he was being arrested for a parole
violation. When Sergeant Reinbolt told him the Accord had been stolen, defendant
responded: “‘I don’t know. I don’t know what you’re talking about.’”
At trial, defendant produced the bill of sale for the Accord that Ruben had given to
him. He explained that prior to his arrest he had given the bill of sale to his girlfriend for
safekeeping. While in jail awaiting trial, he wrote to his girlfriend to get the bill of sale.
She mailed it to him, and he gave it to an attorney.
7
C. Defendant’s Decision to Stop Cross-examination
After the prosecutor cross-examined defendant for approximately 45 minutes, a
lunch recess was taken. At the end of the recess, defendant informed the court that he
was “done” and would not testify further. The court and counsel then discussed how the
court should respond. The prosecutor argued that the court should strike defendant’s
testimony in its entirety. The prosecutor expressed particular concern about the fact that
he had not yet gone “deep into” questioning defendant about the bill of sale. Defense
counsel requested that the jurors be informed of defendant’s decision and that they could
consider that fact in determining defendant’s believability, but that defendant’s testimony
be allowed to stand.
The court decided to inform the jurors that defendant had chosen not to continue
testifying, and that they could consider that choice in determining whether and to what
extent to believe defendant’s testimony, but that it did not necessarily destroy his
credibility. The court also excluded the bill of sale and struck defendant’s testimony
relating to the bill of sale. The court explained that this result “is a balanced alternative.
It still leaves the defendant with some opportunity to present his defense under the
circumstances, but allows the jury to draw . . . [a] negative inference of credibility from
his refusal to continue to testify and strikes, what, for him, is a key piece of evidence . . .
because [the prosecutor has not] had a chance to fully cross-examine on the issue.”
The court then instructed the jury as follows: “The defendant, Mr. Bernal, has
refused to continue to testify. Because Mr. Bernal has refused to testify further, the
8
People, through their representative, Mr. Mason, have been deprived to [sic] the right for
a full and fair cross-examination of Mr. Bernal’s testimony. Therefore, I am ordering
that the bill of sale and Mr. Bernal’s testimony related to the bill of sale be stricken from
the record. You are not to consider the bill of sale or Mr. Bernal’s testimony relating to
the bill of sale for any purpose. Furthermore, you may consider Mr. Bernal’s refusal to
testify further in determining the believability of the rest of his testimony.”
D. Rebuttal
In the prosecution’s rebuttal case, an investigator testified that he spoke with the
owner of the apartment complex where the Morenos purportedly lived and with five of
the eight tenants of the complex. The investigator found no indication that Ruben or
Olivia Moreno ever lived at that complex.
An audio recording of a police interview with defendant was played to the jury.
At the outset, defendant said his birthday was October 15, 1977. The officer
subsequently discovered defendant’s real name and his birth date of October 27, 1977.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s manner of questioning defendant about his
prior convictions exceeded the bounds of a pretrial ruling and constituted misconduct.
We find no error.
9
Defendant refers to the following portions of the prosecutor’s cross-examination:2
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Sir, you’ve been convicted of several crimes in the past;
isn’t that right?
“A That’s right.
“Q These are crimes that show a lack of honesty on your part, aren’t [they]?
“A Never.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Motions in limine. I think we covered this.
“THE COURT: You can answer that question.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: You can answer that question, sir.
“A I’ve never been convicted of receiving stolen property or GTAs.
“Q That’s not what I asked you, sir, is it?
“A You asked me if I’ve been convicted of this crime.
“Q I asked you if the crimes you’ve been convicted of involve crimes that show a
lack—that show you’re a dishonest person?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. That’s speculation, and I don’t think my
client can testify to that. It’s argumentative as well.
“THE COURT: All right. I’m going to—you asked the previous question.
“[Defendant], I’m going to ask you to answer the previous question. I’m going to
reread it.
2 Although lengthy, we include all the excerpts relied upon by defendant because
the tenor of the questioning is not adequately reflected in smaller parts.
10
“These are crimes that show a lack of honesty on your part, aren’t they?
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Now, you were convicted January 22, 1998, of a crime
that shows lack of honesty on your part; isn’t that correct?
“A On what date?
“Q January 22, 1998, is when you committed the crime that you were convicted
of; is that correct?
