People v. Superior Court , 151 Cal. App. 4th 85 ( 2007 )

Opinion

DUFFY, J.

Real party in interest Maurice Xavier Nasmeh has been charged with the murder of Jeaniñe Harms (Pen. Code, § 187)¹ and awaits trial. The superior court granted a pretrial motion by Nasmeh to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5), ruling that the search and seizure of Nasmeh’s car exceeded the scope of a warrant and that there was no other ground to permit the introduction of the evidence. The People petitioned for a writ óf mandate in this court asking us to order the superior court to vacate its order granting the motion to suppress and enter a new order denying the motion.

Because the warrant authorized the search and seizure in question, and because in any event the search and seizure were reasonable under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the superior court erred in granting Nasmeh’s motion to suppress. We will issue the writ.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background Facts and Police Officer’s Affidavit

Following Harms’s disappearance over the weekend of July 28 through 29, 2001, police investigation focused on Nasmeh as the last person to report seeing her alive when he left her house in Los Gatos in the early morning of July 28. The police obtained a search warrant to search Nasmeh’s home and car for certain items missing from Harms’s house, including a large Persian-style rug.

According to the affidavit of Officer Steve Wahl of the Los Gatos-Monte Sereno Police Department offered in support of a warrant to search Nasmeh’s home and vehicle, on July 30, 2001, Chigiy Edson-Binell, Harms’s Mend and landlord, filed a missing-person report regarding Harms, who had failed to report to work on Monday and whose family and friends had not been able to contact her all weekend. Edson-Binell had noticed that Harms’s car had remained in her driveway all weekend. When the police and Edson-Binell went inside Harms’s residence, she was absent and several items were missing, including seat cushions and pillows from the couch, a rug usually in front of the couch, and Harms’s purse.

Examination of Harms’s car produced Nasmeh’s fingerprint. Police officers interviewed Nasmeh on July 31, 2001. He admitted going to Harms’s house with her. He reported following her in his Jeep Cherokee sport utility vehicle and parking in front of her house. He said they arrived between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. After talking for a while, they went to a comer market to purchase beer and returned to the house. They continued to talk for about an hour, when Harms said she was sleepy and fell asleep on the couch. She had told him he could stay until he was sober enough to drive. He said he stayed for another hour, and then left without any acknowledgment from the sleeping Harms. Nasmeh said he used the bathroom while he was there, but he denied engaging in any sexual interaction with Harms. He did not recall anything unusual about Harms’s couch, such as missing cushions, and he believed there was a mg in front of the couch but he could not describe it. Nasmeh also reported that as he was driving away, he saw a man get out of a car parked on the street several driveways behind him and walk in his direction, which he thought was strange for that hour of the night.

During the investigation, the police learned from a neighbor of Harms that in the early morning hours of July 28, 2001, he heard a loud bang similar to a gunshot. When he looked out his window, he saw a vehicle headlight make a quick turning movement, as if a vehicle was possibly making a U-turn, in front of Harms’s house.

In the affidavit, Officer Wahl also averred that “I know, based on my training and experience,” that “people who commit murder and transport their victims in their vehicles may, in an attempt to conceal their guilt, try to clean their vehicle in an attempt to conceal or rid the vehicle of incriminating evidence.”

II. The Search Warrant

On August 3, 2001, a magistrate signed the following search and seizure warrant:

“To any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, Police Officer or Peace Officer in the County of Santa Clara:

“Proof by affidavit[] having been made before me this day by Steve Wahl that there is probable cause for believing that evidence of the commission of [murder] [has occurred] ....

“You are therefore commanded in the daytime to make search of [a home in] San Jose, Santa Clara County, California ....

“And . . . Maurice Xavier Nasmeh, date of birth February 3, 1964; described as a white male adult, 5' 8" tall, 180 pounds, brown hair, green eyes, wherever located in Santa Clara County.

