People v. Randolph CA2/2 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 8/3/22 P. v. Randolph CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
    not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,                                                B317519
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. MA027017)
    v.
    RAYMOND CHARLES
    RANDOLPH,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT:
    Defendant and appellant Raymond Charles Randolph
    (defendant) appeals from an order denying his pro se petition for
    clarification of his restitution fine obligation and to stop the
    collection of funds from his prison trust account. Appointed
    counsel filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to
    follow the procedures set forth in People v. Serrano (2012) 
    211 Cal.App.4th 496
    . Where appointed counsel finds no arguable
    issues in an appeal seeking postjudgment relief, the appellate
    court is not required to conduct an independent review of the
    record for arguable issues. (People v. Cole (2020) 
    52 Cal.App.5th 1023
    , 1039-1040, review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264278; see
    People v. Serrano, supra, at p. 503.) Instead, the defendant is
    given the opportunity to file his or her own supplemental brief or
    letter, and we review the defendant’s contentions or arguments
    set forth in any such supplemental brief or letter that may be
    filed. (People v. Cole, supra, at p. 1039.) Here, defendant was
    notified of his counsel’s brief, and he filed a supplemental brief.
    We have reviewed the contentions or arguments set forth therein,
    and we agree with the trial court that defendant has failed to
    make a prima facie case for relief. We thus affirm the court’s
    order.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2004, defendant was convicted of second degree murder,
    assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and unlawful possession of
    a firearm. He was sentenced to life in prison with a minimum
    parole period of 80 years. In addition, defendant was ordered to
    pay a restitution fine of $750. In 2020, prior to filing the current
    petition, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
    the superior court, which the court construed as requesting that
    the amount of his restitution fine in superior court case
    No. MA027017 be reduced or discharged due to COVID-19.1 The
    court denied the habeas petition on August 28, 2020.
    In December 2021, defendant filed a “Petition for
    Clarification of Restitution Order,” which is the subject of this
    1     As the habeas petition is not the subject of this appeal and
    has not been included in the appellate record, we are unaware of
    the allegations.
    2
    appeal. Defendant’s appointed counsel construes it as a request
    for clarification of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition
    for writ of habeas corpus; and as the denial of a habeas petition is
    not appealable, counsel asks this court to deem the current
    petition to be one for writ of mandate. We do not agree that the
    current petition was one for clarification of the trial court’s
    habeas order, as the petition does not ask for clarification, but
    purports to provide clarification to the trial court that
    misconstrued defendant’s claim. Defendant’s petition appears to
    be seeking mandamus without expressly so stating. “A writ of
    mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal,
    corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act
    which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an
    office, trust, or station . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).)
    The petition attaches copies of the payment history of the
    $750 restitution fine imposed in superior court case
    No. MA027017, kept by the California Department of Corrections
    and Rehabilitation (CDCR). It is alleged that the $750
    restitution fine was paid in full by 2015, and the CDCR
    unlawfully continued to collect payments from defendant’s trust
    account in 2020. After the trial court denied the habeas petition,
    defendant sought relief through a claim and appeal to the CDCR,
    which was denied. The petition further alleges that defendant
    had three prior cases, superior court case Nos. MA007794,
    MA012133, and MA017730, for which he was “Discharge Parole
    [sic]” on February 28, 2002, causing the trial court to lose
    jurisdiction to collect restitution fines imposed in those prior
    cases. The petition seeks the following relief: that the court’s
    understanding be clarified; that the court stops the unlawful
    collection of restitution; and for any further relief deemed proper.
    3
    On December 4, 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s
    petition, ruling that defendant had not made a prima facie case
    for relief due to the absence of documentary evidence supporting
    his claim. In addition, the court explained:
    “The court records reveal that Petitioner has been
    incarcerated . . . pursuant to four separated cases.
    (Case numbers MA027017, MA017730, MA012133,
    and MA007794.) In each of those cases, he was
    ordered to pay a mandatory restitution fund fine.[2]
    Petitioner has provided documents, showing that
    CDCR is garnishing his account, in order to pay his
    outstanding restitution obligations in case numbers
    MA017730 and MA012133, notwithstanding the fact
    that he has paid his restitution fine in full in case
    number MA027017. [¶] The California Department
    of Corrections and Rehabilitation had the authority,
    under Penal Code section 2085.5(a), to resume
    garnishing an inmate’s prison wages whenever he is
    returned to prison, even if the defendant has
    completed the sentence for the prior crime on which
    the restitution fine is based. (See People v. Ellis
    (2019) 
    31 Cal.App.5th 1090
    .)”3
    Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.
    2    Those records have not been included here in the record on
    appeal.
    3     In Ellis, the defendant was in prison at the time of the
    deduction by the CDCR, although he had fully served his
    sentence to which the fine as attached. (People v. Ellis, supra, 31
    Cal.App.5th at pp. 1093-1094.)
    4
    DISCUSSION
    In his supplemental brief defendant argues that People v.
    Ellis, cited by the trial court, is distinguishable because, there,
    the CDCR still had all of the collection records. Defendant
    asserts that he has been discharged from parole in the prior
    cases, that the CDCR gave up jurisdiction to collect the prior
    fines to the Franchise Tax Board, and now only that agency has
    jurisdiction to collect them. Defendant further asserts that the
    records of the CDCR and Franchise Tax Board do not match;
    however, as the trial court observed, defendant presented no
    documentary evidence in support of his contentions.4 Nor has
    defendant provided authority for his contentions.
    A restitution fine survives parole, and any portion that
    remains unsatisfied when a defendant is no longer on parole
    remains enforceable. (Pen. Code, § 1214, subd. (a).) Restitution
    fines may be collected in myriad ways. (See generally, Estate of
    Casserley (2018) 
    22 Cal.App.5th 824
    , 836-838.) Under certain
    conditions, the CDCR may refer the defendant’s outstanding
    obligation to the Franchise Tax Board. (Rev. & Tax. Code,
    § 19280.) Defendant has cited no authority suggesting that the
    CDCR loses jurisdiction to collect the debt from a prisoner if
    there had been a previous referral, and we have found none. The
    CDCR has the authority to garnish an inmate’s prison wages
    whenever he is in prison, even if he has completed the sentence
    for the prior crime on which the restitution fine is based. (People
    v. Ellis, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1093-1094.) Indeed, the
    CDCR is required to deduct specified amounts owing on a
    4    In particular, defendant has not provided any evidence of
    how, when, or even if the Franchise Tax Board came to collect
    defendant’s restitution fine obligation.
    5
    restitution fine from the wages and trust account deposits of a
    prisoner. (Pen. Code, § 2085.5, subd. (a).) It follows that the
    CDCR has the authority to resume garnishing an inmate’s prison
    wages whenever he is returned to prison, as the trial court
    concluded here.
    In sum, we conclude that the trial court understood
    defendant’s clarification of his claim and correctly found that
    defendant had not made a prima facie case for ordering the
    CDCR to stop collecting amounts owed on any previous
    restitution fines.
    DISPOSITION
    The order of the superior court denying defendant’s petition
    for clarification of restitution order is affirmed.
    ____________________________________________________________
    ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B317519

Filed Date: 8/3/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2022