“A Yes. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Sir, prior to the last few questions that I asked, you said
you’d never been convicted of a theft crime; is that correct?
“A Correct.
“Q But on January 4, 2005, you committed a [Penal Code section] 459, second,
which is entering a residential building with the intent to commit a theft or a felony
therein; is that correct?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Misstates the evidence, I think, as to
residential.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I meant commercial. I apologize. Not residential.
Commercial.
“THE COURT: All right.
“[DEFENDANT]: That’s on—be 171 North Palm. That’s my sister’s house.
There was nothing missing, nothing. I didn’t want them getting involved. I admitted I
11
opened the door. I was asleep on the couch. And, uh, the police chase me there, too. I
had a warrant. And nothing was missing. And that’s where Steve lives. I can give you
guys the number, and that’s where—
“Q What did you give us?
“A 171 North Palm. That’s the address.
“Q When did you give that to me.
“A To my lawyer.
“Q Okay. Steve what?
“A Brown.
“Q All right. Steve Brown, you still know him?
“A I was remodeling before I got arrested, that house.
“Q Sir, I asked you if you still know him?
“A Yes.
“Q All right. I know you have a lot to say. If you want to say it, I’ll sit down in
this chair and let you talk. You can get if off your chest, if that’s what you’d like to do.
Is that what you want?
“A Well, you’re trying to—
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Improper—that’s not a question. It’s an
argument. It’s improper form of a question.
“THE COURT: Sustained.
12
“Also, you’re not going to sit down. You’re going to use question-and-answer
format.
“You’re going to try to answer these questions to the best of your ability and
proceed in the ordinary course.
“Go ahead.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Sir, you still know Steve; right?
“A Yes.
“Q That’s the person you said you were working for; is that correct?
“A Yes.
“Q We will get back to that in a minute. I want to continue. I want to talk to you
about these other crimes. You said [o]n August 29, 2002, you committed a crime that
shows lack of honesty on your part; is that correct?
“A Yes.
“Q You said, ‘yes,’ but you shook your head left and right as though you mean
‘no’?
“A Because I don’t—I don’t know. What crime was that?
“Q Would looking at a copy of your CII or your rap sheet refresh your
recollection?
“A Can you just tell me the Penal Code or—
“[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I’m not sure how to proceed here.
“THE COURT: You can tell him the Penal Code section.
13
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: [Penal Code section] 11379[, subdivision] (a),
transportation of methamphetamine, sir.
“A Yes.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’d object as to the convictions coming
in, code sections.
“THE COURT: Well, overruled in this instance. Okay.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Does that refresh your recollection?
“THE COURT: Let me explain the rules for you.
“You’re welcome to look at the piece of paper he’s got if that’s going to help you.
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
“THE COURT: You want to look at that?
“[DEFENDANT]: Can I?
“THE COURT: Yes, you can.
“[DEFENDANT]: What does my past got to do with now?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Sir, there’s no question pending.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: You don’t understand how if someone has done something
in the past that shows they lied that doesn’t reflect at all on whether they will tell the truth
now?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Argumentative.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Is that what you’re telling the jury?
14
“A People shouldn’t lie, but people do change.
“Q We’re not talking about people. We’re talking about you, aren’t we?
“A Yes.
“Q We’re talking about what you did in the past?
“A Yes. Yes.
“Q We’re talking about what you did in this case; right?
“A Right.
“Q We’re talking about how you lied in this case?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Argumentative. Assumes facts not in
evidence.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: You’ve admitted you lied about your name; isn’t that
correct?
“A Yes.
“Q You’ve committed crimes that show that you’re not an honest person; isn’t
that correct?
“A I shouldn’t have lied about my name, no.
“Q I’m not talking about lying about your name. I’m talking about these crimes
you committed in the past over the last fourteen years. That’s what I’m talking about. So
let me ask you, sir, do you think that reflects on your credibility?
15
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for improper opinion.
Argumentative.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: You may answer.
“A What was the question again?
“Q Do you think what you’ve done in the past to where this jury has heard that
you lied, where this jury has heard you committed crimes that show you were dishonest,
do you think that reflects on your credibility?
“A Yes.
