Hecke v. Federal Insurance Co. CA6 ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 12/14/20 Hecke v. Federal Insurance Co. CA6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LEO HECKE,                                                          H046369
    (Santa Clara County
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. 17CV315410)
    v.
    FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Appellant Leo Hecke obtained a $21,750 judgment in a breach of contract and
    fraud action against Mall Teen Cards, LLC (MTC), which had been insured by
    respondent Federal Insurance Company (Federal). After Federal refused to pay the
    judgment, Hecke filed this action against Federal. The trial court granted Federal’s
    summary judgment motion and dismissed Hecke’s action.
    On appeal, Hecke contends that he was entitled to recover from Federal because
    he was a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract, the claim was a covered claim,
    and Federal’s exhaustion of the policy limits by paying the remaining limits to the
    insureds was illegal. We reject his claim that he was a third party beneficiary. As he
    therefore lacked a legal basis for a direct action against Federal, we affirm the judgment.
    I.       UNDISPUTED FACTS
    Federal issued a directors and officers policy to MTC and Michael Ferguson as
    MTC’s managing member. This policy, which covered a period from January 2013 to
    March 2014, provided $1 million in coverage for MTC and an additional $500,000 in
    coverage for executives. This policy provided that defense costs, including attorney’s
    1
    fees and expenses for investigation and defense of any claim, reduced the policy limits.
    The policy excluded claims for bodily injury or property damage. It also excluded claims
    “based upon” “any deliberately fraudulent act” and contract claims against MTC. The
    policy provided that Federal’s obligation to defend ceased upon exhaustion of the policy
    limits.
    In January 2014, Hecke filed an action against Ferguson, MTC, and others for
    fraud and breach of contract. Neither the original complaint nor the July 2015 amended
    complaint made any mention of negligence; both alleged breach of contract and
    intentional fraud. Hecke did not allege that he had suffered any bodily injury or property
    damage.
    Ferguson and MTC were defendants in multiple civil actions, and Ferguson was
    the defendant in a criminal action. By December 2015, Federal had reimbursed defense
    costs of $740,944.93 and funded $140,000 in settlements in these actions. These outlays
    had substantially reduced the $1 million policy limit, but the $500,000 policy limit
    remained unimpaired.
    In December 2015, Federal entered into a settlement agreement with MTC and
    Ferguson under which Federal agreed to pay $619,055.77, the remaining policy limits, to
    MTC in return for a release of all claims that Ferguson and MTC might have against the
    policy. Federal, MTC, and Ferguson agreed that “the Policy shall be deemed fully
    exhausted and null and void and of no force or effect whatsoever.” The settlement
    1
    The policy provided: “THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY TO PAY DAMAGES OR
    SETTLEMENTS WILL BE REDUCED AND MAY BE EXHAUSTED BY ‘DEFENSE
    COSTS’, AND ‘DEFENSE COSTS’ WILL BE APPLIED AGAINST THE
    RETENTION. IN NO EVENT WILL THE COMPANY BE LIABLE FOR ‘DEFENSE
    COSTS’ OR THE AMOUNT OF ANY JUDGMENT OR SETTLEMENT IN EXCESS
    OF THE APPLICABLE LIMIT OF LIABILITY.”
    2
    agreement, which was executed by Ferguson both as an individual and as managing
    partner of MTC, expressly provided that Ferguson had “no personal interest” in the
    proceeds of the policy. In January 2016, Ferguson paid $500,000 in restitution in his
    criminal case. Ferguson’s criminal attorney understood that “the source of the funds”
    used to pay Ferguson’s criminal restitution “was from CHUBB Insurance Company.”
    Federal is part of Chubb.
    Hecke’s action against MTC and Ferguson was tried in December 2016.
    No defendants appeared at the trial, and the trial court entered judgment for Hecke
    against MTC for $21,750 on Hecke’s fraud and breach of contract claims. In May 2017,
    Hecke demanded that Federal pay this judgment or he would “file suit under Insurance
    Code Section 11580.” Federal refused to pay the judgment because the policy limits had
    been exhausted and Hecke’s action did not allege any covered claims.
