People v. Walker CA4/2 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 11/18/14 P. v. Walker CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       E060486
    v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. RIF1202613)
    JARRETT WALKER,                                                          OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Christian F. Thierbach,
    Judge. Affirmed.
    Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Defendant Jarrett Walker is serving two concurrent terms of 15 years to life for
    orally copulating his friend’s six-year-old sister. For the reasons discussed below, we
    affirm the conviction and sentence.
    1
    FACTS AND PROCEDURE
    On June 5, 2012, the defendant, who was 19 years old at the time, was staying in a
    friend’s home after having a disagreement with his parents. The friend was the primary
    caretaker of his younger brother and sister while their mother worked. That afternoon,
    the friend left home to pick up his younger brother from school, leaving his six-year-old
    sister at home with his grandfather and defendant. During that time, according to the
    sister, defendant orally copulated her twice—once in a downstairs office and again in her
    bedroom upstairs. The sister immediately told her older brother what had happened when
    he returned home a short time later. Defendant was arrested and interviewed. During the
    interview, he eventually confessed to having briefly orally copulated the girl a single
    time. Forensic evidence indicated DNA consistent with defendant’s DNA was found on
    the girl’s genital area.
    On July 22, 2013, the People filed an information alleging in both counts 1 and 2
    that defendant orally copulated a child under the age of 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd.
    (b)).
    On December 12, 2013, a jury convicted defendant on both counts. When the
    victim was testifying at trial, the prosecutor asked if she saw defendant in the courtroom.
    The victim stated she was not wearing her glasses, and that she was not sure, but she
    thought she saw defendant sitting two rows back from the defense table. The person she
    pointed to was not defendant, but his older brother.
    On January 10, 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life on
    count 1 and a concurrent term of 15 years to life on count 2.
    2
    This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    After the notice of appeal was filed, this court appointed counsel to represent
    defendant. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 436
     and Anders v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 738
     [
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 493
    ], setting forth a statement of the case and identifying one potential arguable issue:
    whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion under People v. Marsden
    (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 118
    .
    Defendant was offered an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which
    he has done. In a handwritten supplemental brief, defendant argues: 1) the police should
    have considered defendant’s brother as a suspect; 2) the victim’s brother testified he was
    gone from the home for about ten minutes, which defendant argues was not enough time
    for him to commit the two crimes; 3) the details of the crime(s) in defendant’s confession
    do not match the details given by the victim; and 4) defense counsel was incompetent
    because she did not address these issues when cross-examining witnesses.
    Defendant argues police should have investigated his brother as a possible subject,
    given that his brother lived near the home where the crimes took place, that he resembled
    defendant enough to confuse the witness at trial, and that his DNA was likely similar to
    defendant’s DNA. However, the investigation of a law enforcement body is not the
    judgment or order of a lower court, and so is not a proper subject for appeal (Code Civ.
    Proc., § 904.1) and so we cannot consider this argument.
    3
    Defendant’s second and third contentions are in effect challenges to the
    sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “ ‘review
    the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
    contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
    value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 680
    , 701.) Here, the
    victim testified that defendant orally copulated her twice while her brother was gone. In
    addition, the victim’s brother testified that the victim told him about the crimes
    immediately upon his return to the home. The jury also saw a video of the victim
    describing the crimes in a forensic interview conducted the day after the crimes. The jury
    was entitled to believe this testimony, which in addition was supported by DNA
    evidence. We have reviewed the testimony and find more than sufficient evidence to
    support the verdict.
    Next, we address defendant’s claim that defense counsel was incompetent. A
    defendant who wants to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) must
    demonstrate, “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
    standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s
    deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a ‘reasonable probability’
    that, but for counsel’s failings, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result.
    [Citations.] A ‘reasonable probability’ is one that is enough to undermine confidence in
    the outcome. [Citations.]” (People v. Dennis (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 468
    , 540-541, citing,
    among other cases, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
    466 U.S. 668
    ; accord, People v.
    4
    Boyette (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 381
    , 430.) Hence, an IAC claim has two components:
    deficient performance and prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, at pp. 687-688,
    693-694; People v. Williams (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 153
    , 214-215; People v. Davis (1995) 
    10 Cal.4th 463
    , 503; People v. Ledesma (1987) 
    43 Cal.3d 171
    , 217.) If defendant fails to
    establish either component, his claim fails. When a claim of ineffective assistance is
    made on direct appeal, and the record does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged
    actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no
    satisfactory explanation. (People v. Pope (1979) 
    23 Cal.3d 412
    , 426.)
    In this case, defendant argues defense counsel rendered IAC because she did not
    attempt to establish defendant’s brother as a possible suspect, did not address the effect of
    the victim’s brother’s testimony about being gone for only ten minutes on the timeline for
    the crimes, and did not address the difference between defendant’s confession and the
    victim’s testimony.
    Regarding the defendant’s brother as a possible suspect, defense counsel did cross-
    examine the victim about when defendant’s brother was present on the day of the crimes.
    The victim answered that the brother was present after the crimes were committed but
    before the police took defendant away in a police car. Defense counsel addressed this
    issue again on re-cross, getting the victim to state that defendant and his brother looked a
    lot alike. Defense counsel attempted, but was unable to, shake the victim’s statement that
    she was sure that the man she saw being placed in the police car was defendant, and that
    was the same person who did “bad things” to her. Defense counsel also cross-examined
    the victim’s older brother about whether defendant’s brother was in the home before the
    5
    victim’s older brother left to pick up his younger brother, and how long it would have
    taken defendant’s brother to drive from his own home to the victim’s home where the
    crimes took place. Defense counsel got the DNA analyst to testify on cross-examination
    that there was a good chance that defendant’s brother’s DNA would be consistent with
    the DNA found on the victim’s genitalia, because defendant and his brother had the same
    mother and father. Defense counsel also discussed this point during closing arguments.
    Also during closing arguments, defense counsel discussed the victim’s misidentification
    of defendant’s brother during the victim’s testimony.
    Regarding the time discrepancy, defense counsel addressed this during closing
    arguments in an attempt to create reasonable doubt.
    Regarding the difference between defendant’s description of events and that of the
    victim, defense counsel discussed this during closing argument.
    Based on the record, there is nothing to indicate that the performance of
    defendant’s counsel was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Defendant’s IAC claim fails.
    Under People v. Kelly (2006) 
    40 Cal.4th 106
    , we have conducted an independent
    review of the record and find no arguable issues.
    6
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    RAMIREZ
    P. J.
    We concur:
    McKINSTER
    J.
    MILLER
    J.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E060486

Filed Date: 11/18/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021