“And ... [a] 2000 Jeep Cherokee, gray in color, bearing California license number 4MUC016, wherever located in Santa Clara County;

, “Property described as follows:

“1. Pair of tan colored khaki shorts;

“2. Pair of brown colored utility-type boots;

“3. Blood sample from Maurice Xavier Nasmeh;

“4. Receipts tending to show the washing or detailing of Nasmeh’s vehicle;

“5. Couch cover with a blue floral pattern;

“6. [Two sofa] cushions white in color with blue pin-stripes;

“7. Woman’s black leather purse containing items associated with Jeanine Harms;

“8. Credit cards and/or personal checks bearing the name of Jeanine Harms;

“9. Floor rug described as being mostly blue Persian style wool rug with a tag on the back;

“10. Indicia of occupancy consisting of articles of personal property tending to establish the identity of the person in control of the premises searched, including but not limited to phone bills, utility bills, rental agreements, identification papers, canceled mail and personal letters. Other evidence of ownership and control may be found on the occupants and may be keys, rent receipts and identification with names and addresses.

“And if you find the same or any part thereof, to hold such property in your possession under California Penal Code Section 1536.” (Boldface and capitalization of entire word attributes removed.)

Various items of clothing were seized from Nasmeh’s house. Wahl visually inspected Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee to see if it contained any of the listed items, but saw none. The car was then towed to the police crime laboratory for forensic processing. Certain forensic evidence was purportedly found on a tape lift of the rear cargo area of the vehicle.²

III. The Motion to Suppress

As alluded to, after Nasmeh was charged with murdering Harms he filed a motion under section 1538.5 to quash the search warrant and to suppress evidence seized under the warrant.³ At a hearing on the motion, Wahl testified that after looking in the Jeep for the items listed in the search warrant, he sealed the vehicle and had it transported to the crime laboratory to search for trace or biological evidence related to those items. Based on his training and experience, Wahl suspected that trace evidence from Harms’s body or the missing items might be found in Nasmeh’s vehicle, which was big enough to transport her body, the couch cushions and pillows, couch cover, and rug. Wahl believed that the search warrant authorized him to search the vehicle for trace evidence and that under the law he could seize the vehicle and move it to another location to facilitate the search.

The superior court concluded that seizing Nasmeh’s car and taking it to the crime laboratory for forensic examination exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The court further concluded that the automobile exception applied to the police officer’s warrantless search of the car, but the duration of the search violated Nasmeh’s possessory interest in the car without adequate justification. The court granted Nasmeh’s motion to suppress forensic evidence the police purportedly discovered in the rear cargo area of Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee.

The superior court’s reasoning regarding the scope of the warrant is important to understanding how the court erred in suppressing the evidence. We therefore set forth its ruling at length. The court wrote:

“The seizure and removal of the jeep exceeded the scope of the warrant....

“The permissible scope of any search is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. This protection against wide-ranging exploratory searches is embodied in the requirement that no warrant issue unless it ‘particularly describes the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized’ (Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84 [94 L.Ed.2d 72, 107 S.Ct. 1013]). In this case, the warrant contained a particularized statement of the object of the search of the Jeep Cherokee: a purse and contents, rug, sofa cushions, pillows, boots, khaki shorts, a polo shirt,, car wash receipts, credit cards, checks and indicia of occupancy or ownership. Any and all of these items are of a size and type that they would have been found, if they were in fact in the vehicle, by officers conducting a typical search at the scene.

“At the hearing on defendant’s Motion to suppress the officer testified that it was his intention to seize the vehicle and transport it to the crime lab to look for biological evidence like blood, hair, or saliva or traces of the items mentioned in the warrant. . . . [T]he technician who conducted the forensic examination[] indicated that he actually conducted a general search for fingerprints, trace evidence, and biological evidence. The warrant and affidavit make no mention of the possible existence of fingerprints, hair, fiber or other biological or trace evidence. The magistrate was not asked to consider whether probable cause existed to seize the car as evidence of a crime, and authority to seize and forensically examine the vehicle was not granted in the warrant itself. [‘]As stated in Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 238, 250 [118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590]: [f] “It is axiomatic that a warrant may not authorize a search broader than the facts supporting its issuance. [Citation.]” “Thus, the concept of breadth may be defined as the requirement that there be probable cause to seize the particular thing named in the warrant.” (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec 10, 1987 (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 847, 857.) This standard carries out the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on general warrants. The vice of a general warrant is that it permits “ ‘a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings .... [Citation.]’ ” (Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463, 480 [49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737].)’ (People v. Hepner (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 417].)