“Q Would you agree that someone who lies about something, lies to get out of
trouble, can’t be trusted?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Argumentative.
“THE COURT: All right. Sustained. I’m going to ask you to just proceed with
the convictions. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Q . . . Now, let’s go back to, you said that [o]n August 29, 2002, you were
convicted of [Penal Code section] 11379; is that correct?
“A Yes.
“Q Transportation?
“A Yes.
“Q Is that a crime where you don’t really do that out in the open?
“A Is that a crime—out in the open?
16
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. This has been ruled on, your Honor.
“THE COURT: All right. Sustained.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: January 24, 2004, you committed another crime that calls
into question your ability to be honest and truthful?
“A Yes.
“Q January 4, 2005, you committed the [Penal Code section] 459, second, another
crime that calls into question your ability to be truthful?
“A Yes. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Sir, would you like me to give you specific examples of
specific crimes that you committed where you lied about what you did?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m objecting. [Evidence Code section] 352. Motions
in limine.
“THE COURT: This is [Evidence Code section] 352. Move to the next subject.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Have you committed—have you lied to get out of trouble
in the past?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Asked and answered. Same objection.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I believe, given the answers he’s given—
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“You can answer.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I want to clarify. I want this jury to know.
17
“THE COURT: Wait. Stop. I’ll allow the [question] to be answered, and you
asked a different one. We’re going to ask the question you just asked. I’m going to ask
the question be read back, please.
“(The record was read by the court reporter.)
“THE COURT: That’s the question.
“Have you lied to get out of trouble in the past?
“[DEFENDANT]: I honestly don’t remember.
“Q [PROSECUTOR]: Would looking at reports from the crimes you committed
help refresh your recollection?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, objection, for the reasons given before.
[Evidence Code section] 352. Motions in limine.
“THE COURT: I’m going to sustain this on [Evidence Code section] 352.”
1. Motion in Limine Regarding the Use of Defendant’s Prior Convictions for
Impeachment
Prior to trial, the court and counsel discussed the prosecution’s anticipated use of
defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment. The court specified which prior
convictions could be used. (This ruling is not an issue on appeal.) In addition, there was
discussion as to what counsel could say about the prior convictions and how the court
18
would instruct the jury on the matter. The court indicated that it would instruct with
CALCRIM NO. 316.3
As for the manner of questioning, defendant contends that an “apparent
agreement” was reached whereby counsel would be limited to questioning defendant as
to whether he had suffered the specified prior convictions. We disagree. Neither the
citations to the record provided by defendant nor a reading of the entire transcript of the
hearing support such an agreement. Although the court indicated that counsel should not
inquire about “the facts of the prior convictions” or refer to the crimes as “crimes of
moral turpitude,” the record does not reveal a more explicit ruling regarding the form or
manner of questioning or any agreement among the parties. In the absence of a clear
ruling on this point, we reject defendant’s argument that the prosecution exceeded the
bounds of any ruling or agreement on the matter.
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In addition to arguing that the prosecutor’s questions exceeded the bounds of an
agreement or ruling made during the discussion regarding motions in limine, defendant
contends that the prosecutor’s conduct violated his right to due process under the United
States Constitution, as well as state law.
3 CALCRIM No. 316, as given in this case, provides: “If you find that a witness
has been convicted of a felony, you may consider that fact only in evaluating the
credibility of the witness’s testimony. The fact of a conviction does not necessarily
destroy or impair a witness’s credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact
and whether that fact makes the witness less believable.”
19
The standard for reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct is well-settled:
“‘Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes
use of “deceptive or reprehensible methods” when attempting to persuade either the trial
court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome
more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal
Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the defendant’s
specific constitutional rights—such as a comment upon the defendant’s invocation of the
right to remain silent—but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional
violation unless the challenged action “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Dykes (2009)
46 Cal.4th 731, 760.)
Defendant does not focus his argument on any particular questions; rather, the
claim is directed at the prosecutor’s decision “to couch all of his questions regarding the
prior convictions in accusatory terms suggesting that the prior conviction showed
[defendant] was a dishonest person, lied at the time of those offenses and was lying
during his testimony at this trial.” Defendant adds that the “questions posed by the
prosecutor were not only argumentative but also suggested by their form that the
prosecutor personally believed [defendant] was lying to the jury.” Finally, he contends
that the “tenor of the questioning and the questions permitted by the court were to
inflame the passions of the jury and created a situation in which [defendant’s] trial was
negatively and unfairly impacted.”
