Bazua v. City of Montebello CA2/7 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 3/14/16 Bazua v. City of Montebello CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    JOSE BAZUA,                                                          B257628
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC488330)
    v.
    CITY OF MONTEBELLO,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Michelle R. Rosenblatt, Judge. Reversed with directions.
    Alexander Krakow + Glick, J. Bernard Alexander III and Tracy L. Fehr for
    Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Geoffrey S. Sheldon and Jennifer M. Rosner for
    Defendant and Respondent.
    _____________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Jose Bazua sued his former employer, the City of Montebello, alleging that the
    city fired him in retaliation for complaining about the city’s misuse of federal housing
    funds provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
    (HUD). Bazua alleged causes of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5,
    which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for engaging in certain
    whistleblower activities, and for defamation, and sought penalties under the Labor Code
    Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). The trial
    court sustained Montebello’s demurrer to Bazua’s Labor Code section 1102.5 cause of
    action without leave to amend because the court ruled Bazua had failed to exhaust his
    administrative and judicial remedies, granted Montebello’s motion to strike Bazua’s
    PAGA claim, and later granted Montebello’s motion for summary judgment on the
    remaining defamation cause of action and for summary adjudication on particular issues.
    Bazua challenges each of these rulings.
    We conclude that Montebello’s post-termination appeal procedure was an
    inadequate administrative remedy because it failed to provide a clearly defined procedure
    for resolving disputes, including an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, Bazua did not have
    to exhaust the procedure, and the exhaustion of judicial remedies doctrine did not apply
    because there was no quasi-judicial administrative decision for Bazua to challenge in
    court. We also conclude that, although the trial court did not err in striking Bazua’s
    PAGA claim, the court erred in granting Montebello’s motion for summary judgment on
    Bazua’s defamation cause of action and for summary adjudication of issues.
    2
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.     Factual Background
    1.     Bazua’s Employment With Montebello
    According to the allegations of the operative first amended complaint, which we
    accept as true for purposes of reviewing the trial court’s order sustaining Montebello’s
    demurrer,1 Bazua began working for Montebello as an administrative analyst in 1996.
    He rose through several promotions to become the Acting Director of Economic
    Development in July 2008, and the Director of Economic Development in March 2009.
    Bazua then began his fall. In January 2010 Montebello demoted Bazua to Economic
    Development Manager. On January 6, 2011 Montebello placed Bazua on administrative
    leave, and on September 15, 2011 Montebello terminated his employment.
    2.     The Redevelopment Project and HUD Funds
    On March 12, 2008 Montebello entered into an Exclusive Negotiation Agreement
    with Ku and Associates, a developer, for a project. On May 22, 2008 Michael Huntley,
    Montebello’s Director of Community Development, directed the city attorney, Arnold
    Alvarez-Glasman of Alvarez-Glasman & Colvin, to prepare a draft Owner Participation
    Agreement (OPA). On June 25, 2008 the city council approved a resolution designating
    $1.3 million in federal HOME program funds for the project and authorizing an escrow
    account to hold the funds.2 On July 2, 2008 Montebello issued a check for $1.3 million
    1      Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 
    51 Cal. 4th 524
    , 528.
    2       The HOME Investment Partnership Act (HOME), Title 42 United States Code
    section 12701 et seq., “provides federal housing funds directly to participating
    jurisdictions. The jurisdictions disburse those funds in the form of loans and grants ‘to
    provide incentives to develop and support affordable rental housing and home ownership
    affordability.’” (Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority (8th
    Cir. 2003) 
    342 F.3d 871
    , 875, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12742(a)(1).)
    3
    in HUD funds to the escrow account. According to Bazua, this disbursement of funds
    violated HUD regulations because it occurred before there was a signed OPA between
    Montebello and Ku and Associates.
    After he became Acting Director of Economic Development in July 2008, Bazua
    discovered the improper disbursement of HUD funds and reported the matter to the city
    administrator and to Alvarez-Glasman. Alvarez-Glasman decided to prepare something
    called a HOME Program Loan Agreement in lieu of an OPA.