“This warrant does not authorize the police to seize the vehicle for an unspecified and lengthy period of time, and to conduct an unlimited search for fiber or other microscopic evidence. To find otherwise would open the door to general exploratory searches far beyond the reach of the probable cause set forth in any search warrant affidavit.

“ ‘If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.’ (Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 140 [110 L.Ed.2d 112, 110 S.Ct. 2301].) The seizure and removal of the Jeep and the resulting forensic examination at another location far exceeded that which was authorized and cannot constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the magistrate. Thus, if the seizure and search are to be justified, they must be justified on some other theory.”

The superior court was unable to find any alternative theory that would permit introducing the evidence purportedly found in Nasmeh’s vehicle. As will be discussed below, the court ruled that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement could not apply because the police had held the car for too long, making a warrantless search and seizure unreasonable. Accordingly, the court granted Nasmeh’s motion to suppress the evidence.

The People filed a notice of intention to file a petition for writ of mandate and requested a temporary stay of the trial proceedings. We issued the requested stay on April 13, 2006.

DISCUSSION

I. Forfeiture

Before turning to the merits, we must resolve Nasmeh’s claim that the People did not present to the superior court their contention that the warrant’s scope encompassed the seized evidence and have forfeited their Fourth Amendment claim on review.

Nasmeh’s claim is unpersuasive. The purpose of forfeiture rules generally is to avoid the unfairness that would occur on review if a party were permitted to “argue the [lower] court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765].) No such unfairness would occur here. The superior court recited at the hearing on the motion to suppress that “the People’s position is that... the seizure of the vehicle was not outside the scope of tihe warrant.” The court certainly understood that the Jeep Cherokee was seized to search for trace evidence of certain items listed in the warrant once Wahl failed to see those items in a visual inspection of the vehicle. The court must have understood as much, because Nasmeh had argued exactly that point in his memorandum of points and authorities accompanying his motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence. Nasmeh argued, “the search warrant here simply did not authorize the police to seize the Jeep, impound it, and then order the crime lab to conduct a full search for microscopic trace evidence . . . .” The question was preserved for review, and we turn to the merits of the People’s argument.

II. Searches and Seizures Under the Warrant

We now consider whether the search and seizure were within the scope authorized by the warrant.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

A. Overbreadth

The superior court’s ruling shows that the court conflated two concepts: overbreadth and particularity. The court was correct, of course, about the unconstitutionality of wide-ranging warrants. The Fourth Amendment was adopted as a bulwark against the reviled practices of issuing general search warrants and writs of assistance. (See Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 339-340 [149 L.Ed.2d 549, 121 S.Ct. 1536]; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) 494 U.S. 259, 266 [108 L.Ed.2d 222, 110 S.Ct. 1056].) Accordingly, a warrant that fails to “particularly” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) describe the evidence sought is unconstitutional. (Groh v. Ramirez (2004) 540 U.S. 551, 557 [157 L.Ed.2d 1068, 124 S.Ct. 1284].)

But, contrary to the superior court’s reading of the warrant, the warrant here was not overbroad. It sought, in whole or in part, 10 specific items or particularly described groups of items related to Harms’s disappearance and Nasmeh’s possible involvement—e.g., a blood sample from Nasmeh, two sofa cushions, or Harms’s credit cards and personal checks. The court’s concerns about “unlimited searches],” “general exploratory searches,” and “wide-ranging exploratory searches” were misplaced, because nothing in the warrant’s language authorized any general search.

B. Search and Seizure of the Material Inside the Vehicle

We now turn to another basis for the superior court’s decision that the search and seizure exceeded the warrant’s scope: the lack of the warrant’s specification that the police were to search for and seize material inside Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee that might, on inspection, be found to constitute trace evidence.

