People v. Cruz CA3 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 7/22/14 P. v. Cruz CA3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    (Glenn)
    ----
    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                  C073253
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 12NCR09205)
    v.
    BERNABE TRENADO CRUZ,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    The People appeal from the trial court’s reduction of defendant’s felony
    conviction to a misdemeanor following his successful completion of Proposition 36
    probation. Defendant Bernabe Trenado Cruz concedes the trial court erred in reducing
    the felony conviction, but argues the People’s appeal is moot. Under the guise of arguing
    mootness, he argues--in his reply brief--that his conviction should be reversed due to a
    subsequent change in the law. As we explain, we shall vacate the trial court’s order
    reducing his crime of conviction to a misdemeanor, but decline to entertain his argument
    for reversal.
    1
    BACKGROUND
    On August 1, 2012, following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the trial court found
    defendant guilty of transportation of hydrocodone, a felony. (Health & Saf. Code,
    § 11352, subd. (a).) On August 8, 2012, the court suspended imposition of sentence and
    placed defendant on Proposition 36 probation. Defendant did not appeal from his
    conviction.
    On January 9, 2013, having completed the terms and conditions of his probation,
    defendant moved the trial court to reinstate and dismiss the charge. The trial court orally
    found defendant had completed his Proposition 36 obligations, instructing him to “make
    sure that [defense counsel] gets that order done for you,” and that the court would “sign it
    as soon as I receive it.” Defense counsel subsequently prepared an order reinstating and
    dismissing the charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (d)(1).1 The
    proposed order also purported to reduce the (felony) offense of conviction to a
    misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). The trial court signed the order on
    January 22, 2013.
    The People appeal from the order reducing defendant’s offense to a misdemeanor,
    contending the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reduce this particular felony charge as it
    was not a “wobbler,” that is, a crime punishable either as a misdemeanor or a felony.
    Defendant agrees with the People’s contention, conceding the trial court erred in signing
    the order his counsel prepared and submitted.
    He then argues, however, that the People’s appeal is moot, because the conduct of
    which he was convicted no longer constitutes transportation of methamphetamine, due to
    recent amendments to Health and Safety Code section 11352. He proceeds to argue for
    reversal of his 2012 conviction. As we explain post, he failed to appeal his conviction
    and cannot now bootstrap his argument for reversal to his argument for mootness in the
    absence of a proper appeal or cross-appeal. We shall vacate the order reducing
    1   Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    defendant’s conviction to a misdemeanor and remand with directions to enter a corrected
    order and submit a new report of the disposition to the Department of Justice.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Reduction to a Misdemeanor
    The People contend that the trial court lacked authority to reduce defendant’s
    conviction for transportation of methamphetamine from a felony to a misdemeanor
    pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3). Defendant agrees, as do we.
    Section 17, subdivision (b) permits a trial court to declare a designated felony
    offense to be a misdemeanor where the offense is punishable either as a felony or as a
    misdemeanor, that is, by up to one year of imprisonment in the county jail (outside of the
    application of section 1170, subdivision (d)). In order to qualify for reduction to a
    misdemeanor, the offense in question must be a “wobbler”--a crime punishable either as a
    misdemeanor or felony. “Straight” felonies, which are crimes punishable only as
    felonies, cannot be declared misdemeanors pursuant to section 17. (See People v.
    Prothero (1997) 
    57 Cal. App. 4th 126
    , 134.) Defendant’s crime of conviction,
    transportation of a controlled substance, is a straight felony, punishable by three, four, or
    five years of incarceration. (Health and Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a).) Thus the trial
    court lacked jurisdiction to reduce it to a misdemeanor. We must vacate the order
    purporting to do so.
    II
    Mootness
    Defendant argues the People’s contention of error, although correct, is moot. He
    argues that his current conviction cannot stand, regardless of whether it takes the form of
    a felony or misdemeanor. His argument is based on the fact that the Legislature recently
    amended Health and Safety Code section 11352, providing that the crime of
    transportation of a controlled substance no longer includes transportation for personal
    3
    use. (Stats. 2013, ch. 504, § 1.) Claiming that the stipulated evidence at his bench trial
    proved that the oxycodone was transported for personal use, defendant asserts he is
    entitled to a retroactive application of the amended law. He concludes that his conviction
    should be reversed for insufficient evidence, and his crime cannot be reduced to
    possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350), as possession is not an
    element of transportation of a controlled substance.
    Defendant’s contentions are based on the rule that “absent a saving clause, a
    criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of
    his appeal.” (People v. Babylon (1985) 
    39 Cal. 3d 719
    , 722.)
    Defendant’s 2012 conviction is not, however, “on appeal.” The fact that the
    People have appealed the trial court’s 2013 order does not “open season” on defendant’s
    2012 conviction, which was appealable at the time his order of probation was entered and
    60 days thereafter.
    A notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment
    or the making of the order being appealed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a); People v.
    Ramirez (2008) 
    159 Cal. App. 4th 1412
    , 1420-1421.) The timely filing of the notice of
    appeal is, as a general matter, essential to appellate jurisdiction. (People v. Mendez
    (1999) 
    19 Cal. 4th 1084
    , 1094.) If the notice of appeal is not timely filed, the appeal will
    be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits. (In re Chavez (2003)
    
    30 Cal. 4th 643
    , 650.) “Unless the notice is actually or constructively filed within the
    relevant period, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to determine the merits of the
    appeal and must dismiss the appeal. [Citations.]” (In re Gary R. (1976) 
    56 Cal. App. 3d 850
    , 853.)
    Under section 1237, subdivision (a), a defendant may appeal from “a final
    judgment of conviction,” and the statute specifies that “an order granting probation . . .
    shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of this section.” An order
    granting probation is appealable even though imposition of sentence is otherwise
    4
    suspended. (People v. Cook (1975) 
    13 Cal. 3d 663
    , 666, fn. 1, disapproved on other
    grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 
    45 Cal. 4th 390
    , 421, fn. 22.) An appeal from an
    order granting probation may attack the conviction upon which the order granting
    probation is based. (See, e.g., Cook, at pp. 666-667 [permitting defendant to attack
    conviction based on trial counsel’s conflict of interest]; People v. Hamilton (1978)
    
    80 Cal. App. 3d 124
    , 127, fn. 1, 134-135 [probation with imposition of sentence
    suspended, order granting probation reversed for instructional error at trial].) “In general,
    an appealable order that is not appealed becomes final and binding and may not
    subsequently be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order or judgment.
    [Citations.]” (People v. 
    Ramirez, supra
    , 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.)
    The trial court placed defendant on Proposition 36 probation on August 8, 2012;
    defendant did not appeal from that order. Many more than 60 days have passed since the
    order was entered. Defendant cannot now argue that his conviction was improper under
    the guise of arguing mootness. Further, the instant appeal--the People’s appeal from the
    January 2013 order--was filed outside the same 60-day window; thus the filing of this
    appeal did not give defendant the right to challenge his conviction in a cross appeal from
    the order granting probation. Simply put, defendant is out of time to argue on direct
    appeal that he did not transport methamphetamine as charged, found, and sentenced,
    despite the possible effect of any subsequent change in the law on his conviction.
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The order reducing defendant’s conviction for transportation of a controlled
    substance to a misdemeanor is vacated. The trial court is directed to enter a corrected
    order omitting the vacated portion and submit a certified copy thereof to the Department
    of Justice.
    DUARTE                , J.
    We concur:
    NICHOLSON             , Acting P. J.
    MURRAY                , J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C073253

Filed Date: 7/22/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014