    On February 10, 2009 Montebello entered into a HOME Program Loan
    Agreement with Ku and Associates. Alvarez-Glasman and Matthew Gorman, an attorney
    in Alvarez-Glasman’s law firm, advised Bazua that the agreement was an acceptable
    substitute for an OPA. Another lawyer in Alvarez-Glasman’s law firm, Roger Colvin,
    prepared and advised Bazua “regarding creation of the OPA.”
    In January 2010 the Economic Development Department became a division of
    Community Development under Huntley as Director of Planning and Development. This
    change placed Bazua under Huntley.
    3.     The Inspector General’s Audit and the Internal Investigation
    In July 2010 HUD’s Office of Inspector General conducted an audit and
    discovered that someone in Montebello had given HUD an OPA dated March 14, 2008
    with fraudulent signatures. Montebello accused Bazua of creating the fraudulent OPA.
    On January 6, 2011 Montebello placed Bazua on administrative leave. Bazua
    subsequently filed a complaint with the California State Controller claiming that Huntley
    was responsible for the alleged misuse of redevelopment funds.
    Montebello hired a private investigative firm, RCS Investigations and Consulting
    LLC, to investigate the fraud. On January 19, 2011 RCS interviewed Bazua about the
    release of the $1.3 million in HUD funds and the HUD investigation. Bazua provided
    RCS with substantial documentation, including documents drafted by Alvarez-Glasman
    and Gorman and memoranda among various Montebello officials. RCS presented its
    conclusions to Montebello in a written report.
    4
    4.     Montebello’s Pre-Termination Hearings and the Termination
    of Bazua’s Employment
    On May 31, 2011 Montebello sent Bazua a notice of intent to terminate his
    employment, signed by Huntley. Montebello accused Bazua, among other things, of
    falsifying and concealing the fraudulent OPA and other records, willfully concealing
    information, misappropriation, and incompetence, all of which, according to Bazua,
    occurred while Huntley was in charge. The notice informed Bazua of his right to respond
    orally before the city administrator’s designee, David Biggs. On July 11, 2011 Bazua
    appeared before Biggs and gave Biggs the documents he had given to RCS.
    On September 8, 2011 Montebello sent Bazua an amended notice of intent to
    terminate, also signed by Huntley. The amended notice accused Bazua of 31 additional
    violations. On September 15, 2011 Bazua again appeared before Biggs and again
    submitted documents. Promptly after the second hearing Biggs notified Bazua of the
    termination of his employment.
    5.     Montebello’s Proposed Post-Termination Hearing
    Montebello’s Administrative Policy V-B-40, which applied to Bazua, provided for
    a post-termination review by the city administrator. This policy stated, in relevant part:
    “If discipline is imposed against any unclassified management employee, the exclusive
    method of review of same shall be as follows: Such employee may, within ten (10) days
    of the notification of the imposition of such discipline, request, in writing, a review of the
    action by the City Administrator. The City Administrator shall review such facts as he
    determines are appropriate and shall advise such management employee, informally, of
    the result of his review and his decision. The decision of the City Administrator shall be
    final and conclusive.”
    On September 23, 2011 Bazua requested a hearing to review the decision to
    terminate his employment. He also requested a description of the procedure and format
    of the hearing.
    5
    On September 27, 2011 Montebello’s Director of Human Resources informed
    Bazua that Colvin would serve as the “judge” in the hearing. Bazua objected, stating that
    Colvin was Alvarez-Glasman’s law partner and had advised Bazua regarding the creation
    of an OPA. Bazua stated that Colvin could not act as a neutral factfinder, and that the
    proposed hearing was inconsistent with Administrative Policy V-B-40.
    On October 31, 2011 the Director of Human Resources responded to Bazua
    stating, “Administrative Policy V-B-40 does not provide specific details about an
    unclassified employee’s right to an evidentiary hearing if discipline is imposed.” The
    letter also stated that, consistent with its past practice, Montebello would provide Bazua
    an evidentiary hearing that included the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and
    Montebello would bear the burden of proof to justify his termination. Bazua declined to
    participate in the proposed hearing because, among other reasons, the newly-proposed
    procedure did not appear in any written policy, Bazua’s participation in such a hearing
    would been futile, and the HUD fraud allegations permeated the entire city government.