“Whether the description in a warrant of property to be seized is sufficiently definite is a question of law subject to independent review by the appellate court.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,1041 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68]; accord, People v. Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 393 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 9 P.3d 993].) Kraft and Amador apply to the question before us: the general rule that because the superior court’s ruling on the propriety of the search was based on its resolving a mixed question of law and fact that is, however, predominantly legal, we review its determination de novo. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) In other words, we “independently apply constitutional principles to the trial court’s factual findings in determining the legality of the search.” (People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 211].)

Reviewing de novo the superior court’s analysis and ultimate conclusion that the warrant’s description was inadequate, we conclude that the court erred.

When criminal defendants claim that a warrant is too general, they are on firmer constitutional ground than when they claim that an otherwise valid warrant that properly limits the items of property to be searched for and seized is invalid because terminology further defining the nature and quality of the items is insufficiently precise. A general warrant offends the Fourth Amendment in part because it leaves too much “ ‘ “to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” ’ ” (Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. 463, 480.) By contrast, “ “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant” ’ ” (ibid.) when all that may be searched for are components: of validly specified items. The officer’s discretion is confined to the items or their constituent parts, and if an item is the subject of a valid warrant, searching for part of the item does not confer any discretion on the searching officer to search for something beyond the item. We do not believe that searching for part of a properly sought item would offend the Fourth Amendment in most cases. ,

Moreover, even if a search for constituent parts of an item did present Fourth Amendment problems because the warrant did not mention such parts, here the warrant authorized the search and seizure of “any part” of the listed items. The question before us is the adequacy of this particular warrant’s language, which referred to “part[s],” but did not recite a list of such possible further descriptive terms as fractions, pieces, components, particles, elements, flecks, filaments, films, specks, strands, shards, residues, remnants, samples, subsets, trace amounts, or the like.

“[T]he requirement that a search warrant describe its objects with particularity is a standard of ‘practical accuracy’ rather than a hypertechnical one.” (U.S. v. Peters (8th Cir. 1996) 92 F.3d 768, 769-770; accord, People v. Amador, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 393.) The rule against excessive parsing of the language used in a warrant (while retaining the rule that items to be seized be identified in a warrant with constitutionally required specificity, so that the police do not engage in unfettered rummaging through a person’s effects) militates in favor of truthfinding in criminal investigations, a value of significant importance to the public safety and societal order. Nasmeh argues that the warrant’s “‘any part thereof’ ” specification refers only to “any subset of the named items on the list,” e.g., a single credit card or one sofa cushion, rather than a constituent part of a single identified item. This kind of linguistic scrutiny might be warranted in a case construing a contract negotiated and signed by sophisticated parties whose counsel examined the placement of each comma and semicolon and who included language to cover any conceivable eventuality. A warrant’s language involves different considerations and requires less absolute certainty of linguistic meaning. “ ‘[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is “. . . to deter illegal police conduct, not deficient police draftsmanship.” ’ ” (People v. Amador, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 392.) Moreover, the draftsmanship here was not deficient, just not as exhaustive as Nasmeh would prefer.

C. Seizure of the Vehicle

We next turn to whether the seizure of Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee offended the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that it did not.

Notwithstanding the superior court’s ruling that “authority to seize and forensically examine the vehicle was not granted in the warrant,” the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment in seizing Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee. The vehicle could not have been properly searched without being seized, and it would vitiate the state’s power to execute a lawful search if the object of the search could not be seized for a reasonable time to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence pending the search. (See Dixon v. Wallowa County (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 1013, 1018 [“But for the seizure, [a resident] would have successfully removed property from the residence.”]; see also Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 328, 330-333 [148 L.Ed.2d 838, 121 S.Ct. 946] [police could briefly seize residential premises for the time needed to obtain a search warrant].) In sum, a valid warrant to search a vehicle brings with it authorization to seize it for the time reasonably needed to undertake the lawful search.