    II.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In September 2017, Hecke filed this action against Federal seeking to recover
    damages from Federal based on Federal’s failure to pay the judgment against MTC.
    His three-page complaint alleged that Federal had insured MTC, that Hecke had obtained
    a judgment against MTC, and that Federal had refused Hecke’s demand that Federal pay
    the judgment. Hecke alleged that he had been damaged by Federal’s refusal to pay the
    judgment, and he asserted that the policy “is deemed by law” to entitle him to bring an
    action against Federal to recover on the judgment against MTC. He asserted that Federal
    had breached its insurance contract and that Federal had a contractual obligation to pay
    the judgment.
    Federal moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the policy had been
    “exhausted,” (2) Hecke lacked the authority to bring this action because Insurance Code
    section 11580 did not apply, (3) Hecke could not show that the underlying judgment was
    a covered loss under the policy, and (4) Hecke lacked standing to bring an action against
    Federal because Federal owed no contractual or tort duty to Hecke.
    3
    Hecke responded that (1) the policy limits had not been exhausted because Federal
    had illegally paid Ferguson’s criminal restitution, (2) although Insurance Code
    section 11580 was inapplicable, Hecke was a third party beneficiary of the policy and
    therefore could sue Federal, and (3) the judgment was a covered loss because the trial
    court in the underlying case made no findings that precluded coverage. Although Hecke
    did not dispute that the underlying complaint alleged only fraud and breach of contract,
    he contended that he could have amended that complaint to allege a covered cause of
    action. He disputed that the policy limits were exhausted because he claimed that the
    payment by Federal under the settlement agreement was an illegal payment to fund
    criminal restitution.
    The court granted Federal’s summary judgment motion. It concluded that Federal
    had established that Hecke could not proceed under Insurance Code section 11580
    2
    because Hecke’s judgment was based solely on “economic losses.” The court further
    3
    found that Hecke had not even alleged a basis for third-party beneficiary standing.
    The court found that Federal had shown that the policy did not cover Hecke’s claims.
    In addition, the court found that Federal had established that the policy was fully
    exhausted before Hecke demanded payment of his judgment. The court entered a
    judgment of dismissal, and Hecke timely filed a notice of appeal.
    2
    Hecke had conceded this point in his opposition to Federal’s motion.
    3
    Because the hearing on the summary judgment motion was not reported, Hecke
    filed a request for a settled statement with a proposed settled statement concerning what
    had occurred at that hearing. Federal filed no response, and the trial court then certified
    the proposed settled statement. The settled statement asserted that Federal’s trial counsel
    had conceded at the hearing that Hecke was a third party beneficiary of the policy. We
    view this alleged concession as immaterial. The policy language stands for itself, and
    Federal’s pleadings below asserted that Hecke was not a third party beneficiary.
    4
    III.   DISCUSSION
    Hecke contends that (1) he was a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract,
    (2) the judgment he obtained against MTC was for a covered loss, and (3) Federal could
    not have lawfully exhausted the policy limits because it permitted Ferguson to use the
    policy proceeds to pay his criminal restitution.
    Although Hecke’s complaint against Federal was based on Insurance Code
    section 11580, he concedes that that statute was inapplicable. Insurance Code
    section 11580, which permits a judgment creditor to bring a direct action against an
    insurer in certain circumstances, is limited to claims for bodily injury or property damage
    and applies only to insurance policies covering personal injury and property damage.
    (Ins. Code, § 11580.) Federal’s policy excluded bodily injury and property damage, and
    Hecke’s judgment was not based on any bodily injury or property damage.
    Hecke nevertheless claims that Federal was not entitled to summary judgment
    because Hecke “was an intended third party beneficiary under the policy upon obtaining
    a final judgment.” He fails to cite any authority that supports his argument.