    Bazua filed this action on July 12, 2012.
    B.     Trial Court Proceedings
    1.     Bazua’s First Amended Complaint and Montebello’s Demurrer
    and Motion To Strike
    Bazua’s first amended complaint against Montebello alleged causes of action for
    violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, which included a claim for monetary penalties
    under PAGA, and defamation.3 Bazua alleged that, before he became Acting Director of
    3      The trial court had sustained Montebello’s demurrer to the Labor Code
    section 1102.5 cause of action in Bazua’s original complaint with leave to amend and
    overruled Montebello’s demurrer to Bazua’s defamation cause of action. The court had
    also granted Montebello’s motion to strike the PAGA claim in Bazua’s original
    complaint, with leave to amend to allege a proper representative PAGA claim on behalf
    of Bazua and other current or former employees.
    6
    Economic Development, Montebello improperly disbursed HUD funds without the
    required OPA. Bazua alleged that upon discovering this impropriety he promptly
    notified the city administrator and the city attorney. Bazua alleged that Montebello
    terminated his employment in retaliation for complaining about the city’s mishandling
    and improper use of HUD funds and Huntley’s improper use of redevelopment funds.
    Bazua also alleged that Montebello had made false accusations and other defamatory
    statements about him to third parties and to the public.
    Bazua alleged that the post-termination evidentiary hearing proposed by the
    Director of Human Resources on October 31, 2011 was not an established procedure, was
    created solely for Bazua’s termination, and was patently inadequate. Bazua also alleged
    that it would have been futile for him to participate in the proposed hearing because he
    had already participated in two prior pre-termination hearings before Biggs and had
    provided evidence to Montebello’s investigators prior to his termination, Colvin was
    biased, and Huntley had mishandled the HUD funds and initiated the biased investigation
    of Bazua. Bazua alleged that Montebello’s entire city administration was biased against
    him and could not provide a fair and impartial hearing.
    Montebello demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing that by abandoning
    the administrative appeal of his termination Bazua had failed to exhaust his
    administrative remedies. Montebello also argued that Bazua had failed to exhaust his
    judicial remedies because he never challenged the city’s procedures or decision by filing
    a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. Montebello also moved to strike
    Bazua’s PAGA claim, arguing that Bazua had not alleged a representative PAGA claim
    on behalf of himself and other current or former employees.
    Bazua argued in opposition to the demurrer that it would have been futile for him
    to exhaust the administrative remedy offered to him for several reasons, including that
    Colvin was “the attorney who advised [Bazua] to engage in the conduct which caused
    [his] termination” and “was clearly a biased decisionmaker.” He also argued that the
    administrative remedy provided by Administrative Policy V-B-40 was unclear and
    inadequate.
    7
    The trial court sustained Montebello’s demurrer to Bazua’s cause of action for
    violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 without leave to amend, based on Bazua’s failure
    to exhaust his administrative and judicial remedies. The court also granted Montebello’s
    motion to strike the PAGA claim, ruling that Bazua was seeking only individual relief
    and had failed to allege any basis for a representative claim, as required by PAGA.
    2.     Montebello’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary
    Adjudication
    Montebello filed a motion for summary judgment on Bazua’s remaining cause of
    action for defamation, arguing that Bazua’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies
    barred his defamation cause of action. Montebello also moved in the alternative for
    summary adjudication of issues with respect to 11 specific statements Bazua claimed
    were defamatory, labeling them “Plaintiff’s Alleged Defamatory Statement Number[s]” 1
    through 11. Montebello argued that there was no evidence of any specific defamatory
    statement by a city employee (for Alleged Defamatory Statement Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
    7), statements made by Bazua to third parties were not actionable (Alleged Defamatory
    Statement Nos. 9 and 10), one of the statements was not published to third parties
    (Alleged Defamatory Statement No. 11), Bazua did not suffer any injury, the alleged
    defamatory statements were protected by the common interest privilege, and Montebello
    was immune from liability under Government Code sections 815.2, 818.8, and 822.2.