And contrary to the superior court’s view, taking Nasmeh’s seized vehicle to the crime laboratory to search for and conduct a scientific analysis of trace items did not offend the Fourth Amendment. In People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 [51 Cal.Rptr. 417, 414 P.2d 633], overruled on other grounds in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 540 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580], and People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442 [82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22], our Supreme Court rejected a claim of unlawful search and seizure “predicated on the fact that the automobile was removed from the. scene and the trunk opened and searched subsequently.” (People v. Talbot, supra, at p. 708.) Discovery of blood on the automobile and other circumstances warranted transporting it “for a later, more scientific examination.” (Ibid.)⁴ The Fourth Amendment, for example, does not require the state to have equipment and personnel on hand at, or trundle them to, the shoulder of a busy freeway for a sophisticated search of a vehicle for trace evidence. “[I]f the police have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle.” (California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 570 [114 L.Ed.2d 619, 111 S.Ct. 1982].) The vehicle can be taken to a crime laboratory for the time reasonably needed to undertake and complete the search. (See also United States v. Johns (1985) 469 U.S. 478, 480, 484 [83 L.Ed.2d 890, 105 S.Ct. 881] [regarding warrantless search of packages after they were later, and in a different location, removed from seized vehicles that police had probable cause to believe contained contraband, “officers acted permissibly by waiting until they returned to . . . headquarters before they searched the vehicles and removed their contents,” for “[t]here is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure”].)

D. Time Taken to Complete Execution of the Warrant

The next question that arises is whether the time taken to complete the execution of the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that it did not.

The superior court based its ruling in part on the length of time it took to complete the execution of the search warrant. It ruled that the “warrant does not authorize the police to seize the vehicle for an unspecified and lengthy period of time.” Because this ultimate determination was based on resolving a mixed question of law and fact that is, however, predominantly legal, we review it de novo. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 182; People v. Balint, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205.)

In this, too, the superior court erred. The warrant was dated August 3, 2001. According to Wahl’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the next day, August 4, he searched Nasmeh’s vehicle for obvious and gross evidence that any of the warrant’s listed items were present, and found nothing. Believing that the warrant authorized a search for trace evidence he could not see, Wahl arranged for the vehicle to be delivered to the Santa Clara County crime laboratory, and it arrived there on August 10. Apparently the key to the Jeep could not be located and arrangements had to be made to have the car unlocked by a towing company. Once this was done, a criminalist was able to examine the vehicle, and he processed it on August 14 and 15, 2001. The vehicle was released to a police detective on August 23, and reclaimed on behalf of Nasmeh on August 28. The key to the vehicle was found several years later in Wahl’s police locker; he had misplaced it there and had forgotten to send it along with the vehicle to the crime laboratory.

There was no constitutional violation in this case. As a general proposition, “ ‘[t]he Fourth Amendment does not specify that search warrants contain expiration dates.’ ” (U.S. v. Sims (10th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 945, 955.) “[C]ompleting a search shortly after the expiration of a search warrant”—a time period governed in this state by section 1534—“does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and cannot be the basis for suppressing evidence seized so long as probable cause continues to exist, and the government does not act in bad faith.” (U.S. v. Gerber (11th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 1556, 1560.) On independent review, we find that, in light of the alleged facts surrounding Harms’s disappearance and Officer Wahl’s testimony, probable cause continued to exist when the search of Nasmeh’s vehicle was completed on August 15, 12 days after the warrant issued. And there is no showing of bad faith. Wahl expeditiously executed the warrant by visually searching Nasmeh’s vehicle the day after the warrant issued. To complete the search, the authorities needed to conduct an examination of the vehicle’s interior for evidence not visible to Wahl. Wahl inadvertently misplaced the vehicle’s key, and evidently, rather than simply breaking into Nasmeh’s car and damaging it, the authorities secured the services of a towing company to gain entry to the vehicle’s interior. Despite all of these factors, the search was completely executed 12 days after the warrant issued. Under similar facts, the Gerber court found no constitutional violation. (Id. at p. 1557 [automobile search not completed until next business day following warrant’s expiration; one reason for the delay was that “[r]ather than damaging the car, the agents decided to wait ... to obtain the assistance of an automobile mechanic in opening the hood”]; id. at p. 1561 [reversing order, granting motion to suppress].) The time taken to completely execute the warrant did not result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment.⁵

E. The Warrant Authorized the Searches and Seizures

In sum, the state of the law convinces us that the superior court erred in granting the motion to suppress insofar as it found the warrant incompatible with the searches and seizures performed by the state.