20
We agree that some of the prosecutor’s questions were improper or argumentative,
and that the prosecutor pursued the matter of defendant’s prior convictions to the point of
constituting an undue consumption of time. (See Evid. Code, § 352.) As the record
reveals, the trial court ultimately sustained defense counsel’s objections on these grounds
and told the prosecutor to “[m]ove to the next subject.”
However, we reject defendant’s contention that the prosecutor’s questions were so
deceptive or reprehensible as to constitute misconduct under state law, or that they
deprived defendant of due process. Because defendant testified at trial, his veracity was
an issue in the case and the prosecution was permitted to ask defendant about his prior
felony convictions involving moral turpitude. (See People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d
301, 306; People v. Gray (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 635, 641; Evid. Code, § 788.)
Although there is always a danger that the jury will misuse the evidence of prior
convictions for purposes other than impeachment, this risk is reduced when, as in this
case, the court instructs the jury with CALCRIM No. 316. (See People v. Gray, supra, at
p. 642.) As for the form or manner of questions to which an objection was made, the
impropriety was appropriately dealt with by the court’s responses to objections. If and to
the extent the court overruled an objection that should have been sustained, the questions
were not so egregious as to constitute misconduct under state or federal law. We
therefore reject defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims.
21
B. Striking of Defendant’s Testimony Regarding Bill of Sale
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in striking his testimony regarding
the bill of sale he received from Ruben.
As set forth above, after about 45 minutes of cross-examination, defendant refused
to testify further. After hearing the argument of counsel, the court informed the jurors of
defendant’s decision and instructed them (1) not to consider evidence of the bill of sale
and (2) they may consider defendant’s refusal to testify in determining the believability
of his testimony.
The applicable legal principles and our standard of review are not disputed.
“Essential to a fair trial is that the accused have the opportunity to exercise his
fundamental, constitutional right to be heard in his own defense by testifying at trial.”
(People v. Reynolds (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 42, 45 (Reynolds).) The defendant’s right to
testify “must be considered in light of the principle that ‘[w]hen a defendant voluntarily
testifies in his own defense the People may “fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into
the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence
through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences
which may necessarily be drawn from them.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 46.)
“[T]he right of cross-examination takes on added significance where the witness’s
credibility is of special significance to the proceedings.” (People v. Seminoff (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 518, 527 (Seminoff).) When the defendant refuses to testify on cross-
examination, the prosecution is deprived of its right to subject defendant’s claims “to ‘the
22
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’ cross-examination.
[Citation.]” (Reynolds, supra, at p. 46.)
A trial court that is presented with the situation of a testifying witness who refuses
to answer questions on cross-examination has discretion to strike the entirety of the
witness’s testimony, strike part of the testimony, or allow the trier of fact to consider the
witness’s failure to answer in evaluating the witness’s credibility. (Reynolds, supra, 152
Cal.App.3d at pp. 47-48; Seminoff, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 526; People v. Miller
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 999.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court should consider
the witness’s motive in refusing to testify and the materiality of the testimony he or she
has refused to give. (Reynolds, supra, at pp. 47-48.) In addition, before employing the
“drastic solution” of striking the witness’s entire testimony, the court should consider
whether less severe remedies are available. (Ibid.; accord, Seminoff, supra, at p. 526.)
The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of its discretion. Initially, we note that
defendant did not explain his motive for not testifying. After a recess, the prosecutor
asked the court to take up an “issue that just came up.” The court then asked defendant:
“It’s my understanding, [defendant], you don’t want to testify any further?” Defendant
responded: “I’m done.” After some discussion among the court and counsel, the
following colloquy with defendant took place:
“THE COURT: I should ask you one more question, [defendant]. [¶] If I order
you to take the stand and continue testifying, will you obey my order or disobey my
order?
23
“THE DEFENDANT: I’ll disobey your order.
“THE COURT: You are refusing to testify further?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: I’m going to actually—I’m going to order you to complete your
testimony. What is your response?