    Bazua argued in opposition to the motion that the exhaustion requirement did not
    apply to his defamation cause of action and the alleged defamatory statements were
    sufficiently specific. He also argued that Montebello was responsible for any foreseeable
    repetition of the defamatory statements to third parties, including Bazua’s repetition of
    the statements in employment interviews. Bazua argued that he did not have to prove any
    economic injury and that, in any event, he had suffered economic injury in the form of his
    inability to find new employment, as well as mental anguish. Bazua also argued that the
    defamatory statements were not privileged and Montebello was not immune from
    liability.
    8
    The trial court granted Montebello’s motion for summary judgment. The court
    ruled that Bazua’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies by challenging his
    termination in a post-termination hearing precluded any claim, including his defamation
    claim, based on the merits of his termination or the reasons for his termination. The court
    stated that, in order “to prove his defamation claim, [Bazua] would necessarily have to
    challenge his termination,” and that had he “utilized his administrative remedies and
    proved his termination wrongful, he may pursue a defamation claim for damages
    attributed to statements stemming from the wrongful reason for his termination.” The
    court concluded that, by “foregoing the procedures set forth in [Administrative Policy] V-
    B-40, [Bazua] has no basis for challenging the alleged statements.”
    The court also ruled on Montebello’s motion for summary adjudication of issues
    with respect to particular statements, agreeing with some of Montebello’s arguments and
    rejecting others. The court concluded that Montebello was entitled to summary
    adjudication of issues with respect to four of the 11 allegedly defamatory statements.
    The court also ruled that Bazua could not prove injury or malice because he had not
    exhausted his administrative remedies, that the common interest privilege applied to
    some but not all of the statements, and that Montebello was not entitled to governmental
    immunity.
    On April 29, 2014 the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Montebello.
    Bazua timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    A.     The Trial Court Erred by Sustaining the Demurrer Based on Failure
    To Exhaust Administrative and Judicial Remedies
    1.     Standard of Review
    “When reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we employ the de novo standard
    of review. [Citation.] ‘“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of
    9
    law; as such, it raises only a question of law.” [Citation.] “‘The reviewing court gives
    the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all
    material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the
    truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be
    affirmed “if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]”’”’”
    (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 
    235 Cal. App. 4th 385
    , 390-391.) “‘We apply a de novo
    standard of review to the legal question of whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
    administrative remedies applies in a given case.’” (Defend Our Waterfront v. California
    State Lands Commission (2015) 
    240 Cal. App. 4th 570
    , 580; see Coastside Fishing Club v.
    California Fish and Game Commission (2013) 
    215 Cal. App. 4th 397
    , 414 [“[w]hether the
    doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a given case is a legal
    question that we review de novo”].)
    2.     Bazua’s Labor Code Section 1102.5 Claim Is Not Barred by Failure
    To Exhaust Administrative Remedies
    Where an applicable statute, ordinance, or regulation provides an adequate
    administrative remedy, a party must exhaust it before seeking judicial relief. (Coachella
    Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd.
    (2005) 
    35 Cal. 4th 1072
    , 1080; see American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified
    School Dist. (2014) 
    227 Cal. App. 4th 258
    , 291.) “Exhaustion requires ‘a full presentation
    to the administrative agency upon all issues of the case and at all prescribed stages of the
    administrative proceedings.’ [Citation.] ‘“The exhaustion doctrine is principally
    grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere
    with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial
    efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative
    dispute unless absolutely necessary).”’” (City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local
    Union No. 3 (2010) 
    49 Cal. 4th 597
    , 609 (San Jose); see AIDS Healthcare Foundation v.
    State Department of Health Care Services (2015) 
    241 Cal. App. 4th 1327
    , 1337.)