III. Warrantless Search Under the Automobile Exception

The People also assert that the police need not have sought a warrant in the first place if probable cause existed to search the vehicle.

We agree. When the police have probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence they may search the automobile and the containers within it without a warrant. (California v. Acevedo, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 580.) The “ ‘specifically established and well-delineated’ ” (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390 [57 L.Ed.2d 290, 98 S.Ct. 2408])’automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is rooted in the historical distinctions between the search of an automobile or other conveyance and the search of a dwelling. (California v. Acevedo, supra, at p. 569.) In Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 153 [69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280], the Supreme Court recognized “a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”

It is also well established that “ ‘[t]he scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower—and no broader—than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.’ ” (California v. Acevedo, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 570.) “ ‘[I]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ ” (Ibid.) In addition, and as noted, “if the police have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway,- they may conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle.” (Ibid.)

In the case of a warrantless search and seizure, the burden of proof rests on the People to show that the search and seizure were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128, 130 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52].) As a reviewing court, “[w]e exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498].) For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that the search and seizure were reasonable under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. In particular, based on his training and experience, Officer Wahl suspected that valuable trace evidence might be found In Nasmeh’s vehicle. His affidavit averred that he knew that “people who commit murder and transport their victims in their vehicles may, in an attempt to conceal their guilt, try to clean their vehicle in an attempt to conceal or rid the vehicle of incriminating evidence.” That averment, coupled with the mobility of the Jeep Cherokee and the accompanying risk that any trace evidence might be lost, sufficed to make the search and seizure reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if there had been a constitutional ■ problem with the search and seizure under the warrant issued by the magistrate.

As noted, the superior court concluded that delay in returning Nasmeh’s automobile to him made the search and seizure unreasonable. “Instead of conducting either a prompt, on-scene search of the vehicle or a prompt off-scene search at a police station or laboratory facility, the officers seized the vehicle for a search that did not take place until 10 days later. The vehicle was retained by police for 24 days, even though the evidence shows that only one or possibly two days were required to conduct the entire search, and no justification was given for the additional 22 days that defendant was deprived of use and possession of the Jeep. The officers had and took the opportunity to obtain a warrant, and yet, inexplicably they failed to seek a magistrate’s approval for a lengthy, intensive seizure and search of Defendant’s vehicle.”

In fact, however, the length of time during which the police held Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee did not make the search unreasonable. “Not a single published federal case speaks of a ‘temporal limit’ to the automobile exception. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a warrantless search of a car (1) need not occur contemporaneously with the car’s lawful seizure and (2) need not be justified by the existence of exigent circumstances that might have made it impractical to secure a warrant prior to the search. [Citations.] Therefore, the passage of time between the seizure and the search of [a] car is legally irrelevant.” (U.S. v. Gastiaburo (4th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 582, 587.) In Gastiaburo, a warrantless search of an automobile occurred 38 days after its impoundment, when the police received a tip about a secret compartment. The car had earlier been impounded under a forfeiture statute when the defendant was arrested and a search of the car revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia, and money. (Id. at pp. 584-585.) Gastiaburo held that the search was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. (16 F.3d at p. 587.)