“THE DEFENDANT: Well, I refuse—
“THE COURT: You’re refusing?
“THE DEFENDANT: —to take the stand, your Honor.
“THE COURT: And testify.
“THE DEFENDANT: I already testified, your Honor.”4
Thus, this is not a case where, as in Reynolds, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 42, the
defendant refused to answer questions because doing so would implicate others and make
him a “snitch.” (Id. at p. 45.) Nor does this case involve a witness who, like the witness
in Seminoff, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 518, testified for the defense at a suppression
hearing, then invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer specific questions on
the ground the answers would incriminate her. (Id. at pp. 524-525.) Here, it appears that
defendant had simply had enough of testifying, and declared he was “done.” Needless to
4 By the time this colloquy took place, the court had already indicated, with
defendant present, that it would strike the evidence of the bill of sale and instruct the jury
that it may consider the refusal to testify in evaluating defendant’s believability.
Defendant was thus aware of the likely consequences of his decision when he reiterated
his refusal to testify.
24
say, this is not a very good reason. Consideration of defendant’s motive for not
testifying, therefore, does not weigh in his favor.
Attempting to evaluate the materiality of the testimony defendant refused to give
in this case is a somewhat speculative endeavor. Unlike other cases where the witness
refused to answer specific questions (see, e.g., Reynolds, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 45
[refusal to answer question calling for names of accomplices]; Seminoff, supra, 159
Cal.App.4th at p. 526 [refusing to answer question asking about her intent to sell
marijuana]), the record does not indicate what specific questions the prosecutor planned
to ask. However, the record does support the prosecutor’s assertion that he had not gone
“deep” into cross-examination regarding the bill of sale. Shortly before the lunch recess,
the following colloquy occurred:
“[PROSECUTOR]: Now, let’s go back to when you say that you got this car. [¶]
All right. Mr. Moreno is the one who wrote out the bill of sale; isn’t that right?
“A Correct.
“Q You’re telling this jury Mr. Moreno did that on this own. It was his idea;
right?
“A It was our idea to give me the bill of sale for now.
“Q How’d that go?
“A It went fine. He wrote it on the hood of the car, had his lady sign it, and this,
then I signed it.
“Q Whose idea was that?
25
“A Both of ours, mine and Ruben’s.
“Q Who suggested it first?
“A Me.”
The prosecutor then moved on to other matters before the lunch recess was taken.
In light of the prosecutor’s brief questioning regarding the bill of sale, the court
could reasonably accept the prosecutor’s representation that he “didn’t get deep into [the
bill of sale] yet” and “intended to go farther into it with the defendant.” Because
defendant prevented the prosecution from delving deeper into the subject matter of the
bill of sale, striking defendant’s testimony regarding the bill of sale is reasonable and
within the court’s discretion.
Finally, we note that the court’s ruling did not deprive defendant of a defense.
Defendant’s defense was that he believed he had purchased the car and did not know it
had been stolen. On direct examination, defendant testified in some detail about his
purchase of the car from Ruben, including the terms of payment. While a portion of his
testimony included his description of the bill of sale, the court’s ruling striking the
evidence of the bill of sale did not affect the remainder of his testimony regarding the
transaction. His counsel was still able to, and did, discuss defendant’s testimony
regarding the transaction during his closing argument. Counsel stated, for example:
“Important thing, my client testified what he heard and what he saw and he provided real
specific details in his testimony about this transaction. He remembered what these people
looked like. He remembered even some details, like, actions that they took, things that
26
they did together after the transaction, like driving these people back to an apartment they
said they lived at, [defendant] saying that he brought them to his mother’s house. There’s
some real specifics there that I think add to the credibility of that statement.” Although
the evidence regarding the bill of sale would certainly have supported this defense,
excluding such evidence did not deprive defendant of the defense.
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court did not abuse it discretion
in striking evidence of the bill of sale or instructing the jury as it did.
C. Failure to Give Claim-of-right Defense Instruction
Defendant requested to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1863 regarding the
defense of claim of right.5 The court denied the request, stating: “I do not think it
applies in these circumstances. I do think—this is more classic to the robbery scenario or
embezzlement scenario. However, if [defense counsel] can find a case that applies to
5 CALCRIM No. 1863 provides:
“If the defendant obtained property under a claim of right, (he/she) did not have
the intent required for the crime of (theft/ [or] robbery).