    10
    The exhaustion requirement is subject to exceptions, one of which is where the
    administrative remedy is inadequate.4 (San 
    Jose, supra
    , 49 Cal.4th at p. 609.) The
    statute, ordinance, regulation, or other written policy establishing an administrative
    remedy must provide clearly defined procedures for the submission, evaluation, and
    resolution of disputes. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System
    (2014) 
    224 Cal. App. 4th 210
    , 236-237 (City of Oakland) [city charter provision]; Unfair
    Fire Tax Com. v. City of Oakland (2006) 
    136 Cal. App. 4th 1424
    , 1429-1430 (Unfair Fire
    Tax Com.) [ordinance].) A policy that only provides for the submission of disputes to a
    decisionmaker without stating whether the aggrieved party is entitled to an evidentiary
    hearing or the standard for reviewing the prior decision is inadequate. (City of 
    Oakland, supra
    , at p. 237; Unfair Fire Tax 
    Com., supra
    , at p. 1430.) An administrative remedy
    also “must include a fair right to be heard on an issue and to have a decision rendered
    through a fair and sufficient process.” (Payne v. Anaheim Memorial Medical Center, Inc.
    (2005) 
    130 Cal. App. 4th 729
    , 739-740 (Payne).) An administrative remedy that fails to
    satisfy these requirements is inadequate and need not be exhausted. (City of 
    Oakland, supra
    , at pp. 236-237; Unfair Fire Tax 
    Com., supra
    , at p. 1430; 
    Payne, supra
    , at p. 744.)
    Administrative Policy V-B-40 stated that the “exclusive method of review” of
    discipline imposed on an unclassified management employee such as Bazua was by
    submitting a request for review by the city administrator. The policy stated that the city
    administrator “shall review such facts as he determines are appropriate and shall advise
    such management employee, informally, of the result of his review and his decision.”
    The written policy did not provide for an evidentiary hearing, or even any hearing, made
    no provision for the submission of evidence or argument, and was silent on the standard
    by which the city administrator would decide the matter. It also only required an
    4       Labor Code section 244, subdivision (a), enacted in 2013 (Stats. 2013, ch. 577,
    § 4), provides, “An individual is not required to exhaust administrative remedies in order
    to bring a civil action under any provision of this code, unless that section under which
    the action is brought expressly requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy. . . .”
    Bazua does not argue that this provision applies to his action.
    11
    informal advisement of the decision. Because the policy lacked clearly defined
    procedures for the submission, evaluation, and resolution of disputes, it was an
    inadequate administrative remedy. (See City of 
    Oakland, supra
    , 224 Cal.App.4th at pp.
    236-237; Ahmadi-Kashani v. Regents of University of California (2008) 
    159 Cal. App. 4th 449
    , 458 (Ahmadi-Kashani) [grievance procedure without a right to an evidentiary
    hearing before a neutral decisionmaker was inadequate and need not be exhausted];
    Unfair Fire Tax 
    Com., supra
    , 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430 [exhaustion of
    “nebulous” administrative procedure is not required]; Life Care Centers of America v.
    CalOptima (2005) 
    133 Cal. App. 4th 1169
    , 1177 [“[t]o constitute an internal or
    administrative remedy requiring exhaustion before filing suit, ‘“[t]here must be ‘clearly
    defined machinery’ for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by
    aggrieved parties”’”].)5 The informal internal grievance procedure of Administrative
    Policy V-B-40 was also inadequate to resolve the complex issues presented in this kind of
    dispute. (See Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 
    15 Cal. 3d 328
    , 342-343 [“[a] procedure which provides merely for the submission of a grievance
    form, without the taking of testimony, the submission of legal briefs, or resolution by an
    impartial finder of fact is manifestly inadequate to handle disputes of the crucial and
    complex nature”]; accord, 
    Payne, supra
    , 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 741-742.)
    Because the post-termination administrative remedy was inadequate, Bazua was
    not required to exhaust it. Therefore, the trial court erred by sustaining Montebello’s
    demurrer to the Labor Code section 1102.5 cause of action based on the failure to exhaust
    administrative remedies.
    5       The written policy must provide specific procedures that the administrative body
    is required to follow. (See City of 
    Oakland, supra
    , 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 236; Lindelli v.
    Town of Anselmo (2003) 
    111 Cal. App. 4th 1099
    , 1106 (Lindelli).) Montebello’s after-the-
    fact proposal to provide an evidentiary hearing with Colvin as the “judge” was contrary
    to the “exclusive method of review” by the city administrator outlined in Administrative
    Policy V-B-40 and could not cure the defects in the written policy.