There is no claim here, nor was evidence presented below, that Nasmeh requested return of his car or objected to its seizure at any time. Nasmeh emphasizes that the superior court made a factual finding that the prosecution’s evidence failed to explain or justify the duration of the seizure of the Jeep. But the findings of fact made by the court concern the specific dates on which certain events occurred as well as what actually happened. We review these findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.) Whether in fact the search and seizure themselves were reasonable under the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment is a question of law on which we exercise independent review. (People v. Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)

The duration of the search was reasonable. The police were investigating Harms’s disappearance. It was possible that she had been kidnapped or murdered. There was little or no direct evidence and apparently there were no eyewitnesses. The evidence technician testified that the key to the seized vehicle was missing and he could not gain immediate access to it. Moreover, the police held the vehicle for almost two weeks after completing their search, and Nasmeh does not allege in his return when he first sought the vehicle’s return, if he did at all; rather, in his argument accompanying his return, he states that the questions of “what prompted the release of the Jeep or . . . whether or when [Nasmeh] sought to regain possession of his vehicle” were not addressed in the proceedings before the superior court. The record does not give us the impression that Nasmeh needed to regain possession of his vehicle with any urgency. In light of the serious nature of the possible crimes and the complexity of the investigation, we cannot agree with the superior court’s legal conclusion that the police held Nasmeh’s vehicle for too long.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its order granting Nasmeh’s motion to suppress evidence purportedly taken from his Jeep Cherokee and to enter a new order denying the motion. In the interests of justice, this opinion is made final immediately on filing with regard to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).) This court’s order of April 13, 2006, temporarily staying the trial proceedings, is vacated.

Bamattre-ManouMan, Acting P. J., concurred.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 At Nasmeh’s request, we strike the petition’s exhibit R because it was not considered by the superior court.

3 The People point out that Nasmeh’s motion is entitled “Superseding notice of motion and motion to suppress evidence . . .” because Nasmeh’s initial filing was rejected for failure to comply with local rules of court.

4 Instructive on this point is State v. Petrone (1991) 161 Wis.2d 530 [468 N.W.2d 676], overruled on another ground in State v. Greve (2004) 272 Wis.2d 444, 465, fn. 7 [681 N.W.2d 479], In Petrone, the defendant asserted that even if a warrant included rolls of undeveloped film, “developing the film later at the police station was a second, separate search for which a warrant should have been obtained.” (468 N.W.2d at p. 681.) Petrone rejected the claim, stating: “A search warrant does not limit officers to naked-eye inspections of objects lawfully seized in the execution of a warrant. fi[] Developing the film is simply a method of examining a lawfully seized object. Law enforcement officers may employ various methods to examine objects lawfully seized in the execution of a warrant. For example, blood stains or substances gathered in a lawful search may be subjected to laboratory analysis. [Citation.] The defendant surely could not have objected had the deputies used a magnifying glass to examine lawfully seized documents or had enlarged a lawfully seized photograph in order to examine the photograph in greater detail. Developing the film made the information on the film accessible, just as laboratory tests expose what is already present in a substance but not visible with the naked eye. Developing the film did not constitute, as the defendant asserts, a separate, subsequent unauthorized search having an intrusive impact on the defendant’s rights wholly independent of the execution of the search warrant. The deputies simply used technological aids to assist them in determining whether items within the scope of the warrant were in fact evidence of the crime alleged. Because the undeveloped film was lawfully seized pursuant to the warrant, the deputies were justified in developing and viewing the film.” (Id. at p. 681, fn. omitted.)

Similarly, the police here were entitled to use technology to determine the evidentiary value of trace materials possibly coming from an item listed in the warrant and puiportedly found in Nasmeh’s car. “The seizure of [listed items] is within the plain language of the warrant; their recovery, after attempted destruction, is no different than decoding a coded message lawfully seized or pasting together scraps of a tom-up ransom note. [Citations.] The ... warrant did not prescribe methods of recovery or tests to be performed, but warrants rarely do so. The warrant process is primarily concerned with identifying what may be searched or seized—not how—and whether there is sufficient cause for the invasion of privacy thus entailed.” (U.S. v. Upham (1st Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 532, 537.)

5 The warrant specified that the searches it authorized were to occur “in the daytime,” ,but did not set a time limit for executing the searches. Section 1534, however, requires that a search warrant be executed and returned within 10 days after its issuance date. It also provides, without again mentioning return, that “[a]fter the expiration of 10 days, the warrant, unless executed, is void.”

Nasmeh does not invoke section 1534 in this court, nor does he state in his return that he did so in the superior court. Accordingly, we need not discuss the implications of the statutory requirements set forth in section 1534.