“The defendant obtained property under a claim of right if (he/she) believed in
good faith that (he/she) had a right to the specific property or a specific amount of
money, and (he/she) openly took it.
“In deciding whether the defendant believed that (he/she) had a right to the
property and whether (he/she) held that belief in good faith, consider all the facts known
to (him/her) at the time (he/she) obtained the property, along with all the other evidence
in the case. The defendant may hold a belief in good faith even if the belief is mistaken
or unreasonable. But if the defendant was aware of facts that made that belief completely
unreasonable, you may conclude that the belief was not held in good faith. [¶] . . . [¶]
“If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the intent
required for (theft/ [or] robbery), you must find (him/her) not guilty of
_________________ .”
27
[section] 10851 or vehicle theft or possession-of-stolen-vehicle context, then I’ll
reconsider.” Defendant contends the court’s ruling was error. We agree.
On appeal, we review de novo a claim of instructional error. (People v. Posey
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) We review the legal correctness of the court’s ruling, not
the court’s reasoning. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.)
Under the claim-of-right defense, a defendant charged with theft-related crimes
does not have the requisite intent if the defendant obtained the property with a good faith
belief that he or she had a right to the property, even if that belief is mistaken.
(CALCRIM No. 1863; People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938, 943.) As the
Supreme Court explained: “Although an intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred when
one person takes the property of another, . . . proof of the existence of a state of mind
incompatible with an intent to steal precludes a finding of either theft or robbery. It has
long been the rule in this state and generally throughout the country that a bona fide
belief, even though mistakenly held, that one has a right or claim to the property negates
felonious intent. [Citations.] A belief that the property taken belongs to the taker
[citations], or that he had a right to retake goods sold [citation] is sufficient to preclude
felonious intent. Felonious intent exists only if the actor intends to take the property of
another without believing in good faith that he has a right or claim to it.” (People v.
Butler (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 573, fn. omitted, overruled on another ground in People v.
Tufunga, supra, at p. 956.) The defense is applicable to “all theft-related charges.”
28
(People v. Tufunga, supra, at pp. 952-953, fn. 4; see also People v. Williams (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 1521, 1526-1527; People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1428.)
Defendant was not charged with theft; he was charged with taking or driving a
vehicle unlawfully under section 10851. A person commits a violation of section 10851,
subdivision (a) by taking or driving “a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of
the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner
thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to
steal the vehicle . . . .” The crime can thus be committed “either by taking a vehicle with
the intent to steal it or by driving it with the intent only to temporarily deprive its owner
of possession (i.e., joyriding).” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851.) Because
the crime can be committed by merely driving (without taking) a vehicle and with the
intent to deprive the owner of possession temporarily, the crime “is technically not a
‘theft.’” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034, fn. 2; see also People v.
Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 871 [unlawful driving of a vehicle under § 10851 is not a
form of theft].)
We have not found any published case addressing whether a claim of right can be
a defense to a charge of violating section 10851. However, the rationale for the defense
in theft cases applies equally to section 10851. Just as a “belief that the property taken
belongs to the taker,” negates the felonious intent required of theft (People v. Butler,
supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 573), a belief that the vehicle taken (or driven) belongs to the taker
(or driver) negates the intent to deprive—either permanently or temporarily—the owner
29
of title or possession. Stated differently, one who has a bona fide belief, even though
mistakenly held, that the vehicle he is driving is his does not have the intent to deprive
the vehicle’s owner of title or possession for any length of time for purposes of section
10851. (Cf. Butler, supra, at p. 573.) Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the defense of
claim of right should and, we hold, does apply to a charge of violating section 10851.6
In a criminal case, “the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law
governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts
before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.”
(People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531.) In addition, a defendant has a right to an
instruction upon request that pinpoints the crux, or theory, of the defense when there is
evidence to support the defense. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 81; People v.
Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137.) Such pinpoint instructions must be given upon
request even when, as here, the defense merely negates the intent element of the crime on
which the jury is properly instructed. (See People v. Romo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514,
517.)