    12
    3.     Bazua’s Labor Code Section 1102.5 Claim Is Not Barred by Failure
    To Exhaust Judicial Remedies
    The doctrine of exhaustion of judicial remedies provides that a party to a quasi-
    judicial proceeding who fails to challenge adverse findings made in that proceeding by
    filing a petition for writ of mandate in court is bound by those findings in a later civil
    action. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 
    24 Cal. 4th 61
    , 69-70; Y.K.A. Industries,
    Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009) 
    174 Cal. App. 4th 339
    , 355-356
    (Y.K.A.).) “Exhaustion of judicial remedies . . . is necessary to avoid giving binding
    ‘effect to the administrative agency’s decision, because that decision has achieved finality
    due to the aggrieved party’s failure to pursue the exclusive judicial remedy for reviewing
    administrative action.’” (Johnson v. City of Loma 
    Linda, supra
    , at p. 70.)
    Bazua did not and did not need to participate in the proposed post-termination
    hearing, so there were no findings for him to challenge by filing a petition for writ of
    administrative mandamus. Absent any administrative findings, Bazua had no judicial
    remedies to exhaust. Therefore, the exhaustion of judicial remedies doctrine is
    inapplicable. (See McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 
    45 Cal. 4th 88
    , 113 [“[i]n the absence of quasi-judicial proceedings, [plaintiff] was not
    required to seek judicial relief to set aside any findings or bear the consequences of their
    binding effect”]; 
    Y.K.A., supra
    , 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 361 [“[t]he predicates to the
    doctrine’s application are therefore the existence or availability of an administrative
    process possessing a judicial character and a quasi-judicial adjudication, finding, or
    action adverse to the plaintiff produced therefrom”]; 
    Ahmadi-Kashani, supra
    , 159
    Cal.App.4th at p. 459 [“[b]ecause Ahmadi-Kashani never participated in a quasi-judicial
    hearing as part of her aborted grievance process, there was no decision rendered that
    would be entitled to preclusive effect in a subsequent court proceeding”].)
    13
    B.     The Trial Court Properly Granted Montebello’s Motion To Strike Bazua’s
    PAGA Claim
    “Under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, the court “may . . . at any time in its
    discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: [¶]. . . [¶] (b) Strike out all or any part of any
    pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
    order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The trial court’s ruling on a
    motion to strike a pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 436 generally is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations] However, the proper interpretation of a
    statute, and its application to undisputed facts, presents a question of law subject to
    de novo review.” (Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013)
    
    221 Cal. App. 4th 304
    , 309.) A motion to strike is an appropriate method for challenging a
    PAGA claim. (See USS-POSCO Industries v. Case (2016) 
    244 Cal. App. 4th 197
    , 222
    [defective PAGA claim is “subject to a demurrer or motion to strike”]; Caliber
    Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 
    134 Cal. App. 4th 365
    , 385 [“[t]he appropriate
    procedural device for challenging a portion of a cause of action seeking an improper
    remedy is a motion to strike”].)
    PAGA authorizes an “aggrieved employee” to file a civil action “on behalf of
    himself or herself and other current or former employees” and seek civil penalties for
    violations. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a).) Civil penalties imposed under PAGA are
    distributed 75 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and 25 percent
    to the aggrieved employees. (Id., subd. (i).) “The act’s declared purpose is to
    supplement enforcement actions by public agencies, which lack adequate resources to
    bring all such actions themselves. (Stats. 2003, ch. 906, § 1 [Legislature’s findings and
    declarations].) In a PAGA claim the employee plaintiff represents the same legal right
    and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies—namely, recovery of civil penalties
    that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by the Labor Workforce
    Development Agency.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 
    46 Cal. 4th 969
    , 986.)