    Hecke cites Civil Code section 1559, which provides: “A contract, made
    expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the
    parties thereto rescind it.” Nothing in this statute tells us whether the insurance contract
    was expressly intended to benefit Hecke.
    The only case he cites, Harper v. Wausau Ins. Co. (1997) 
    56 Cal. App. 4th 1079
    (Harper), is readily distinguishable. In Harper, the plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall
    on the insured’s property. (Id. at p. 1083.) Her action against the insured, which the
    insurer defended under the liability coverage in the policy, resulted in a defense verdict.
    She then sought payment from the insurer under the “medical expenses” coverage in the
    insured’s policy, alleging in her complaint against the insurer that she was a third party
    beneficiary of the insurance contract. (Ibid.) The insurance policy expressly stated that
    the insurer would pay “medical expenses” incurred by an “injured person” regardless of
    5
    fault. (Id. at pp. 1088-1089.) The trial court granted the insurer summary judgment after
    the insurer argued that the plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract and was not
    a third party beneficiary. (Id. at p. 1083.)
    The Court of Appeal reversed. It reasoned: “There are several exceptions to the
    general rule which prohibits a third party claimant from suing an insurer. For example,
    once a party has a final judgment against the insured, the claimant becomes a third party
    beneficiary of the insurance policy and may enforce the terms which flow to its benefit
    pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580. [Citations.] Further, a claimant may sue the
    insurer as a third party beneficiary utilizing traditional contract principles. Under
    California law third party beneficiaries of contracts have the right to enforce the terms of
    the contract under Civil Code section 1559 which provides: ‘A contract, made expressly
    for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties
    thereto rescind it.’ Traditional third party beneficiary principles do not require that the
    person to be benefited be named in the contract.” 
    (Harper, supra
    , 56 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 1086, fn. omitted.)
    The Harper court examined the language of the particular insurance contract at
    issue and found that “the medical coverage provisions [of the policy] provide direct
    obligations on the part of the insurer to the intended beneficiaries.” 
    (Harper, supra
    , 56
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1089, italics added.) “The express language of ‘Coverage C’ plainly
    indicates it is meant to directly confer a benefit upon third parties who are injured on the
    owner’s property. The payment is premised on the happening of the event and
    is not premised on fault. Thus, the insurer undertook a separate and direct obligation to
    pay to [sic] the medical expenses of any persons injured on the owner’s property
    regardless of its insured’s negligence. Accordingly, the payments were plainly intended
    to directly benefit plaintiff and were not incidental or remote.” (Id. at p. 1090.)
    The Harper court’s third party beneficiary analysis turned on specific language in
    the insurance contract expressly demonstrating the intent to directly benefit those injured
    6
    on the insured’s property. Hecke did not allege in his complaint or identify in his
    opposition to Federal’s summary judgment motion any language in the insurance
    agreement between Federal and MTC expressly evidencing an intent to directly benefit
    Federal’s insured’s judgment creditors. On appeal, Hecke rests his entire argument on
    the insurance contract’s provisions concerning losses incurred by its insured. Those
    provisions provide no support for his assertion that he was a third party beneficiary of the
    insurance contract because they do not demonstrate an intent to directly benefit those
    injured by Federal’s insured’s conduct, rather than to benefit Federal’s insured. As the
    trial court cogently pointed out, “[p]laintiff points to no language in the Policy which
    otherwise supports his contention that he was intended to be a third-party beneficiary to
    it.” Hecke has failed to meet his appellate burden of demonstrating that the trial court
    4
    erred in granting Federal’s summary judgment motion.
    IV.    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    4
    Since Hecke lacked any legal basis for a direct action against Federal, we need
    not address whether he established that his judgment was for a covered claim or whether
    Federal lawfully exhausted the policy limits by entering into the settlement agreement
    with MTC and Ferguson.
    7
    _______________________________
    ELIA, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _____________________________
    PREMO, Acting P.J.
    _____________________________
    BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
    Hecke v. Federal Insurance Company
    H046369
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H046369

Filed Date: 12/14/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2020