We note that a different rule applies in the absence of a request for such an
instruction. In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, the Supreme Court held that
the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of accident
6 Although the Attorney General argues that the evidence does not support the
giving of the claim-of-right instruction in this case, she does not contend that the defense
is inapplicable as a matter of law to a charge of violating section 10851.
30
because that defense merely negates the mental state element of the charged crime. (Id.
at pp. 996-998.) The court noted, however, that “the defendant would have been entitled
to a pinpoint instruction relating his theory of accident to the evidence of intent, but only
upon request.” (Id. at p. 998, fn. 3.) In People v. Lawson (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108[Fourth Dist., Div. Two], this court applied the holding of Anderson to the defense of
mistake of fact and any other defense that operates only to negate the mental state
element of the crime. (People v. Lawson, supra, at p. 117.) Relying on Anderson, we
stated: “‘“‘[W]hen a defendant presents evidence to attempt to negate or rebut the
prosecution’s proof of an element of the offense, a defendant is not presenting a special
defense invoking sua sponte instructional duties. While a court may well have a duty to
give a “pinpoint” instruction relating such evidence to the elements of the offense and to
the jury’s duty to acquit if the evidence produces a reasonable doubt, such “pinpoint”
instructions are not required to be given sua sponte and must be given only upon
request.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting People v. Anderson, supra, 51 Cal.4th
at pp. 996-997.) Thus, while Anderson and Lawson hold that trial courts have no sua
sponte duty to instruct on defenses that merely negate the mental state element of a crime,
they also reaffirm that the court must instruct on such defenses upon request.
“A trial court must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by
substantial evidence . . . .” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.) “‘“‘Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury,” that is, evidence
that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.’”’” (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th
3169, 102.) Sufficient evidence to support the claim-of-right may be supplied solely by the
defendant’s own testimony. (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 944.) “‘“In
evaluating the evidence to determine whether a requested instruction should be given, the
trial court should not measure its substantiality by weighing the credibility [of the
witnesses] . . . . Doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions
should be resolved in favor of the accused. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.;
see also People v. Romo, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 519.)
Here, defendant’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to support the requested
claim-of-right instruction. Defendant testified that he purchased the Accord from Ruben
for the price of $800. He gave Ruben $400 for immediate possession of the car and
promised to give Ruben the remaining $400 in exchange for the pink slip approximately
two weeks later. The transaction took place in a commercial parking lot during the day
time. According to defendant, there was nothing about the appearance of the car to make
him suspect the car was stolen. This was consistent with the prosecution’s evidence that
the thief took the keys along with the car and did not have to break into the car. Based on
the description of the transaction, defendant’s testimony that he believed the transaction
was legitimate was, on its face, plausible. Even without the bill of sale, defendant’s
testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish that he held a good faith belief that the
car was his. The court therefore erred in refusing to give the claim-of-right instruction.
32
The error is subject to the Watson7 test for harmless error. (Cf. People v. Sojka
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 733, 738; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 462.)
Under this test, we will reverse the conviction if, “‘after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence’ [we are] of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that
a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.” (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) In determining whether such
a reasonable probability exists, we will take into consideration the jury’s factual findings
on other instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1132; People
v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 556-557.)
Significantly, the jury was instructed as to the defense of mistake of fact, and
rejected the theory. In particular, the jury was told: “If you find that the defendant
believed that the motor vehicle was not stolen, he did not have the specific intent or
mental state required to commit the crimes of Unlawful Taking or Driving of a Vehicle or
Receiving a Stolen Motor Vehicle.”8 By convicting defendant of these crimes, the jury
necessarily rejected the assertion that defendant believed the Accord was not stolen,
which implies the finding that defendant believed the car was stolen.
7 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
8 The quoted instructions are the written instructions. The instructions given
orally on this point differ in one respect. The oral version of the first clause is: “If you
find that the defendant believed that he lawfully purchased the motor vehicle not
knowing it was stolen . . . .” The difference does not appear to be substantive. Also, the
written instructions control over any discrepancy with the oral instructions. (People v.
Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)
33
If the jury had been given the claim of right instruction, it had to acquit defendant
if it found that defendant “believed in good faith that [he] had a right to” to the Accord,
“even if the belief is mistaken or unreasonable.” (CALCRIM No. 1863.) Having
implicitly concluded that defendant believed the car was stolen, if the jury was to acquit
defendant based on the claim of right defense, it would have had to conclude that the
defendant believed the car was stolen and yet still held a good faith belief that he had a
right to the Accord, or, stated differently, that defendant had a good faith belief he had a
right to possess a stolen car.
Because a good faith belief under the claim-of-right defense can exist even if it is
mistaken or unreasonable, it is theoretically possible to have a mistaken, unreasonable,
good faith belief in the right to possess a stolen car purchased from another. Thus, the
jury’s rejection of the mistake of fact defense does not necessarily mean that the jury
would have also rejected the claim-of-right defense. Nevertheless, while possible, we
conclude that such a result is not, in this case, “reasonably probable” for purposes of
Watson. The evidence supporting the defense consisted primarily of defendant’s
testimony regarding the purchase of the car and evidence establishing the lack of indicia
of a break-in or punched ignition. Such evidence supported the defendant’s contention
that he did not know the car was stolen. This contention, however, was rejected by the
jury when it rejected the mistake of fact defense. There was no evidence to support the
further possibility that he believed the car to be stolen but nevertheless believed he could
rightly possess it. We are convinced, therefore, that the jury, having rejected the mistake
34
of fact defense, would not have acquitted defendant if it had been further instructed as to
the claim-of-right defense.
Defendant relies on People v. Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 1415 for support.
In Russell, the defendant possessed a stolen motorcycle. (People v. Russell, supra, 144
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421.) He testified that he had found the motorcycle and
believed it had been abandoned. (Id. at pp. 1422-1423.) He was convicted of receiving a
stolen motor vehicle. (Id. at p. 1419.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of mistake of fact and claim of right.
The Court of Appeal agreed and concluded that the errors were prejudicial because there
was “relatively strong” evidence that the defendant believed the motorcycle had been
abandoned. (Id. at pp. 1431-1433.) Russell is distinguishable because the jury in that
case had not been instructed on either claim of right or mistake of fact. The fact that the
jury in our case was instructed on mistake of fact and implicitly rejected defendant’s
primary contention that he did not know the car was stolen is fundamental to our
conclusion that the failure to instruct on claim of right was harmless. Because the Russell
jury was not instructed as to mistake of fact, that case is not controlling here.
D. Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Conviction for Vehicle Theft Under Section 10851
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to convict him under section
10851. We disagree.
To establish a violation of section 10851, the prosecution must prove the
defendant (1) took or drove a vehicle without the owner’s consent and (2) the defendant
35
had the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or
possession. (People v. O'Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.)
Regarding the first element, defendant contends there is no “evidence to suggest
he was the person who actually took the vehicle on the morning” it was taken from
Fuentes. Fuentes, defendant points out, was unable to identify the gender or other
characteristics of the person who took his vehicle. This argument is misplaced because
the prosecution is not required to prove that defendant “actually took the vehicle”; it is
enough to establish that defendant drove the vehicle without the owner’s consent.
(People v. Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 851.) Defendant admitted he drove the vehicle
and Fuentes testified that he did not give defendant his consent. The first element is
easily satisfied.
It is not clear from defendant’s appellate briefs whether he is arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding as to the second, specific intent
element. To the extent he is making that argument, it is rejected.
“Intent is a state of mind. A defendant’s state of mind must, in the absence of the
defendant’s own statements, be established by the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 433; see also
People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [“Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind
is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct
evidence to support a conviction.”].)
36
Here, there was evidence that defendant ran a stop sign and sped away when he
began to be followed by a police officer. He then parked in an apartment complex
parking lot, leaving the car parked in an awkward manner that suggested he was in a
hurry to leave the scene and get away from the car. Contrary to defendant’s testimony,
there was evidence that the Morenos did not live in that apartment complex. When a
police officer saw him walking away from the car, defendant ran away. After he was
apprehended, police found no documents in defendant’s possession or in the car
evidencing defendant’s legal title to the car. Jurors could reasonably infer from such
behavior that defendant knew the car he was driving was stolen. From the fact that
defendant was driving the car with such knowledge, jurors could further infer that he
intended to deprive the owner of possession, at least temporarily. The evidence was
therefore sufficient to support the conviction for violating section 10851.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
KING
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
37