    California courts construing Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (a), have
    concluded that an aggrieved employee suing under PAGA must bring the claim as a
    14
    representative action on behalf of “himself or herself and other current or former
    employees” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a), italics added).6 (See Rope v. Auto-Chlor
    System of Washington, Inc. (2013) 
    220 Cal. App. 4th 635
    , 651, fn. 7 [“[s]uits brought
    under PAGA must be representative actions”]; Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 
    202 Cal. App. 4th 1119
    , 1123-1124 [“[a] plaintiff asserting a PAGA claim may not bring the
    claim simply on his or her own behalf but must bring it as a representative action and
    include ‘other current or former employees’”].) Bazua argues that Reyes “did not hold
    that a single plaintiff’s PAGA claims must be dismissed,” but instead “held that the
    PAGA claim was not an individual claim and thus could not be compelled to arbitration
    with the rest of Reyes’ case.” Bazua, however, does not explain why the language in
    Reyes does not apply to his PAGA claim, and he does not even address Rope. He asserts
    that he alleged he was suing on behalf of himself and other current or former employees,
    but he has not explained how the allegations in his complaint concerning his termination
    provide a factual basis for a violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 with respect to any
    other employees. Bazua’s lawsuit is about his personal experience working for
    Montebello and his personal grievances against the city. Bazua is not bringing this action
    or seeking to recover anything on behalf of anyone but himself.
    C.     The Trial Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment Based on
    Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies
    In granting Montebello’s motion for summary judgment on Bazua’s sole
    remaining cause of action for defamation, the trial court stated that Bazua’s failure to
    exhaust his administrative remedies precluded any claim that depended on proving his
    termination was wrongful. The court ruled that, because the defamation cause of action
    6      Labor Code 2699, subdivision (g)(1), also states that an aggrieved employee may
    recover a monetary penalty in a civil action “filed on behalf of himself or herself and
    other current or former employees against whom one or more of the alleged violations
    was committed.” (Italics added.)
    15
    challenged the stated reasons for Bazua’s termination, Bazua’s failure to exhaust his
    administrative remedies precluded his defamation cause of action in its entirety. Because
    the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is inapplicable, however, the basis for
    the trial court’s ruling no longer exists and the court’s ruling must be reversed.
    Moreover, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies only where
    there is an administrative remedy available to address the particular grievance. (See
    
    Payne, supra
    , 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 743-744 [plaintiff was not required to exhaust an
    internal grievance procedure because his specific grievance was not within the scope of
    the hearing offered]; 
    Lindelli, supra
    , 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 [“‘the doctrine [of
    exhaustion of administrative remedies] does not apply in those situations where no
    specific administrative remedies are available to the plaintiff’”].) Montebello’s
    Administrative Policy V-B-40 only provided for the review of an imposition of
    discipline. Defamation is not discipline, and Policy V-B-40 provided no remedy for
    defamatory statements. Montebello has not cited any authority for the proposition that a
    failure to exhaust an administrative remedy, which does not result in factual findings that
    might have collateral estoppel or other preclusive effect, precludes an employee from
    pursuing a defamation cause of action that is not within the scope of grievances for which
    the employer has provided the administrative remedy. Bazua’s failure to exhaust an
    administrative remedy he did not have for his defamation claim does not preclude him
    from pursuing that claim in court.
    Johnson v. Hydraulic Research & Mfg. Co. (1977) 
    70 Cal. App. 3d 675
    (Johnson),
    cited by Montebello, is distinguishable. In that case a company terminated an employee
    after a doctor to whom the company had referred him told the company that the employee
    had tested positive for barbiturates. The employee sued the company for interference
    with his contractual relations with the doctor, conspiring with the doctor to commit
    unprofessional conduct, and defamation, alleging that “the doctor had no right to disclose
    to the company the results of the blood test.” (Id. at p. 678.) The employee did not
    exhaust the collective bargaining agreement’s “specific, exclusive grievance and
    arbitration procedures to resolve disputes of this nature.” (Id. at p. 679.) The court held
    16
    that, “[b]ecause the procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement were
    intended to be exclusive,” the employee’s “failure to exhaust those procedures precludes
    the present attempt to resort to the courts instead.” (Ibid.)
    Johnson was about exhaustion of a procedure in a collective bargaining
    agreement, not exhaustion of administrative remedies, which the court only mentioned in
    passing as “‘analogous.’” 
    (Johnson, supra
    , 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 679.) The court in
    Johnson emphasized that its decision was based on the “well established” rule that “a
    party to a collective bargaining contract which provides grievance and arbitration
    machinery for the settlement of disputes within the scope of such contract must exhaust
    the internal remedies before resorting to the courts in the absence of facts excusing such
    exhaustion.” (Ibid.; see Araiza v. National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. (S.D. Cal. 1997)
    
    973 F. Supp. 963
    , 969 [“[t]he dispute in Johnson concerned the interpretation and
    application of specific clauses of the collective bargaining agreement”].) Montebello
    does not provide any authority that Johnson applies outside the context of collective
    bargaining agreement, or for the proposition that the failure to exhaust administrative
    remedies with respect to the imposition of discipline precludes a defamation cause of
    action in these circumstances.7
    7       The other case cited by Montebello, Joftes v. Kaufman (D.D.C. 1971) 
    324 F. Supp. 660
    , also involved a grievance procedure under a collective bargaining agreement. The
    collective bargaining agreement authorized the employer to disclose the reasons for the
    plaintiff’s discipline to persons with a legitimate interest. (Id. at pp. 662-663; see
    Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (D.C. 1998) 
    715 A.2d 873
    , 880 [in
    Joftes “the contract in question provided for or contemplated the publication of the
    evaluations of which [the] plaintiff was complaining”].) Moreover, the holding of Joftes
    was that the communications were privileged. (See Joftes, at p. 663 [“[i]t is our
    conclusion that statements made either by representatives of management or by
    representatives of an employee at a conference or bargaining session having for its
    purpose the adjustment of a grievance of the employee or other peaceable disposition of
    such grievance are unqualifiedly privileged”].)
    17
    D.     The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Adjudication of Issues
    In addition to granting Montebello’s motion for summary judgment on the entire
    defamation cause of action, the trial court summarily adjudicated parts of the defamation
    cause of action in a manner that did not dispose of the entire cause of action. Montebello
    identified 11 separate allegedly defamatory statements, organized into categories of
    statements that city officials made to third parties, statements that city officials made to
    city employees, and statements that Bazua repeated to third parties. Montebello moved
    for summary adjudication as to each statement on different grounds, including that the
    statement was not defamatory, Bazua suffered no injury, there was no publication, the
    statements were protected by the common interest privilege, and governmental immunity.
    The trial court granted summary adjudication on four of the statements, concluding that
    one statement was true and that Montebello was not liable for Bazua’s publication of
    three other statements.
    Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, however, does not authorize such summary
    adjudication of issues; it allows the summary adjudication of an entire cause of action, an
    affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
    § 437c, subd. (f)(1) [“[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it
    completely disposes of a cause of action”]; McCaskey v. California State Auto. Assn.
    (2010) 
    189 Cal. App. 4th 947
    , 975 [“there can be no summary adjudication of less than an
    entire cause of action”]; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 
    178 Cal. App. 4th 243
    , 251
    [“[s]ummary adjudication must completely dispose of the cause of action to which it is
    directed”].)8 The trial court erred to the extent it granted summary adjudication of issues
    8       At the time of Montebello’s motion the only exception was former subdivision (s)
    of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, which authorized a motion for “summary
    adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does
    not completely dispose of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, or an issue of duty.”
    (Stats. 2011, ch. 419, § 3.) Former subdivision (s) allowed such a motion only on a prior
    stipulation by the parties and a prior court order finding that the motion would further the
    interests of judicial economy or significantly improve the parties’ ability to settle the
    18
    based on the various categories of defamatory statements created by Montebello for
    purposes of the motion.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate
    its order sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for violation of Labor Code
    section 1102.5 without leave to amend, and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer
    and granting the motion to strike the PAGA claim. The trial court is also directed to
    vacate its order granting the motion for summary judgment and adjudication of issues on
    the defamation cause of action, and to enter a new order denying the motion. Bazua is to
    recover his costs on appeal.
    SEGAL, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.                                            ZELON, J.
    case. There is no indication in the record that the parties ever filed such a stipulation or
    that the trial court made the required findings.
    19